A Steady Drip of Israeli Casualties Could Change the Public's View on War in Lebanon -
Contrary to the impression imparted by some reports in the Israeli media, the air force's attack in Iran Saturday is not, in fact, the end of the story. It merely put the dilemma in Tehran's court: Should it respond and if so, when and how forcefully?
The initial statements coming from Iran seem to indicate an intent to strike back at Israel. If so, the Iranians will have to decide whether the strike should be of limited intensity, out of a desire to end the conflict, and whether it should take place before the November 5 U.S. presidential election.
Understanding that Iran will presumably respond, Israel's military, both defensive and offensive, has remained on alert. American forces in the region, including a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, anti-missile battery deployed in Israel and other units and weapons systems, also remain on high alert.
Maj. Gen. (res.) Tamir Hayman, head of the Institute for National Security Studies, said on Haaretz's Hebrew-language podcast on Sunday that the statements coming from Iranian officials are meant to give the country's supreme leader "maximal flexibility" in making his decision. Ambiguity, the former director of Military Intelligence explained, keeps Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's options open.
Among the considerations that will shape Iran's retaliation, he added, the regime's perception of the domestic front – that is, the Iranian public – will play a significant role. Iranians are upset over their economic problems and the suppression of freedom of _expression_, yet so far they have seen Iran as a strong state that has successfully defended itself against its enemies.
But Israel's missile strike Saturday, the first Iran has suffered since its war with Iraq ended in the late 1980s, undermines Iranians' sense of security. Consequently, it could push Khamenei to decide on a retaliation of yet-unknown proportions.
A billboard shows pictures of Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Iranian Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Major General Mohammad Bagheri and U.S. President Joe Biden and Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in Tehran, October 27.Credit: Majid Asgaripour/Reuters
Israel's defense establishment is still trying to assess how much damage the attack caused Iran. So far, its assessment is positive.
The air force, relying on precise intelligence and careful planning, apparently managed to severely damage Iran's strategic surface-to-air missile deployment, shut down detection systems in western Iran and disrupt missile and drone production for many months. Among other things, the destruction of 12 planetary mixers – components that are critical to the production of solid fuel for ballistic missiles – has been reported.
Nevertheless, there's a possibility that Russia will soon decide to supply Iran with a more advanced anti-aircraft system, the S-400, in part to try to correct the impression that Russian-made air defense systems proved inferior to the Western planes Israel uses.
As was true in earlier stages of the war, the two branches of the Israel Defense Forces most denigrated during the protests against the judicial overhaul and in the immediate aftermath of Hamas' attack on October 7, 2023 – the Israel Air Force and Military Intelligence – were the ones behind this exceptional operational success, the first of its kind. The pilots, who were called a dangerous gang of leftists, and their commanders, who were accused of excessive leniency toward them, have once again made an unassailable contribution to the country's defense.
Just as their civic commitment thwarted the government's plans for a putsch against democracy last year, they are helping to defend the country again now. It's worth remembering that during the conflict over the judicial overhaul, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu responded to reservist pilots' threats to stop volunteering for duty by saying it would be better to do without two squadrons of fighter planes than to retreat from the overhaul.
In this photo provided by the Israeli army, armed Israeli Air Force planes depart from an unknown location to attack Iran, Saturday, Oct. 26, 2024.Credit: Israeli Army via AP
Critical time for decisions
This October, which hasn't yet ended, has been the worst month for Israeli losses since the year began. On Sunday, the army lifted a gag order on the news that five reservists were killed in combat in southern Lebanon Saturday afternoon. Another 14 were wounded, including five in serious condition. The dead and wounded came from the Northern Command's 228th Infantry Brigade (Alon), comprised of veterans of the Nahal Brigade.
In the previous two days, 10 reservists were killed in two other incidents in southern Lebanon. And on Sunday, a civilian was killed in what appears to have been a car-ramming terror attack near the Glilot military bases. Thirty-two people were wounded, including several who were seriously hurt.
The government is portraying the string of recent military success in the Gaza Strip, Iran and Lebanon as proof that its strategy has been right and that the war must continue on every front. But in reality, it's impossible to ignore the price that continuing the war for much longer would entail.
The greatest danger lies in Lebanon, a theater where the IDF's operation is actually producing good results. Hezbollah is already recovering to some degree, having appointed new commanders to replace the many who have been killed in Israeli attacks.
This may well produce a steady drip of casualties that could gradually change the public's view of the need to continue the war. In quite a few cases in the past – the first Lebanon War of 1982, Israel's presence in the security zone in southern Lebanon for the next 18 years and the unilateral pullout from Gaza in 2005 – a mounting death toll created pressure on governments (even right-wing ones) and led them to change their policies, including by agreeing to withdrawals.
Iran and its proxies can wage a war of attrition against Israel that would also include ongoing harassment of the home front in the country's north and center. Although Netanyahu has shored up his government's political stability by adding Gideon Sa'arand his party's three lawmakers to the governing coalition, this stability will ultimately be tested by the continuation of the war and the mounting casualties.
Israeli security personnel work on site of a house damaged after a barrage of rockets was fired from Lebanon into Israel in Tamra, northern Israel October 27, 2024.Credit: Gonzalo Fuentes/Reuters
In the background is the growing public anger over the inequality in the burden of service. Netanyahu, under pressure from his ultra-Orthodox coalition partners and the threat of the Supreme Court, is insisting on passing a scandalous draft-dodging lawthat would give Haredi men a blanket exemption from military service.
But the rise in the number of people being killed in the war and the fact that the burden of reserve service and sacrifice falls on a fairly narrow slice of the population will intensify the political crisis. This could make it hard for him to continue conducting the war as he wishes.
The dispute over continuing the war divides along the fault line between the right and the center-left. But it could also be described as an argument between optimists and pessimists.
Netanyahu and his supporters see an opportunity to create deeper changes in the Middle East. After the blows suffered by Hezbollah and Hamas and the recent strike on Iran, they think it's possible to continue weakening the region's radical Shi'ite axis, to the point of attacking Iran's nuclear program and even (as Netanyahu himself recently said) spurring the Iranian people to oust the regime.
In contrast, advocates of ending the war fear that Israel is increasingly getting bogged down, and on too many fronts. They believe that most of what could be achieved has already been achieved and that taking further risks could prove to be an excessively costly gamble.
Evidence of this tension can be seen in Sunday's memorial ceremony for last October's massacre. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, the sober wing of this far-right government and the only minister whose performance wins a positive approval rating from voters in the polls, said in his speech at the ceremony that "Hamas and Hezbollah no longer constitute effective Iranian tools.
People take cover as sirens sound in Nahariya, Israel October 27, 2024.Credit: Gonzalo Fuentes/Reuters
"These important achievements create a change in the balance of power... But not every goal can be achieved by military action alone," he continued. "Force isn't the be-all and end-all. In fulfilling our moral obligation to bring the hostages home, we will have to make painful compromises."
Netanyahu, in contrast, promised in his speech to continue "working with maximum momentum until our victory is complete."
When he got up to speak, he was interrupted by catcalls from some bereaved families. This hostility, which is also reflected in the general public, is related to the continuation of the war, his determination to thwart a state commission of inquiry into his failures and his stubborn refusal to sign a deal for the hostages' return.
Negotiations with the hostage mediators resumed in Qatar on Sunday. A Saudi television station quoted senior Hamas officials as saying they had proposed releasing all the hostages in exchange for a massive release of Palestinian prisoners and a full Israeli retreat from every inch of Gaza.
This is a critical moment of decision, and not just on the hostage issue. Hayman said that "within eight days," we would know whether Israel is sinking into the Lebanese quagmire for the third time or reducing its military presence there and seeking a diplomatic agreement to end the war with Hezbollah.
But Netanyahu evidently isn't in any hurry to get anywhere. He prefers to wait for the outcome of next week's U.S. presidential election before embarking on any significant diplomatic move. And even before then, we could face another attack by Iran.