The realpolitik binding Israel’s hand
Netanyahu’s strikes on Iran were a breach of the IDF’s usual strategic calculus.
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) are widely seen by friend and foe alike as among the world’s most powerful military machines. Yet Israel’s leaders habitually present their country as besieged by hostile nations bent on its destruction. This narrative persists even though some of the most important states in the Middle East – Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan – scarcely fit this description anymore and, moreover, are aligned with the United States, Israel’s principal protector. It is this conception of Israel’s predicament that has led its leaders to favour a particular formula for deterring adversaries: when hit, hit back rapidly and much harder.
So, when some 100 Israeli warplanes and drones hit sites in Iran – as well as Iraq and Syria – on 26 October, no one could rightly have been surprised. It was always a question of when Israel would strike – not if. Yet Israel’s response didn’t conform to its typical hit-back-quickly-and-harder logic. For a start, Israel uncharacteristically delayed for nearly a month: Iran had fired a barrage of missiles at Israel on 1 October following the killing of Hezbollah’s leader Hassan Nasrallah. Perhaps Israel’s war cabinet was divided about which Iranian targets to strike. Perhaps the United States needed more time than it anticipated to persuade Israeli not to hit Iran’s nuclear and energy infrastructure. No matter: the delay was surprising.
So was the scope of Israel’s retaliation. It avoided striking Iran’s nuclear sites and energy infrastructure and confined itself to missile production factories, air defence systems, radars, and military bases – some 20 sites in all, according to the IDF – encompassing Tehran, Ilam, and Khuzestan. It was a far cry from some of the apocalyptic scenarios feared by pundits. Any attack on Iran’s uranium enrichment centres and parts of its energy complex would necessarily have increased the probability of a further exchange, and an ever-growing cycle of escalation.
Again: it’s possible that the United States used its leverage as Israel’s indispensable source of arms and economic assistance to convince Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant to settle for a measured attack; or that Israel itself wanted to avoid a protracted tit-for-tat. But by opting for prudence, Israel has departed from its standard playbook. According to Axios reporter Barak Ravid, Israel’s government even alerted Iran a day before the attack and warned it not to retaliate. And the restraint displeased politicians on the far right, including the Minister of National Security, Itamar Ben-Gvir, as well as the centrist opposition leader Yair Lapid.
Israel also had economic reasons for modulating its attack. Strikes on Iran’s oil infrastructure would have rattled the oil market, causing a spike in prices – something that would not have sat well with the American government just days before its election, or with Israel’s other Western supporters. Iran accounts for only around 4 per cent of global oil production and sends almost of its oil exports to China. But that’s beside the point: markets badly react to turmoil and uncertainty; the oil market is no exception.
More importantly, about a quarter of the world’s maritime oil trade passes through the Straits of Hormuz, hugging the underbelly of Iran. Insurance policies typically do not cover wartime damages and losses, and had Iran merely warned that tankers would be plying that waterway at their own risk, shipping companies would have forbidden their captains from sailing through it. And Israel itself is highly sensitive to higher energy prices. It already imports almost all the oil it consumes, and its economy is under severe stress from the mounting costs of the wars in Gaza and Lebanon (monthly military costs had ballooned from $1.8 billion before the Gaza war to $4.7 billion by the end of last year, and have doubtless increased further since then).
If Israel had good reasons to avoid escalation, so did Iran. The Iranian leadership knows that Prime Minister Netanyahu has long wanted to bring down the Islamic Republic, which he considers Israel’s most dangerous foe, and that Iran cannot rule out the possibility that the United States might be pulled into a war between it and Israel. Despite its often-heated rhetoric, the Iranian leadership is not irrational and, above all, values the preservation of its state. During spats with Israel and the United States, it has therefore exercised what’s known as “strategic patience”, and did so again after the weekend’s strikes. Supreme Leader Khamenei carefully stated that the attack should not be “exaggerated or downplayed”, while Iran’s military all but brushed off its impact, citing “limited damage” and touting the performance of Iranian air defense batteries.
A massive, lengthy confrontation between Israel and Iran seems to have been averted for the simple reason that both parties have compelling reasons to avoid one. Still, Israel’s strikes on Iran have increased its isolation in its own neighbourhood. Major Arab countries have criticised its attack, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, all closely tied to the United States and none of them at present sworn enemies of Israel. It is possible to read their condemnations as calculated posturing. But it nevertheless attests to the antipathy toward Israel on the Arab “street” in the wake of its war in Gaza – and rulers’ sensitivity to that sentiment. As Israel’s dual war against Hamas and Hezbollah only looks to continue, that antipathy will only increase. And should other Arab nations voice stronger support for the Palestinians’ cause in response, the tension between Israel and Iran of the past few months may be remembered as little more than a sideshow in what is a regional conflict with no end in sight.