

11. The Imperial Presidency

1.

Theodore Roosevelt's presidency, from 1901 to 1909, marked the consolidation of the United States as a world power. Building on the triumphs of 1898, America became the dominant force in the Caribbean and a major presence in Asia. Its navy ranked with the best; Roosevelt sent it around the world in a show of strength that won the respect of some and aroused the consternation of others. It established a "special relationship," which would last out the century, with the foremost naval power, Great Britain. It came to be consulted on the important issues of the day; Roosevelt himself negotiated an end to the Russo-Japanese War. In the words of Alfred Mahan, now a full-time pundit, "Imperialism, the extension of national authority over alien communities, is a dominant note in the world-politics of today." With its new empire, small as it was compared with European colonial holdings, the United States had won a place at the table of world powers.

Roosevelt's first term, though truncated by half a year, was a particularly fecund period in the growth of America's status as a great power. Elihu Root, as secretary of war, established mechanisms for government in Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines. At the State Department John Hay was charged with clearing the diplomatic path toward the construction of an isthmian canal, securing hegemony in the Caribbean and Central America, establishing American credentials in the scramble to open up the enticing market with China, and resolving disputes with the British, including defining the boundary between Canada and Alaska. With hands-on leadership from an ac-

tivist president, Hay managed all these challenges with conspicuous success.

If Hay had not already been in office when President McKinley was assassinated, he would probably not have been Roosevelt's choice for secretary of state. The new president had promised continuity; keeping Hay and Root in place would fulfill that pledge. But Roosevelt gave an early indication of his opinion of the two men: he cancelled McKinley's plan to move the colonial administration from Root's war department to Hay's state department. The president kept Hay on because he was fond of him and because the secretary was highly regarded in the country. Roosevelt had a long and deep relationship with Hay, his father's friend and benefactor. He liked Hay's company, enjoyed his wit, and admired his modesty. "There was not in his nature the slightest touch of the demagogue," he told Lodge. After church on Sundays the president was given to stopping off at Hay's grand house on Lafayette Park for an hour's chat on his way back to the White House. When Hay gave him a ring containing a lock of Lincoln's hair, he wrote: "I wonder if you have any idea what your strength and wisdom and sympathy, what the guidance you have given me and the mere delight in your companionship, have meant to me."

Yet behind Hay's back and after his death, Roosevelt was not so respectful. He considered Hay weak in conviction, insufficiently committed to a muscular policy of expansion, and so friendly to Britain and hostile to Germany that he could not be trusted to deal with either. He ridiculed Hay's devotion to all things British and took jealous umbrage that the secretary, in congratulating Arthur Balfour's elevation to British prime minister in 1902, had called that position "the most important official post known to modern history." After Hay's death in 1905, Roosevelt, writing to Lodge, pronounced him "not a great Secretary of State. . . . He had a very ease-loving nature and a moral timidity which made him shrink from all that was rough in life, and therefore from practical affairs. He was at his best at a dinner table or in a drawing room, and in neither place have I ever seen anyone's best that was better than his. . . . In public life during the time he was Secretary of State under me he accomplished little. . . . In the Department of State his usefulness to me was almost exclusively the usefulness of a fine figurehead." Roosevelt distrusted Hay's compe-

tence: "I had to do all the big things myself, and the other things, I always feared would be badly done." This crabby evaluation was partly true but unfair. It was surely influenced by Roosevelt's resentment that the media-savvy Hay sometimes got more credit than his chief and by the marked difference in their hare vs. tortoise operating styles. In fact Hay's fingerprints were all over most of Roosevelt's first-term foreign policy successes.

Hay considered Roosevelt something of a blowhard and enjoyed lampooning him. For Hay it had been "more fun than a goat" when Roosevelt made a fool of himself in Washington over the vice presidency. Once Roosevelt ascended to the presidency, however, Hay gave him total loyalty, at the expense of his own feeble and declining health. But he chafed at the president's frenetic management style. He recalled wistfully that McKinley had seen him less than once a month; with Roosevelt it was every day. Hay hated the frequent summonses to Oyster Bay and the way he was treated when he got there: "When McKinley sent for me he gave me all his time till we got through; but I always find TR engaged with a dozen other people, and it is an hour's wait and a minute's talk." He recoiled at Roosevelt's impetuosity: "The President is all right, provided you can restrain him for the first fifteen minutes after he has conceived a new idea."

While the secretary was too loyal to disagree with the president, his views tended to be softer than Roosevelt's. He was less than a fervent imperialist. In 1884 he had published an antiannexation poem about Hawaii pleading: "Oh, may we long postpone the evil hour, /When in our zeal for making others free, /We join them with us." More recently he had remarked to Henry Adams that Roosevelt was trying to "steal" Panama. As ambassador in London he had not welcomed the war against Spain and, even after his appointment as secretary of state, had told Andrew Carnegie so. Once in office, however, he had sent tough instructions to the team negotiating the peace treaty.

Hay's early thinking on the Philippines had been marked more by concern for fair treatment of the natives than by strategic objectives. Like Root, he was uncomfortable with Roosevelt's animosity toward big business. He refused to hide his Anglophilia or to cater to the Britain bashing pushed mainly by Irish-Americans. Why, he wondered, should "we . . . be compelled to refuse the assistance of the

greatest Power in the world, in carrying out our own policy, because all Irishmen are Democrats and some Germans are fools."

Hay lacked the dynamism and fervor that Roosevelt embodied and increasingly saw in Root. Unlike his chief, Hay was almost entirely without ambition. He had not wanted to be secretary of state when McKinley named him; as Henry Adams wrote, "his obedience to the President's order was the gloomiest acquiescence he had ever smiled." Still less did he want to continue after McKinley was killed. The dead president was the third assassinated leader, after Lincoln and Garfield, to whom Hay had been close. In that same terrible year of 1901, Hay lost his son Del (who fell out of a window at his Yale reunion), his close friend and Five of Hearts member Clarence King, and his lifelong friend and Lincoln coauthor John Nicolay. "I have acquired the funeral habit," he mused. He tried to resign at the beginning of Roosevelt's presidency, citing "my grief for the President mingled and confused with that for my boy." But the new president insisted on his remaining in office.

The State Department that Hay took over was far from the expert-laden, high-tech, rapid-reaction institution of today. It shared with the War and Navy departments the French Second Empire building at Pennsylvania and Seventeenth streets next door to the White House. It was and is a structure that in its flamboyance contrasts with the dour and immobile monstrosities in the style of classical Greece that house much of official Washington. In these ornate premises, with their high ceilings, grand staircases, and omnipresent marble, Hay presided in a large office now used as a conference room.

But his domain was minuscule for a burgeoning country like the United States. The department had a mere eighty-two employees, and even they were not allocated enough space. Abroad America's thirty-five diplomatic missions were staffed by fewer than seventy diplomats—the number had not increased since Hay had begun his diplomatic career three decades before—plus sixteen military attachés. The rank of ambassador had been created only five years before; Hay in London had been one of the first ambassadors. A vast consular corps of more than a thousand people (not all Americans) populated 323 consular posts, many of them targets of political patronage.

The foreign service, according to Andrew Dickson White, the first president of Cornell and a distinguished diplomat, was "not a democratic service resting upon merit, but an aristocratic service resting largely upon wealth." Moreover, there were no professional foreign service officers as such, though some political appointees served long enough to become professionals. Appointees got their posts through the kindness of influential friends, as young Hay himself had done thanks to Secretary of State Seward. In 1895 Cabot Lodge unsuccessfully sponsored a bill to take the consular service out of politics. That same year President Cleveland issued an executive order setting standards, based on testing or experience, for middle-level consular positions. It was not until after Hay's death in 1905 that President Roosevelt, who had professionalized the civil service in the 1880s, established examinations for prospective young diplomats.

Under McKinley and his political mentor Mark Hanna the spoils system was rampant. So Hay had to live with a system that, according to Lodge, put the United States at a disadvantage with every other civilized nation. McKinley, Hay quipped, had already promised all the consulates, but importuning senators would "refuse to believe me disconsulate." Despite his lightheartedness, the pressures of patronage took their toll. "The worst," he wrote Whitelaw Reid, "is the constant solicitations for office . . . the strain of mind and nerves in explaining why things can't be done, and the consciousness that the seekers and their 'influence' think I am lying." Hay discovered that he could not even choose his own clerk "as a friend of the President's from Canton had the place."

Despite the vagaries of the spoils system, Hay got professional assistance from his senior deputies. The first assistant secretary was Francis Loomis, a younger man in his early forties, with experience abroad and a penchant for imperialist activism. John Bassett Moore, the most eminent international lawyer of his time, shuttled from his professorship at Columbia to Washington to provide legal counsel. Moore's agility in giving legal cover to preferred policy options established a principle followed by future legal advisers: not to tell the secretary what he cannot do but rather to find legal support for what he wants to do.

The second assistant secretary, Alvey A. Adee, was even more indispensable to Hay. A fixture at State since the 1870s (he was to serve

until 1924), Adee was a walking encyclopedia of diplomatic history, practice, protocol, communication, and style. An indefatigable worker, he participated in debates on every major foreign policy issue and most minor ones. Adee was a unique, even a bizarre character. At just over five feet, he was shorter than Hay himself. A shy bachelor, he had a falsetto voice and a gathering deafness that necessitated ever-enlarging ear trumpets. When he traveled, he always carried three spoons, not trusting alien utensils. His memos, written in red ink on green slips, were classics of brevity and wit. This effete and puckish character maintained a consistent and determined position against imperialism and its excesses, competing for Hay's ear against the more jingoistic Loomis and Moore. Roosevelt did not take Adee seriously, considering him a hopeless fuddy-duddy entombed in the fatuous language of diplomatic delicacy. He may also have resented Adee's skepticism about his imperial ventures.

Hay's routine as secretary would appear leisurely by today's standards. From his house on Lafayette Square it was only a five-minute walk to his office or to the White House, where the cabinet met on Tuesdays. On Thursdays he received the entire diplomatic corps, which could fit into his office. Typical mornings at State were devoted to conferring with Adee or other aides, going over diplomatic dispatches, generating instructions to the field, or dictating to his male secretary. Typewriters were a rarity, and there were only three or four telephones in the entire department. Papers were moved from office to office by messengers who appeared to be walking in their sleep. The telegraph did exist for urgent messages. Hay walked home for lunch, then back to the office for a short afternoon of work, following which he strolled for a hour with Henry Adams; the two then took a cup of tea with Clara Hay. Since Hay reveled in company, his extravagant after-hours social life, where business was also transacted, was more a pleasure than a burden to him.

What was a burden was his relationship with senators. Unlike his colleague Root, who invested infinite charm and patience on influential legislators, Hay could be imperious, dismissive, or patronizing with them. He railed against the Senate's inability to understand the value of compromise in negotiation and its view that, as he put it, "we must get everything and give nothing." His experience with the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, which he thought should have taken one day in-

stead of six weeks, made him regret that the Constitution required a two-thirds vote by the Senate for treaties. He complained to Henry Adams: "The worst of all is the uncertainty about what the Senate may do in any given case. You may work for months over a Treaty, and at last get everything satisfactorily arranged, and send it into the Senate, when it is met by every man who wants to get a political advantage, or to satisfy a personal grudge, everyone who has asked for an office and not got it, everyone, whose wife may think mine has not been attentive enough,—if they can muster one-third of the Senate and one, your Treaty is lost without any reference to its merits."

In his chronic pique with the Senate, Hay ignored the fluctuations in its power since the Civil War. When he took office as secretary, there had not been a strong president since Lincoln; for decades Congress had asserted dominance over the executive branch. This phenomenon received a scholarly analysis in 1879 from a Princeton senior named Woodrow Wilson, whose article, later to inspire his famous book *Congressional Government*, condemned this trend toward legislative control and advocated a strong presidency. Ironically, Henry Cabot Lodge, who had accepted Wilson's article for the *International Review*, came to represent the very symbol of senatorial power that Hay and Wilson resented. Hay understood neither the traditional strength of the Congress nor the fact that by the time of McKinley's presidency the legislature was again growing more malleable to presidential leadership. Roosevelt was to restore much of the president's earlier power. But not all. Lodge administered a lesson on congressional government to Wilson himself when he led the successful assault on the League of Nations treaty in 1919.

2.

Hay's deficiencies with the denizens of Capitol Hill gave him a bad start on the effort to build a canal across the narrow waist of land separating the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. Ever since Balboa discovered the Pacific, romantics had dreamed of linking the two oceans. John Keats, mixing up his conquistadors, wrote of

. . . stout Cortez when with eagle eyes
He star'd at the Pacific—and all his men

*Look'd at each other with a wild surmise—
Silent, upon a peak in Darien.*

Darién was an old name for Panama, where the isthmus was at its narrowest, only forty-seven miles. A quarter century after Keats's death, this territory became the subject of a historic treaty between the United States and the country that owned it, Colombia, then called New Granada, which had become independent from Spain in 1821. The "wild surmise" of Keats's roving imagination was converted to ink and parchment in 1846, when Colombia, geographically cut off from Panama by dense jungle, ceded to the United States transit rights across the isthmus in return for an American pledge to guarantee its "rights of sovereignty."

Four years after the Bidlack Treaty, named for the American diplomat who had negotiated it, the United States and Great Britain reached an agreement on building a canal. The water route envisaged by the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850 assumed a new urgency during the next years, after gold had been discovered in California. The increasing number of U.S. settlers bound for the West Coast had difficulty crossing Panama by land. The 1850 treaty stipulated that neither party would maintain exclusive control over a future canal or fortify it; passage would be unrestricted for all countries. These and other clauses made the treaty hugely unpopular in the United States, but it was not until the end of the century that it came under heavy fire.

Mahan, Lodge, and Roosevelt all attacked Clayton-Bulwer as a major obstacle to the construction of a water route across the Isthmus of Panama. Mahan spoke from firsthand experience, having sailed the sea approaches to Panama during the Civil War and having crossed the isthmus by train two decades later. As the three saw it, if the United States took on the risk and expense of building a canal, it should not then have to share control with the British, undertake not to fortify it, and be compelled to let through the ships of other nations—even the warships of an enemy.

The war of 1898 clinched their case. The seizure of the Philippines and the annexation of Hawaii made the United States a Pacific, as well as an Atlantic and a Caribbean, power. The U.S. Navy had to be able to move between the two oceans without taking the long route

around Cape Horn at the bottom of South America. The experience of the battleship *Oregon* proved that; it had been compelled to round the Horn to get from Puget Sound to Santiago Bay and almost missed the battle for Cuba. Had there been a canal, its voyage of sixty-seven days might have been cut by two-thirds.

Sensing these new realities, McKinley assigned Hay as secretary of state to clear away the legal and political underbrush so that work could begin on a canal. The first step was to negotiate with the British a canal treaty to replace Clayton-Bulwer. In his usual dyspepsia, Hay was not keen on a canal; he thought transcontinental railroads, in which he was an investor, would provide sufficient linkage between the East and West coasts. Nor did he accept the primacy of the military and strategic factors that energized Mahan, Roosevelt, and Lodge. Thus in his negotiations with the British he aimed too low. He began with a cardinal diplomatic error: He asked the genial and able British ambassador in Washington, Lord Julian Pauncefote, to write the first draft of a revision of Clayton-Bulwer. Working from that draft, which naturally contained all the British desiderata, the two concluded on February 3, 1900, a treaty allowing the United States to build and own a canal. That was an advance, but the draft's retention of the neutrality principle and of the ban on fortification was not.

When the text of the treaty reached the governor's mansion in Albany, Theodore Roosevelt got so angry at Hay's concessions that he issued a statement opposing them. The governor believed that a canal built under Hay-Pauncefote rules would have been counterproductive in the war of 1898, since Spanish warships would have been free to use the canal to get to the Pacific and ravage the American West Coast or the Philippines. The exchange of letters between the two men captured the complexity of their relationship. Hay admonished the governor to mind his own business: "Et Tu? Cannot you leave a few things to the President and the Senate, who are charged with them by the Constitution?" Roosevelt's response was both defiant and obsequious. He reiterated his strong opposition to the treaty but assured Hay that he was "the greatest Secretary of State I have seen in my time."

Even worse for Hay, Cabot Lodge, whose support was critical for Senate approval, declared himself an implacable opponent of the new treaty and led the successful battle to kill it. The two men had a seri-

ous falling-out, as Hay accused Lodge of renegeing on his promise to support a treaty to succeed Clayton-Bulwer. Henry Adams, ghoulishly relishing the feud between his two friends, wrote: "So [Lodge] has thrown Hay over; declared against his treaty; alienated the Major [McKinley], and destroyed all the credit with the administration which he has labored so hard to create. . . ." Hay, in disgust, agreed with Adams about Lodge: "He would cut my throat or yours for a favorable notice in the newspapers."

But Hay himself was the principal author of his own defeat. He had been insufficiently firm with the British and insufficiently flexible with the Senate. He had disastrously failed to consult Lodge and his colleagues on the Foreign Relations Committee during the negotiations and had withheld all texts from them. After this defeat Hay tried to resign; McKinley would not let him and sent him back to the negotiating table. The British were more than willing to renegotiate, in itself an indication that Hay had not bargained hard enough the first time around. This time Hay brought Lodge in at the outset; the senator worked assiduously on behalf of the new treaty and won public credit for shepherding it through the Senate less than a month after signature. In December 1901 the newly inaugurated President Roosevelt could hail it as his first foreign policy achievement. Hay wrote his wife: "Theodore was very funny about Cabot. He says 'Cabot thinks he made the Treaty.' I said, 'I wanted him to think so.'"

The second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty plugged the main leak of the first by giving the United States by implication the right to fortify a canal. Of note was the cooperative attitude of the British. Embroiled as they were in the Boer War, they were not in a strong position to play tough. But they had also decided that American strength in the Caribbean could serve as a proxy for British interests. That assumption determined their position on the canal, just as it had guided their wartime support for the United States against Spain. A few years after the ratification of the second Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, Britain reduced the military garrisons in its West Indian colonies and its overall naval presence in the Caribbean. It was learning to use American power to its advantage.

With the legal problems finally settled, President Roosevelt moved briskly to the next question of where to build an American canal under U.S. control. Colombia and Nicaragua both were competing for

the large boons that construction, revenues, and commerce would bring. Two days after the signing of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, a presidential commission recommended Nicaragua as the more "practicable and feasible" route. It was much closer to the United States, posed less complex a construction problem because the canal would be at sea level, and had won favorable evaluations in the engineering reports. Six weeks later the House of Representatives approved Nicaragua by a 308-2 vote.

But Panama had formidable advocates. The prospect of Keats's "realms of gold" brought to Washington a rare assortment of adventurers, promoters, con artists, and shysters. The most important, if not the most respectable, of these soldiers of fortune were an American lawyer, William Nelson Cromwell, founding partner of the New York law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell, and a French engineer named Philippe Bunau-Varilla. Both were associated with Panama's interest against Nicaragua's in winning a canal contract.

Bunau-Varilla, a tiny Frenchman of charm and ingenuity, was a protégé of Ferdinand de Lesseps, the French engineer who had built the Suez Canal and had toiled unsuccessfully to achieve an even larger canal across the Isthmus of Panama. Bunau-Varilla had been chief engineer for de Lesseps's company, which finally went bankrupt, leaving behind huge earthworks and deteriorating machinery. He was a knight-errant whose grail was a canal across Panama. He was also acutely interested in a large share of the profits that would accrue from reviving the canal project. His single-mindedness and brilliance made him one of the most skillful lobbyists ever to hit Washington.

Cromwell, equally diminutive, fastidious in dress, devious, and highly articulate, represented the New Panama Canal Company, the Paris-based successor to the original company; he was also a stockholder and a director. Cromwell's aim was to sell the company—with its property holdings, railroad, and rusting equipment splayed along the canal route—to the U.S. government at a large profit to himself. Like Bunau-Varilla, he was a world-class lobbyist with a keen instinct for using money to buy influence. He even donated sixty thousand dollars to the Republican National Committee to sweeten its views on the Panama option, charging the contribution to his French clients. His greed, unlike Bunau-Varilla's, was unflecked by any particles of altruism.

The Nicaragua option had no champions to compete with these two Lilliputian giants. They lobbied the Washington power structure with single-minded determination, reaching First Assistant Secretary of State Loomis, the State Department lawyer Moore, Secretary Hay himself, and Senators Hanna and Spooner. Cromwell even got access to Roosevelt through Hanna, whom the slick lawyer had sold on the Panama route. The energetic and resourceful Bunau-Varilla persuaded the New Panama Canal Company to cut its price for its Panama properties from \$109 million to \$40 million, a reduction that made Panama a cheaper bet for the United States than Nicaragua. With the Senate he played on the recent devastation of Martinique by a volcano to stress the risks in Nicaragua, which is also situated in a volcano belt. In making his point, he circulated to each senator a one-centavo Nicaraguan stamp proudly displaying an active volcano puffing away.

By January 1902 Roosevelt, who was impressed by the pro-Panama arguments of George S. Morison, an engineer and fellow Harvard man, had made up his mind to support the Panama route. Sniffing the political wind, the presidential commission discovered reasons to switch its allegiance to Panama, thus reversing a recommendation of only six weeks earlier. Congress, under intense lobbying, also came around; the Senate vote in favor of Panama on June 19 was 67-6. On June 28 the president signed into law Senator Spooner's bill designating Panama as the site. Now the negotiation with the government of Colombia could begin in earnest.

Washington had been involved in a close relationship with Bogotá ever since the Bidlack Treaty of 1846. Because impenetrable jungle denied Colombia effective control over Panama, a pattern had formed in which Colombia would call on the United States to defend its sovereignty against armed Panamanian bids for independence. According to Roosevelt's probably exaggerated count, there had been an average of one Panamanian uprising a year since Bidlack; the United States had intervened to protect Colombia in thirteen of them and had landed troops seven times, occupying Panama for a total of two hundred days.

Less than three months after the U.S. Congress had selected the Panama route, Panamanian nationalists staged another revolt. Without consulting Colombia, Roosevelt ordered marines landed to pro-

tect the railroad across the isthmus between Colón on the Caribbean side and Panama City on the Pacific. Although the United States finally brokered an end to the hostilities—on an American battleship—this unilateral action left a stain of bad blood on the subsequent negotiations. The Americans had acquired the habit of dominance over Colombia, the Colombians a feeling of victimization.

The negotiations in Washington nevertheless began well. Hay opened them in January 1903 with the Colombian chargé d'affaires, Tomás Herrán, a fluent English speaker and a graduate of Georgetown College in Washington, D.C. The secretary of state, aware of his reputation as a weak negotiator, took a firm position, even threatening to revive the Nicaragua option if Herrán did not agree to the American terms. Intimidated, the Colombian diplomat signed prematurely, three days before receiving a cable from Bogotá instructing him to hold off. The treaty, excellent from the U.S. point of view, provided for a canal zone six miles wide to be leased to the United States. The term was for a hundred years, renewable at American option, with a one-time payment of \$10 million to the Colombian government plus an annual rent of \$250,000. The treaty specifically recognized Colombian sovereignty over Panama but diluted it by authorizing U.S. judicial and police rights within the zone. Cromwell, who had been camping out at the State Department, was present at the signing. In recognition of his effort to achieve the treaty, Hay presented him with the pen he had used. The Senate quickly voted its approval on March 17, 1903.

Then the trouble began. The reaction in Colombia was negative, and, under Cromwell's greedy importuning, Hay inflamed it further. Cromwell feared that Colombia might delay any deal with the United States until the New Panama Canal Company's concession expired in a year's time, then seize the company's property without compensation and sell it to the United States. So he persuaded Hay to guarantee that the huge profits from the sale of the company's holdings on the isthmus would accrue not to Colombia but to the company—and of course to Cromwell as an officer of the company.

Hay had no reason to follow Cromwell's advice on this question. The United States was ready to pay the French company forty million dollars, the largest real estate price ever up to that time. If it had waited for Colombia to possess the property, it might even have got-

ten it for less. It was the price, not the identity of the seller, that ought to have mattered. But Hay instructed the U.S. minister in Bogotá to inform the Colombian government that the United States would not condone any Colombian effort to deal independently with the New Panama Canal Company. In cutting off this potential path to additional Colombian profits, the United States administered a rebuff to Colombian sovereignty, Colombian interests, and Colombian pride. Prodded by the president, Hay then conveyed a threat to Bogotá: Delay or rejection by Colombia might produce congressional action, "which every friend of Colombia might regret." Several days later a newspaper article planted by Cromwell just after his meeting with the president alleged that the Americans were ready to support a revolution in Panama.

In a mixture of vexation and voracity, the Colombian Senate procrastinated and then voted unanimously against the Hay-Herrán Treaty on August 12. Cromwell had meanwhile been feeding the White House and the State Department scurrilous reports about Colombian politicians. The competent and experienced U.S. minister in Bogotá, Arthur Beaupré, had a much better feel for the country than Cromwell did, but Washington preferred to listen to Cromwell's tendentious distortions. When Roosevelt, thus conditioned, got the news of the vote, he exploded. In invective usually reserved for the likes of Carl Schurz or Henry James, he flailed the Colombians as "blackmailers," "homicidal corruptionists," "cut throats," and—the unkindest cut—"jack rabbits."

The man who had urged the U.S. Senate to reject Hay's first treaty with Pauncefote was now castigating the Colombian Senate for exercising the same prerogative. The president's explosion was partly understandable. Greed was undoubtedly one factor in the Colombians' maneuvering, making their negotiating style tricky and exasperating. As Roosevelt complained, "You could no more make an agreement with the Colombian rulers than you could nail currant jelly to a wall." Hay had an equally striking phrase: "Talking with those fellows down there . . . is like holding a squirrel in your lap and trying to keep up the conversation." Whatever their motives, the Colombians were shortsighted in giving up certain profits for the uncertain prospect of greater ones. Still, it was the right of the Colombian Senate, as it was of the U.S. Senate, to reject a treaty negotiated by its government.

Following the Colombian vote, the key American officials managed to fit into their summer vacation schedules a discussion of next steps. As Roosevelt fulminated from Long Island, Hay in New Hampshire suggested a return to the Nicaragua alternative. Alvey Adee, sweltering in Washington, far from the cooling breezes of Lake Sunapee or Oyster Bay, also pressed the Nicaragua option and warned against American involvement in a revolution in Panama. Three decades of foreign policy experience had convinced this canny veteran that the United States had a moral responsibility not to subvert Colombia's legitimate, if unwelcome, decision. "Our policy before the world should stand, like Mrs. Caesar, without suspicion," he wrote Hay, adding: "We are very sorry, but really we can't help it if Colombia doesn't want the Canal on our terms."

Roosevelt had no intention of impersonating "Mrs. Caesar." Logically, the obvious recourse was to go back to the Nicaragua option. Nicaragua had considerable assets in its proximity, its friendly government, and the fact that no revolution was required to make a canal possible there. Yet Roosevelt never wavered in his determination to build in Panama. He set his staff to devising ways to achieve a route through Panama even in the teeth of Colombia's opposition. John Bassett Moore helpfully decided that Colombia's frequent requests for U.S. intervention in Panama under the Bidlack Treaty made the United States in effect the responsible sovereign on the isthmus and thus free to complete the canal even without Colombia's consent. Moore's opinion transformed a treaty authorizing U.S. intervention on behalf of the interests of Colombia into a treaty authorizing U.S. intervention *against* the interests of Colombia.

Hay, back from vacation, sensitive to the president's wishes, and exposed to the blandishments of the Panama lobby, was wracked with an ambivalence that led him to caution Roosevelt against seizing Panama while noting that a war would be brief, inexpensive, and legally justified. The secretary started telling people that Colombia would not be allowed to stand in the way of a U.S.-built canal. Moreover, he added, in the event of a revolution in Panama the U.S. Navy would prevent the landing of Colombian troops. At the same time, Lodge was urging Roosevelt to proceed with the canal, either invoking the Bidlack Treaty or pointing to the likelihood of Panama's secession. Roosevelt confided in his autobiography that he was determined to

seize the isthmus and build the canal whether Panama seceded or not.

Panama's impending loss of a canal as the result of the Colombian decision produced an immediate alliance between Panamanian dissidents and operators like Bunau-Varilla and Cromwell. The Panamanians resolved to launch a revolution against Colombia; the two lobbyists undertook to ensure that it had American support. Under Cromwell's sponsorship, one of the principal conspirators spent two and a half hours with Hay on September 3. On October 10, Bunau-Varilla called on Roosevelt for the first time and emerged with a wink, if not a promise. The Frenchman told Elihu Root afterward that his talk with the president had convinced him that the United States would not let Colombia crush a revolution.

In fact American military activity, the result of careful preparation, was decisive to the outcome. Roosevelt had sent two U.S. Army officers to Panama in secret to evaluate anti-Colombian feeling; they reported to him on October 16 that revolution was certain. After Bunau-Varilla told the State Department that the revolution was scheduled for November 3, the president dispatched ten warships to the scene. One arrived in time to be useful. The USS *Nashville* put in at Colón, on the Caribbean side of the isthmus, on November 2; Bunau-Varilla, probably tipped off by American officials, had alerted the insurrectionists to its arrival. Heartened by this show of force, they used persuasive arguments and even more persuasive money to win the defection of the Colombian general in command of the Panama garrison. The *Nashville* prevented Colombian troops from landing, and some fifty marines disembarked to secure the transisthmian railroad against use by the Colombian Army. Thus the U.S. Navy, which had acted as guarantor of Colombia's sovereignty over Panama for half a century, assisted in the destruction of that sovereignty. Independence was accomplished with ridiculous ease; a new government of Panama sought recognition from the United States on November 4 and received it in slightly over an hour.

The light-opera character of the Panama affair reached its final crescendo with the appearance in Washington of Bunau-Varilla in the guise of envoy of the new state of Panama. He claimed to be empowered to conclude a canal agreement with the United States. It was the easiest agreement John Hay ever negotiated, and it was rushed to sig-

nature just before the arrival of the genuine representatives of the new government of Panama. They denounced Bunau-Varilla as acting without authority but could do nothing to change the treaty in the face of strong American pressure.

By the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty the width of the canal zone was increased from six miles to ten, and four islands were added to it. Judicial powers, formerly to be shared, were awarded exclusively to the Americans. The United States switched from Colombia to Panama its payment of \$10 million plus \$250,000 a year in rent. Most important of all, the United States was given rights in the zone as if "it were the sovereign . . . to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights, power or authority." The United States guaranteed the independence of Panama, a mixed blessing since this could imply the right of intervention in the spirit of the Platt Amendment. The zone was to be held by the United States not for any fixed period but "in perpetuity."

Hay wrote to Senator Spooner: "You and I know too well how many points there are in this treaty to which a Panamanian patriot could object." Not without charges of piracy and dishonor, the Senate on February 23, 1904, approved the treaty by a 66-14 vote. The initial cost to the United States was higher than the price of Louisiana, Alaska, and the Philippines combined: ten million dollars to Panama and forty million to the New Panama Canal Company, with Bunau-Varilla and especially Cromwell reaping significant financial rewards. Construction on the canal began later the same year.

Just after the revolution Roosevelt played coy about the U.S. role, disclaiming prior knowledge of the uprising or support for it. To the Congress he justified his action on universal grounds: It was in "the interests of collective civilization. If ever a Government could be said to have received a mandate from civilization . . . the United States holds that position with regard to the interoceanic canal." As he was preparing to leave office in late 1908, he was ready to take all the credit. He wrote to a London editor: "This I can say absolutely was my own work, and could not have been accomplished save by me or by some man of my temperament." Once out of office, he was even more boastful. To an audience at the University of California at Berkeley, he said: "I am interested in the Panama Canal because I started it. If I had followed traditional, conservative methods I would

have submitted a dignified State paper of probably 200 pages to Congress and the debates on it would have been going on yet; but I took the Canal Zone and let Congress debate; and while the debate goes on the Canal does also."

Roosevelt was proud of his canal; in 1906 he made the first trip abroad by a president of the United States to inspect the construction work. But the story of its inception casts little glory on his administration. The arrogant dismissal of the constitutional practices of Colombia, the cynical rewriting of international law to fit U.S. policy, the unacknowledged role of the U.S. Navy, and the punitive treaty imposed on the fledgling republic of Panama: None of these actions comported with Roosevelt's pious rationalizations. The Panama affair was also one of the most conspicuous examples of aggressive lobbying in American history. The machinations of Cromwell and Bunau-Varilla were visible at every stage in the process: in the selection of Panama over Nicaragua, in the Panamanian revolution, and in the one-sided treaties with Colombia and Panama. Roosevelt and Hay should never have allowed their government to be so manipulated by unscrupulous men who had a clear financial stake in the outcome.

Yet the president, convinced by the engineers and captivated by the con men, was keen to charge ahead. Hay did nothing to stop him. The secretary's occasional and all-too-temporary second thoughts—for example, his pursuit of the Nicaragua option after Colombia had rejected the treaty—usually came only when he was out of Washington and away from the lobbyists' pressures. They never coalesced into a reasoned effort, which Adee would have enthusiastically supported, to press an alternative strategy on the president. Perhaps Hay was not the man to do it; he was not a confronter, and Roosevelt considered him too soft anyway. After Roosevelt's determined actions had proved successful, Hay was all too happy to bask in the glow of a triumph achieved without the direct use of force. As he wrote to Root, "How on earth a fair-minded man could prefer that the President should have taken possession of the Isthmus with the mailed hand, and built a canal in defiance of the Constitution, the laws, and the treaties, rather than the perfectly regular course which the President did follow, passes my comprehension."

In Cuba and the Philippines the United States had managed to alienate revolutionary groups that had urged American intervention

and pleaded common cause with American values. Now, in Panama, Roosevelt's "perfectly regular course" treated in the same cavalier fashion the revolutionaries who had made a canal possible. The new Panamanian government, a liberal one, took office with a grudge against the United States. Like many of its successors, it objected to having become an American protectorate.

Colombia was an even bigger loser. Partly by its own action it had lost ten million dollars plus annual revenues of half a million from the U.S. rent and the payment by the railroad. It had also lost Panama, and in violation of tradition and perhaps even international law, the United States had connived in that loss. Colombia had been insulted and humiliated by its northern neighbor and would not soon forget. Hay considered compensating Colombia, but Bunau-Varilla talked him out of it. Other Latin American countries quickly adjusted to reality and recognized the new Panamanian republic, but even with them Roosevelt's display of force left a residue of suspicion and fear.

In Roosevelt's defense, it must be said, there was a powerful argument for the Panama Canal that did not depend on specious appeals to duty, necessity, or the mandate of civilization. It was Mahan's old strategic conviction that a canal was necessary for the United States to build a great navy and become a great power. When the canal was finally opened under President Wilson, it undoubtedly increased both the perception and the reality of American power vis-à-vis the rest of the world.

But there had been other ways to accomplish this; Mahan himself assumed that a canal across the Nicaragua route would be favored. The way chosen by Roosevelt was described with appropriate cynicism by Root, who had been on a ship en route from Liverpool to New York at the time of the Panamanian revolution but thereafter defended the president's actions. At a cabinet meeting shortly after the Panama affair, Roosevelt launched into a long defense of his position, then turned to Root and asked if he had answered the charges. "You certainly have, Mr. President," Root responded. "You have shown that you were accused of seduction and you have conclusively proved that you were guilty of rape." A more contemporary conclusion was delivered by California senator S. I. Hayakawa during the Senate debate in 1977 over returning the canal to Panama. A professor of linguistics and a man who chose his words carefully, Hayakawa captured Roo-

sevelt's blend of legalistic sanctimony and ruthless action over the canal when he said: "We stole it fair and square."

3.

In his memoirs Theodore Roosevelt wrote that his action over the Panama Canal was the most important foreign policy achievement of his entire presidency. Indeed, while he was in office, the strategic imperative of creating a water passage between the Atlantic and Pacific outweighed all other considerations in his approach to the Caribbean and Central America. The growth of trade with Latin America, the primacy of American investment in the hemisphere, the need for friendly local governments and for dominant U.S. influence over them, the importance of stability, and the endorsement of the Caribbean as an American lake: All these elements of Roosevelt's policy flowed from his determination to guarantee to the U.S. Navy monopolistic control over the isthmian passage. As Elihu Root wrote in 1905, "The inevitable effect of our building the Canal must be to require us to police the surrounding premises. In the nature of things, trade and control, and the obligation to keep order which go with them, must come our way."

Roosevelt set two priorities regarding the Caribbean and Latin America. The first was the traditional Monroe Doctrine consideration that no foreign power must be allowed to establish a foothold. This meant, after Spain's expulsion from the hemisphere, avoiding a vacuum and preventing local governments, whether out of greed or weakness, from attracting the influence of European powers. The second priority was new or, more accurately, was more available to Roosevelt than to his predecessors. This was a license to control local regimes whose activity or fecklessness might affect U.S. interests, and it came to be known as the Roosevelt Corollary. Roosevelt, Hay, and Root exercised caution and subtlety in the development of their Latin American policy, but the net result was to establish a tradition of American hegemony that was to set an example for their successors.

With Great Britain no longer a competitor, the only serious foreign challenge in the Caribbean came from Germany. German pugnacity with Dewey in the Philippines was a fresh memory. Concern that the Germans might buy the Virgin Islands, with their excellent harbor on

St. Thomas, prompted Hay to make a purchase offer to their owner, Denmark. He concluded a treaty in 1902 and actually got it through the Senate (one of his rare victories), but the Danish parliament—under German pressure, some alleged—voted it down. The United States had to wait until World War I to buy the islands.

A sharper confrontation between Roosevelt's America and Kaiser William II's Germany arose in Venezuela. The dictator in Caracas, Cipriano Castro, had run through the national treasury and foreign loans to support a voluptuary's life-style: twenty-three houses, twenty-two mistresses, and a bunch of cronies with fingers as sticky as his. The Germans and the British, whose investments had suffered the most, were eager to intervene to collect their debts. In principle Roosevelt was not opposed. While vice president, he had written Speck von Sternberg, his German diplomatic friend: "If any South American State misbehaves towards any European country, let the European country spank it." Faced with the issue as president, however, he felt constrained to be precise about the conditions under which European spanking would be permitted. In his annual message of December 1901 he called the Monroe Doctrine the "cardinal feature" of U.S. foreign policy and warned non-American powers against "territorial aggrandizement . . . at the expense of any American power on American soil."

In December 1902 Germany and Britain blockaded La Guaira, the port of Caracas, and four other ports and seized several Venezuelan gunboats. Castro gave in, while beseeching American arbitration under the Monroe Doctrine. The Germans contributed to their bad reputation by destroying a Venezuelan village, and the blockade continued until February 1903, long enough to arouse the American public against Germany. Years later, when he was pressing for U.S. entry into the world war against Germany, Roosevelt retrospectively burnished his belligerency in the Venezuelan affair by claiming that he had threatened to send Admiral Dewey, fortuitously stationed in Puerto Rico, to drive the Germans out of Venezuela. The former president seems to have wildly overstated the sharpness of the crisis and of his "threat," though if he had provoked a skirmish with the Germans, he might well have had the country behind him. A journalist in Minnesota, a state with many German immigrants, wrote:

*Yankee Dewey's near La Guayra,
Yankee Dewey Dandy,
Maybe just as well to have our
Yankee Dewey handy.*

In the end the blockade was lifted without the use of American force. Roosevelt was not eager to take the side of Castro, whom he called a "villainous little monkey." The financial issues were settled by arbitration, with the United States acting as broker between Venezuela and the European powers. This Venezuelan affair showed Roosevelt and Hay in a moderate light. The president clearly did not want to be the savior of last resort in every hemispheric dispute and thus a dupe for hysterical and sybaritic local dictators or for European countries desirous of using American power to advance their own interests. So he sensibly tempered his insistence on recognition of American hegemony. Still, the ultimate German climb-down dispelled any doubt about which power was dominant in the area.

The Venezuela incident spawned an attempt by the foreign minister of Argentina, Luis M. Drago, to win international acceptance for the proposition that European powers could not resort to armed intervention or territorial occupation in order to collect debts. With American support a diluted version of the Drago Doctrine ultimately won international adoption at the Hague Conference of 1907; it banned the use of force except in cases where the debtor state did not cooperate in arbitration.

The U.S. government showed less restraint in the next Caribbean crisis, though Roosevelt moved carefully at the end. The Windward Passage, the most direct approach from the Atlantic to Panama, lies between Cuba and the island of Hispaniola. The Dominican Republic and Haiti, which share Hispaniola, were notorious for corruption and instability; in fact their wretched political condition had been one argument for establishing the Platt Amendment in Cuba. Since Seward's time the U.S. Navy had been interested in the deepwater Samaná Bay in the Dominican Republic. As secretary of state Hay had resisted efforts by the Dominican dictator Ulises Heureaux, a sophisticated version of Venezuela's Castro, to cede the use of Samaná Bay in exchange for making his country an American protectorate. In

1903, four years after Heureaux's assassination, a revolution broke out against the successor government. Panicked at the prospect of violence and instability, the American financial community, which had large investments in the country and to which Hay was close, joined the U.S. Navy in pressing for action to protect the government.

Early in 1904 the navy landed troops, one of whom was killed in the capital, Santo Domingo; the insurgents also fired on a U.S. cruiser. The navy responded by shelling rebel positions and landing marines. No sooner had the shaky government been buttressed than the country went bankrupt, bringing its European creditors, including Germany, to the point of armed intervention. Like the Venezuelan government before, the Dominican government appealed for help to the United States. Hay resisted pressure from his own deputy Loomis, from British, German, and French property owners, and from the Dominican government, to authorize U.S. seizure of the customshouses. Instead he developed an arbitration mechanism that produced in December 1904 a U.S. decision to establish an American collector of customs who would distribute revenues to the Dominican government and to European creditors. Over Loomis's objections, Hay insisted that the agreement guarantee the republic's territorial integrity and disavow annexation. With American naval vessels standing offshore, the arrangement worked to the benefit of everybody: the United States, the Europeans, and the Dominican treasury.

The U.S. government's Dominican fix was a pragmatic response to a particular challenge in a country at that time more important to American interests than Venezuela was. Except for the British, who applauded the American action, the Europeans grumbled but reconciled themselves to getting their money out. The Dominican people gained a few years of respite from the rapacious incompetence of their rulers. Roosevelt never thought of annexation; as he told a friend, "I have about the same desire to annex it as a gorged boa constrictor might have to swallow a porcupine wrong-end-to." Only the U.S. Senate caused difficulties with the customs agreement on constitutional grounds; it took Hay two years to get it through.

In the process Roosevelt devised a policy that was designed to apply not just to the Dominican Republic but to the entire hemisphere. As he described it in his annual message in December 1904, "Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general

loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America [i.e., the American hemisphere], as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the western hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international police power."

This was the Roosevelt Corollary, which extended the Monroe Doctrine beyond preventing foreign intervention in the hemisphere to privileging American intervention there. It was born of a specific need and hedged with limiting words like "chronic," "ultimately," "flagrant," and "reluctantly." Roosevelt took pains to disclaim aggressive intent: "It cannot be too often and too emphatically asserted that the United States has not the slightest desire for territorial aggrandizement at the expense of any of its southern neighbors, and will not treat the Monroe Doctrine as an excuse for such aggrandizement on its part." Root, who wrote the Platt Amendment, may have had a hand in the Roosevelt Corollary as well; certainly he and the president had discussed the issue. Both of them considered that the corollary limited, as well as expanded, American power. In a speech given several weeks after Roosevelt's, Root described the president's view as "[arrogating] to ourselves, not sovereignty over the American continent, but only the right to protect."

Despite such caveats, Roosevelt had taken a momentous step. He had warned the Europeans that if there were any spanking to be done in the hemisphere, the United States would do it. And he had alerted the "Dagoes" (his favorite derogatory word for Latin American leaders) that incompetence or iniquity could bring American power down on them. The Roosevelt Corollary expanded both the Monroe Doctrine, by authorizing American intervention, and the Platt Amendment, by extending the right of intervention beyond Cuba to the entire hemisphere. It also illustrated the increasing influence of economic interests on U.S. policy in Latin America. American business, which had been ambivalent about getting into war over Cuba, was now behind much of the pressure to enforce stability in the hemisphere.

Not long after, in 1906, Roosevelt took the Platt Amendment off the shelf of principle and put it into practice. Again, he acted with great reluctance. In Cuba, Tomás Estrada Palma, the venerable politician to whom Leonard Wood had turned over power when he sailed

away in May 1902, had gotten into serious difficulties. After a disputed election in 1905, the opposition Liberal party launched a somewhat languid insurrection in the late summer of 1906, which inspired a classic cable to Washington from the U.S. chargé d'affaires: "Revolution spreading. Everything quiet." Estrada Palma, invoking the Platt Amendment, appealed to Roosevelt for warships and marines.

American intervention in Cuba was the last thing Roosevelt wanted, but he would not shrink from it if, as he warned the Cuban minister in Washington on September 14, "Cuba herself shows that she has fallen into the insurrectionary habit, that she lacks the self-restraint necessary to secure peaceful self-government, and that her contending factions have plunged the country into anarchy." He ordered naval vessels carrying marines to position themselves off Havana, but he also sought an urgent diplomatic solution, sending William H. Taft, by then secretary of war, and Assistant Secretary of State Robert Bacon (a Harvard boxing friend of Roosevelt's and a partner of J. P. Morgan's) to Havana. They began talks with both sides on September 19 and worked out a potential compromise by which Estrada Palma would be a caretaker president until a new temporary government could be inaugurated. On September 25 Roosevelt implored the Cuban leader through Taft not to resign and cause "the death of the republic." But Estrada Palma did resign, leaving Cuba with the prospect of escalating violence and the destruction of foreign property.

Roosevelt believed that he had no choice but to intervene quickly. Two thousand marines landed on September 29, six weeks after the revolt had begun, and quelled the gathering violence. The president passed over Wood, the obvious choice to govern Cuba, and sent a civilian judge, Charles Magoon of Minnesota, with full powers to run the country. Judiciously choosing to fly the Cuban rather than the American flag, Magoon stayed for two years, backed by six thousand mostly invisible U.S. troops. The verdict of the British historian Hugh Thomas, in defending Magoon's poor reputation among Cuban historians, is that he contributed positively to the Cuban electoral system, to the foundation of the army, to education, and to road building and that the country he turned back to its people in 1909 was in better shape than it had been at the end of the Spanish-American War.

The Cuban crisis did not set off appeals for annexation in the

United States, except from Senator Beveridge. Even Beveridge's fellow jingo Cabot Lodge showed a measure of restraint. A week after Estrada Palma's appeal for intervention, Lodge wrote the president from Massachusetts: "Disgust with the Cubans is very general. Nobody wants to annex them, but the general feeling is that they ought to be taken by the neck and shaken until they behave themselves." Roosevelt himself continued to see the American intervention in Cuba as an unwanted duty. In a letter to Taft several weeks after the marines had landed, he wrote:

There can be no talk of a protectorate by us. Our business is to establish peace and order on a satisfactory basis, start the new government, and then leave the Island; the Cuban government taking the reins into its own hands; tho of course it might be advisable for some little time that some of our troops should stay in the Islands to steady things. I will not even consider the plan of a protectorate, or any plan which would imply our breaking our explicit promise because of which we were able to prevent a war of devastation last fall. The good faith of the United States is a mighty valuable asset and must not be impaired.

Thus did America's strategic interests in the Caribbean, intensified by the need to protect the Panama Canal and its approaches, pull Roosevelt toward a hegemonic position with which even he did not feel entirely comfortable. Venezuela, the Dominican Republic, and Cuba had been of ascending strategic importance, and the degree of American intervention in each ascended correspondingly. In the Roosevelt Corollary the president left his successors a principle of intervention; in his actions he left them a set of precedents. American interests in the Caribbean and Central America did not diminish after Roosevelt, and American interventions increased considerably.

4.

As Mahan had argued long before, a U.S. Navy with a two-ocean capability would need coaling stations, bases, in the Pacific. It had been this strategic consideration that dictated Roosevelt's enthusiasm for acquiring the Philippines and Hawaii. As with most imperial acquisitions, these new possessions expanded appetites and obligations even

as they satisfied them. It was now possible to look on the Asian mainland with new eyes. As Mahan wrote in 1901, the canal, Hawaii, and the Philippines "are important as facilitating our access to the seas of China and to the valley of the Yangtse, and as furnishing territorial support to our action there."

As he surveyed the Pacific during his presidency, Roosevelt could take satisfaction in the U.S.-held islands that formed stepping-stones in a generally east-west direction across the vast ocean to the shores of the Asian continent. The easternmost was the Hawaiian archipelago, twenty-four hundred miles west of San Francisco. Another thirteen hundred miles to the west was Midway, American since 1867, when it had become Secretary Seward's only acquisition besides Alaska. Southwest of Midway by just over one thousand miles was Wake Island, seized by the U.S. Navy on its way to the Philippines in 1898 and formally annexed in January 1899. Guam, also captured by the navy en route to the Philippines, lay fifteen hundred miles west of Wake. From Guam to Manila was another fifteen hundred miles. The Philippines themselves were twelve hundred miles from Japan and only half that distance from the Chinese mainland.

In the South Pacific, south of this line of possessions, lay the Samoan islands, which had been the subject of U.S. interest and contention with Germany since the Civil War. They were finally divided with Germany in late 1899, with the United States getting the best harbor, at Pago Pago. During the first Cleveland administration State Department veteran Alvey Adee had put the case for acquisition of the Samoan islands (and inferentially for the others as well): ". . . in the hands of a naval Power they threaten our Pacific flank, and indeed they threaten all the Pacific Coast of South America too, and Hawaii besides." For a country with two coasts to protect, the Monroe Doctrine to uphold, a growing navy to supply, and interests that it had begun to define in global terms, even remote islands had become important.

The heaviest American strategic, political, and economic investments were naturally in Hawaii and the Philippines. During Roosevelt's presidency Hawaii had a small population of 150,000 inhabitants, more than half of whom were aliens, mostly Japanese workers in the sugar fields. Political and economic power was still in the

hands of the white oligarchy, which was linked to the islands' missionary past and had been the motive force behind the 1898 annexation. However, thanks to an act passed by Congress in 1900 against the wishes of the white supremacists in the Hawaiian government, native Hawaiians automatically became U.S. citizens (though without the right to vote for president) and were not subjected to a property qualification, which would have restricted their right to vote. These circumstances made for a kind of stability. Native Hawaiians had some rights (aliens had none), the white power structure exercised a centralized but paternalistic rule, and there was no agitation for independence or statehood. The situation was ideal for the army, which established at Schofield Barracks the largest U.S. Army post, and for the navy, which made Pearl Harbor home base for its Pacific fleet.

The Philippines, with their insurrectionary past, presented a greater problem for the Americans. Roosevelt quickly grew apprehensive about the consequences of this colonial acquisition, which he had done so much to promote. As usual, he saw things in strategic terms. The Philippines were too far from the United States and too close to the growing power in Asia, Japan. In fact Manila is as close to Dublin as it is to San Francisco. The president lamented to Taft in August 1907 that "in the physical sense I don't see where they are of any value to us or where they are likely to be of any value." In fact, "The Philippines form our heel of Achilles. They are all that makes the present situation with Japan dangerous. . . . Personally I should be glad to see the islands made independent, with perhaps some kind of international guarantee for the preservation of order, or with some warning on our part that if they did not keep order we would have to interfere again; this among other reasons because I would rather see this nation fight all her life than to see her give them up to Japan or any other nation under duress."

The essence of this visionary passage is not that Roosevelt had been so soon wrong about the Philippines, or that he was honest enough to admit it, or that he was considering a Platt Amendment for the country. What stands out is his extraordinary prescience in wanting to give the Philippines independence before Japan could attack the islands. This idea was not a passing fancy; in the 1912 presidential campaign Roosevelt was to come out for Philippine indepen-

dence. He was long dead when Japan captured the Philippines from the United States in 1942, but he had warned of just such a risk thirty-five years before.

The acquisition of Hawaii and the Philippines expanded the American interest in the mainland of Asia, a continent where U.S. involvement had previously been episodic. A special target was China, a weak and sprawling giant whose vast potential market had provoked a competition among the European powers for influence and territory. In his seven years as secretary of state, particularly the three under McKinley, Hay developed the first modern U.S. policy toward China. It was based on America's new pretensions as an Asian power.

Before 1898 the United States had been a bystander rather than a participant in what Hay called "the great game of spoliation" in China. As an advocate of business he focused on America's burgeoning commercial interests in China, though they represented only 2 percent of global foreign trade and only 1 percent of America's foreign trade. He did not want to see the Chinese Empire broken up into pieces that the European powers could swallow. Now that the United States had acquired important holdings in the Pacific, he explored ways that it could inject itself into the "great game." Hay was not a profound strategic thinker, but he showed considerable foresight when he said: "The storm center of the world has shifted . . . to China. Whoever understands that mighty Empire . . . has a key to world politics for the next five centuries."

After China's loss of a war with Japan over Korea in 1895, Great Britain, France, Germany, and Russia had put pressure on the weakened country to cede territory to them. In the next few years all had gained land from China, either by lease or by outright seizure. Britain, whose interest in China was primarily commercial, began to grow concerned at the prospect that China would be partitioned among its rival great powers. Just before the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, the British had sought American cooperation in keeping China open to all foreign commerce. McKinley, preoccupied with the Caribbean, had brushed them off, but in the fall of 1899 Hay returned to the British concept of an Open Door to China, this time as an American initiative. He sent diplomatic notes to Britain, Russia, Germany, France, and Japan, soliciting support, in guarded language, for an agreement by which the parties would respect equal commer-

cial opportunities in China. The replies were positive but conditioned, except for Russia's, which was a polite turndown. Counting on the fact that no government wanted to be seen opposing fair play, Hay asserted in March 1900 that he had "final and definitive" agreement. No country demurred.

Open Doors are for those who are not already inside. Hay was negotiating from weakness since the United States was far behind in the scramble for China. The Open Door notes had no practical effect on the commercial competition in China. "Your open door is already off its hinges," Henry Adams told his friend before the policy was six months old. Hay himself recognized the shaky underpinnings of his approach. He lamented that there was not a single country which the Open Door policy could compel, adding: "The inherent weakness of our position is this: we do not want to rob China ourselves, and our public opinion will not permit us to interfere, with an army, to prevent others from robbing her. Besides, we have no army. The talk of the papers about 'our preeminent moral position giving us the authority to dictate to the world' is mere flap-doodle."

The Open Door was more perception than substance, a policy temporarily and conditionally accepted by the great powers for their own reasons. Yet perceptions often count. Hay's diplomatic legerdemain made him a celebrated figure in the United States and a potential asset to Roosevelt in his 1904 presidential campaign. Americans were pleased that their country was finally welcome at the international high table. They liked Hay's high-sounding opposition to spheres of influence in China, not noticing that the United States had no sphere to renounce. They were also glad that their country was thought of as a power with influence in Asia. The perception of other countries was changing as well. The United States, heretofore a power of the second rank, was now insisting on equal treatment with the traditional great powers and was to continue to insist on such treatment.

As evidence, in the summer of 1900 the United States sent five thousand troops to join an international force to rescue the besieged diplomatic legations in Beijing from the murderous Boxers, members of a secret society dedicated to expelling foreigners from China. The U.S. soldiers came from the Philippines; two years before there would have been no significant American military presence anywhere near China. During the Boxer crisis Hay issued a second set of notes, this

time without requesting a response, advocating the territorial integrity of China. Again perception trumped substance, since the disintegration of China continued, and indeed Hay himself contributed to it. Under pressure from the navy, he violated his own precepts by trying unsuccessfully to acquire a naval base in southern China. The Japanese, who had prior rights, quoted his own policy back at him.

With all the mirrors he had skillfully deployed, Hay set the United States on the way to becoming an Asian power. The Open Door policy was one of his two great contributions to American foreign policy. The other was a rapprochement with Great Britain that was to solidify into permanence. The China initiative engaged Hay's mind; his approach toward Britain was an affair of the heart. The close relationship between Washington and London that ensued, and that has lasted ever since Hay's term of office, can easily be taken for granted. But in 1900 Britain was still considered an adversary, as it had been during the American Revolution and in the War of 1812, when the British burned Washington, and during the American Civil War, when they tilted toward the Confederacy.

As recently as 1885, the normally unaggressive President Cleveland had assumed a belligerent stance toward Britain over the Venezuelan boundary. Irish-Americans, a growing factor in American politics, were automatically anti-British, often defining their entire foreign policy in terms of what might injure their erstwhile colonial oppressor. In the 1896 presidential election the Democrats charged that McKinley was pro-British; the Republicans defended their candidate by issuing a pamphlet describing how deeply the president was hated in England. For Root, British imperialism was a paradigm of colonial government; for Mahan, part Irish himself, the British Navy was a model to be emulated. But for both Britain remained a rival.

At loftier intellectual and social levels there was closer understanding. Roosevelt and his friends had grown up with the English classics, and American authors like Hawthorne, Cooper, Twain, Dreiser, and Wharton were popular in England. The bond among living literati was strong. Writers traded domiciles, Kipling to Vermont, Henry James to London. During the run-up to the American war with Spain, Alfred Austin limned the relationship in a verse whose quality provides no clue to how he had bested Swinburne to succeed Tennyson as England's poet laureate:

*Yes, this is the Voice on the bluff March gale,
"We severed have been too long:
But now we have done with a worn-out tale,
The tale of an ancient wrong,
And our friendship shall last long as Love doth last,
and be stronger than Death is strong."*

Hay, then ambassador in London, responded to the poem in less fevered tones: "We are bound by a tie which we did not forge and which we cannot break; we are joint ministers of the same sacred mission of liberty and progress. . . ."

The wellborn of both countries mingled freely. Cabot Lodge, who courted Irish-American votes in Massachusetts, saw no contradiction in taking anti-British positions in the Senate and then, during its recesses, sailing off to vacations in England. The two aristocracies, one based on birth, the other on wealth, made some prominent mergers in the late nineteenth century. Joseph Chamberlain, Randolph Churchill, and George Curzon all took American wives. Anthony Trollope ended his Palliser novels with the grand wedding of the future Duke of Omnium, who did not need the money, and the beautiful and wealthy Miss Isabel Boncassen of New York. Economic ties were close. British investment in the United States far outweighed Germany's, and the market in Canada, a British dominion, was lucrative for Americans.

British statesmen meanwhile began to see the merits of a policy that favored the United States, with its growing power, as an effective counterweight to Germany, fast becoming Britain's real adversary. Chamberlain, colonial secretary in a Conservative government, confirmed the change in a speech three weeks after the outbreak of the Spanish-American War. Exceeding his previous assertion that Britain and America were "more closely allied in sentiment and interest than any other nations on the face of the earth," he hinted at an actual alliance between them. Chamberlain's extravagant language represented more than the zeal of a man who had married the daughter of President Cleveland's secretary of war and had succumbed to the inducements of the charming Ambassador Hay. A British strategy shift was under way. It was first visible in Central America, which the British had dominated throughout the century, and the Caribbean, where they now seemed ready to cede domination to America.

Britain's support for the United States in 1898 had to overcome some dynastic and political sympathy for Spain; the Spanish queen regent Maria Christina was a niece of Queen Victoria's. But Maria Christina complained in vain that the British were letting the U.S. Navy use their facilities in the Caribbean. The British Navy also helped Dewey in his Hong Kong preparations for the attack on the Philippines and again in Manila Bay in his confrontation with von Diederichs. The British backdown in Venezuela in 1895, their support for the United States in 1898, and their concessions over the canal in 1901 were not intended as a renunciation of influence but rather, from a geopolitical standpoint, as a means to put American power at the service of British interests. As Kipling described it, "After a nation has pursued certain paths alone in the face of some slight misrepresentations, it is consoling to find another nation (which one can address without a dictionary) preparing to walk along the same lines to, I doubt not, the same ends."

British support was noticed and appreciated by Americans, as Lodge, a recovering Anglophobe, gracefully observed in his history of the Spanish-American War. The United States reciprocated by sympathizing with Britain's fight against the Boer rebellion; even Theodore Roosevelt's Dutch heritage and his exasperation at British treatment of the Boers did not prevent him from favoring a British victory. Mahan's writings took on a markedly pro-British cast when he began to share London's view of the dangers posed by Germany; to count the British fleet as a potential asset was no small thing. Having branded Britain before the war as "undoubtedly the most formidable of our possible enemies," he wrote in 1901 that "the British Empire is in external matters our natural though not our formal ally."

Talk by Roosevelt and others about annexing Canada subsided. The annexation plank that had been inserted in the Republican platform in the 1896 campaign was dropped in 1900. In fact, with America's new power and confidence, Canada, indefensible against an American land attack, came to be seen as a useful hostage to British behavior. Roosevelt, who had many close British friends, wrote to one of them, Arthur Lee, that British support in 1898 "worked a complete revolution in my feelings," that "the English-speaking peoples are now closer together than for a century and a quarter, and that every effort should be made to keep them close together." To his closest British

friend, Spring Rice, he wrote: "I am greatly mistaken if we ever slide back into the old condition of bickering and angry distrust."

Hay, the most fervent Anglophile among American leaders, was of course conscious of these trends and worked to translate them into policy. As he was settling in as secretary, he wrote to Henry White, his former deputy in London: "As long as I stay here, no action shall be taken contrary to my conviction that the one indispensable feature of our foreign policy should be a friendly understanding with England." Hay's first try at that understanding was the ill-starred Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. His second try at an isthmian treaty was a success because this time it was the British who compromised.

The British were driven to an even more important concession in a dispute with the United States over Canada's border with the panhandle of Alaska. Gold had been discovered in 1897 in the Canadian Yukon, so the issue was not trivial, since it concerned ownership of harbors and water passages to the goldfields. Before then even the British had assumed the area belonged to the United States; now the Canadians convinced them to reverse themselves. Britain demanded arbitration, a no-lose proposition, since at worst its phony claim would be rejected.

Hay, who cared more for improving the bilateral relationship with Great Britain than for harbors in the frozen north, probed for a *modus vivendi*. But his suggestions on the modalities of an arbitration tribunal were unacceptable to the Canadians, and a British proposal fell afoul of the Senate, eliciting a new round of complaints from Hay about senatorial fecklessness. In the end Hay managed to stall the Alaska issue until completion of the isthmian negotiations removed a British bargaining chip. By then Roosevelt was president, and his determination to preserve the maritime approaches to Alaska was positively bellicose. He told Hay Canada's claim was "an outrage pure and simple"; to pay the Canadians anything would be "dangerously near blackmail."

Under his new chief Hay faced the challenge of working out a procedure to resolve the dispute that would be acceptable to London yet tough enough to overcome Roosevelt's suspicion that he was soft toward the British. He came up with the idea of compulsory arbitration by "six impartial jurists of repute," three to be chosen by the United States and three by the British government. Even with the assurance

that the United States could get no worse than a tie, which would leave it with a preponderant military position in the region, he had difficulty persuading Roosevelt and the Senate. They finally succumbed on the understanding that the three American commissioners would be selected for their steadfast commitment to the U.S. position. Roosevelt thereupon appointed Lodge, who met none of the agreed-on criteria, being neither "impartial" nor a "jurist," and his only "repute" in Britain being ill. The second selection, of Root, was almost as blatant a disregard of the criteria; as Roosevelt's secretary of war, he was under discipline to vote as instructed. The third commissioner was a retired senator from Washington, a state with a clear financial interest in a pro-American outcome. The British members were two Canadians and Lord Alverstone, a jurist of distinction, who was the lord chief justice.

Roosevelt rattled sabers during the six-week deliberations of the commission in September and October 1903, threatening a military occupation of the disputed territory if the decision went the wrong way. Not surprisingly, the Americans and Canadians, both on instruction, voted their national positions; the Americans had been instructed by Roosevelt not to compromise on "the principle involved." Alverstone—because he was intimidated, or because the British government had grown tired of supporting Canada's dubious claim, or because he felt an obligation to do the right thing—voted with the Americans. In a letter to his wife, Hay paid him generous tribute: "I think myself that Lord Alverstone is the hero of the hour. No American statesman would have dared to give a decision on his honor and conscience directly against the claim of his own country."

Resolution of the Alaska dispute was the final settlement of the long border between the United States and the British dominion of Canada. More than that, as Roosevelt wrote Mahan, it "settled the last serious trouble between the British Empire and ourselves." Henry Adams could observe in 1904: "I no longer feel the old acute pleasure in vilifying the British." Mr. Dooley, that quintessential Irishman, also saw the writing on the wall. Following Roosevelt's election in 1904, he observed that "th' king sint f'r Ambassadeur Choate, who came as fast as his hands an' knees wud carry him."

Hay's affection for England and his skill as a diplomatist ensured that the opportunity for change was exploited and that the change

was not episodic or short-lived. He probably needed the toughening that Roosevelt gave him both on the isthmian issue and on the Alaska boundary, but he in turn moderated Roosevelt's excessive demands and belligerent rhetoric. More than the president, he saw that the overall connection with Britain would transcend ephemeral wins or losses. Above all, Hay was responsible for establishing the civilized and friendly tone of a relationship that, more than a century later, is still seen on both sides of the Atlantic as a family one.

The rigors of Hay's stewardship during an exceptionally important and demanding period of foreign policy took their toll on him. Never robust, he suffered from a variety of physical and mental ailments, including chronic depression. The Senate, and particularly Lodge, wore him down. Since becoming secretary of state, he came to consider this erstwhile friend, with whom he had been exchanging Christmas presents for decades, as obstructive, duplicitous, narrow-minded, and marred by "infirmity of his mind and character." He told Henry Adams that Lodge gave him more trouble than "all the governments of Europe, Asia and the Sulu Islands, and all the Senators from the wild West and the Congressmen from the rebel confederacy." One may wonder if Hay saw his trials with Lodge as unwitting punishment for his once having cuckolded him.

Yet even in his decline Hay's humor remained as sharp as ever. He described to a friend a meeting during the Boxer Rebellion with the Chinese minister Wu Ting-fang, who was not noted for clarity of expression: "Minister Wu came by this morning and stayed for two hours, at the conclusion of which Wu was Hazy and Hay was Woozy." One of Hay's last acts occurred after a Moroccan bandit called Raisuli had kidnapped and held for ransom a presumed American citizen, Ion Perdicaris. Hay sent the Moroccan government an ultimatum that was gleefully read to cheers at the 1904 Republican National Convention: "We want Perdicaris alive or Raisuli dead." When Perdicaris was freed to nationwide acclamation, Hay wrote in his diary: "It is curious how a concise impropriety hits the public."

But Hay's lifelong bouts of depression increased after he lost King, Nicolay, McKinley, and his son Del in 1901, the same year in which he had to juggle the isthmian and Alaskan negotiations. His absences from Washington after 1901 lengthened as he sought the quiet of Lake Sunapee. His friends wondered if he was really sick, while Pres-

ident Roosevelt assumed he was malingering. Early in Roosevelt's second term, on a recuperative trip to Europe with Henry Adams, Hay remarked on shipboard that a dozen treaties were "hung up in the Senate Committee-room like lambs in a butcher's shop." When he returned, he could endure only a week in Washington before fleeing to New Hampshire. He died there on July 1, 1905, at sixty-six. As his biographer Tyler Dennett remarked, "John Hay had to die to prove that he was unwell."

Two weeks before his death Hay dreamed that he had gone to the White House to report to the president, "who turned out to be Mr. Lincoln." Lincoln was sympathetic about his illness and kindly gave him two unimportant letters to answer. The dream left Hay melancholy. A day later he wrote the final entry in his diary: "I say to myself that I should not rebel at the thought of my life ending at this time. I have lived to be old; something I never expected in my youth. I have had many blessings, domestic happiness being the greatest of all. I have lived my life. I have had success beyond all the dreams of my boyhood. My name is printed in the journals of the world without descriptive qualifications, which may, I suppose, be called fame. By mere length of service I shall occupy a modest place in the history of my time."

Roosevelt was right that Hay had not been a great secretary of state. Still, his two great contributions to American foreign policy merit him a place much higher than he would have given himself, in fact not far below his own model, Seward. With his ability, through the Open Door, to convince the American people of their stake in China and the Asian mainland, Hay helped ensure that the acquisition of Hawaii and the Philippines led to an American Asian strategy. The enormous U.S. economic and political interests in Asia today, as well as the commitments reflected in wars fought by American soldiers in Japan, Korea, and Vietnam during the twentieth century, trace some of their origin to his Asian diplomacy.

In addition, Hay's establishment of a special relationship with Great Britain created a catalyst for the growth and conduct of America's responsibilities as a great power in the twentieth century. The Venezuelan crisis of 1895 marked the last time the two countries almost went to war. In the twentieth century the dynamic combination of the two English-speaking peoples helped overcome the threats to

peace posed first by Nazi Germany and then by Soviet Russia. Often reluctantly America took on the burdens of global responsibility in the two world wars and at the beginning of the Cold War. Almost certainly it would not have done so without the influence of Great Britain. In every case British diplomacy, persuasion, example, and sometimes weakness weighed heavily in the American decisions to engage. The relationship survived, and even gained from, the power shift from Britain to the United States. As a future British prime minister, Harold Macmillan, told a colleague in 1943, "We . . . are Greeks in the American Empire. You will find the Americans much as the Greeks found the Romans—great big, vulgar, bustling people, more vigorous than we are."

Hay's career in all its variety embodied some of the reasons for America's emergence as a great power. His work with Lincoln during the Civil War contributed to uniting and strengthening the country in the dynamic postwar decades. As a successful businessman he caught the rising tide of America's economic expansion. As a secretary of state who knew both the world and his own country, he presided over a period of expansion with modesty, civility, and a self-deprecating humor that excluded arrogance. As a writer—novelist, poet, historian, and journalist—he immersed himself in the human condition and made himself a man of uncommon humanity. He himself was the best example of the "fine good nature" that he urged on Americans after they had won their "splendid little war."

5.

The years between the Spanish-American War and the end of Theodore Roosevelt's presidency were distinguished by an unprecedented projection of power and influence outward from America's shores. But they were also marked by an extraordinary movement in the opposite direction, a mass migration of people from all over Europe and parts of Asia to the United States. During the first decade of the twentieth century nearly nine million legal immigrants entered the country, more than in any other decade until the 1990s. It was the largest concentrated migration in all human history up to that time. By 1910 more than one in seven Americans was foreign-born, more than twice the proportion of today.

The current of imperial expansion flowing out and the current of immigration flowing in did not always keep to separate channels. Sometimes they intersected, enriching or polluting each other, and when they did so, the element that joined them was race. A nineteenth-century American's views on race influenced his reaction to his country's expansion, to immigration, and to the connection between the two. This linkage was especially important with Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, because they were in a position to affect both directions of the two-way traffic: how the United States exported its power abroad and how it treated the millions of foreigners seeking its shores.

America was almost entirely open to newcomers throughout the nineteenth century. Immigration was unregulated at the federal level from the time of the ineffective Alien Acts of 1798, which were directed mainly against radical French and Irish refugees, until the early 1890s. During the century immigrants were enormously important to the growing American economy. When their numbers increased after the Civil War, primarily as the result of the advent of the steamship, they became even more essential for the growth industries of railroads, steel, mining, textiles, meatpacking, and construction. Immigrants were welcomed not only as laborers but also as settlers; midwestern states and land-grant railroads actually advertised for them.

For many Americans, the racial mixture that these new immigrants enhanced was a good thing. Herman Melville exulted: "Our blood is as the flood of the Amazon, made up of a thousand noble currents all pouring into one." The Statue of Liberty was dedicated in New York Harbor in 1886, with Emma Lazarus's words "Give me your tired, your poor, / Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free" engraved on its pedestal. Ralph Waldo Emerson praised the America emerging from the "smelting pot" of Europe. Oliver Wendell Holmes compared Americans with Romans, "the great assimilating people."

At the same time the foreign-born arrivals were often swamped by the waves of anti-immigrant bigotry that swept the United States, especially during periods of economic distress. Immigrants were made to pay for the anti-Catholic, antiradical, and pro-Anglo-Saxon prejudices that typified this American nativism. The decade of the 1890s, which included an economic collapse in 1893, was also a time when

more and more immigrants were arriving from southern and eastern European countries. These less educated, often swarthier, and less familiar Italians, Russians, and Habsburg Empire Slavs were distrusted by Americans disposed toward Anglo-Saxon racism. This new immigration did not so much create the nativist offensive as intensify it. In their search for a promised land the immigrants often found themselves in the wrong place at the wrong time.

The xenophobia of the 1890s had two main elements. First was the fear, usually exaggerated, of radicalism. An immigrant anarchist tried unsuccessfully to kill the steel baron Henry Clay Frick in 1891, and President McKinley's assassin had been on the fringes of the anarchist movement. But most immigrants actually tended toward political conservatism. Coming for the most part from European autocracies, they were used to keeping their heads down and to prizing order over social or political instability. In the cities where most of them lived, they fell under the protection of mainly Irish urban political machines and were more inclined to tolerate corrupt paternalism than to flock to join reform movements. They were generally patriotic and loyal to their chosen country. Foreign-born accounted for 20 percent of the Union army in the Civil War, a higher figure than their proportion of the U.S. population.

Fear of immigrant radicalism made capitalists like Carnegie, Frick, and Hay weigh the value of immigrant labor against the supposed dangers of imported disorder. Still, Carnegie came down on the side of continued high immigration. The institutional voice of capitalism, the National Association of Manufacturers, also maintained a consistent proimmigration position. Less affluent Americans—the urban working class, the lower middle class, anti-Catholic Protestants, members of earlier waves of immigration—clung to the proposition that the new immigrants were a threat to their livelihood, their way of life, and even their safety.

These lower-class anti-immigrants had at least experienced in their own lives the actual effect of the huge waves of immigration. Those who constituted the second nativist element had no such excuse since they were among the wealthiest and best-educated men in America. Their hostility to immigration was almost entirely an intellectual construct, acquired not in the sooty mill cities of Pittsburgh, Cleveland, or Fall River but on the leafy campuses of Harvard, MIT,

Yale, Columbia, Johns Hopkins, Cornell, Wisconsin, and Stanford. Theirs was an upper-class nationalism suffused by bizarre theories of race and directed against people presumptuous enough to bring their alleged inferior civilization to America's shores.

Intellectuals who were influenced by social Darwinism and/or Anglo-Saxonism brought a racial emphasis to American imperialism, whether they supported imperial expansion because it was part of the march of civilization against savagery or opposed it because it might bring undesirables to the United States. But they displayed no division in their views on the immigration of non-Anglo-Saxons; to a man they opposed it. Nathaniel Shaler, Roosevelt's professor at Harvard, found "non-Aryan" peoples lacking in the correct "ancestral experience" and impossible to Americanize. John W. Burgess, Roosevelt's law teacher at Columbia, warned of "mongrel races" and the "rabble" immigrating from southern Europe. Francis A. Walker, president of MIT and of the American Economic Association, conducted a study that claimed the declining birth rate of native Americans was due to immigrants, "beaten men from beaten races; representing the worst failures in the struggle for existence."

Eugenics, which became a fad in the United States, inevitably fueled the anti-immigrant fire. The idea of eugenics, an offshoot of Darwinism started by Darwin's cousin Francis Galton, in its crudest application (most of its applications were crude) held that race determined social conditions and that biological deficiencies rather than environmental factors condemned the poor to misery and vice. In a famous American study of a degraded family, *The Jukes* (1877), Richard Dugdale concluded that heredity determined disease, pauperism, and immorality. American eugenicists, who were devoted to selective breeding (as if people were racehorses), managed to persuade the legislatures of twelve states to pass laws favoring sterilization. To the eugenicist mind, immigration was a purely biological issue: Since the degenerate genes of new immigrants could never be improved by the American environment, the best immigrant stock had to be selected at the start and the rest discarded.

Paradoxically, no city in the United States was more affected by anti-immigrant nativism than the town that had stood so firmly against slavery in generations before, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Considering the intellectual brawn of Harvard and MIT, it would have been possible to stand in Harvard Square and be no more than a few miles from many of the most prominent social Darwinists, Anglo-Saxonists, and eugenicists in the entire United States. In that environment it may not be surprising that the American politician most imbued with this patrician nationalism was Henry Cabot Lodge of Boston, Cambridge, and Nahant. Restriction of immigration was one of the most consistent and important objectives in his long political career.

He was not an ideologue on race. He was a leading spokesman in the Senate for African American rights, and in 1890 he sponsored a Senate bill to expand them. He had adjusted pragmatically to the Irish immigration in the Boston area and was well tuned to the fact that the Irish voted and wielded political power. His efforts were concentrated on keeping southern and eastern Europeans out of the United States. As a student of, and writer about, the Teutonic influence on American civilization Lodge was fascinated by genealogies, especially his own. His pedigree on his father's side was suitably Teutonic, and he managed to upgrade the Cabots of his mother's lineage, who were of Norman descent. In obeisance to his intellectual mentors, he wrote: "Darwin and Galton have lived and written, Mendel [who gave heredity priority over environment] has been discovered and revived, and the modern biologists have supervened, so that a man's origin has become a recognized part of his biographer's task." Applying genealogy to American life, Lodge produced in 1891 a study that, using a biographical encyclopedia, argued that it was the English racial strain that had contributed most to the development of the United States.

Lodge believed that racial characteristics were immutable. "The men of each race," he wrote, "possess an indestructible stock of ideas, traditions, sentiments, modes of thought, an unconscious inheritance from their ancestors, upon which argument has no effect." The races arriving from southern and eastern Europe, he believed, brought with them negative qualities that could not be changed and would be passed on to their descendants. This new immigration was "most alien to the body of the American people" and "a great and perilous change in the very fabric of our race." To combat it, Lodge became

the spokesman for the Immigration Restriction League, founded in Boston in 1894 by several young Harvard graduates and a key organization for the next quarter century.

Lodge's greatest effort to stem immigration was through legislation. Early in his political career he adopted an idea that was making the rounds of restrictionist circles, a literacy test as a requirement for immigration. In his version a prospective immigrant had to be able to read forty words in his own or any other language in order to be admitted to the United States. Everybody knew that this would apply mainly to the poorest immigrants from southern and eastern Europe. It was a clever and indirect way to keep them out. Lodge first introduced a bill to make the literacy test law in 1891 and repeatedly thereafter. The wonder was that it kept failing. It was defeated in Congress in 1898, 1902, and 1906; it passed both houses in 1896, 1913, and 1915, but was vetoed successively by Presidents Cleveland, Taft, and Wilson. It finally passed in 1917, over Wilson's veto, during a wartime frenzy of hostility against foreigners. Lodge failed for so long with the literacy test because he had only lukewarm labor support—Samuel Gompers was caught between protecting immigrants and protecting jobs—and because immigrants had begun to constitute a formidable voting bloc increasingly attractive to Republican candidates. In 1924, the year of his death, the legislative efforts of Lodge and his anti-immigration colleagues culminated in the passage of the most restrictive immigration law ever approved by the U.S. Congress.

Theodore Roosevelt was a much more complex figure when it came to race. He was obsessed with the issue, studying and discussing it all his life. But his views were often contradictory. He defended the rights of blacks and extolled the bravery of Indians, but he caricatured both groups and was likely to fasten similar stereotypes onto Filipinos, Cubans, and Latin Americans in general. His scathing description of Cuban soldiers after the American landing in 1898 focused on their ragged appearance and untrustworthy behavior, not on their three-year struggle, which crucially helped the Americans by weakening Spanish rule there. Like American Indians and Aguinaldo's Filipinos, Cubans were for Roosevelt inconvenient occupants of real estate that he would have preferred to find unencumbered by lesser breeds.

With all his prejudices, Roosevelt's innate sense of fairness set him well above Lodge and others of his class on racial issues. He named his beloved Oyster Bay house Sagamore Hill in compliment to the Indians of New York State, for whom the word "Sagamore" means "chieftain." In the glow of hindsight, he recalled in his autobiography that he had promoted Jews and blacks in the New York City police force, had helped create a level playing field in the U.S. civil service, had appointed the first Jewish cabinet member (Oscar Straus, of the New York family of merchants and philanthropists), and had invited Booker T. Washington to dinner at the White House (once). He talked the talk of equal opportunity, telling a Republican audience in 1905: "Our effort must be to secure to each man, whatever his color, equality of opportunity, equality of treatment before the law."

Roosevelt's racial ambivalence carried over to his views on immigration. In *The Winning of the West* he made a point of emphasizing that his backwoods heroes were not recent immigrants but of Scotch-Irish stock, longer in America. He supported Lodge's efforts to curb immigration, though he lacked his friend's zeal on the issue. During the 1890s he favored restricting and regulating immigration "by much more drastic laws than now exist." As president he presided over increases in the head tax for immigrants and the extension of entry restrictions to epileptics, prostitutes, beggars, anarchists, imbeciles, tuberculosis sufferers, and persons who had committed crimes involving moral turpitude. He kept up a running and friendly correspondence with racist intellectuals like Madison Grant, a Yale-educated blue-blooded eugenicist who wrote a virulent book attacking blacks and non-Nordic immigrants. He counted among his good friends racial bigots like the artist Frederic Remington, who once boasted of his desire to massacre "Jews, Injuns, Chinamen, Italians, Huns—the rubbish of the earth," and Owen Wister, who complained that urban civilization was being debased by "encroaching alien vermin."

Still, Roosevelt had a vision of America that depended critically on its immigrants. "Americanization," as he called it, featured the power not of race but of the American environment. His view, influenced by the writings of his friend Frederick Jackson Turner, was that the frontier Americanized people: "A single generation of life upon it has invariably beaten all the frontiersmen of whatever stock into one mould, and this a mould different from any in Europe." In contrast with

Lodge's view of the immutability of race, Roosevelt's consistent belief was that America itself wrought a benevolent transformation on the people who came to it and lived in it, regardless of their ethnic background. He loved the jumble of races and made his *Rough Riders* a living symbol of it.

The idea of America as a "melting pot" captivated his imagination. Israel Zangwill dedicated his 1908 play of that name to the president, who attended the premiere with Mrs. Zangwill. In *The Melting Pot*, two immigrants from Russia fall in love in America. One is a Jewish boy; the other a Russian girl whose nobleman father was implicated in a pogrom in which the boy's parents died. At the play's end the boy proclaims the victory of the melting pot over ethnic antagonisms: "Celt and Latin, Slav and Teuton, Greek and Syrian—black and yellow . . . how the great Alchemist melts and fuses them with his purging flame!" Four years after the play opened, Roosevelt assured Zangwill of his continued dedication to its theme. He wrote to him that the play "not merely dealt with the 'melting pot,' with the fusing of all foreign nationalities into an American nationality, but it also dealt with the great ideals which it is just as essential for the native born as for the foreign to realize and uphold if the new nationality is to represent a real addition to the sum total of human achievement."

Roosevelt treasured the melting pot not only for its leveling value and its lessons in egalitarian responsibility but also for the evils it warded off. He warned somewhat defensively: "The one absolutely certain way of bringing this nation to ruin, of preventing all possibility of its continuing as a nation at all, would be to permit it to become a tangle of squabbling nationalities." The melting pot was a valuable preventative and thus vital to national security. However, to his mind the pot did not melt all who fell into it equally. Roosevelt was clearly more anxious for the new immigrants to become Americans like him than for the reverse transformation to take place. He did not need melting; they did. This failure to transcend his time and his class prevented him from moving into an intellectual world free of racial bias. Still, his basic goodwill allowed him to distance himself considerably from the world of Darwin, Galton, Lodge, and the racist professors of his youth.

Roosevelt's presidency reflected both sides of his ambivalence on immigration. He signed restrictive, if relatively minor, laws on the

subject. He supported the exclusion of Chinese, a subject on which his mentor was Edward Alsworth Ross, a University of Wisconsin sociologist who described immigrants as "hirsute, low-brained, big-faced persons of obviously low mentality." At the same time, drawing on his experience as New York City police commissioner, Roosevelt took reformist actions that improved the lot of immigrants: He attacked corruption in the immigration program by cleansing Ellis Island, the main reception center in New York Harbor, of bribery, shakedowns, and the sale of entry documents, and in 1906 he backed a law to end the practice of naturalizing masses of immigrants on the eve of elections. Since most immigrants voted Democratic, in this latter case Roosevelt was probably influenced by politics, as he often was.

With an eye to the Jewish vote, he responded to the massacre of Jews by Russians in 1903 with diplomatic *démarches* directed at St. Petersburg. His appointment of Oscar Straus as secretary of commerce and labor was aimed in part at stealing Jewish votes from William Randolph Hearst's bid for the governorship of New York in 1906. Straus's duties included immigration, in which he strongly believed. He talked Roosevelt out of intervening on behalf of the 1906 version of Lodge's ultimately unsuccessful bill to institute the literacy test, despite the president's previously declared support for such legislation.

Roosevelt's earlier experience with the cigar makers kept fresh his concern about the economic exploitation of immigrants. He sought and valued the advice of Frances Kellor, a dynamic social worker and muckraker who went on to transform the living conditions of immigrants in New York State. Roosevelt also presided over, if he did not originate, fairly permissive policies concerning migration from and to America's new overseas territories. Filipinos could come to Hawaii as sugarcane workers, and Puerto Ricans after 1900 had the right of entry to the United States. In addition, large-scale Mexican immigration north of the border began during his presidency. On the other hand, Roosevelt believed that the Anglo-Saxon race was committing "suicide" by allowing itself to be outnumbered by foreigners, a view developed under the influence of Professors Ross and Walker. But his solution, unlike theirs, was not to cut immigration sharply but to encourage old-stock families to have more children.

The close relationship between American expansion outward and

immigration inward was full of ambiguities. Some immigrants supported the expansion of the American empire; some opposed it. The working-class immigrants who were the principal readers of Hearst's warmongering newspapers clearly thirsted for a war with Spain, as their purchases of the *New York Journal* in record numbers showed. They thus contributed to heating the war fever to which McKinley responded. On the other hand, prominent immigrant intellectuals like Schurz, Carnegie, and Godkin opposed imperialism and helped lead the political fight against it. So did the American Federation of Labor, which contained many immigrant members.

On the other side of the coin, the jingoes who supported imperial expansion tended to oppose mass immigration, and their denigration of non-Anglo-Saxon cultures augmented existing prejudices against immigrants. As Fritz Stern, one of the foremost historians of modern racism, has written, "the tacit or unquestioned acceptance of imperialism depended on a presumption of racial inequalities." Imperialism is inherently racist. People like Lodge, who wanted to project superior Anglo-Saxon power and values abroad, also wanted to protect their American homeland from the onslaught of inferior cultures. Other Americans took a restrictive view of immigration out of horror that their traditions would be contaminated by foreigners. Gompers forever wavered on this issue, and the Irish-born Godkin supplemented his anti-imperialism with an anti-immigration position just as strong. It was left to a lonely few, led by Senator Hoar, Carnegie, and Schurz, to reject racial arguments and make the parallel cases against imperialism and for immigration.

Legislation shutting down the immigration of non-Anglo-Saxons did not come until 1924, but pressure for such laws was building for decades. The first signal was the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882. Since 1850 some three hundred thousand Chinese had emigrated to the West Coast to find employment as gold miners, railroad workers, farm laborers, and small businessmen. (Chinese laundries, nonexistent in China, proliferated in the American West.) Their presence provoked a torrent of bigotry led by the Workingmen's party, headed by Denis Kearney, an Irish immigrant. Under popular pressure from California, where Kearney was based, Congress passed an act to suspend Chinese immigration for ten years and deny naturalization to Chinese already in the country. Senator Hoar denounced it as the legalization

of racial discrimination, but it was renewed in 1892; in 1902, under Roosevelt, Chinese immigration was suspended indefinitely.

Racial feeling against Chinese was not limited to California; it was shared by American imperialists in general. Mahan, in a letter to the *New York Times* in 1893, wrote that "the vast mass of China—now inert—may yield to one of those impulses which have in past ages buried civilization under a wave of barbaric invasion." Hay's Open Door policy had originated not in respect for China but rather in a desire to prevent the division of its markets by America's European rivals. The door was open to American interests in China but firmly closed to Chinese who wanted to emigrate to the United States.

The racial superiority flaunted by many Americans over Filipinos, Cubans, and Puerto Ricans probably stimulated the efforts made in Congress to close the doors on Chinese and on southern and eastern Europeans. Although Roosevelt, Lodge, Root, Mahan, and Hay all were unfriendly to mass immigration, their views varied in stridency. Hay, for example, regretted what was happening to the Chinese, though he did nothing about it. Two weeks before his death he wrote in his diary that the exclusion of Chinese was "barbarous." Root deplored the "dreadful" treatment of Chinese immigrants in California. When it came to the Japanese, it was Roosevelt and Root who took a moderate position in ensuring that they were not treated as cavalierly as the Chinese had been. Roosevelt's relationship with Japan was in fact a curious amalgam of his views on global strategy and on race.

6.

Roosevelt considered his accomplishments with Japan the major foreign policy achievement of his second term. He was not disposed to believe Asian nations should be admitted into the restricted club of superior Anglo-Saxons, but he made an exception for the Japanese. "The Japs interest me and I like them," he wrote his British friend Spring Rice. To another friend he called the Japanese "a wonderful and civilized people" who were "entitled to stand on an absolute equality with all the other peoples of the civilized world." What impressed him was Japan's energy, technical prowess, culture, industrial achievement, and growing military strength. Japan, like America, was in a heroic phase of political and economic development.

Roosevelt was not just a starry-eyed admirer; he had solid strategic reasons for his pro-Japanese attitude. In Europe he considered Germany a potential enemy and Britain, having conceded the Caribbean to the United States, a budding friend. In Asia he most feared the expansive inclinations of Nicholas II's Russia, against which Japan could be a useful buffer. The Anglo-Japanese alliance of 1902 strengthened ties between two countries friendly to the United States; Roosevelt warmly approved it. He also welcomed Japan's surprise attack on Russia in February 1904, though as the conflict between them wore on, he went beyond being a cheerleader. In fact his analysis of the global geopolitical situation reflected an impressive sophistication.

Now that the United States had made its great imperial thrusts in the Caribbean, the Pacific, and Panama, what Roosevelt cared for most in foreign, as in domestic, affairs was order. He wanted order on America's two long land borders with Canada and Mexico, order in the Caribbean and Central America, and order for the protection of the new Pacific holdings of Hawaii and the distant and vulnerable Philippines. He involved the U.S. government in Venezuela in 1903 and intervened in the Dominican Republic in 1904 and in Cuba in 1906 for the purpose of establishing order. The principle of intervention enshrined in the Roosevelt Corollary was intended to be invoked in disorderly countries, not in stable ones like Argentina or Brazil.

With America's new and significant assets in the Pacific, a similar regime of order was required for Asia. Roosevelt believed this could be achieved through a balance of power between the two major nations, Japan and Russia. The war between them was thus convenient, but only if neither side won convincingly; a "yellow peril" or a "Slav peril" would be equally dangerous. He wanted Japan to succeed but not too overwhelmingly. To ensure such a result, Roosevelt thought it necessary to inject himself into the situation.

Throughout 1904 the president operated with great diplomatic skill on the principal global powers: Germany and France as a means of moderating Russia, Britain as an ally of Japan, and of course Russia and Japan directly. He made use of old and new friends. Spring Rice was in the British Embassy in St. Petersburg, and Speck von Sternberg was the German ambassador in Washington. A Japanese who had gone to Harvard, the influential Baron Kantaro Kaneko, became

his back channel to the Japanese government. The president did not trust the Russian ambassador in Washington, so he appointed an able American diplomat, George von Lengerke Meyer, U.S. ambassador to St. Petersburg to give him access to the tsar. He wrote Meyer's detailed instructions himself; Secretary Hay described them admiringly as being so direct as to be indiscreet.

As always when a president pursues personal diplomacy, the professional diplomats were cut out, and though this usually acts to the detriment of good policy, that was not the case this time. The U.S. ambassadors in Berlin and Tokyo were told no more about American negotiations with the Germans and Japanese than successive U.S. ambassadors in Moscow knew about U.S.-Soviet relations during much of the Cold War, when bilateral business was transacted in Washington with an experienced Soviet ambassador. After Roosevelt's victory in the 1904 election, as Hay sickened and died, the president's hands-on involvement became even greater. In Washington he initiated with a special Japanese envoy discussions so secret that even Japan's ally Britain had no inkling of them. But his ingenious diplomacy foundered on Russia's refusal to make peace, even after defeats at Port Arthur and Mukden in northeastern China. The destruction of the Russian fleet in the Tsushima Strait in late May 1905 finally persuaded the tsar of the weakness of his position.

Roosevelt was the choice of both sides to broker a peace. In his memoirs he claimed that this was his own idea; the diplomatic record indicates that the Japanese put him up to it. In any case he was willing, even eager to accept a global mediating assignment larger than any president had undertaken before. The predictable bickering over the venue for the talks drew from Roosevelt a diplomatic patience hitherto unfeatured in his character but left him sputtering privately about Russian treachery and Japanese selfishness. With great reluctance he finally offered the United States as the site in July 1905; the negotiations were held in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, and at Oyster Bay.

The Japanese, preening as victors, stunned the Russians with a set of severe demands (a dry run for the even harsher ones imposed twelve years later by Germany on the new Bolshevik regime). In addition to major territorial changes, Japan insisted on a large monetary indemnity and the cession of Russian-held Sakhalin Island, which the tsar's police had turned into a place of exile for political prisoners.

The Russians, already humiliated militarily, were aggrieved, aggressive, and so opposed to concessions that a renewal of the war was a real possibility. Not even the presence in Portsmouth of a first-rate Russian envoy, Sergei Witte, an important prerevolutionary economic reformer and prime minister, could soften the government's obduracy. Witte towered over his Japanese counterpart by more than a foot—a physical intimidation that symbolized the toughness of the Russian negotiating position. Despite Japan's military advantage, therefore, a solution was by no means inevitable.

Given the keen attention the American press paid to the negotiations and to Roosevelt's involvement, a breakdown of the talks would not have been cost-free for a president just beginning his second term. Roosevelt thought that the Japanese had the better of the argument—they had won after all—so he tried a full diplomatic onslaught on the Russian government, using all the instruments of modern diplomacy except his personal presence, which was not an option since St. Petersburg was weeks away by steamship. He persuaded the Japanese to compromise on the lesser issue, Sakhalin Island, which they agreed to split with Russia. Then, in the improved atmosphere, he sent Ambassador Meyer to Nicholas with a personal letter that emphasized Japan's flexibility and urged similar moderation from Russia. Roosevelt warned the tsar not too gently that if hostilities were renewed, Russia might well lose eastern Siberia. Expanding the points of persuasion, the president got Kaiser William II to exhort his Russian cousin on behalf of compromise and the French to weigh in as well.

Roosevelt's efforts, brilliant as they were, failed. The tsar, in a cable to the president and a two-hour meeting with Meyer, refused to give up either territory or money. As often happens, however, the sobering prospect of diplomatic failure provokes reassessments that begin to change rigid positions. Roosevelt made sure that both sides saw the abyss before them. Finally Witte broke the impasse. He cabled home his belief that Russia's "peace-loving public opinion" (an obvious euphemism in that tsarist police autocracy) would not accept the loss of dignity implied by an indemnity but might accept the partial cession of Sakhalin. He emphasized the dangers if Russia were seen as wrecking the negotiations and the future benefits if Russia won Europe and America to its side. For those reasons, Witte concluded, "we must

take Roosevelt's opinion into consideration." He was recognizing, and using as an argument with his monarch, the fact that America's new power had made its voice worth listening to. This time the tsar agreed.

Roosevelt now exploited Russia's concession on Sakhalin to press Japan to drop its demand for indemnity. His arguments, made in a personal message to the emperor, were trenchant. Russia would refuse to pay, so Japan would gain nothing and the war would resume. As he had told the tsar, he now told the emperor that the Japanese could take eastern Siberia, but it would be worthless to them. They would have spent millions of dollars and shed rivers of blood, and worst of all, they would have the whole world against them because nobody would understand their waging war over an issue of money alone. Prudently the president took the precaution of putting his *démarche* in writing; he suspected that the mikado was usually told what he wanted to hear, not what Roosevelt wanted to tell him.

As the Japanese pondered, Roosevelt blanketed the diplomatic field with further pleas to Japan to give up the indemnity and to Russia to pay it. A week dragged by in extreme tension and with no sign of hope; the Russians even asked for their hotel bill. Roosevelt concentrated on emphasizing to both sides the consequences of failure and decided privately to blame that failure on Russia. At that point the Japanese gave in. Terms were agreed on August 30 on the basis of no indemnity and the division of Sakhalin.

In Japan the peace agreement set off street riots among Japanese angry that it had deprived them of the fruits of their military victory. Russia's obstinacy had indeed achieved more than a defeated country could expect, but the war itself had produced enormous gains for Japan in territory and economic privileges. It had also established Japan as the strongest power in Asia; the Portsmouth Treaty effectively ratified that status. For Roosevelt, it had been a signal victory. The balance of power had been established: Russia had been humbled but not destroyed, and Japan's increase in power had been stopped short of hegemony.

Roosevelt was also able to use the crisis in the Far East to win additional acceptance of America's hold on the Philippines. As a believer in spheres of influence he saw the Yellow Sea as a Japanese sphere, just as he expected the Japanese and others to recognize an American

sphere in the Caribbean. But the Philippines, much closer to Japan than to the United States, could not be protected in any American sphere. During the discussions leading to Portsmouth, Roosevelt sent Secretary of War Taft to Tokyo, where he worked out an arrangement to solve this problem. The two sides agreed that the United States, in violation of an 1882 pledge to support Korea's independence, would not interfere with any Japanese claim to Korea. Japan in return would respect U.S. ownership of the Philippines. Taft was accompanied to Japan by Roosevelt's eldest and still-single daughter Alice, a vivacious beauty of twenty. While Alice reaped the publicity, Taft, to protect a vulnerable American acquisition close to the Asian mainland, quietly made the deal to sell out the Koreans.

The Portsmouth negotiation was a masterpiece of classical diplomacy. While he was not present the whole time, Roosevelt set the strategy and did most of the negotiating himself, without a secretary of state, Hay having died six weeks before the first meeting at Portsmouth. As a mediator and negotiator Roosevelt was informed, focused, understanding, sympathetic, firm when he had to be, trustworthy, and decisive. He had learned to speak softly without a big stick. His achievement received due credit throughout the world, including from the two protagonists. "Your personal energetic efforts," cabled Nicholas II, "brought the peace." "Your advice," his Japanese friend Kaneko told him, "was very powerful and convincing, by which the peace of Asia was assured."

These references to peace were strange accolades for a man who had spent most of his life lauding the glories of war. Even stranger was the Nobel Peace Prize he was awarded a year later. Yet he deserved it. He had ended a war that was causing horrific human carnage. He had also taken the United States another rung up the ladder of world power as a successful mediator between the two leading Asian states, as a country that had won recognition of its interests in Asia, and as a growing military giant. Because of Portsmouth, Roosevelt's America now occupied a larger place on the political map of the world.

There was a domestic coda to Roosevelt's foreign policy encounters with Japan. Japanese emigrants to the continental United States and to Hawaii contributed greatly to the American economy. Like the Chinese, however, they were the targets of restrictionists who wanted to

exclude them as the Chinese had been excluded since 1882. In California racial feeling welled over in the year after Roosevelt scored his victory at Portsmouth. In October 1906 the San Francisco School Board ordered Asian students into segregated schools; the ruling affected ninety-three Japanese children. Japan erupted into anti-American rioting, and its government protested to Washington. Roosevelt, whose sympathies on this issue lay entirely with the Japanese, acted to head off restrictive federal legislation. He told Congress that the school board's act was a "wicked absurdity" and urged fair treatment for the Japanese.

Once again a mediator, Roosevelt worked out with the San Francisco authorities and the Japanese government a "gentleman's agreement" that dealt with the larger issue involved, Japanese immigration. The Japanese, but not the other Asian, children returned to the public schools, and the Japanese government agreed to restrict immigration by denying passports to Japanese workers heading directly to the United States. Roosevelt also plugged a loophole by prohibiting Japanese in Hawaii from entering the United States. The president had averted a bilateral crisis at the expense of the free immigration of Japanese. The outcome entirely satisfied him, for though he was no fan of mass immigration, he did insist that immigrants, once they had arrived, be treated just like Americans. "We cannot afford to regard any immigrant as a laborer; we must regard him as a citizen," he wrote in 1907.

In addition to his sophisticated approach to Japanese issues, Roosevelt expanded the American presence on the world stage in other ways. Most important, he continued the naval buildup he had advocated since before the Spanish-American War. He never ceased to believe in the vital role of naval power in defining a country's strength and influence. The United States had succeeded abroad, he wrote a congressman in 1904, "because, and only because . . . we possess a navy which makes it evident that we will not tamely submit to injustice or tamely acquiesce in breaking the peace."

In the diplomacy of his second term Roosevelt was greatly assisted by Elihu Root, whom he had named—inevitably—secretary of state as Hay's successor. Root had been back in private law practice for eighteen months but seemed to have had no hesitation about returning to Washington at one-twenty-fifth his law income. He already had

considerable diplomatic experience as administrator of America's colonial acquisitions and as acting secretary of state during the Boxer Rebellion when Hay was ill. He brought to the position an enormous capacity for work (not a feature of Hay's tenure), natural diplomatic skill, and fearlessness in exposing brutal realities.

Root had proved himself as a manager in reorganizing the War Department and creating a general staff. Now he presided over a department that, though boasting twice the personnel numbers of 1898, still had fewer than two hundred people. He reformed the patronage-stained consular service by introducing a competitive examination. Unlike Hay, he was an adept with the Senate. He wore down Lodge's fidelity to the Gloucester fishermen to win the help of "the Senior Senator from the fishing grounds" in negotiating an arbitration treaty with Great Britain over fishing rights in Newfoundland. To an unrivaled degree he had the lawyer's skill of understanding an adversary's case as well as he understood his own. Lord Bryce, the British ambassador, described a *démarche* in Root's office, at which the secretary argued the British case more cogently than the instructions from London that Bryce clutched in his hand. Root then proceeded to demolish the British position. Roosevelt considered Root the greatest statesman of his time. Indeed he might be remembered as a great secretary of state if there had been major crises during his four years in office.

Like Roosevelt, Root took a sympathetic view toward Japanese immigration and helped the president quell the disputes that continued to bubble between California and Japan. He defused the extremism of the California authorities, which was provoking fear of war among the more nervous observers, by initiating secret conferences—the Clam Club, as he called it—between them and the president. On this, as on other subjects, Root showed no fear of his boss. When Roosevelt began to threaten the Californians, Root brought him into line with a tap of his pencil on the mahogany table.

Working with the Japanese ambassador in Washington, Kotaro Takahira, Root in 1908 formalized the agreement Taft had reached three years earlier in Tokyo by which Japan agreed to respect U.S. ownership of the Philippines and Hawaii, in return for American recognition of Japan's hold over Korea. He continued Roosevelt's work in making the United States a global arbiter. In a dispute in 1905 be-

tween Germany and France over Morocco, Kaiser William II urged Roosevelt to become involved, and the president reluctantly used his good offices to call a conference at Algeciras in Spain. Roosevelt and Root did not attend in person; the United States was represented by Henry White, who had been Hay's able deputy in the London embassy. The Root-White combination helped produce a facesaving formula for lowering the tension. It was not an important accomplishment and the American part was not decisive. Nevertheless, for the first time the United States helped settle a major regional dispute in which neither its geographical nor its political interests were directly involved. In the second half of the century it was to do this again and again.

Root made his most significant contribution in Latin America. Like Roosevelt, he was reluctant to push for military intervention to restore order in chronically unstable countries; he preferred negotiation. Working with Mexico, he engineered a calming of tensions between Guatemala and Honduras, and later he tried unsuccessfully to mediate a dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras. His approach derived from his moderate view of the Monroe Doctrine, which he did not see as a "warrant for interference" in Latin America. On the other hand, he took it as given that strong powers were bound to exert certain rights over weaker ones. After all, he had forced the Platt Amendment on Cuba, had probably taken a hand in writing the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, and had prosecuted the war in the Philippines.

His strongest belief was that because of geography, Latin America was a vital interest for the United States, and it was therefore important to be a "good neighbor," a phrase he coined in 1907. He understood the bruises that America's Cuba and Panama policy had inflicted on Latin American trust in the United States. To heal them as well as to reinforce U.S. interests, he made a three-month trip to Latin America by steamship in 1906, visiting Puerto Rico, Brazil, and Argentina on the eastern side, and then—having passed through the Strait of Magellan—Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Panama in the west. It was the longest visit to Latin America by a secretary of state ever. It revived the hemispheric concentration of James G. Blaine and foreshadowed the Good Neighbor policy of Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Theodore Roosevelt's diplomacy, skillful as it was, had little lasting

effect on the course of world history. In Europe the U.S. mediation over Morocco did not curb the growing hostility between Germany and France, which were at war within a decade. In Asia the Russo-Japanese War proved that as he himself admitted, the Open Door closed as soon as a powerful nation showed itself willing to run the risk of war in order to disregard it. His Portsmouth mediation did prevent further military horrors but did not deter Japan's drive toward militarism. But it was the effect of these actions on the American position that counted. Roosevelt wrote in 1910: "We ourselves are becoming, owing to our strength and geographical situation, more and more the balance of power of the whole world." Seven years after that statement, and partly at Roosevelt's urging, the United States was finally to enter the world war to restore the balance between Germany and the Western democracies.

Roosevelt's two terms constituted America's first imperial presidency, in the sense that the country for the first time was administering possessions near and far, had achieved dominant influence over the Caribbean and Central America, had built its navy into the second strongest in the world, and had convinced the world to take its counsel and its policies seriously. When Roosevelt saw off the U.S. battleship fleet for its round-the-world cruise in December 1907, he was sending three messages. To Japan and Europe he was proclaiming that the United States was both a Pacific and an Atlantic power. To the world at large he was broadcasting that America now had global scope and influence. To the American people he was celebrating the fact that their country had finally achieved the status of a great power.

12. America's Century

1.

Events from 1898 through the Roosevelt presidency were the direct result of expansionist policies that began overland during the nineteenth century and reflected an ambition to extend American influence overseas as well. By the last years of the nineteenth century economic and cultural conditions had coalesced in favor of expansion, the weakness of Spain had provided the opportunity, and exceptional men had been there to stiffen a reluctant president. The emergence of the United States as a world power was a culmination, not an aberration.

That emergence was followed not by a retreat to isolation but by an increasingly confident American acceptance of the mantle of a great power. The progress toward global involvement was often hesitant and erratic, and Americans were pulled reluctantly into the two world wars. But as we can see in the hindsight of a century, the direction was steady. The United States did involve itself, late but decisively, in both world conflicts, then led a Western alliance in successfully opposing the challenge from Soviet communism. It was in large part because of America's actions as a great power that the twentieth century was not the "Century of the Third Reich" or the "Century of the Glorious Victory of World Communism."

There was no retreat from the high imperial moment of the Theodore Roosevelt era. During the Taft administration (1909-13) the policy of Dollar Diplomacy, in the spirit of the Platt Amendment, gave the United States increased influence in Central America and the Caribbean. In 1912 Taft sent marines into Cuba to help quell a revolt and into Nicaragua to defeat an uprising against a government