Contemplating naval combat in the Western Pacific 80 years after the largest sea battle in historyThe Battle of Leyte Gulf holds important lessons for a hypothetical China-U.S. naval clash—and Chinese strategists know it.The following was originally published on October 24, 2024 in The Diplomat. Many experts have probed the causes of the current South China Sea dispute, with explanations varying from national pride and natural resources to vital maritime trade routes and even to nuclear strategy. Yet the rich historical background of naval combat in the waters of the Philippines is too often neglected. This October, Americans are proudly celebrating the 80th anniversary of the stunning triumph of U.S. sailors and the maritime service in history’s largest ever naval battle: the Battle of Leyte Gulf. Today, American strategists are once again focused on the prospect of large-scale naval combat in the western Pacific. The prospect of a naval war with China, a country that now possesses an estimated 230 times the shipbuilding capacity of the United States, is daunting. In this article, I not only explore the epic collision of two massive armadas and related strategic lessons from the Battle of Leyte Gulf, but also use unique Chinese military documents to discuss how contemporary Chinese strategists are similarly studying this classic naval clash of arms. In the Pacific theater of World War II, the “miracle” at Midway in mid-1942 had given way to the bloody attritional battles of Guadalcanal and Tarawa in 1943. Americans gained many lessons in these initial campaigns, including the crucial role of logistics and the need to rotate personnel frequently given the intensity of combat. In mid-1944, the United States pierced Japan’s final defense line with its invasion of Saipan, near present-day Guam. At that point, the two main leaders of the U.S. war effort in the Pacific, Admiral Chester Nimitz and General Douglas MacArthur, came to an understanding that the Philippines needed to be liberated before the U.S. could make a final assault on Japan proper. Military leaders in Tokyo saw a final opportunity to halt the American onslaught by inflicting a major defeat on the U.S. Navy in the vicinity of the Philippines. The elaborate plan involved throwing all of Japan’s major naval assets, including its vaunted super-battleships and the last of its carriers, into this last desperate fight and dividing its fleet in order to lure the Americans into a trap. This trap involved using the remaining Japanese aircraft carriers approaching from the north as bait to lure the main forces of the American fleet away from the landing zone off the island of Leyte—thus allowing Japan’s two other surface squadrons approaching from the west and south to pounce. The U.S. Navy skillfully succeeded in unhinging this elaborate Japanese plan through careful reconnaissance that revealed Japan’s disparate forces, as well as with aggressive attacks by American submarines, PT boats, destroyers, and especially its overwhelming airpower. Despite these successful initial actions for the American side, the “fog of war” nevertheless did prompt U.S. Admiral William Halsey to partially take the bait, rushing Task Force 34 north to attack Japan’s carrier force. This decision momentarily put the U.S. landing force off Leyte in grave jeopardy. A number of U.S. warships, including some escort-type aircraft carriers, were sunk by a still powerful Japanese surface action group that managed to penetrate into Leyte Gulf. Distraught by the momentary success of the Japanese fleet, Nimitz sent Halsey one of the most famous messages in U.S. naval history: “Where is Task Force 34 … The world wonders.” Only the incredible heroics of American destroyers USS Samuel B. Roberts and USS Johnston among other forces in this grouping succeeded in preventing a significant U.S. disaster. Their aggressive tactics and self-sacrifice convinced Japanese Admiral Takeo Kurita to back off and retreat at the most critical moment. That fateful decision by Kurita allowed the Americans to claim a lopsided victory, sinking 28 Japanese ships to just 12 American losses that also tended to be smaller ships. This major victory, albeit a closer shave than U.S. Navy leaders might have hoped for, cemented the inevitability of Japan’s defeat less than a year later. Early in 2024, the Chinese military newspaper Guofang Bao published a “Battle Case Review” of the epic naval engagement described above. The People’s Liberation Army Navy had written a similar study of the Battle of Leyte Gulf in its official monthly magazine, Dangdai Haijun, in late 2023. For a growing naval force that is lacking, to a large extent, the experience of large-scale naval warfare, such historical studies are of substantial importance. Perhaps bearing a prospective campaign for Taiwan in mind, the analysis initially focused on the Americans’ successful amphibious landing, noting that U.S. ground forces were able to “land smoothly … [due to the] large-scale bombing … that completely eliminated the [Japanese] air threat.” The analysis emphasized the U.S. ability to “carry out high-density, uninterrupted, multi-firepower saturation attacks on the same important enemy targets from different directions.” Similarly, Chinese strategists examining the Battle of Leyte Gulf emphasized the importance of “gathering multi-domain superior combat forces [in order to] … annihilate the enemy in waves.” Furthermore, such multi-domain forces should bring about a “situation of dispersing and preserving strength and a timely gathering of superiority.” This Chinese analysis made the important observation that asymmetric warfare applies to strong powers as well as weak ones. It recommended that Chinese strategists “actively seek asymmetric combat advantages over the enemy …using fast to defeat slow… [and] more to defeat fewer.” Finally, this Chinese military assessment was sharply critical of Japanese Admiral Kurita’s hesitation in the final phase of the battle. The article concluded with the observation that “the biggest mistake in deploying troops is hesitation.” The article argued that Chinese military leaders must, despite “intensified fog on the battlefield,” be “decisive… seize the opportunity, and win the victory.” For the United States, there are also lessons to be drawn. In the early stages of the war, the Imperial Japanese Navy was significantly underestimated by U.S. military planners. Such biased appraisals partially explain the initial setbacks for the United States in the Pacific War. In evaluating China’s intensive naval buildup, then, U.S. leaders should avoid hubris and overconfidence. In fact, the PLAN is already ahead in certain key domains of naval warfare, including with respect to hypersonic missile development and deployment. As noted above, moreover, the stark asymmetry favoring China in terms of shipyard capabilities could benefit Beijing’s fleet and related military ambitions before, during, and after a naval war. Only the incredible heroics of American destroyers USS Samuel B. Roberts and USS Johnston among other forces in this grouping succeeded in preventing a significant U.S. disaster. Their aggressive tactics and self-sacrifice convinced Japanese Admiral Takeo Kurita to back off and retreat at the most critical moment. That fateful decision by Kurita allowed the Americans to claim a lopsided victory, sinking 28 Japanese ships to just 12 American losses that also tended to be smaller ships. This major victory, albeit a closer shave than U.S. Navy leaders might have hoped for, cemented the inevitability of Japan’s defeat less than a year later. Early in 2024, the Chinese military newspaper Guofang Bao published a “Battle Case Review” of the epic naval engagement described above. The People’s Liberation Army Navy had written a similar study of the Battle of Leyte Gulf in its official monthly magazine, Dangdai Haijun, in late 2023. For a growing naval force that is lacking, to a large extent, the experience of large-scale naval warfare, such historical studies are of substantial importance. Perhaps bearing a prospective campaign for Taiwan in mind, the analysis initially focused on the Americans’ successful amphibious landing, noting that U.S. ground forces were able to “land smoothly … [due to the] large-scale bombing … that completely eliminated the [Japanese] air threat.” The analysis emphasized the U.S. ability to “carry out high-density, uninterrupted, multi-firepower saturation attacks on the same important enemy targets from different directions.” Similarly, Chinese strategists examining the Battle of Leyte Gulf emphasized the importance of “gathering multi-domain superior combat forces [in order to] … annihilate the enemy in waves.” Furthermore, such multi-domain forces should bring about a “situation of dispersing and preserving strength and a timely gathering of superiority.” This Chinese analysis made the important observation that asymmetric warfare applies to strong powers as well as weak ones. It recommended that Chinese strategists “actively seek asymmetric combat advantages over the enemy …using fast to defeat slow… [and] more to defeat fewer.” Finally, this Chinese military assessment was sharply critical of Japanese Admiral Kurita’s hesitation in the final phase of the battle. The article concluded with the observation that “the biggest mistake in deploying troops is hesitation.” The article argued that Chinese military leaders must, despite “intensified fog on the battlefield,” be “decisive… seize the opportunity, and win the victory.” For the United States, there are also lessons to be drawn. In the early stages of the war, the Imperial Japanese Navy was significantly underestimated by U.S. military planners. Such biased appraisals partially explain the initial setbacks for the United States in the Pacific War. In evaluating China’s intensive naval buildup, then, U.S. leaders should avoid hubris and overconfidence. In fact, the PLAN is already ahead in certain key domains of naval warfare, including with respect to hypersonic missile development and deployment. As noted above, moreover, the stark asymmetry favoring China in terms of shipyard capabilities could benefit Beijing’s fleet and related military ambitions before, during, and after a naval war. |