10. The White Man's Burdens

1.

Rudyard Kipling knew the United States well. He married an American, Caroline Balestier, a month after the death of her brother Wolcott, a close friend of Kipling's. In 1892 the young couple—Kipling was only twenty-six, but already famous—settled in Brattleboro, Vermont, where off and on they lived for four years. He was not an admirer of the country of his chosen residence. In an earlier visit in 1889 he had disparaged America's aggressive capitalism. Now he found Americans lawless and greedy, eaten by "moral dry rot" and polluted by "barbarism" amid the material wealth of telephones, electric lights, railroads, and "suffrage."

Kipling made his first trip to Washington in 1895. True to form, he lambasted the Cleveland administration as "a colossal agglomeration of reeking bounders." Despite his undisguised hostility, the celebrated author of *Plain Tales from the Hills*, *Barrack-Room Ballads*, and *The Jungle Book* did not escape the admiring attention of the small segment of Washington society that took books seriously. Henry Adams swept him into his salon, where he met Hay and Roosevelt. Perhaps to counter Kipling's pugnacious anti-Americanism, Hay treated him to the standard American opinion of an Englishman: "When a man comes up out of the sea, we say to him: 'See that big bully over there in the East? He's English! Hate him, and you're a good American.'" Roosevelt found Kipling, who was even more precocious than he was, "nervous, voluble, rather underbred" but admitted to his sister Bamie that he was a genius. The night of their first meeting Kipling and Roosevelt had what the latter described as a "rough-and-tumble," with each defending his respective nationalism. Kipling was on his best

behavior thereafter, and the two developed considerable respect for each other.

Roosevelt worked to persuade the British writer of the virtues of American expansion. He took Kipling to the Smithsonian to see Indian artifacts and to the National Zoo to watch grizzly bears. The tutorial did not work. As Kipling wrote in his autobiography, "I never got over the wonder of a people who, having extirpated the aboriginals of their continent more completely than any modern race had ever done, honestly believed that they were a godly little New England community, setting examples to brutal mankind. This wonder I used to explain to Theodore Roosevelt, who made the glass cases of Indian relics shake with his rebuttals."

Kipling's American sojourn ended badly, in an argument with his alcoholic and aggressive brother-in-law. The Englishman took the dispute to a Vermont court, where he won his case but at the cost of humiliating publicity, which drove him back to England. There in 1897 he wrote a stanza of verse about British imperialism for Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee; it began "Take up the white man's burden." The poetry was stirring but the theme inappropriate: Britain was hardly at the beginning of its imperial career, having taken up the burden long before. Kipling put the verses aside and wrote instead "Recessional," with its magnificent themes of pride and withdrawal:

Far-called, our navies melt away;
On dune and headland sinks the fire:
Lo, all our pomp of yesterday
Is one with Nineveh and Tyre!

After the United States defeated Spain and became embroiled in the debate over whether to annex the Philippines, Kipling was stirred to action. He decided to write for an American audience a poem that would revive the theme of his debates with Roosevelt. Summoning the experience of an old imperial power to the task of instructing a new one, the poem would proclaim the sacred duty of imperialism and alert the Americans to its difficulties, to the dangers, frustrations, ingratitude, thanklessness, and criticism. Kipling took the fragment he had begun in 1897 and expanded it. "The White Man's Burden" appeared in the American magazine *McClure's* in February 1899, just

as the Congress was confirming McKinley's decision to turn the Philippines into a colony.

The White Man's Burden

Take up the White Man's burden—
Send forth the best ye breed—
Go, bind your sons to exile
To serve your captives' need;
To wait, in heavy harness,
On fluttered folk and wild—
Your new-caught sullen peoples,
Half devil and half child.

Take up the White Man's burden—
In patience to abide,
To veil the threat of terror
And check the show of pride;
By open speech and simple,
An hundred times made plain,
To seek another's profit
And work another's gain.

Take up the White Man's burden—
The savage wars of peace—
Fill full the mouth of Famine,
And bid the sickness cease;
And when your goal is nearest
(The end for others sought)
Watch sloth and heathen folly
Bring all your hope to nought.

Take up the White Man's burden—
No iron rule of kings,
But toil of serf and sweeper—
The tale of common things.
The ports ye shall not enter,
The roads ye shall not tread,
Go, make them with your living
And mark them with your dead.

Take up the White Man's burden,
And reap his old reward—
The blame of those ye better
The hate of those ye guard—
The cry of hosts ye humour
(Ah, slowly!) toward the light:—
"Why brought ye us from bondage,
Our loved Egyptian night?"

Take up the White Man's burden—
Ye dare not stoop to less—
Nor call too loud on Freedom
To cloak your weariness.
By all ye will or whisper,
By all ye leave or do,
The silent sullen peoples
Shall weigh your God and you.

Take up the White Man's burden!
Have done with childish days—
The lightly-proffered laurel,
The easy ungrudged praise:
Comes now, to search your manhood
Through all the thankless years,
Cold, edged with dear-bought wisdom,
The judgment of your peers.

Kipling's poem was an instant sensation in a United States enthused with its imperial conquests. But it angered his anti-imperialist friends in Boston, like Charles Eliot Norton, who underrated its cautionary tone. Godkin exploded in all his Irishness: "I think most of the current jingoism on both sides of the water is due to him. He is the poet of the barracks room cads." Kipling's companionable nemesis Roosevelt sent a copy to Lodge with the comment "Rather poor poetry, but good sense from the expansion standpoint." "The White Man's Burden" was much more than a defense of imperialism. It was a challenge to the Americans to treat their new colonies with the same sense of duty, responsibility, and moral high-mindedness that the British, at their best, had shown.

Kipling's own colonial experience had been in India, where he had spent his boyhood. One of the ablest British viceroys of India, Lord George Curzon, took up his position there in the same year that the United States annexed the Philippines. Curzon reflected the standard that Kipling described in the poem. As the viceroy explained to British businessmen in Bengal, "If I thought it were all for nothing, and that you and I . . . were simply writing inscriptions on the sand to be washed out by the next tide, if I felt that we were not working here for the good of India in obedience to a higher law and to a nobler aim, then I would see the link that holds England and India together severed without a sigh. But it is because I believe in the future of this country, and in the capacity of our own race to guide it to goals that it has never hitherto attained, that I keep courage and press forward."

Kipling—and British example—thus set a test for the American imperialists. Nobody surpassed American politicians in their high-flown defense of the superiority of their country's unique values and traditions. Now those values and traditions were to be put to an unprecedented examination. Would the Americans, with their spotty conduct toward the natives of their own continent, treat their new subjects with dignity and respect? Or would they be driven by power and greed and tempted into brutal behavior? Could they live with the fact that they enjoyed the full measure of liberty guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution while their colonial subjects did not? Would they act with the "fine good nature" that John Hay had called for as a sequel to the "splendid little war"? In short, just how would the United States rate as a colonial power?

2.

Nobody was more concerned about these questions than William McKinley. Not only was the president required to protect the new U.S. holdings from outside pressures and internal weaknesses, but he also had to find ways to promote the well-being of multiethnic, mostly non-English-speaking colonial populations far more impoverished than the meanest American state or territory—and, to some degree, hostile. For much of the population of Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, one colonial dictatorship had been replaced by another. In Cuba McKinley had to square the Teller Amendment's commitment to independence with the exclusively American military rule that had been declared. In the Philippines there had been no public American assurance of independence and therefore no inducement to Aguinaldo's liberation army to cease its resistance.

McKinley wanted desperately to rule the Caribbean and Pacific islands in the interests of their inhabitants. But how was a benevolent approach possible if the United States was unwilling to cede complete sovereignty to the local populations? Was empire compatible with democracy? McKinley, though a lifelong optimist, was not sure he knew the answers. What he did know was that U.S. colonial rule had to be carried out, at least initially, through military occupation and government. That mission naturally belonged in the War, rather than the State, Department. But the bumbling secretary Alger was clearly not the man for the job.

After the Spanish-American War the attacks on Alger actually increased. Lodge launched a scathing denunciation of the shortage of artillery pieces and smokeless (invisible) powder. While the actual fighting in Cuba, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico had been creditable, the logistical effort to transport the army to Cuba and back to the mainland after the war had been a scandal. So had the poor quality of food supplied to the troops and the lack of medical resources to deal with malaria, typhoid, and other sicknesses, which took the lives of ten times more soldiers than did combat. What was forgotten was that the secretary of war had succeeded in the largest overseas military transport and supply operation in American history. What was remembered were the flaws, which his pomposity and self-importance only exaggerated. Too kind to wield a hatchet, the president did not act on Roosevelt's recommendation for Alger's removal before the 1898 election but let him hang on until July 1899. His successor was his opposite in every respect, a problem-solving lawyer with outstanding political skills and clean hands, Elihu Root.

Having been surprised by McKinley's insistence that he take over the government's colonial responsibilities, Root moved reluctantly to Washington in late July 1899. Neither he nor Clara ever managed to feel at home there. Clara saw little of her husband, who imported his workaholic New York ways to a still-southern city where six hours constituted more than a good day's work. Intelligent and amusing though they were, the Roots were practically invisible on the Wash-

ington social scene. Hay, Lodge, and Adams liked Root enormously but were rarely able to entice him to dine. Typically he lunched at his desk in his high-ceilinged office in the State, War, and Navy Building on sandwiches, olives, and a bottle of Apollinaris water sent over from the Metropolitan Club a block away. His one indulgence was cigars, which he smoked throughout the day.

Root's assignment was to establish U.S. colonial government on all the islands taken from Spain and to prepare Cuba for independence. Without significant experience in either government or foreign affairs, he took the British Empire as his model and immersed himself in British colonial history. He quickly established a close working relationship with Secretary of State Hay, who had preceded him to Washington by nearly a year and had recommended him to the president for the War Department. Hay, who had no interest in battles for bureaucratic turf, made no effort to challenge Root's sweeping responsibilities in the Caribbean and Pacific or even to dispute McKinley's selection of Root to run the State Department in the summer of 1900, when he was ill.

Root proved an extraordinarily quick study. In his first annual report to Congress at the end of 1899, when he had been in office less than half a year, he set out an approach to colonial policy that combined firm military rule with a generous paternalism. Root asserted that the subject peoples could make no claim to the constitutional rights enjoyed by American citizens or even by the inhabitants of Alaska and Hawaii, other territories not designated for statehood. In his view they had no rights except what the United States gave them. Within this matrix of dictatorship, however, Root emphasized the responsibility of the United States to work on behalf of its colonial subjects. The American people had an "implied contract" with them: ". . . it is our unquestioned duty to make the interests of the people over whom we assert sovereignty the first and controlling consideration in all legislation and administration which concerns them, and to give them, to the greatest possible extent, individual freedom, self-government in accordance with their capacity, just and equal laws, and opportunity for education, for profitable industry, and for development in civilization."

For the neophyte colonial manager, Puerto Rico offered an initial laboratory for the combination of authority and solicitude that Root

professed. The island was extremely poor, with a population density seven times Cuba's, the highest illiteracy rate in the Caribbean—more than 80 percent—and no significant resource base. Just two weeks after Root was sworn in, Puerto Rico was devastated by a hurricane that killed over three thousand people and destroyed two-thirds of the coffee crop. It was Root's first challenge, and he met it well, turning the entire U.S. Army on the island into a relief corps. Longer-term reforms followed: a mass vaccination program; a near tripling of the school population; penal and tax reforms; and the successful, though not immediate, achievement of congressional authority for most Puerto Rican products to enter the United States duty-free. In the first decade of the century trade between the island and the mainland was to increase fourfold from a low base.

Root inherited a tense political situation in Puerto Rico. The U.S. military government had dismissed the elected ministry of Luis Muñoz Rivera in 1898 and had clamped down on the press, causing Puerto Ricans to lament their barely tasted autonomy under Spain. Root quickly saw the defects of military rule, but he was not ready to give Puerto Rico the self-determination planned for Cuba. He reported to Congress at the end of 1899 that the people "have not yet been educated in the art of self-government, or any really honest government." In his opinion they were not qualified for what both main local parties sought: independence, autonomy, or statehood.

Wisely, Root did not impose an American system of municipal law on Puerto Ricans, believing, as he said later, that the Spanish legal system "was far better for them than anything we could produce out of our own experience." He decided that a civilian government should replace military rule but insisted that the governor and his cabinet be appointed by the president; he opposed the creation of a legislature. Senator J. B. Foraker of Ohio, an 1898 war hawk who nevertheless opposed excessive American control over the island dependencies, sold Root on a slightly more liberal approach, which took effect on May 1, 1900. The Foraker Act exchanged military for civilian government and provided for a bicameral legislature, one chamber of which was to be elected by Puerto Ricans. But the civilian governor and upper chamber of the legislature were to be appointed by the U.S. president, and the justices of the Puerto Rican Supreme Court by the governor. Foraker and Root treated the island as a colony rather

than a territory, effectively giving Washington a veto on its every political act.

In a 1901 decision designed to determine the status of the new U.S. territories, the U.S. Supreme Court confirmed Root's hybrid approach to Puerto Rico, ruling that the island belonged to but was not a part of the United States. Puerto Ricans were not citizens, nor were they protected by the U.S. Constitution. The ruling relieved Puerto Ricans of federal taxes, but the unequal status it implied disillusioned two generations of moderate Puerto Rican politicians. Among these were Muñoz Rivera and his son Luis Muñoz Marín, who felt compelled to forgo the objectives of independence or statehood and concentrate instead on the more modest goals of home rule and improvement in the standard of living.

The Supreme Court decision meant that Puerto Rico ranked below the forty-five states of the Union; below the "incorporated territories" of Oklahoma, Arizona, and New Mexico, destined to become states; and below the territories of Alaska and Hawaii, which benefited from the Constitution though they were not on the statehood track. Puerto Rico was thus relegated to the fourth-class status of "unincorporated dependency." In the words of Chief Justice Melville W. Fuller, who dissented from the Court's decision, Puerto Rico was left "like a disembodied shade in an intermediate state of ambiguous existence." A Puerto Rican politician put it more graphically: "We are Mr. Nobody from Nowhere."

Cuba was the most predictable of Root's colonial problems since the Teller Amendment committed the United States to the island's independence once "pacification" was achieved. But Root, on taking office, found no American strategy for Cuba's independence. Nobody was clear when pacification would come, though during the period of transition it was assumed that the Cuban rebels would be given no major role in governing. The freeze-out had begun with General Shafter's refusal to let rebel forces participate in the surrender of Santiago. This American policy of exclusion had a devastating effect on soldiers who in some cases had been fighting the Spanish for three decades and had materially assisted the American victory.

José Martí would not have been surprised at the American takeover. He saw the United States as compulsively predatory, writing in 1895 of his duty "to prevent, through the independence of Cuba, the U.S.A. from spreading over the West Indies and falling with added weight upon other lands of Our America." Martí had lived in the United States for fourteen years and planned the 1895 revolution from his small apartment in New York City. He admired the individualism of Americans but hated their materialism; the last thing he wanted was an American conquest of Cuba. "Once the United States is in Cuba," he wrote, "who will get her out?"

The disenchantment of the rebels was compounded by their debarment from the Paris Peace Conference and their enforced absence from the Havana ceremony transferring the government from Spain to the United States. The American soldiers in the occupying force, many of them southerners, did not get along with the insurrectionary forces, which were mostly black. President McKinley issued a proclamation stating the advisability of keeping on in the civil government officials who had served in the Spanish regime. Given the need to avoid governmental chaos, the decision was understandable, but it made the Cubans wonder why the Americans had come at all. It was particularly insulting when the Americans decided to appoint as civil governor of Santiago Province, where the rebels had been most active, the former mayor of Santiago city.

Fatefully this American tilt toward the Spanish authorities failed to convince one Spanish soldier who turned out to play a role in later history. Ángel Castro, a subaltern in the Spanish Army, had been transferred to military duty from Spain to Cuba following the 1895 revolution. He hated the Americans for preventing his army from defeating the rebels; this hostility burned throughout his long life. No doubt he vented it in front of his son Fidel, born in 1926.

American authority in Cuba was a military dictatorship from the start. The military governor was in charge of both branches of government, military and civil. His authority on the island was supreme; his only superiors were the president and the secretary of war. Before Root joined McKinley's administration, the military governor was General John R. Brooke, a Civil War veteran, who tried to balance the retention of local Spanish law—anathema to Cubans who had fought Spain—with the hiring of Cuban revolutionaries to positions in government.

Brooke's most difficult task was to disband the Cuban revolutionary army, a mission that became more urgent with the outbreak of war

in the Philippines the month after he assumed charge. It might have seemed contradictory for the United States to want to demobilize the army of a country to which it had pledged independence, but the pressure from Congress to avoid the risk of wars on two fronts was extreme. The Americans were fortunate in the character of General Máximo Gómez, commander in chief of the Cuban Army and the most revered war hero in Cuba, who agreed to dissolve the army and accept the three million dollars offered by the McKinley administration as demobilization pay for the soldiers, who were in dire need.

Despite the short-lived opposition of the anti-American Cuban Assembly, whose existence ended in April 1899, Gómez's conciliatory views prevailed, the army was disbanded, and the threat of armed rebellion in Cuba passed away. When some of his generals came to Gómez to ask him to negotiate with the United States on behalf of the army, he answered in a voice of disappointed realism: "We must recognize that the only power today in Cuba is the power of those who have intervened, and therefore for the present, thoughts of a Cuban independent government can be no more than a dream."

Brooke's refusal to delegate authority to subordinate officers was not popular among the American generals in charge of the Cuban provinces and was especially hated by Leonard Wood, ex-commander of the Rough Riders, Roosevelt's soldierly model, and now the military governor of Santiago Province. A haughty and confrontational soldier, Wood protested, inter alia, about Brooke's decree that the revenues from the port of Santiago be directed to the Cuban treasury, thus depriving him of funds needed for local public works projects. Such grievances, immemorially an obstacle to good relations between a leader at the center and a subordinate in the field, degenerated in this case into a nasty blood feud. Brooke sent withering orders to Wood: "Your estimate for August is wrong and cannot be allowed"; "The haphazard methods . . . must cease instantly"; "The accounts rendered for the last six months are a disgrace to the army."

In retaliation, Wood used his powerful friends at home against his chief. In the United States Wood was considered a war hero, whereas Brooke, who had never gotten past the training camps of Florida, was a nonentity. Wood had the ear of Roosevelt, Congress, and even his former medical patient the president. He complained to them all. When Root took office, he listened sympathetically to the replay of

Wood's grievances and became convinced that Wood had the dynamism, independent-mindedness, and youth (he was not yet forty, younger than Roosevelt) necessary in a proconsul. Overriding the objections of the army, which opposed Wood as too junior and as a medical rather than line officer, McKinley acted on Root's recommendation and appointed Wood to replace Brooke as military commander of Cuba. Wood took over on December 13, 1899, and from that time served as an energetic executor of Root's policy toward Cuba.

In his first annual report in late 1899 Root confirmed the American pledge, embodied in the Teller Amendment and reaffirmed by the president as a sacred obligation, that Cuba would become independent and that the U.S. occupation was therefore limited in function and temporary:

> The control which we are exercising in trust for the people of Cuba should not be, and of course will not be, continued any longer than is necessary to enable that people to establish a suitable government to which the control shall be transferred, which shall really represent the people of Cuba and be able to maintain order and discharge international obligations. . . . Our present duty is limited to giving every assistance in our power to the establishment of such a government, and to maintaining order and promoting the welfare of the people of Cuba during the period necessarily required for that process.

Even in affirming the Teller Amendment, Root seemed to be sliding away from its categorical determination "to leave the government and control of the island to its people." What did Root mean by a "suitable" government? Suitable to whom? When would it be established? Were the maintenance of order and the discharge of international obligations a condition of its establishment? McKinley, in his own annual message at the end of 1899, compounded the ambiguity. In a passage probably drafted by Root, the president stated that an independent Cuba "must needs be bound to us by ties of singular intimacy and strength. . . . Whether these ties shall be organic or conventional, the destinies of Cuba are in some rightful form and manner irrevocably linked to our own, but how and how far is [*sic*] for the future to determine in the ripeness of events." The reference to "organic" ties provoked a rush of hope among American annexation-

ists. It soon dissipated, but clearly McKinley and Root were beginning to think about how they could balance the commitment to Cuba's independence against a continuation of American influence there.

In accepting a moral obligation toward Cuba, Root encouraged Wood in his efforts to improve the lives of ordinary Cubans. He told Wood: ". . . if we once got into a position where we are retaining our hold on Cuba, to the injury of the Cuban people, doing them an injustice, refusing to properly care for them while we prevent them from caring for themselves, the position will be untenable, and I am not willing to occupy it." Still, Root realized that humanitarian concern was not the only or even the primary American interest in Cuba. "The trouble about Cuba," as he described it with his customary clarity, "is that, although technically a foreign country, practically and morally it occupies an intermediate position, since we have required it to become a part of our political and military system, and to form a part of our lines of exterior defense." Echoing Mahan and his friend Roosevelt, Root saw Cuba as a vital strategic necessity for the United States. But how could its place in "our political and military system" be reconciled with the legislative requirement for its independence? He struggled with that question.

Meanwhile he immersed himself in the details of Cuba's problems, visiting the island three times on inspections, spending hours with Wood in Havana and Washington, and corresponding frequently with the military governor. Under Root's guidance Wood plunged into the task of comprehensive reform. The military governor was a forerunner of several American military commanders in Vietnam, energetic, dedicated, attentive to details, and result-oriented but impatient with the inefficiencies of the local population and myopic about political realities.

Wood was prepared to include in his administration Cubans who had fought against Spain, but he was most comfortable with upper-class Cuban conservatives desirous of a close economic relationship with the United States. He accepted the requirement of the Teller Amendment that Cuba be prepared for independence, but he believed personally that Cuba should be annexed and, listening to the wrong people, thought that most Cubans agreed with him. He assured McKinley in September 1899 that "the people who are talking 'Cuba Libre' and the total withdrawal of the American Army in the

daily press represent at most not over five percent of the Cuban people."

Wood's strength lay in his determination and ability to attack the problems of everyday life in Cuba. Enlarging programs started by Brooke, he reformed the penal system, freed prisoners improperly held, sped up judicial procedures, and rid the courts of traditional corrupt practices. He improved sanitation and hygiene in orphanages, reform schools, mental institutions, and other public places. He cleaned up the cities; Roosevelt's sister Corinne, after a midnight inspection of Havana in Wood's company, stated boldly that she would be willing to eat breakfast off the street. The military governor tasked Cuban civil officials with building roads, bridges, and wharves; dredging harbors; and paving streets. He pressed education reform, giving it a heavy American character. A vigorous American educator, recommended by President Eliot of Harvard, arrived with a mandate to build a school in every village. Wood arranged for more than a thousand Cuban teachers to be sent to Harvard to study American education.

His medical training made Wood particularly alert to the dangers of yellow fever, which in the aftermath of the war was sweeping Cuba in epidemic proportions. He launched a campaign to eradicate it, taking inspiration from a Cuban doctor, Carlos Finlay, who had theorized in 1881 that the disease was carried by mosquitoes. Wood encouraged Walter Reed, a major in the Medical Corps, to test Finlay's theory and supported him through a series of unsuccessful experiments. Reed's eventual success led directly to the reduction of yellow fever in Cuba and later worldwide. To the fire of all these reforms Wood was the essential spark; he was a dervish of activity, inspecting, inspiring, and inciting all over the island. In his reforms on behalf of the Cuban people, he earned comparison with his great British contemporaries, Lord Cromer in Egypt and Lord Curzon in India.

Wood tested his success in stabilizing Cuba against economic criteria, whether money could be borrowed at a reasonable rate of interest and whether American capital would be willing to invest there. He was sympathetic to American businessmen seeking franchises and contracts from the War Department. But the Senate had other ideas. Before Wood had been elevated to governor, Senator Foraker, concerned to limit American economic power, had succeeded in winning passage of an amendment to prohibit the U.S. government from

granting property franchises or concessions in Cuba during the occupation. Foraker's Amendment, consistent with Teller's Amendment mandating Cuba's independence, was designed to prevent the economic exploitation of Cuba and to shorten the American presence there. Foraker predicted that if the United States established an economic foothold on the island, it would not leave for a century.

Wood advocated repeal of the Foraker Amendment and in the meantime managed to get around it in some areas. Mining claims, for example, were simply considered not to be concessions, and public works projects were ruled to be in the interest of Cuban development. Wood persuaded the president of the Canadian Pacific Railway to undertake a railroad from Havana to Santiago; it was operating in less than three years, cutting the travel time from ten days to one. Also, American sugar interests were able to locate, or in some cases relocate, in Cuba during the occupation. Their control of the market, however, was not overwhelming; in 1905 American-owned mills produced only 21 percent of Cuba's sugar. By contrast, during the occupation nearly half the island's manufacture of cigars and cigarettes was in American hands. In opposition to Republican party policy, Wood urged tariff relief for Cuba in sugar and tobacco. Taken overall, his economic programs favored Cuban development as well as American capitalism. The evidence does not support charges, made at the time and later, that the McKinley administration provided a cover for a massive American economic penetration of Cuba.

3.

On political issues Root and Wood began cautiously. Root authorized municipal elections in Cuba for February 1900, perhaps believing that he could do the right thing at negligible risk since Wood had predicted a victory for pro-American Cubans. As in Puerto Rico, the franchise was limited—in the Cuban case to those who were either literate or owners of valuable property. The American aim was to reduce the vote of the nearly one-third of the Cuban population that was black. Both Root and Wood were seeking to avoid the tumultuous and unstable rule, often by black dictators, that was prevalent in Haiti and Santo Domingo on the island just east of Cuba.

In Cuba, however, stability could be just as threatened by disenfranchising the black population as by empowering it, so Root and Wood conceded the vote to former soldiers in the Cuban Army, most of whom were black. When, against Wood's prediction, the radicals won, both American officials absorbed the rebuff as good sports. They claimed a victory for democracy, and Wood authorized the flying of the Cuban flag from municipal buildings. But the Americans concluded that an independent Cuba could not be trusted to cooperate closely with the United States. Root and Wood now acted to construct a policy that would limit the damage of Cuba's impending independence.

After consulting with Root in Washington, Wood issued instructions in late July 1900 for the election of delegates to a convention that was "to frame and adopt a constitution for the people of Cuba, and as a part thereof, to provide for and agree with the Government of the United States upon the relations to exist between that Government and the Government of Cuba. . . ." This passage, no doubt Root's handiwork, undercut Cuban sovereignty in two important ways. First, there was to be no nationwide popular vote on the constitution. The instructions left not only the drafting but also the adoption of the constitution in the hands of thirty-one delegates rather than the people of Cuba. Moreover, the agreement on bilateral relations desired by the United States would be an integral part of the constitution, not a separate document.

In the face of this blatant American effort to manipulate Cuba's future, only 30 percent of the qualified voters participated in the election of delegates. Moreover, despite Wood's intrusive efforts to encourage Cubans to "send their very best men" to the convention, he admitted that "some of the worst agitators and political rascals" had been elected. The constitutional convention convened on November 5, 1900, the day before McKinley won reelection, in a theater ironically named after José Martí. By then the furor in Cuba had caused Wood to persuade Washington to back off its insistence that the agreement on bilateral relations be part of the constitution. Instead the convention was instructed to consider the bilateral agreement right after adopting the constitution. Thus an attenuated linkage remained, and the founding document of independent Cuba would still be irrevocably connected to the new state's relationship with its northern neighbor.

The convention produced the blueprint for a republican system of government resembling that of the United States: separated powers, with a president, vice president, bicameral legislature, and supreme court; separation of church and state; and universal male suffrage (a far more liberal electoral system than the American occupiers had permitted in the two earlier elections they had supervised). Root gave the new constitution a grudging and provisional seal of approval:

> I do not fully agree with the wisdom of some of the provisions of this constitution, but it provides for a republican form of government; it was adopted after long and patient consideration and discussion; it represented the views of the delegates elected by the people of Cuba; and it contains no features which would justify the assertion that a government organized under it will not be the one to which the United States may properly transfer the obligation for the protection of life and property under international law, assumed in the Treaty of Paris.

The passing grade Root gave the constitution was not enough to allay his concerns. There also had to be a built-in guarantee of American influence. Except where the British, French, and Danes ruled colonial possessions, the Caribbean was a sea of unrest, the worst of it right across the narrow Windward Passage from Cuba. An unstable Cuba would be intolerable for the United States. American economic interests in sugar and tobacco would be threatened. A hostile power like Germany might take advantage of domestic unrest, perhaps even occupy Cuba. The Monroe Doctrine, never enshrined in international law, might come under challenge. America's all-important strategic interest in Cuba as the gateway to the Caribbean and to the planned isthmian canal might be menaced. Any one of these negative factors would be troubling. Taken together, they led Root's coldly logical mind to the conclusion that as the price for independence, the United States had to compel the Cubans to limit their sovereignty.

Root's thinking was set forth clearly in a letter he wrote to Wood on January 9, 1901. The secretary of war urged the military governor to press the convention to outline the relationship it wanted between Cuba and the United States. The Cuban delegates should be disabused of any notion that they would be protected by the United States whatever they did. "If Cuba declines to accord to this government the authority and facilities for her protection, she will have to look out for herself in case of trouble with any other nation." Root then sketched a formula for making protection mandatory: The Cubans should accept a "reservation" to carry the American right to "protect" the island into the period of independence. Root's argument here was highly legalistic, but it formed the base on which rested all the subsequent American actions to curb Cuba's sovereignty:

> Another fact which the Cubans should consider is that in international affairs the existence of a right recognized by international law is of the utmost importance. We now have[,] by virtue of our occupation of Cuba and the terms under which sovereignty was yielded by Spain, a right to protect her which all foreign nations recognize. It is of great importance to Cuba that that right, resting upon the treaty of Paris and derived through that treaty from the sovereignty of Spain, should never be terminated but should be continued by a reservation, with the consent of the Cuban people, at the time when the authority which we now exercise is placed in their hands. If we should simply turn the government over to the Cuban administration, retire from the island, and then turn round to make a treaty with the new government, just as we would make treaties with Venezuela, and Brazil, and England, and France, no foreign State would recognize any longer a right on our part to interfere in any quarrel which she might have with Cuba, unless that interference were based upon an assertion of the Monroe Doctrine. But the Monroe Doctrine is not a part of international law and has never been recognized by European nations.

For Root Cuba was too important and too weak to be dealt with as if it were Venezuela or Brazil. There would be too much risk in treating it as a fully independent country. As he wrote Wood five weeks later, there must be safeguards for the United States: "The preservation of that independence by a country so small as Cuba, so incapable, as she must always be, to contend by force against the great powers of the world, must depend upon her strict performance of international obligations, upon her giving due protection to the lives and property of the citizens of all other countries within her borders, and upon her never contracting any public debt which in the hands of citizens of foreign powers shall constitute an obligation she is unable to meet."

Root was not just a brilliant lawyer but also a skillful politician. Not only had he thought through the legal basis, tenuous as it might be, for the assertion of a special American right in Cuba, but he had also determined the specific and politically feasible steps the United States could take. He described these in a January 11 letter to Secretary of State Hay outlining the provisions that in his view should be incorporated into Cuban law. Independent Cuba was expected to lock in all the decisions of the military occupation, to provide to the United States naval bases on its territory, to give the United States a determining role in the conduct of its foreign relations, and, most important of all, to allow the United States to intervene when the latter decided that stability was threatened. There was some slight precedent for the blockbuster clause on intervention: A decade earlier Secretary of State Blaine had tried to negotiate the right to land U.S. troops in Hawaii but had backed off when King Kalakaua objected. Root's four points, soon to become demands, seriously undercut the independence promised by the Teller Amendment.

The secretary of war had tested the political waters for his extraordinary initiative and was sure of congressional support. Indeed, when Senator Orville Platt of Connecticut, chairman of the Senate Committee on Relations with Cuba, suggested to him a resolution ending the military occupation and prescribing certain conditions on Cuba, Root was ready with his four points, which were incorporated into Platt's legislation with minimal additions. The Platt Amendment, as it is known to history, passed the Senate on February 27, 1901, by a vote of 43–20. Fourteen senators who had supported the Teller Amendment, including Senator Teller himself, voted in favor, thus making a mockery of their principled support for Cuban independence. After passage by the House McKinley signed the bill on March 2. One of the key documents in the entire history of American foreign policy, the amendment was the handiwork of Elihu Root, who devised its key provisions:

> [ART. I.] That the government of Cuba shall never enter into any treaty or other compact with any foreign power or powers which will impair or tend to impair the independence of Cuba, nor in any manner authorize or permit any foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization or for military or naval purposes, or otherwise, lodgment in or control over any portion of said island.

> [ART. III.] That the government of Cuba consents that the United States may exercise the right to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence, the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty, and for discharging the obligations with respect to Cuba imposed by the Treaty of Paris on the United States, now to be assumed and undertaken by the government of Cuba.
>
> [ART. IV.] That all Acts of the United States in Cuba during its military occupancy thereof are ratified and validated . . .
>
> [ART. VII.] That . . . the government of Cuba will sell or lease to the United States lands necessary for coaling or naval stations at certain specified points. . . .

Root's defense of the Platt demands, intended for the delegates to the Cuban Constitutional Convention, combined a soft and a hard approach. The soft approach was legalistic, designed to prove that the American claim to the right of intervention under Article III sprang naturally from the original U.S. intervention against Spain and from the terms of the Treaty of Paris. Root argued that Article III was really in the interests of Cuban independence because it turned the Monroe Doctrine from a declaratory to a legal principle, compelling European nations to recognize the American right to intervene in Cuba and thus protecting Cuba from them. In invoking the Monroe Doctrine, Root was giving it an unprecedented scope beyond the rhetorical use made of it by earlier American statesmen. Traditionally it had been designed to keep the Europeans out of the hemisphere; in Root's definition it now gave the United States the right, sanctioned by international law, to intervene. Not even Roosevelt, in a magazine article in 1897 on the doctrine, had claimed this much for it.

Root, Wood, and Platt all professed themselves unable to understand how anyone could read the intervention article in the amendment as undermining Cuba's independence. Platt wrote Root that "the amendment was drafted with a view to avoid any possible claim that its acceptance by the Cuban Constitutional Convention would result in the establishment of a protectorate or suzerainty, or in any way interfere with the independence or sovereignty of Cuba, and speaking for myself, it seems impossible that any such construction can be placed upon that clause." Root expressed the hope to Wood that "you have been able to disabuse the minds of members of the

Convention of the idea that the intervention described in the Platt amendment is synonymous with intermeddling or interference with the affairs of a Cuban Government." But in case Root's tortuous legalisms failed to convince the Cuban delegates, the Americans simultaneously deployed a tougher approach: There would be no Cuban independence unless the Platt Amendment was incorporated in the constitution. Platt warned that if all the articles of the amendment were not accepted, "we shall occupy until they are."

Even before the amendment passed, Wood began a lobbying campaign in Cuba. His characteristically rosy assessments were partially confirmed by the support of the sugar interests and of two of Cuba's grand old revolutionary icons, General Gómez, the rebel military leader, and Tomás Estrada Palma, who had been president of the provisional rebel government in the Ten Years' War and later chief of the Cuban junta in New York during the 1895–98 revolution. But the American view that the amendment reinforced rather than undermined Cuba's independence failed to persuade the elected constitutional convention. The committee of the convention responsible for relations with the United States found some of the Platt points unacceptable "because they impair the independence and sovereignty of Cuba":

> Our duty consists in making Cuba independent of every other nation, the great and noble American nation included, and if we bind ourselves to ask the governments of the U.S. for their consent to our international dealings, if we admit that they shall receive and retain the right to intervene in our country to maintain or precipitate conditions and fulfil duties pertaining solely to Cuban governments and . . . if we grant them the right to acquire and preserve titles to lands for naval stations and maintain these in determined places along our coast, it is clear that we would seem independent of the rest of the world although we were not in reality, but never would be in reference to the U.S.

Juan Gualberto Gómez, a radical black delegate from Santiago and a determined opponent of the Platt Amendment, made a graphic point about Article III: "To reserve to the United States the faculty of deciding for themselves when independence is menaced and when therefore they ought to intervene to preserve it is equivalent to delivering up the key to our house so that they can enter it at all hours when the desire takes them, day or night. . . ." The committee produced counterproposals that failed to meet the American requirements on intervention, debt, and naval stations and that, moreover, were not designed to be included in the Cuban constitution, as the Americans insisted.

A determined American administration and Congress were in no mood to compromise. Even some anti-imperialists accepted Root's argument that Cuba's independence could be enhanced by limiting it. Too late as usual, the Anti-Imperialist League held a mass meeting to denounce the amendment in Faneuil Hall on March 28, nearly four weeks after it had become law. Missing was Massachusetts's venerable anti-imperialist Senator Hoar, who had voted for the amendment. On this issue, as on the Treaty of Paris and on the Philippine war, the anti-imperialists were too weak and too divided to make a difference.

In Cuba the convention voted to refuse incorporation of the Platt Amendment into the new constitution. From Washington Root sent a private note to Wood threatening strong measures if the Cubans finally rejected it: "[T]he Convention . . . will have failed to perform the duty for which it was elected and the duty must be performed by others." Having badly underestimated Cuban opposition to the amendment, Wood now persuaded Root to receive a visit to Washington from a five-member delegation of the convention that, Wood thought, was seeking a cover for capitulation.

The delegation enjoyed high-level treatment: a lunch hosted by Root at the Metropolitan Club with Senator Platt, General Miles, and other key officials and senators; a short meeting with President McKinley, who was friendly but opaque; and several long meetings with Root, who deployed his now-familiar argument that American policy was designed to advance Cuban independence. Hinting at a possible trade-off, the Cubans urged American agreement to a reciprocity treaty that would allow Cuban sugar and other products free access to the U.S. market. Root replied that negotiations on reciprocity would be possible when a representative Cuban government was in place, implying that the Platt Amendment first had to be accepted so that the Cuban constitution could take effect.

The Cubans' visit tipped the convention toward a settlement.

American intransigence had exposed the weakness of the Cuban hand. The alternative to capitulation was continued American occupation, making Cuba a colony rather than a protectorate. A truncated independence, with the vague prospect of a reciprocity treaty to help the Cuban economy, seemed to offer a more honorable future. After unsuccessful efforts to rewrite or interpret some of the provisions, the convention voted sixteen to eleven to accept the amendment, which became an integral part of the Cuban constitution as an appendix. With a military government sitting over them, the Cubans had little choice, but there could have been no doubt on either side that the independence of Cuba was a relative term. In a burst of candor Wood wrote Roosevelt, by then vice president: "There is, of course, little or no independence left Cuba under the Platt Amendment."

Did Root act cynically to produce this result? There is little reason to think so. From the beginning of his tenure he had seen himself as performing "a lawyer's duty upon the call of the greatest of all our clients." That client, the U.S. government, had been ambivalent from the start about Cuban independence. McKinley's war message had contained not a word about it. It was the Senate, via the Teller Amendment, that had injected independence into the picture, and now Teller was happy to circumscribe that independence. Root had every reason to believe that in his hard line, he was negotiating for the State Department, the navy, the Senate, and President McKinley himself.

Moreover, he undoubtedly had faith in what he was doing. Root was a pragmatist. He understood, even if he may have exaggerated, the risks of untrammeled independence for Cuba. His legal arguments were, to say the least, tricky—he could have argued the other side just as effectively—but he was undoubtedly convinced that their objective was worthy. Moreover, on the nuts-and-bolts issues Root made every effort to keep faith with the Cuban people. He gave Wood unstinting support in his health, education, and development efforts. He also threw himself into the bruising debate to win trade reciprocity for Cuba's fragile economy. Thanks largely to his efforts, and Wood's, a reciprocity treaty of benefit to Cuba was signed in December 1902 and took effect three months later.

In the context of the world imperialism of the time, the American decision to give Cuba even partial independence was unusual. Even

the most enlightened colonial power, Great Britain, fought a war to deny independence to the Boer republics of South Africa. Curzon, one of the ablest of the British colonial governors, would never have imagined offering imminent, or even eventual, independence to the three hundred million Indians he ruled. As for the Americans, it would have been difficult to deliver fully on the obligation they had assumed in the Teller Amendment. Their strategic requirements, their terror of instability, their fear of foreign encroachment, and their sense of racial superiority made the bestowal of genuine independence too much for them. All these concerns were almost certainly exaggerated, but they were nevertheless taken seriously. Root's policy of partial independence accurately reflected the basic American consensus on Cuba.

Leonard Wood had consistently advocated an alternative to partial independence, annexation. Juan Gualberto Gómez, the Santiago radical, speculated rhetorically that it might be better for Cuba "to be officially and openly administered from Washington" than governed by "discredited Cuban functionaries, pliable instruments of a foreign and irresponsible power." The case for annexation was not absurd. If Cuba had been administered as a U.S. territory with solicitude for its welfare and ample resource allocations, it might have reached the point at which it could choose its future from strength rather than weakness. In this palmiest of scenarios, in time it could have become independent without the residue of anti-Americanism that was to give Fidel Castro a significant measure of his appeal. Or it might eventually have become, like noncontiguous Alaska and even more distant Hawaii, a state in the American Union.

In actuality Cuba became a semi-independent country defined by the reality of American influence and by the shadow of American intervention. The navy constructed a naval base at Guantánamo Bay—an American Gibraltar—on the eastern end of the island, under a lease that contained no termination date. The threat of intervention, as much as the future interventions themselves, assured a heavy American weight on Cuban decisions. Article III of the Platt Amendment distorted the entire bilateral relationship and established a principle for intervention to be invoked in the future in Cuba and in other Latin American countries as well.

In Cuba independence began in controversy. The first political act,

the election of a president, produced a charge from the left that Wood had rigged the electoral commission. The favored American candidate, the cooperative Estrada Palma, who had taught school in upstate New York, ran unopposed, the anti-Platt candidate having withdrawn. Estrada Palma thus became the first president of Cuba in a tainted election. On May 20, 1902, Wood transferred to him and to the Cuban Congress "the government and control of the Island" on the condition that they undertake the obligations assumed by the United States in the Treaty of Paris with Spain. After the raising of the Cuban flag, Wood sailed away past the wreck of the *Maine* on the *Brooklyn*, an armored cruiser that had participated in the destruction of Cervera's squadron in Santiago Bay.

4.

The first years of American occupation of the Philippines were marked by full-scale war. As Cabot Lodge commented disingenuously, "The people whom we liberated down there have turned against us." From the outbreak of violence on February 4, 1899, it took the United States more than three years to subdue what was to the Americans an insurrection and to the Filipinos a war for independence. At its height the American troop presence constituted three-quarters of the entire U.S. Army. Casualties on both sides far exceeded the killed and wounded in the three weeks of fighting in Cuba.

The shape of the Philippines, an archipelago of more than seven thousand islands stretching a thousand miles from north to south, complicated the task of the U.S. Army. Also, Aguinaldo's forces at first outnumbered the Americans by about seventy-five thousand to twenty-four thousand. Rapid American buildups reduced the advantage; by 1900 the U.S. Army had seventy thousand troops in the Philippines. The Filipinos were well armed, with Mauser rifles as good as the Americans' Krag-Jorgensens. While the war progressed, the parity in weaponry eroded as an American naval blockade impeded Aguinaldo's efforts to resupply arms to his forces. In the arts of war the Americans were superior in generalship and strategy. Aguinaldo was a political leader with little military expertise of his own. His officers, unskilled in tactics and ineffective in the command of troops, were largely chosen for political rather than military

reasons. His army was inexperienced in guerrilla war, where its comparative advantages lay. On the other side, twenty-six of the thirty American generals who served in the Philippines were veterans of the Indian wars and well trained in irregular operations.

Aguinaldo's movement also suffered from inherent weaknesses. Only 30 percent of the Filipino population spoke Tagalog, the language of his ethnic group, which was concentrated on one island (albeit the largest and most populous), Luzon. Moreover, the rebel leader remained bound to his middle-class heritage; his appeal was to Filipinos of privilege. He eschewed the opportunity to proclaim a social revolution that would have attracted the masses to his cause. Yet despite these drawbacks, Aguinaldo was a redoubtable adversary. His soldiers were fighting in their own country against a foreign foe threatening their dreams of liberation. Carl Schurz had put it presciently: "The Filipinos fought against Spain for their freedom and independence, and unless they abandon their recently proclaimed purpose for their freedom and independence, they will fight against us."

In these challenging and unaccustomed conditions, the Americans were nevertheless able to develop a political-military strategy that ultimately won the war without irrevocably alienating the population. It was based on McKinley's strong sense of responsibility toward the Philippine people. Six weeks before the war broke out, in his instruction to the U.S. forces to occupy the entire archipelago, the president had emphasized that "we come, not as invaders or conquerors, but as friends." The instruction concluded: "Finally, it should be the earnest and paramount aim of the military administration to win the confidence, respect, and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assuring them in every possible way that full measure of individual rights and liberties which is the heritage of a free people, and by proving to them that the mission of the United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule."

After the fighting began, "benevolent assimilation" came under attack by American opponents of the war, who saw it as a cynical mask for a policy of repression. But the president was serious about it and remained so right up to his death. In January 1899 McKinley seized on a proposal by Admiral Dewey, always more sensitive than his fel-

low officers to Philippine concerns, and sent to Manila an investigative commission headed by the president of Cornell University, Jacob Gould Schurman. The commission was intended to supplement, rather than replace, U.S. military rule; its mandate was to facilitate "the most humane, pacific and effective extension" of America's authority and to secure "the benefits of a wise and generous protection of life and property to the inhabitants." Its arrival roughly coincided with the outbreak of war in February, giving new urgency to its role of ensuring civilian participation in an increasingly military operation.

Before accepting his mission, Schurman had opposed the U.S. annexation of the Philippines, but his experience there changed his mind. The commission report strongly backed the U.S. military objective: "Only through American occupation . . . is the idea of a free, self-governing and united Philippine commonwealth at all conceivable." Though he did not undermine the army, Schurman did lay the groundwork for a significant effort to make the civilian population more sympathetic to the occupation by proposing to put municipal and provincial governments largely in the hands of local officials.

The military commander, General Elwell S. Otis, recognized and accepted the importance of this endeavor. An arrogant and irascible armchair commander who rarely visited the front, he was not popular among the hard-charging generals under his command. Yet he was a man of parts: a graduate of Harvard Law School, a hero at Gettysburg, and the organizer of the smooth transport of troops to the Philippines. He also presided over significant military successes in the early stages of the war; by the autumn of 1899 he had driven Aguinaldo to abandon conventional warfare and to fall back on guerrilla tactics. Otis was also a military intellectual who believed in McKinley's instruction to make the army the agent of civil reform. Like Wood in Cuba, he plunged his men into civic action programs like food distribution, sewer construction, smallpox vaccination, and legal and educational reforms.

Elihu Root was an ideal secretary of war for a strategy of combining military power with civil pacification. Although (or perhaps because) he was a military neophyte, he made sure the army had all the soldiers it needed. He sent Otis more troops than the commander had requested and initiated, over Otis's objection, a program to train and deploy native soldiers. At the same time Root gave top priority to pacification efforts. He established a policy of bringing civil law to all territory occupied by U.S. troops. Aguinaldo's decision in November 1899 to disband his army and launch a guerrilla war enabled Otis to devote more of his resources to civic action programs. The flagship model of pacification was the island of Negros, where an anti-Aguinaldo population welcomed the American establishment of municipal government, public order, and education and health programs.

McKinley and Root operated in the shadow of the 1900 presidential election. They knew that the anti-imperialists would launch a campaign to defeat the president's bid for a second term, and they feared that Bryan, again the Democratic candidate, would make the Philippines the core issue in the contest. By 1900 the war had become a series of regional conflicts, not particularly threatening to the American forces but not susceptible to quick victories either. Otis's arrogance had annoyed the military establishment and, more seriously, the press; it was time to replace him with a commander who inspired confidence. A civilian leader was needed as well. The Schurman commission finished its work in April 1900; its successor would have to convince the American people of the administration's determination to win the allegiance of the local population. The president and Root thus faced two major personnel decisions. One turned out to be only a partial success; the other was brilliant.

Brigadier General Arthur MacArthur was appointed to succeed Otis as military commander in May 1900. An imperious, self-promoting officer with a striking physical resemblance to Theodore Roosevelt, MacArthur disliked his predecessor's cautious approach to battle. He compared Otis to "a locomotive bottomside up on the track, with its wheels revolving at full speed." MacArthur's locomotive, in contrast, would steam forward on a cleared track, bowling over all Filipinos who resisted. The new leader encouraged regional offensives throughout the archipelago and authorized the ruthless approaches favored by many of his regional commanders. MacArthur's strategy was effective in a military sense; by the time he turned over command to his successor a year later, all but three areas had been brought under control. But the harshness of his methods undercut the pacification policy so important to the president.

McKinley reinforced that policy with the choice of William Howard Taft as president of the Second Philippine Commission. Taft was

a big man in every respect, especially physically. A highly respected judge and member of the Ohio political establishment, he had set his sights on an appointment to the Supreme Court. He was not pleased to be asked to go to Manila, having shared with President McKinley his dovish position on the annexation (if a 325-pound man can be compared to a small bird). Taft recalled his conversation with the president:

> "Judge," he said, "I'd like to have you go to the Philippines." I said, "Mr. President, what do you mean by going to the Philippines?" He replied, "We must establish a government there and I would like you to help." "But, Mr. President," I said, "I am sorry we have got the Philippines. I don't want them and I think you ought to have some man who is more in sympathy with the situation." "You don't want them any less than I do," replied the President, "but we have got them and in dealing with them I think I can trust the man who didn't want them better than I can the man who did."

The dispatch of such a formidable figure as Taft symbolized McKinley's determination gradually to establish civilian rule in the Philippines. The first step was to be the shifting in September 1900 of legislative, though not executive, power from the military governor to Taft's commission. The second would be the transfer of every province, once it had been pacified, to civilian rule until the entire Philippines were under Taft's governorship. McKinley was doing in the Philippines, in conditions of open warfare, what he did not do in Cuba, where there was no fighting. In Cuba Wood remained military commander until the handover to a Cuban president in May 1902; in the Philippines MacArthur was to transfer power to Taft almost a year earlier than that. For the Filipinos the contrast with Spanish rule would have been striking since to the end Spain had maintained military governors in all its colonies.

It was Root who wrote the president's instructions to Taft embodying this novel colonial concept. The secretary of war envisioned a "considerable period" before the complete military to civilian transfer could be completed; meanwhile executive powers would continue to be vested in the military commander. But the commission was charged with establishing municipal and provincial governments immediately. The legislative authority scheduled for September 1, 1900, provided for the enactment of laws on taxes, public spending, and the establishment of schools, civil service, and courts. Governmental power was to be decentralized to small units, as far as possible, and Filipinos were to be given preference for offices. Freedoms patterned after those guaranteed in the U.S. Bill of Rights, including due process, protection of private property, speedy and public trials, and freedom of speech and the press, were declared to take precedence over local laws. Primary education would be free and in English.

Root's instruction to Taft's commission attested to the president's concern for the welfare of the Philippine people:

> . . . the commission should bear in mind that the government which they are establishing is designed, not for our satisfaction or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace, and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the measures adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective government.
>
> . . . Upon all officers and employees of the United States, both civil and military, should be impressed a sense of the duty to observe not merely the material but the personal and social rights of the people of the islands, and to treat them with the same courtesy and respect for their personal dignity which the people of the United States are accustomed to require from each other.

Taft reached Manila with the members of his commission on June 3, 1900. One person who was not glad to see them was Arthur MacArthur. The inherent incompatibility between overlapping civilian and military jurisdictions would have been enough to guarantee friction between the commissioner and any general. But MacArthur's vanity, abrasiveness, and contempt for civilian authority, traits he passed on to his son, Douglas, made conflict inevitable. MacArthur tried to humble the commissioners by keeping them waiting all day in the blistering heat, then receiving them like an Asian potentate. He complained to them that their existence was "humiliating" to him. His obstructiveness spurred Taft to inform his excellent connections in Washington, from the president on down, about what was going on.

The dispute between MacArthur and Taft was not just between two strong personalities bent on amassing power. It was also a duel between concepts. Taft believed the Filipinos were inherently sympathetic to the United States, while MacArthur was convinced that Aguinaldo's support spread far beyond Luzon and his Tagalog group. The first analysis argued for pacification; the second for a military solution. The battle was soon joined over whether the Philippines was better run by a military autocracy or a civilian government. Taft was to win it.

In his four years in the Philippines, Taft proved an extraordinary proconsul. Despite his girth, he got around the archipelago and checked the condition of the people for himself. On one occasion, shortly after he had been ill, Root cabled to ask about his health. Taft replied that he felt so well that he had just taken a long horseback trip into the mountains. Root, always fast with a quip, cabled back: "Fine. How's the horse?" Taft's five-man commission was the smallest legislature in the world and one of the busiest, passing 441 measures in its first year. Taft took a hard line on pressing the war to victory and had little respect for the political capacities of Filipinos. The condescension in his reference to them as "little brown brothers" was real (for a man of Taft's bulk, everyone was little), but so was his dream of a civil society for the islands. In his view it could be achieved by enticing native elites to oppose Aguinaldo and bringing them into the colonial government. While the larger units, the provinces, remained under American control, he established governments at the municipal level under elected Filipino leadership.

Under Taft's governorship, half of it in wartime conditions, the literacy rate rose to the highest in Southeast Asia; malaria and cholera were reduced; infrastructure (dams, ports, roads) was improved; and the judicial and tax systems were made more effective. Taft redistributed the lands of the corrupt and unpopular Catholic friars and urged Congress to allow American investors to purchase large tracts of Philippine land. In this he was opposed by a potent coalition of the virtuous (anti-imperialists) and the voracious (beet sugar interests). In the end Senator Hoar achieved legislation to limit the acreage that Americans could buy, as Foraker had done with Cuba. Taft also fought, with some success, to give Philippine sugar, hemp, coconut oil, and tobacco free access to the U.S. market. Taft's qualities of determination, goodwill, and optimism were key to building stable political institutions and to improving living standards. But he was not a man of vision, and he failed to understand the strong desire for independence among many Filipinos. He was content to sacrifice some democracy in order to govern through the conservative elite. He never considered independence an option.

Aguinaldo, on the run and increasingly desperate, put his faith in a Democratic victory in the U.S. elections of 1900. In September he launched attacks designed to disillusion the American electorate with the war. They boomeranged, for the Filipinos' initial successes were followed by crippling U.S. counterattacks. The election was a huge disappointment to the Philippine cause. Bryan made "imperialism" the primary issue of his campaign, berating his opponent for denying the Filipino people their rights, but he failed to shake the popularity of McKinley's foreign and domestic policies. The president swept to reelection by the largest electoral margin since 1872, and Republicans also won majorities in both houses. The victory gave MacArthur the opportunity to toughen his tactics and further weaken Aguinaldo's forces.

Finally, on March 23, 1901, the rebel leader was captured in northern Luzon via a brilliant ruse designed by a flamboyant Kansan, Colonel Frederick Funston. After a harrowing hundred-mile march, Funston, accompanied by an eighty-man detachment of loyal Filipino Macabebe troops, infiltrated Aguinaldo's camp. The Macabebes impersonated rebel soldiers, while Funston and four other Americans masqueraded as their prisoners. Aguinaldo was seized and returned to Manila, where MacArthur, to Taft's horror, treated him like a guest in his palace. The flattery paid off. In a near replica of what he had done with the Spanish in 1897, Aguinaldo issued a proclamation entreating the guerrillas to stop fighting and the Philippine people to recognize American authority. Although the war continued for more than a year, the capture and defection of the Filipino leader had determined its outcome.

Root now moved to bury the independence movement and establish American civilian control over the Philippines. He had prepared his ground carefully. He had disparaged Aguinaldo's claim to authority by unfairly representing him as a military dictator and a "Chinese half-breed" and arguing that he represented only one tribe out of sixty.

Citing Schurman and Taft, he had scoffed at assertions that the Filipinos were ready for self-government. He had quoted back to Schurz the great anti-imperialist's fashionable belief that democracy does not thrive in the tropics. He had developed an elaborate argument, based on Jefferson's congressional authority to govern the Louisiana Territory, to overturn the hallowed principle set forth in the Declaration of Independence that government derives its just powers from the consent of the governed.

Root's policy toward the Philippines, as toward Puerto Rico and Guam, profited from a series of three decisions by the Supreme Court in 1901 that determined the status of the new island possessions. In these Insular Cases, Attorney General John W. Griggs, arguing personally before the Court, successfully established that the Constitution did not automatically apply to the people of an annexed territory or confer on them all the privileges of U.S. citizenship. The Court ruled that only Congress could extend such constitutional provisions. This finding allowed Root to maintain the islands in a colonial status, in contrast with territories in the continental United States. As he said in interpreting the decision, "As near as I can make out the Constitution follows the flag—but doesn't quite catch up with it."

One issue remained to be resolved. The Treaty of Paris stipulated that the "civil rights and political status" of the native inhabitants of the islands taken from Spain "shall be determined by the Congress." Root wanted to transfer that authority to the executive branch. He worked closely with the scholarly Republican senator from Wisconsin John C. Spooner on an amendment that would vest in the president "all military, civil, and judicial powers necessary to govern the Philippine Islands." Although Senate Democrats, plus that protector of senatorial prerogatives Henry Cabot Lodge, were wary about this massive derogation of legislative power, the amendment went through on March 2, 1901.

As it happened, the Spooner Amendment on the Philippines and the Platt Amendment on Cuba both were attached to the same army appropriations bill. In one piece of legislation, Congress had given the president considerable power in Cuba, which was to become nominally independent, and nearly total power in the Philippines, which was to remain a colony. Root was responsible for both accretions of executive authority. Comfortable as he was with power, he was also mindful of the responsibilities that went with it. The last thing he wanted in the Philippines was a continuation of military dictatorship under the likes of MacArthur. Effective July 4, 1901, he appointed Taft civil governor of the Philippines, to exercise all the civil duties previously exercised by the military governor. The military governor was left in control of those areas, now quite few, in which public order had not been restored. Mr. Dooley noted the contradiction between military and civilian rule in quoting his "frind" Taft: "[I]vry wanst in a while whin I think iv it, an illiction is held. Unforchnitly it usually happens that those illicted have not yet surrindhered."

Root understood that in the new conditions it would be impossible for a demoted MacArthur, susceptible to the smallest bruise to his ego, to work with Taft. The general was relieved and replaced by General Adna Chaffee, who had won praise as commander of the American expeditionary force in China during the Boxer Rebellion. Root held Chaffee on a short leash, warning him that his duties would be strictly military. To Taft he wrote that Chaffee "should get the Army out of the business of government and restore it to its proper and natural place as an adjunct of civil government." As head of the army Root might have been expected to expand its powers into the civilian realm. But as an admirer of British colonial policy, which had placed powerful colonial governors in charge of India, Egypt, and South Africa, he was determined to put Filipinos under clear civilian authority with as many of the protections of the American constitutional system as possible. But he remained equally determined not to make them sovereign. He wrote in 1904 that independence would be "the most fatal possible gift to the people of the Philippine Islands."

5.

For the first two years of American colonial rule in Cuba and the Philippines, Theodore Roosevelt was a bystander, though a highly interested one. From the statehouse in Albany and his house in Oyster Bay, he deluged friends in high places with cascades of analysis and advice. He reacted to Aguinaldo's February 1899 insurrection in Manila with a diatribe against his goo-goo bugbears: "[O]ur friends, the peace-at-any-price Senators and publicists have on their shoulders a heavy load of responsibility." He showered Secretary of State

Hay with praise for the passage of the Treaty of Paris following "the most important year this Republic has seen since Lincoln died": "You have indeed led a life eminently worth living, oh writer of books and doer of deeds!" He lectured Lodge unnecessarily that "unyielding resolution" was the key to victory in the Philippines.

Though meddlesome and belligerent, Roosevelt also showed some sensitivity to the political complexities of America's new imperial obligations. In a long letter to Hay in July 1899, he observed that Puerto Ricans seemed to regret the end of Spanish rule; they must therefore be given "the best type of government." He pushed Wood for the top job in Havana because "we need tact and judgment just as much as we need firmness in Cuba now." By contrast, the war in the Philippines awakened his primordial bellicosity. Tact, judgment, and good government gave way to the need to "smash the insurgents in every way until they are literally beaten into peace." He met with the president shortly after his letter to the secretary of state, presumably to press those points.

A few months later, to another correspondent, Roosevelt exhibited his continued fidelity to the martial spirit: "Oversentimentality, oversoftness, in fact, washiness and mushiness are the great dangers of this age and of this people. Unless we keep the barbarian virtues, gaining the civilized ones will be of little avail. . . . A nation that cannot fight is not worth its salt, no matter how cultivated and refined it may be." Along with the "barbarian virtues" went his core belief in the ennobling qualities of conquest, which he hoped would enhance the American character as in his view, they had enhanced the English. "I am an expansionist," he admitted to Finley Peter Dunne, who was certainly not one.

Roosevelt's deep interest in America's new global mission did not divert him from being a reformist governor in his short two-year term in Albany. His greatest obstacle was Tom Platt, ensconced in Washington as a U.S. senator but still the powerful boss of the state Republican machine and a man full of distrust for Roosevelt and his reformist ideas. For both political and personal reasons, Roosevelt had either to co-opt or to neutralize Platt, who, if antagonized, was strong enough to defeat his legislative program and even to destroy his career. The young governor approached the task with Machiavellian subtlety. He wrote Platt adulatory, sometimes even obsequious letters

and met him regularly on Saturdays in New York City, neutral ground between Albany and Washington. Avoiding Platt's headquarters at the Fifth Avenue Hotel, Roosevelt used Corinne's or Bamie's apartment. Before his appointment to Washington, Root, with a foot in both camps, often attended; so did Bamie, whose political judgment her brother always esteemed. Roosevelt's careful handling of Platt proved indispensable because he had resolved on a reform program for the state that would be anathema to the conservative boss.

The issue was joined when the governor supported legislation to tax corporations on the public franchises they controlled, a blow at big business and at Platt's machine. Close as he was to Roosevelt, Root, then still a corporation lawyer, opposed the legislation to the point that it caused a temporary rift between the two men. Platt was as livid as his smooth demeanor allowed. He accused Roosevelt of being "a little loose on the relations of capital and labor," as well as "altruistic" and "populist." The boss squirmed and maneuvered, but Roosevelt won. For good measure, he also succeeded in dismissing the machine-backed superintendent of insurance, a corrupt official in the pocket of the large insurance companies. That was enough for Platt, who decided that Roosevelt had to be removed from New York to a position where he could wield no power and do no harm. Platt publicly suggested that Roosevelt should be the Republican candidate for vice president in 1900.

As Platt and Roosevelt both knew, the vice presidency was a political graveyard. In fact, McKinley's first vice president, a New Jersey politician with no prospects named Garret A. Hobart, died in office. No vice president since Thomas Jefferson had directly succeeded a living president. Roosevelt emphatically did not want the job. He considered it a boring figurehead position, "an irksome, wearisome place where I could do nothing," and a financial drain as well. The costly social obligations would overwhelm the modest annual salary of eight thousand dollars. Though he did not talk about it much, Roosevelt wanted to be president in 1904, after McKinley had finished his second term. He attended a Rough Rider reunion in New Mexico in June 1899 and was thrilled by the crowds thronging the stations along the way, "exactly as if I had been a presidential candidate." He disembarked in Kansas for a chat with William Allen White, the newspaper editor, who immediately wrote: "He is more than a presidential possi-

bility in 1904, he is a presidential probability. . . . He is the coming American of the twentieth century."

For Roosevelt 1899 was not too soon to consider possible paths to the Executive Mansion. The vice presidency was for him the least promising of them. He preferred to run for reelection as governor and for a while persuaded himself that he would have Platt's support. But the hardening enmity of Platt's Republican machine and of the large corporations began to erode his belief in the viability of a second term. For this intensely ambitious governor, the other options were not much better. He continued to covet a place in the foreign affairs spotlight and would have liked to run American policy in the Philippines, either as governor general or as secretary of war. Unfortunately the first position would open too late, not until after Aguinaldo's uprising had been quelled. The second would open too soon; by early 1899 Secretary Alger, thanks partly to Roosevelt's sniping, was on the way out, but Roosevelt was inconveniently just beginning his term as governor. When McKinley appointed Root secretary of war in July 1899, Roosevelt was surprised and a bit jealous, but he had already told the president that he himself could not be a candidate for the position. He briefly considered the Senate, not a natural habitat for such an energetic executive, but was blocked here as well since Platt was planning to run again in 1900 and Roosevelt considered the boss unchallengeable.

As usual, the adviser with the steadiest and surest instincts was Roosevelt's old friend Lodge, who argued consistently that the vice presidency was the best alternative: "If I were a candidate for the Presidency I would take the Vice-Presidency in a minute." Roosevelt admitted Lodge's logic (though Edith did not) but continued to resist. As he mulled his other options, his friend took the initiative of securing agreement in principle from a cautious McKinley that Roosevelt would be an acceptable running mate. As a sweetener, Lodge also suggested to Roosevelt that once Aguinaldo's insurrection was overcome, Roosevelt might move from vice president to governor general of the Philippines. Lodge also persuaded Platt, with little difficulty, to say that Roosevelt had "merely to say the word to have the V.P." Roosevelt, though flattered by Lodge's devotion and activity, continued to ignore his advice. As he wrote Bamie, "the dear old goose actually regards me as a presidential possibility of the future, which always makes me thoroughly exasperated. . . ."

Throughout 1899 and early 1900 Roosevelt debated with himself and with his friends. Much as he despised the vice presidency, he never fully wrote it off. Also, much as he proclaimed his desire to run for a second term in New York, he never could dismiss the dangers. He admitted to Bamie that his chances of reelection in New York were no better than even and that even if he won a second term, the Democrats would probably turn the Republicans out in 1902, auguring for him a decline into obscurity. Still, he persevered. "I myself realize all these chances, but am not only willing, but anxious, to take them," he told his sister.

Lodge persisted. Two months before the Republican National Convention, set for June 1900, he put it to Roosevelt squarely: "If you go to that Convention . . . as a delegate, as I see stated in the newspapers, you will be nominated, . . . and if you are nominated in that Convention you will be unable to refuse." Playing on Roosevelt's Republican loyalties, Lodge circled back to the 1884 convention, when he and Roosevelt had resolved to remain true to the party: "The general feeling is that you are the one man for the Vice-Presidency among those who are looking solely for the interests of the party at large." But he warned that if Roosevelt refused the nomination, he would harm his future national prospects.

In May Roosevelt made a reconnaissance trip to Washington to see the president and apparently to explain why he should not be on the ticket. He seems nevertheless to have expected to be talked out of his reluctance and was outraged when McKinley took him at his word. Hay chortled to a mutual friend: "Teddy has been here; have you heard of it? It was more fun than a goat. He came down with a sombre resolution thrown on his strenuous brow to let McKinley and Hanna know once and for all that he would not be Vice President, and found to his stupefaction that nobody in Washington except Platt had ever dreamed of such a thing."

Despite (or perhaps because of) Lodge's prediction, Roosevelt did attend the convention—"I would be looked upon as rather a coward if I didn't go"—made himself as conspicuous as possible in a cowboy hat, and was nominated easily. Only Roosevelt's old nemesis Mark

Hanna expressed fury at the party's decision. "Don't any of you realize," he exploded with more foresight than anybody could know, "that there's only one life between this madman and the Presidency?" Lodge, in order to elevate him, and Platt, in order to get rid of him, had colluded to push Roosevelt into high national office. In the end their victim was all too happy to jump into the briar patch. After the convention he wrote Bamie: "The thing could not be helped. There were two entirely different forces at work. The first was the desire to get me out of New York. . . . [The second] was the feeling of the great bulk of the Republicans that I could strengthen the National ticket and they wanted me on it at all hazards. . . . While of course I should have preferred to stay where there was more work, I would be both ungrateful and a fool not to be deeply touched by the way in which I was nominated." To Lodge he wrote: "Well, old man, I am completely reconciled and I believe it all for the best as regards my own personal interests and it is a great load of personal anxiety off me."

Roosevelt waged the most active vice presidential campaign in history, arguing that McKinley's policy of expansion was neither imperialism nor militarism but a vital part of the history of America from the day it became a nation. In citing the movement west, subject of his own four-volume study, and the acquisition of Florida, Alaska, and Hawaii, he contended that 1898 had brought "no new departures." Driving out Spain was actually "anti-imperialistic," and fighting Aguinaldo was in the interests of the majority of Filipinos. Under Aguinaldo they would simply be put at the mercy of a syndicate of "Chinese half-breeds" (the favored Republican term of art for Aguinaldo), under whom "corruption would flourish far more freely than ever it flourished under Tweed." Tempering his belligerence slightly, Roosevelt did add that the Filipinos "must, of course, be governed primarily in the interests of their own citizens. Our first care must be for the people of the islands who have come under our guardianship as a result of the most righteous foreign war that has been waged within the memory of the present generation."

McKinley's landslide victory, to which Roosevelt's popularity and vigorous campaigning undoubtedly contributed, made the forty-two-year-old governor nominally the second man in the United States. To prepare for his onerous duties as vice president, he took himself off to Colorado for five weeks in pursuit of cougars. (He killed twelve.) After

the swearing in he exercised his constitutional role of presiding over the Senate for less than one week, whereupon Congress adjourned for eight months. Roosevelt found the vice presidency just as boring as he had feared. Alfred Mahan consoled him as if he were a convalescent: "You are withdrawn perforce, and not by your own volition, for a prolonged rest from the responsibilities and cares of office." Mahan even compared his situation to Saint Paul's four years of "enforced inactivity" in prison.

Except for a week or two in Washington, Roosevelt divided most of his vice presidential term between Oyster Bay and hunting trips in the West. It was clear that McKinley saw him only as a campaign asset, not as an adviser. To friends Roosevelt complained that the president "does not intend that I shall have any influence of any kind, sort or description in the administration from the top to the bottom." His analysis of the problem was accurate: "Neither he nor Hanna (although I really like both) sympathize with my feelings or feel comfortable about me, because they cannot understand what it is that makes me act in certain ways at certain times, and therefore think me indiscreet and overimpulsive." He told Wood that the vice presidency was "an utterly anomalous office" that ought to be abolished. "The man who occupies it may at any moment be everything, but meanwhile he is practically nothing." In general, in his own words, this was a "time of slack water."

It was also a time of long-range political planning. His popularity with the crowds in Illinois, Missouri, and Kansas along his route to Colorado in August had started the political sap rising. When he returned, he sent Lodge, who was traveling in Europe, a detailed analysis of his presidential chances for 1904, based on the support he was shown in the West. "The trip was a revelation to me . . . the men who spoke to me were not nobodies." On the negative side was his belief that his own state of New York would be against him, but he felt confident about New England and parts of the South. A week after his letter to Lodge, he wrote William Allen White that he was working out a presidential strategy.

The irony of this planning was that it was unnecessary. Ten days after Roosevelt's letter to White, on September 6, 1901, President McKinley was shot by a deranged young man at the mammoth Pan-American Exposition in Buffalo. As the assailant was knocked down

and beaten and the stricken president helped to a chair, McKinley, courteous to the last, said, "Don't let them hurt him," then implored an aide to take care how he informed the president's wife. McKinley hung on for eight days, during which time there was hope for his recovery. But gangrene set in, and he died on September 14.

McKinley died as he had lived, an enigmatic figure. The most pacific and civil of men, he had nevertheless launched a war that led to the subjugation of Cuba and Puerto Rico and to a three-year conflict in the Philippines. He never could bring himself to be proud of what he had accomplished. The year before his death, as the U.S. Army was locked in the conflict with Aguinaldo's forces, he confided to his former private secretary that "the declaration of war against Spain was an act which has been and will always be the greatest grief of my life." Whether he liked it or not, McKinley's greatest legacy was America's overseas empire. His next greatest was the quality of the men he chose to run it. Henry Adams was right that he was a "magnificent manager of men." Hay for the State Department, Wood for Cuba, Root for the War Department, and Taft for the Philippines: All were McKinley's personal choices, and the last two were unexpected and unorthodox. All four made a genuine effort to carry out McKinley's wish that the United States should govern for the benefit of the native populations. McKinley also selected Roosevelt twice—for assistant secretary of the navy and for vice president—although both times he made the choice with well-founded trepidation.

Roosevelt had sped to Buffalo from an island in Lake Champlain after receiving word of the shooting, then left the president's bedside when he improved. The news of McKinley's death found him in an even more remote place, a mountain in the Adirondacks. Having rushed back to Buffalo, he was sworn in as the twenty-sixth president of the United States in the library of the house in which he had stayed the week before. Root, the senior cabinet official present, presided. In formulaic and reassuring words on taking the oath of office, Roosevelt pledged to continue the policy of President McKinley "for the peace, the prosperity, and the honor of our beloved country." In a mixture of humility and resolve, he wrote Lodge the week after: "It is a dreadful thing to come into the Presidency this way; but it would be a far worse thing to be morbid about it. Here is the task, and I have got to do it to the best of my ability; and that is all there is about it."

Thus Theodore Roosevelt achieved, by tragic accident, the goal on which he had set his heart for most of his adult life. It is perhaps too much to state categorically that he would never have won it without the wisdom and persistence of Henry Cabot Lodge. Roosevelt was after all the most dynamic politician in the United States and one of the youngest. With or without Lodge, his chances for the presidency would have seemed bright. Still, Lodge gave him two things he lacked, self-confidence and an effective political strategy. Except for the governorship of New York, which fell in Roosevelt's lap, Lodge was involved in virtually every career move that made him a phenomenon in American politics: the decision not to quit the party in 1884, the decision to go on the Civil Service Commission, the decision to accept New York City police commissioner, the campaign to become assistant secretary of the navy, the difficult decision to run for vice president. Roosevelt credited Lodge with all his successes. Even before McKinley's death, he wrote his friend: "You are the only man whom, in all my life, I have met who has repeatedly and in every way done for me what I could not do for myself, and what nobody else could do, and done it in a way that merely makes me glad to be under obligation to you."

Young as he was—not yet forty-three, the youngest president in history—Roosevelt was superbly prepared for the office. He was a war hero and a popular writer who had held high political office in city, state, and national government. He was known and respected in all parts of the country. Moreover, having gained an office for which he had not run, he was not saddled with the usual campaign commitments. At the same time, he had inherited McKinley's problems without having had the prior opportunity to deal with them on any level beyond the rhetorical. Not the least of these problems was the war in the Philippines, which was winding down but also growing more brutal and provoking more intense criticism in the United States. It was now Roosevelt's war.

6.

The new president's private views about the Philippines were more thoughtful than the militant themes he had hammered during the 1900 campaign. He was still a militarist, an expansionist, and a wor-

shiper of British imperialism, but part of him doubted the justice and stamina of a colonial vocation for the United States. Two months before McKinley's assassination, for example, he wrote a New York lawyer: "While I have never varied in my feeling that we had to hold the Philippines, I have varied very much in my feelings whether we were to be considered fortunate or unfortunate in having to hold them, and I most earnestly hope that the trend of events will as speedily as may be justify us in leaving them. . . . I am perfectly clear that we do not want to expand over another people capable of self-government unless that people desires to go with us—and not necessarily even then." Even on the Caribbean, he sounded strikingly moderate: "Barring the possible necessity of fortifying the Isthmian canal, or getting a naval station, I hope it will not become our duty to take a foot of soil south of us."

There was, however, no ambivalence in his first public treatment of colonial issues in his first message to Congress in December 1901. He defended the acquisition of Hawaii and the Spanish islands, called for strengthening the Monroe Doctrine against European threats, urged a near doubling of battleship construction, and advocated the building of an isthmian canal as "one of those great works which only a great nation can undertake with prospects of success." He made a bow toward self-government in the Philippines but not at the cost of abandoning them: "To leave the islands at this time would mean that they would fall into a welter of murderous anarchy. Such dereliction of duty on our part would be a crime against humanity."

On the ground, the Philippine war had become dirtier as it fragmented into a series of regional struggles. In a classic, if one-sided, description of the challenge of guerrilla war to an army unaccustomed to it, Root told the Congress after it had ended that U.S. forces were

> required to crush out a general system of guerrilla warfare conducted among a people speaking unknown tongues, from whom it was almost impossible to obtain the information necessary for successful pursuit or to guard against surprise and ambush.
>
> The enemies by whom they were surrounded were regardless heedless of all obligations of good faith and of all the limitations which humanity has imposed upon civilized warfare. Bound themselves by the laws of war, our soldiers were called upon to meet every device of unscrupulous treachery and to contemplate without reprisal the infliction of barbarous cruelties upon their comrades and friendly natives. They were instructed, while punishing armed resistance, to conciliate the friendship of the peaceful, yet had to do so with a population among whom it was impossible to distinguish friend from foe, and who in countless instances, used a false appearance of friendship for ambush and assassination.

In support of his assertion that the Filipinos inflicted "barbarous cruelties," Root and other American spokesmen were wont to quote an order allegedly issued during the Battle of Manila by the rebel general Antonio Luna calling for the extermination of non-Filipinos. Whether the order was authentic or not, it was not an adequate description of Filipino behavior during the course of the war. Neither Aguinaldo nor his senior officers pursued a policy of systematic terrorism against Americans. In fact Aguinaldo insisted that American prisoners be treated humanely, and with some notable exceptions, they were. The exceptions were certainly barbaric. Some American prisoners were buried alive with their heads coated with molasses to attract ants; some had their feet cut off or their eyes gouged out; some were simply shot.

The Filipino view of the morality of their guerrilla tactics was colored by the conviction that they were fighting in their own country for their own freedom and that the Americans were invaders sent to crush a native revolution. The guerrillas were systematically savage with Filipinos who opposed them, particularly those who had collaborated with the Americans. Rebel-committed atrocities increased toward the end of the war as the pacification program took hold, the insurgents suffered severe military losses, and the U.S. Army started to execute guerrillas for war crimes.

For its part, the American command adopted, and sought to implement, principles of humane conduct. The strong instructions to the Schurman and Taft commissions to act in the interests of the Philippine people were reinforced by General Otis's April 1899 military directive calling for "kind and considerate treatment" of Philippine citizens. American military occupiers were also restrained by General Orders 100, signed by Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War and en-

joining U.S. troops to maintain order, respect private property, and treat the local population justly and humanely. These inhibitions did not apply to continued resistance, however; retaliation against guerrillas was condoned. McKinley, Taft, and Otis believed strongly in the morality of their actions; they believed that the war was by and large clean and that they were altruistically assisting a backward civilization with schools, hospitals, and roads.

That was not, however, the way many officers and men saw the war. The cruder among them dismissed the Filipinos as small, dark, and treacherous barbarians and defined the army's mission as pushing them out of the way. Racial slurs abounded; the rebels were "niggers," "savages," or "goo-goos." (The other "goo-goos," the anti-imperialists at home, were subjected to the same invective by the troops.) The experience of generals and other officers in fighting Indians contributed to the view that the Filipinos should be handled in the same way. One Kansas soldier told a reporter: "The country won't be pacified until the niggers are killed off like the Indians." In fact the triumphal spirit with which American soldiers looked back on the conquest of the West became a corrupting motivation in the war against Filipinos.

Taft's civic program did not go down well with such soldiers, who believed that it weakened their military purpose and dignified a malicious enemy. A jingle made the rounds of the camps satirizing the governor's reference to the Filipinos as "little brown brothers":

They say I've got brown brothers here,
But still I draw the line.
He may be a brother of Big Bill Taft,
But he ain't no brother of mine.

An even coarser marching song castigated the enemy in tones both frustrated and aggressive:

Damn, damn, damn the Filipinos!
Cut-throat Khakiac ladrones [thieves]!
Underneath the starry flag
Civilize them with a Krag
And return us to our beloved home.

The pacification policy favored by Otis and Taft—a "grandmotherish system," according to one private—was not based on civilizing them "with a Krag." But Otis's successor MacArthur began to downplay pacification in the interest of harsher methods aimed at military successes; he initiated or augmented coercive and brutal measures that stretched the restraints in the general orders. In parts of the country MacArthur adopted a "concentration" policy of herding civilians into "protected zones," outside which the army could treat everyone as an enemy. The similarity with General Weyler's reconcentration policy in Cuba was not lost on the anti-imperialists at home, although the American version was less widespread and less costly in human lives.

Outside the "protected zones," the Americans launched a campaign of property destruction, mostly by wholesale burnings. General Samuel Young, a cavalry brigade commander who had won Roosevelt's admiration in Cuba, considered "the judicious application of the torch" the most humane way of waging a conflict between races. Unfortunately, Young's brand of humanity consisted of burning to the ground villages suspected of sympathy to the guerrillas, sometimes with the villagers inside their houses. He also advocated to his superiors the summary execution of guerrillas.

Retributive tortures and executions increased. MacArthur ordered that captured guerrillas be denied prisoner of war status. Thus it became easier for American soldiers to take revenge for such enemy tactics as attacks by guerrillas disguised as civilians, violations of flags of truce, and the torture of U.S. prisoners. Torture became a common American practice during searches for information or weapons. Senior officers, if not confronted with evidence of torture, often looked the other way. Some officers were themselves liable to murderous behavior; the charismatic Funston was one. He bragged in one case of executing twenty-four prisoners in revenge for a fellow officer butchered by rebels; in another he boasted of hanging thirty-five civilians suspected of rebel activity. The most notorious interrogation technique was the so-called water cure, in which (as described by an eyewitness) "the victim is laid flat on his back and held down by his tormentors. Then a bamboo tube is thrust into his mouth and some dirty water, the filthier the better, is poured down his unwilling

throat." This form of torture, which sometimes proved fatal, was never officially sanctioned but was in common use.

Toward the end of the war, after Roosevelt had become president, atrocities on both sides multiplied. General Chaffee proved to be as tough a commander as his predecessor MacArthur. He authorized General J. Franklin Bell to carry out a murderous sweep of Batangas Province in southwestern Luzon. Acting under orders he had written himself, Bell ordered the execution of prisoners by lot in retaliation for assassinations. He punished priests, local officials, and community leaders for refusing to provide information. He told his men that the innocent must inevitably suffer with the guilty and encouraged young officers to act without restraint or senior review. Taking MacArthur's protected zones approach to its limit, Bell forced villagers into camps, then destroyed what was outside: crops, animals, houses, even human beings. Even after he knew of the deadly results of Bell's zeal, Chaffee endorsed his approach as necessary.

The most baleful encounter of the war occurred on the eastern island of Samar at Balangiga. The American company commander, an idealistic and priggish West Pointer named Thomas W. Connell, had set out to improve the morals of the village and of his own troops. Somehow he managed to antagonize both sides; worse, his intelligence failed to pick up the hundred guerrillas who had infiltrated a native work crew. At reveille on a Sunday morning, the guerrillas threw off their disguises and attacked. Connell, his two fellow officers, and fifty-six American soldiers were killed, some horribly mutilated.

It was the worst massacre of American soldiers since Custer's debacle at Little Bighorn a quarter century before, and it provoked a bloody retaliation. Chaffee gave the Samar command to General Jacob Smith, one of the most primitive of the American officers and a veteran of the U.S. massacre of Sioux Indians at Wounded Knee in 1890. Smith's orders, according to the testimony of a subordinate, were: "I want no prisoners. I wish you to kill and burn, the more you kill and burn the better it will please me. I want all persons killed who are capable of bearing arms in actual hostilities against the United States." Asked the minimum age of a person capable of bearing arms, Smith replied, "Ten years of age." He later allegedly declared that "the interior of Samar must be made a howling wilderness."

Whether Smith actually made the statements attributed to him, he and his subordinates acted as if he had. The Samar campaign was characterized by wholesale destruction of property, execution of prisoners, kidnapping of civilians, and outright murder. When American marines came upon any possessions belonging to a soldier massacred at Balangiga, they killed virtually everyone in the area. The conduct of American forces on Samar under Smith, as well as in Batangas under Bell, departed further from the laws of war than U.S. actions in any other parts of the Philippines. Smith was court-martialed and convicted in May 1902. But after the war Generals Young, Chaffee, and Bell, three of the most ruthless American commanders in the Philippines, were named successively by Roosevelt as army chiefs of staff, an indication of what the president, even on reflection, really thought about the harshness of the U.S. Army's conduct.

Roosevelt was close to General Chaffee; he had fought alongside him in Cuba and had helped persuade McKinley to give him the Philippine command. As president Roosevelt encouraged Chaffee in his tough approach toward the rebels. He did not want to hear bad news about atrocities, and he dismissed the attacks by Twain, Hoar, and the other goo-goos as serving the enemy. It was unfortunate that the only case made from inside the government on behalf of the victims of the army's brutality should have been pursued by General Miles, the army chief of staff and a man universally despised as vain and ambitious by Roosevelt and his cabinet.

Miles made an inspection tour of the Philippines with the president's reluctant acquiescence. He returned with scathing evidence against Bell and others and publicized his findings, enraging a president who had assured his secretary of war that "the warfare in the Philippines has been conducted by our troops with very great leniency." In retaliation Roosevelt prevailed on France to withdraw the award of the Legion of Honor that had been planned for Miles. The chief of staff's efforts did lead to the trial of three more officers, including Major Edwin Glenn, a notorious sadist who admitted to ordering forty-seven prisoners bayoneted and clubbed to death. All three were acquitted on the ground that they were simply following General Chaffee's orders to gain information "no matter what measures have to be adopted."

Roosevelt's natural militancy, plus his desire to end the war, would

probably have blinded him to reports of brutality by American forces even if they had not been spread by his domestic enemies. Several months later, in a more reflective mood, he wrote a German friend, the diplomat Hermann Speck von Sternberg, that "there have been some blots on the record." He seemed most disturbed by officers "talking with loose and violent brutality" and singled out General Smith for having spoken about "shooting niggers." But Roosevelt dismissed the water cure as an "old Filipino method of mild torture" in which "nobody was seriously damaged," and his summary arguments to Speck would not have inspired confidence in his humane convictions: "I have taken care that the army should understand that I thoroughly believe in severe measures when necessary, and am not in the least sensitive about killing any number of men if there is adequate reason. But I do not like torture or needless brutality of any kind, and I do not believe in the officers of high rank continually using language which is certain to make the less intelligent or more brutal of their subordinates commit occasional outrages."

The outcry in the American press about atrocities was so strong that the Senate, pushed by Hoar, held hearings beginning in January 1902. Lodge, as head of the Standing Committee on the Philippines, was in the chair. He was not sympathetic to the charges against the army or to investigating them. His own view of the war was narrow: "We make no hypocritical pretense of being interested in the Philippines solely on account of others. While we regard the welfare of these people as a sacred trust, we regard the welfare of the American people first." He ensured that favorable witnesses dominated the hearings and tried to turn them against anti-imperialist critics. Taft, whose testimony took up most of the first month, was honest enough to admit occasional use of the water cure but contended that "there never was a war conducted, whether against inferior races or not, in which there were more compassion and more restraint and more generosity . . . than there have been in the Philippine Islands."

General R. P. Hughes, who had served under all three military commanders, did not help the hard-liners when he defended the U.S. Army's departure from the rules of civilized warfare by arguing that the Filipinos were not civilized. David P. Barrows, who had run the school system in the Philippines, downplayed the water cure as harmless and claimed incredibly that the natives flocked to the camps of

their own free will. The three former commanders made ineffective witnesses. Admiral Dewey used the hearings to backtrack on his earlier expressed admiration for Aguinaldo. General Otis maintained that the war had ended when he departed two years before and claimed that Spanish and other European military observers laughed at the Americans "for the humanity we exercised." General MacArthur numbed his audience with an impenetrable bombast that rarely touched on the Philippines. Senator Beveridge removed from the transcript the criticisms of the army by other witnesses before publishing it as a Senate document.

Root believed, as he said in a letter in 1899, that "it is not a function of law to enforce the rules of morality." He had paid no attention to charges of atrocity until the Senate hearings alerted him to this major public relations problem. His first instinct was to defend the army with a show of reasonableness. He rushed into print a white paper purporting to show that brutal conduct by American soldiers was rare and was severely punished. The anti-imperialists had a field day with the document. Moorfield Storey published a long pamphlet claiming that the trials were pro forma and the punishments light and that Root was guilty of suppressing or misstating information. Storey cited one instance in which Root buried a report, filed by a West Pointer serving as governor in a province adjoining Batangas, that charged General Bell with causing one hundred thousand deaths. Storey's verdict was that Root "was silent in the face of certain knowledge and by his silence he made himself responsible for all that was done with his acquiescence."

As there was mounting evidence of atrocities, especially General Smith's rampage in Samar, Root became more attentive to moral principle. He ordered courts-martial for officers accused of using the water cure and also pressed for military trials of mid-level officers involved in other atrocities. He was probably behind Smith's court-martial, which was opposed by Chaffee, the military commander, who may have feared he would be next in the dock. But Root had no answer to the army's judicial leniency; except for Smith, the most infamous, if not the most egregious, example the culprits were getting off lightly. In April 1902 Root issued a tardy but strong instruction to Chaffee—immediately leaked to the press by the administration—on the subject of courts-martial:

> you will spare no effort . . . to uncover every such case which may have occurred and bring the offenders to justice.
>
> The President desires to know in the fullest and most circumstantial manner all the facts, nothing being concealed, and no man being for any reason favored or shielded. . . . Great as the provocation has been in dealing with foes who habitually resort to treachery, murder and torture against our men, nothing can justify or will be held to justify, the use of torture or inhuman conduct of any kind on the part of the American Army.

Had instructions of this rigor been issued earlier in the war, many atrocities might have been prevented. Of all people, Root, with his passion for the establishment of civil government in the Philippines, should have seen the damage military brutality did to the aims of pacification. Yet even after the war's end Root remained defensive. Acts of cruel and inhuman treatment, he said in September 1902, "were not justified, and they could not be justified, but spread over years of conflict, over a vast extent of territory, over thousands of engagements and skirmishes and expeditions, in which, first and last, 130,000 of our troops were engaged, they were few and far between—exceptions in a uniform course of self-restraint, humanity and kindness." The laxity of his moral standards could be measured by his praise of the execrable Funston as "gallant and fearless." The defender of Boss Tweed had once again let his lawyerly instincts overcome his moral sense.

Roosevelt, like Root, was embarrassed but not outraged by the atrocities. In May 1902 he told Root to have Taft appoint a commission to report on the conduct of General Chaffee and "whether or not any brutalities or indignities are inflicted by the army upon the natives." The president suggested it be composed of three men, including one Filipino. The commission turned out to be a whitewash operation and seems to have been intended as such. On the basis of its investigations the president reported to the Congress that there had been "individual instances of wrong-doing" accounted for by the climate and native provocations but that the guilty, like General Smith, had been sought out and punished. On the whole, Roosevelt reported, "few indeed have been the instances in which war has been waged by a civilized power against semi-civilized or barbarous forces where there has been so little wrong-doing by the victors as in the Philippine Islands."

On July 4, 1902, the president declared the war officially over, calling it the most glorious war in the nation's history. Pockets of resistance remained in Luzon, Samar, and—most tenaciously—Mindanao, where a Muslim sect (the Moros) harassed the American occupiers for decades. When Wood became military governor of Moro province in 1903, he fought the rebels with such ruthlessness that Mark Twain and other anti-imperialists accused him of massacres. John J. Pershing made his career in fighting the Moros; Roosevelt jumped his promotion to brigadier general after his first campaign against them. But these military side issues apart, America had won the war, though how gloriously is debatable. It had cost the United States some four hundred million dollars, twenty times the price paid to Spain for the Philippines. U.S. killed were 4,234, a creditable casualty rate for a three-year engagement; Shafter had lost 1,000 in Cuba in only three weeks. By U.S. Army estimates Filipino military losses were about 20,000. As in Cuba, there were many civilian deaths from disease—up to 200,000, according to most estimates.

While the U.S. Army was fighting the rebels in the Philippines, the scramble for Africa by the European powers was just ending. How the Americans dealt with Filipinos on their own territory warrants comparison with the European treatment of native Africans on theirs. Unlike the American experience in the Pacific, much of European colonialism in Africa was driven by explorers rather than governments, which were reluctant to assume the costs of exploration. Adventurers like Henry Morton Stanley and Cecil Rhodes operated with a latitude that American military officers did not have; these and other empire builders were prone to promiscuous violence.

The comparison is most apt in African areas where European governments were directly involved. At their worst they far surpassed the Americans in brutality. King Leopold II of Belgium presided over a rapacious system in the Congo designed to extract rubber through the use of forced labor; its effect on the population was genocidal. In Southwest Africa the German military commander issued an "extermination order" against the members of a rebellious tribe. On pain of being shot if found on German territory, men, women, and children were driven into the desert, where more than twenty thousand died.

Even the British, so admired by Roosevelt, Root, and Hay, had their lapses. The famous General Horatio Kitchener commanded British troops in the Boer War, which was fought at the same time as the Philippine war, to put down a rebellion by Dutch inhabitants of southern Africa against British colonial rule. Kitchener set up a system of concentration camps—the euphemism was "camps of refuge"—into which he herded neutral Boer refugees and the families of Boers engaged in fighting the British. Outside the camps he burned the farms of combatants and drove off their horses and cattle. Inside the camps the hygiene was so poor that women and children died in droves of typhoid, dysentery, and measles, a third of the camp population, by one estimate. Far from being punished, Kitchener went on to become a field marshal, an earl, and a cabinet minister. As a result of the war won by his ruthless methods, the British government approved a constitution for a South African union that, to appease the Boers, was blatantly racist against the black population.

Against these European outrages—one of them perpetrated against a "civilized" people—American atrocities appeared less extreme. Nevertheless, they fell far short of the God-driven definition of American ideals that Beveridge and Lodge in the Senate and Roosevelt and Root in the administration persisted in using. If what America stood for in the world was so exceptional, as they asserted, then American standards were loftier than those of cynical Europe. In failing to meet them, the country failed not its European rivals but itself.

The Vietnam War of the 1960s and 1970s was the only other war in U.S. history to rival the Philippine war in provoking widespread condemnation by Americans. In one sense the wars were not really comparable. The Philippine conflict was a classical colonial war, whereas in Vietnam the United States was fighting to reestablish the authority of an internationally recognized local regime. The government of the Republic of Vietnam, through its weakness and corruption, proved as much a liability as an asset to the Americans. The Americans had a huge preponderance in firepower in Vietnam, much greater than in the Philippines, but here too the advantage was at least partly negated by the character of the war.

In virtually all other respects the American effort in the Philippines enjoyed assets that were lacking in the Vietnam counterinsurgency. They explain why the United States won the first war and lost the second. Aguinaldo had no recourse to outside aid, which helped the North Vietnamese forces narrow the military disparity. He did not have officers to compare with those of North Vietnam, who had gained valuable experience in their earlier successful rebellion against France. Nor could his forces use sanctuaries comparable to Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam itself. The Filipinos were disunited both ethnically and socially, while the North Vietnamese had on their side a common ethnicity, a strong ideology, and a willingness to sacrifice themselves. As William Bundy, an American official who helped prosecute the Vietnam War, observed, the North Vietnamese were prepared to die more than the Americans were prepared to kill.

Finally, the American pacification effort, which was to fail in Vietnam, proved in the Philippines a key factor in weakening rebel unity and support. Pacification had benefits that lasted beyond the war. The determination of Root and Taft to establish a legal and fair civil society as early as possible, even in wartime conditions, paid dividends. Pacification brought more democracy to Filipinos than other Asian peoples enjoyed; by 1907 the Philippines had the first elected legislature in Asia.

The Philippines had now become a vital possession and a necessity to America's status as a great power. If the United States rejected them, Lodge said on the floor of the Senate, "it would be inevitable that we should sink out from among the great powers of the world." The grand alternative, he proclaimed, was to "follow the laws of our being, the laws in obedience to which we have come to be what we are, and then we shall stretch out into the Pacific; we shall stand in the front rank of the world powers; we shall give to our labor and our industry new and larger and better opportunities . . . ; we shall prosper ourselves; and we shall benefit mankind." He concluded on a messianic note: "I do not believe that this nation was an accident. I do not believe that it is the creation of blind chance. I have faith that it has a great mission in the world—a mission of good, a mission of freedom."

With the end of the wars of 1898–1902, the United States was already, as Lodge said, "in the front rank of the world powers." Moreover, as Kipling predicted, Americans had been through "a savage war of peace" and had won it at some cost to their innocence. They now had colonial possessions in the Philippines and Puerto Rico

and a protectorate in Cuba. The first years of their colonial authority exposed characteristically American traits, both admirable and condemnable. A superior attitude toward the natives, sometimes descending into racism, prevailed on all three islands. It came in different varieties, from the soldiers' crude contempt for the "niggers" to the more intellectualized views of the civilian leaders that the local peoples were not ready for self-government. In both Cuba and the Philippines, the United States had behaved with considerable arrogance toward people who sought to map their own future on their own land and had thus managed to alienate an insurgent population that wanted to be on the American side.

At the same time, Americans deeply and generously felt an obligation to improve the condition of their colonial subjects. In the Senate this obligation could deteriorate into the bombast of Beveridge or the intolerance of Lodge. But Congress also tried to protect the Philippines and Cuba from predatory American business interests, liberalized the suffrage in Hawaii, and granted at least partial independence to Cuba. In the executive branch and in the field, reform was pursued with tenacity, setting American colonialism above its European (even its British) counterparts. Root was a colonial strategist of genius, and Wood and Taft were as effective colonial administrators as any in the world. The inspiration for their progressive approach came from William McKinley, who translated his own common decency and generous spirit into a genuine concern for the island peoples. Many of the best elements of American colonialism are traceable to this modest president.

Unfortunately America's leaders betrayed a timidity of approach that deprived them of what might have been admirable foreign policy achievements. American brutality in the Philippines could not be explained away by the exigencies of guerrilla warfare. Root, letting his legal instincts dominate his moral ones, was too cautious to take on the army, even though its chief of staff would have helped him. Roosevelt, in the early months of his presidency, was too obsessed with his vicarious experience with American Indians and the mystique of his Cuban exploits to do anything that smacked of weakness. In writing and action, he had crudely and blindly exalted the splendors of war, and he applied the same spurious euphoria to the grubby war in the Philippines, worrying more about what American commanders

said to their troops than about what they were doing to Filipino soldiers and civilians. Roosevelt and Root tolerated the atrocities, finding a scapegoat here and there but essentially explaining away and covering up. It was a black mark on Roosevelt's young presidency.

The Americans were also unwilling to devolve sovereignty on to peoples clearly eager to run their own affairs. Colonial administrators preferred to deal with conservative local oligarchs who often misled them about the strength of anti-American feelings in the population. Naïvely sensing popular support for their rule, they believed they were free to limit self-government. There were no early thoughts of awarding a higher status to Puerto Rico or the Philippines within the United States or of giving them independence, even though a large proportion of Filipinos had fought for their freedom. The Cuban solution was even murkier: independence with so many strings attached that significant elements of sovereignty remained with the United States. It was a poor outcome for Cuba, and not much better for the United States, which now had to influence Cuban affairs by remote control. If Root and his colonial managers had transformed their energy from a commendable paternalism to a greater trust in their colonial subjects, the new empire might have embarked on a course more in keeping with the richer elements of American tradition. As it was, the expansionist tradition overwhelmed the democratic one.