For months, momentum had been building toward war between Ethiopia and Somalia. After the breakaway region of Somaliland signed an agreement with Addis Ababa in January to exchange littoral rights for potential diplomatic recognition, tensions soared across the Horn of Africa. While recent weeks have seen the regional boil reduce to a simmer, other hot-button issues, like shifting alignments and the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the main tributary of the Nile River, threaten to coalesce and push the region into open conflict.
While an outbreak of war has appeared inevitable at times, it is also preventable. Ethiopia and Somalia have a long history of conflict with deep political and socio-economic origins. Over the decades it has evolved, engaging numerous parties and interests and greatly impacting the stability of the Horn of Africa. If there is a return to open conflict, both countries would be devastated, given their intractable domestic problems, and the broader region would likely not be spared. Instead, both sides need to walk back from the brink—a process that starts with a multilateral mediation effort to address the cross-cutting and deep-seated sources of tension.
A Long History of Conflict
The borders of modern-day Ethiopia and Somalia were largely drawn by colonial powers, leading to territorial disputes after they both achieved independence. The first major conflict between the two countries occurred in 1964, shortly after Somalia became an independent state. The dispute centered around the Ogaden region, which Somalia claimed based on ethnic lines and invaded in 1977. While Ethiopian forces recaptured Ogaden in 1978, this did not signify the end of tensions between the two countries. Both supported insurgent groups within each other’s borders, further destabilizing the region.
The fall of Somali President Siad Barre’s one-party, authoritarian regime in 1991 resulted in the collapse of the state, leading to a prolonged period of civil war and disorder. This provided the pretext for Ethiopia to intervene in Somalia’s internal affairs, arguing that its actions were necessary for national security. In 2006, Ethiopia intervened militarily to remove the Islamic Courts Union (ICU)—a coalition of Sharia courts that had seized control over much of southern Somalia. This intervention was backed by the United States but elicited strong resistance from various Somali factions. One of the consequences of Ethiopia’s military intervention was the emergence of the powerful al-Shabaab Islamist militant group. This has further complicated the conflict, since it drew in international actors and led to ongoing military operations by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and other forces. Ethiopia has conducted numerous military operations against al-Shabaab both independently and as part of AMISOM.
The conflict has had a dire humanitarian impact, with millions of people displaced and in need of assistance.
Flash Forward
The looming war between Ethiopia and Somalia today is a result of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s resolve to endow his country—which is landlocked after having lost its coastline to Eritrea when it gained its independence in 1993—with a naval facility along the Red Sea. In January, Ahmed signed a memorandum of understanding with President Muse Bihi Abdi of Somaliland—a self-declared and unrecognized independent republic in northwestern Somalia. In return for officially recognizing Somaliland, Ethiopia would secure a 12-mile (20 kilometer) naval base on the Gulf of Aden. This agreement would enable landlocked Ethiopia to have access to the sea. Evidently, Somalis see this as Ethiopian expansionism and a violation of their territorial integrity and sovereignty—a view the international community supports. Somalia seems willing to go to war to prevent Ethiopia from recognizing the breakaway territory of Somaliland and constructing a naval facility there.
A military confrontation between the two states will undoubtedly aggravate an already explosive situation in the Horn of Africa, particularly given the unfolding civil war in Sudan. Somalia, which is slowly recovering from decades of instability and extremism, is particularly vulnerable to catalysts for upheaval. Ethiopia is already mired in economic turmoil and serious conflicts between the central government and the Tigray, Amhara, Oromia and Somali ethnic groups. Indeed, the government’s attempts to maintain control over its diverse ethnic groups have resulted in heavy-handed tactics and human rights violations.
Ahmed’s insistence on regaining sea access as a question of existential importance has caused unease throughout East Africa and beyond, and led to alignments with external powers to support one or the other party, thus exacerbating an already tense situation. The recent memorandum between Ethiopia and Somaliland could create discord between emerging blocs and their allies along the Red Sea. For example, some perceive Ahmed’s claims as a threat to invade Eritrea or to occupy part of Somali territory.
The Ethiopian prime minister’s policy has not only resulted in tensions with Somalia but has aggravated other regional points of contention, especially in the Nile Basin with the filling of the GERD reservoir. Given Egypt’s overwhelming reliance on the Nile, which accounts for 98% of the country’s fresh water supply, Cairo views the issue as an existential one.
One of the main consequences of the Ethiopian-Somali dispute has been a rapprochement between Egypt and Somalia, with Cairo sending Mogadishu arms and planning to deploy 10,000 troops to the country in the coming months. Ethiopia views this step and the broader realignment as an Egyptian bid to settle scores.
Before the outbreak of Sudan’s civil war in the spring of 2023, Egypt relied on its southern neighbor to help counter Ethiopia. Cairo has even stationed fighter jets in Sudan since 2020 to exert pressure on Ethiopia to reach an agreement. Somalia has now emerged as the most promising ally for Egypt in that regard.
To add fuel to the fire, Türkiye is set to begin exploring for hydrocarbon resources off the Somali coast; any discovery could become a source of contention between the parties. Finally, Somalia now says it will oppose Ethiopia’s participation in future African peacekeeping missions until it withdraws from the memorandum with Somaliland. With so many issues of dispute on the table, there is no telling what the next trigger could be.
Diplomatic Offramps
So, what is the way out of the crisis? First and foremost, Prime Minister Ahmed should renounce the port deal and make clear that he does not recognize Somaliland as an independent state. Ethiopia could use coastal facilities in neighboring states without owning a naval base.
To defuse tensions, Djibouti has offered Ethiopia the option of using another of its ports, although Addis Ababa is reluctant to cede further economic leverage to the neighbor that it relies on for most of its imports and because of “unnecessary delays” caused by Djibouti’s cargo regulations and procedures.
Similarly, through the Joint Declaration of Peace and Friendship in 2018, Eritrea agreed for Ethiopia to utilize, tax-free, the ports of Assab and Massawa. Although these plans have not materialized, primarily because of the conflict that erupted in the northern region of Ethiopia, dialogue between the two countries might revive this option.
Alternatively, there are other routes to commercial port access. Ethiopia could reach the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean through various maritime gateways along the shores of Kenya, Somalia, Djibouti, Eritrea and Sudan. A significant and less contentious option is the Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport corridor, which has the potential to connect Ethiopia to the coast of Kenya.
Secondly, Ethiopia, Somalia and Somaliland need to engage in dialogue, while avoiding further provocative or aggressive rhetoric. Coordinated mediation by neutral powers and regional and international institutions should be favored to defuse tensions. The efforts of the regional Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), in coordination with international mediation, to resolve the Ethiopia-Somalia conflict should continue. Furthermore, though Somalia rejected any mediation on the issue, the African Union and the UN Security Council should continue to urge the parties to de-escalate tensions. Türkiye’s failed attempts this past summer should not mean the abandonment of mediation efforts.
Finally, Egypt and Ethiopia should also renew negotiations for a peaceful settlement of tensions over the GERD. Ethiopia needs to participate in mutually beneficial discussions with all its neighbors, who should understand that meeting Ethiopia’s legitimate needs is in the best interests of all parties.
The Ethiopia-Somalia conflict is a deeply rooted and multifaceted issue, whose origins date back to the colonial era, that requires a comprehensive and sustained effort to resolve. Tackling the fundamental causes of the conflict, such as territorial disputes, ethnic tensions and socio-economic inequalities, is crucial for achieving a lasting peace. Comprehensive peacebuilding initiatives that engage all stakeholders, including local communities, are essential for ensuring long-term regional stability. If these longstanding issues are not resolved sooner than later, they will remain fodder for conflict and a war that nobody wants.