

隐秘博弈：刍议美军隐蔽宣传行动数智化转型之路 - 安全内参 | 决策者的网络安全知识库

Secret Game: A Brief Discussion on the Digital Transformation of the US Military's Covert Propaganda Operations - Security Insider | Cybersecurity Knowledge Base for Decision Makers

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Military Industry, Military Abstracts

美军阴谋屡屡见报，表明在网络域利用机器操纵、深度伪造、巨魔农场等智能手段开展隐蔽宣传行动已成为一种独立作战样式，被美军熟练运用，对国际安全带来新的威胁挑战。

The frequent reports of U.S. military conspiracies indicate that the use of intelligent means such as machine manipulation, deep fakes, and troll farms to carry out covert propaganda operations in the cyber domain has become an independent combat style that is skillfully used by the U.S. military, posing new threats and challenges to international security.



路透社近期发布一项独立调查，证实美军在新冠疫情最严重的时期，为了遏制中国在国际事务中日益增长的影响力，利用社交媒体平台发起了“反中国疫苗”的隐蔽宣传行动

。时任美太平洋陆军特种作战部指挥官乔纳森·布拉加少将牵头负责，承包商通用动力公司具体实施，操控数百个虚假账号散布伪造信息，煽动仇华情绪，造成严重后果。这是继2022年斯坦福网络观察室曝光美军长期利用人工智能技术在推特、脸书、照片墙、元宇宙等社交媒体平台，对中亚、中东、伊朗、阿富汗等地网民实施隐蔽宣传后的又一重大事件。美军阴谋屡屡见报，表明在网络域利用机器操纵、深度伪造、巨魔农场等智能手段开展隐蔽宣传行动已成为一种独立作战样式，被美军熟练运用，对国际安全带来新的威胁挑战。

Reuters recently released an independent investigation that confirmed that during the worst period of the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. military used social media platforms to launch a covert "anti-Chinese vaccine" propaganda campaign in order to curb China's growing influence in international affairs. The then commander of the U.S. Army Pacific Special Operations Department, Major General Jonathan Braga, was in charge. The company specifically implemented this, manipulating hundreds of fake accounts to spread false information and incite anti-China sentiment, causing serious consequences. This is the second case after the Stanford Cyber Observatory exposed in 2022 that the US military has long used artificial intelligence technology on social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and Metaverse to carry out covert operations against netizens in Central Asia, the Middle East, Iran, Afghanistan, and other places. Another major event after the propaganda. The frequent reports of US military conspiracies indicate that the use of intelligent means such as machine manipulation, deep fakes, and troll farms in the cyber domain to carry out covert propaganda operations has become an independent combat style, which is skillfully used by the US military and poses new threats and challenges to international security.

驱动美军隐蔽宣传行动变革的关键性因素

Key factors driving changes in the US military's covert propaganda operations

数智时代，互联网的隐蔽性和非归属性为隐蔽宣传行动的“蓬勃发展”开辟了新的通道，在以下因素的共同驱动下，美军在网络域主动作为、大胆进攻。

In the digital age, the secrecy and non-attribution of the Internet have opened up new channels for the "booming" of covert propaganda operations. Driven by the following factors, the US military has taken the initiative and launched bold attacks in the cyber domain.

内在动因：自身难以抑制的霸权战略需求利用宣传手段瓦解敌军战斗意志、冲击民众抵抗精神、干扰外界认知能力，以实现自身战略目标是美军一以贯之的宣传策略。在互联网技术方兴未艾之时，美军便开始秘密操控网络媒体来配合其战场行动：科索沃战争中，建立多个网站污蔑南联盟军实施“种族灭绝”行为，蒙骗国际社会，为其入侵行为洗白；伊拉克战争中，动用各种网络传播手段影响战时舆论环境；利比亚战争中，对卡扎菲政权进行妖魔化宣传，激发国际社会愤怒。随着网络技术的发展、社交平台的普及、人工智能的兴起，网民舆论逐渐成为能挑战官方话语权的强大力量。美军深切地感受到，夺取网络

空间舆论话语权，对维护美国国家安全和军事利益至关重要。鉴于美军负面形象较多，目标国民众对美军官方发布的信息普遍持有抵触或怀疑态度，公开宣传效果往往欠佳，但隐蔽宣传可以规避这些问题。在主流社交媒体平台创设虚假账号，以独立媒体、非政府组织、智库或者普通民众的身份发声，更具亲和力，更能赢得受众信任。美军能够不显山露水、潜移默化地对受众进行深度洗脑，宣扬美军“正面形象”，掩盖“不和谐的声音”，谈论官方无法触及的“敏感议题”，无需顾及被揭穿后导致的责任追究、公信力下降和声誉受损等问题。

Internal motivation: the irresistible need for hegemony strategy. The US military has always used propaganda to disintegrate the enemy's fighting spirit, impact the people's resistance spirit, and interfere with the outside world's cognitive ability in order to achieve its own strategic goals. When Internet technology was in its infancy, the US military began to secretly manipulate online media to cooperate with its battlefield operations: during the Kosovo War, it established multiple websites to slander the Yugoslav army for its implementation of The "genocide" behavior deceived the international community and whitewashed its invasion; in the Iraq War, various online communication methods were used to influence the wartime public opinion environment; in the Libyan War, the Gaddafi regime was demonized and propaganda was carried out to arouse the anger of the international community. With the development of network technology, the popularization of social platforms, and the rise of artificial intelligence, netizens' public opinion Gradually, it has become a powerful force that can challenge the official discourse power. The U.S. military deeply feels that seizing the discourse power of public opinion in cyberspace is crucial to maintaining U.S. national security and military interests. Given the negative image of the U.S. military, the target country's people generally have resistance or suspicion towards the information officially released by the U.S. military. The effect of public propaganda is often poor, but covert propaganda is effective. These problems can be avoided by creating fake accounts on mainstream social media platforms and speaking as independent media, non-governmental organizations, think tanks or ordinary people. This is more approachable and can win the trust of the audience. The US military can subtly and deeply brainwash the audience without showing off, promote the "positive image" of the US military, and cover up the "discordant voices". "They talk about "sensitive topics" that the authorities cannot touch, without having to worry about being held accountable, losing credibility, and damaging their reputation after being exposed.

However, [archived](#) versions of the Discoverer Twitter account show that prior to May 2021, it used a different picture, listed its location as “Florida, USA,” and publicly identified as an “**account belonging to the U.S. Central Command**” that “aims to uncover issues related to regional security and stability.” At that time, the account promoted similar anti-Iran narratives related to Iraq and Syria but also posted statements presented as coming from the U.S. embassy in Baghdad.



Figure 47: Left: Archived version of the Discoverer Twitter account with an Arabic-language bio claiming an affiliation with CENTCOM. Right: The same account shortly before it was suspended by Twitter.

《听不到的声音——五年来亲西方的隐蔽影响力行动评估》报告中曝光美军的虚假账号

The report "Inaudible Voices: An Assessment of Pro-Western Covert Influence Operations over the Past Five Years" exposes fake accounts of the US military

外部动因：大国竞争激发网络域博弈升级. 美国前国防部长拉姆斯菲尔德曾坦言，“媒体被美国的敌人玩弄”是一件令他睡不着觉的事情。美军认为，“伊斯兰国”“伊朗网军”“叙利亚电子军”“黎巴嫩真主党”“俄罗斯网络部队”等敌对力量，非常擅于利用网络进行秘密宣传。近年来，美俄之间的认知对抗愈发激烈，美方声称俄方构建了以“政府机构/官方媒体、国家幕后资助的全球传播媒介、代理媒体网站、社交媒体平台、网络虚假信息”为支柱的虚假宣传生态系统，传播政治谣言、鼓噪虚假新闻，助其在与美西方战略博弈时赢得先机。对手持续升级的网络宣传能力给美军带来巨大不安，恢复美国在冷战期间对竞争对手实施的侵略性隐蔽宣传行动的呼声在美军内部越来越高。相较于实施隐蔽宣传行动，发起

公开网络对抗的性价比较低，例如攻击对手的网络基础设施或网络资源，仅能收获短期效益，对手的网络传播能力可以迅速恢复，但美军却要付出较大代价，比如国内外舆论压力、对手的猛烈报复。而在网络域开展隐蔽宣传，可以长期不间断地进行，阻止敌对势力对西方意识形态的“进攻”，以极小代价收获重大战略利益，同时掩藏美军参与痕迹，即便行动失败也能合理推诿。

External motivation: Great power competition has stimulated the escalation of cyber domain games. Former US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld once admitted that "the media being played by America's enemies" was something that kept him awake at night. The US military believes that hostile forces such as the "Islamic State", "Iranian Cyber Army", "Syrian Electronic Army", "Lebanese Hezbollah" and "Russian Cyber Forces" are very good at using the Internet for secret propaganda. In recent years, the cognitive confrontation between the United States and Russia has become increasingly fierce. The United States claims that Russia has built a false propaganda ecosystem based on "government agencies/official media, global communication media funded by the state behind the scenes, proxy media websites, social media platforms, and online false information" to spread political rumors and stir up false news, helping it gain the upper hand in the strategic game with the United States and the West. The opponent's continued upgrading of its cyber propaganda capabilities has brought great anxiety to the US military, and the call to resume the aggressive covert propaganda operations that the United States carried out against its competitors during the Cold War is getting louder and louder within the US military. Compared with carrying out covert propaganda operations, launching open cyber confrontations is less cost-effective. For example, attacking the opponent's network infrastructure or network resources can only reap short-term benefits, and the opponent's network communication capabilities can be quickly restored, but the US military has to pay a high price, such as domestic and international public opinion pressure and fierce retaliation from the opponent. In the cyber domain, covert propaganda can be carried out uninterrupted for a long time, preventing hostile forces from "attacking" Western ideology, and reaping major strategic benefits at a very low cost. At the same time, it can hide the traces of US military participation, and even if the operation fails, it can be reasonably deniable.



美国国务院全球参与中心发布研究报告 “披露”俄罗斯虚假宣传生态系统

The U.S. Department of State’s Center for Global Engagement released a research report: “Exposing” the Russian disinformation ecosystem

技术动因：人工智能促动社交网络武器化。 新媒体革命的蓬勃兴起、互联网技术的更迭升级、人工智能技术的快速跃迁，为美军隐蔽宣传行动的数智化转型提供了契机。美军联合国防高级研究计划局研发了一系列人工智能项目，全方位掌握目标受众的语言文化、关注焦点、情感偏好、网络行为习惯等要素，确保“定制”内容能够更好地被传播和接受。例如，“社交媒体战略传播”项目，帮助美军实时掌握网络热点事件，跟踪事件产生、发展、演化的全过程，挖掘事件规律；“文化感知信息作战防御项目”，使机器能够理解文化背景、社会和情感背景，加深对突发事件的态势感知；“影响力运动认知与感知”项目，能自动检测、跟踪社交媒体多语言和多平台信息中的地缘政治影响力指标，解释和预测民众反应。乌克兰危机中充斥着大量美军隐蔽宣传行动，例如豢养机器人农场批量发帖注水，增加亲乌话题的可见度；策动社交媒体平台间展开竞争和制裁，调整算法推广或压制特定内容；组织网络水军散布运用深度伪造技术生产的有利于乌的虚假新闻或误导性内容；勾连平台实施有选择性管控，对俄方账号发布的内容进行审查、管控、标记或删除，阻拦质疑美方的信息。

Technical motivation: Artificial intelligence promotes the weaponization of social networks. The vigorous rise of the new media revolution, the succession and upgrading of Internet technology, and the rapid leap of artificial intelligence technology have provided an opportunity for the digital transformation of the US military's covert propaganda operations. The US military and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency have developed a series of artificial intelligence projects to fully grasp the target audience's language culture, focus, emotional preferences, network behavior habits and other factors to ensure that "customized" content can be better disseminated and accepted. For example, the "Social Media Strategic Communication" project helps the US military to grasp the hot network events in real time, track the entire process of event generation, development, and evolution, and explore the laws of events; the "Cultural Perception Information Operations Defense Project" enables machines to understand cultural backgrounds, social and emotional backgrounds, and deepen the situational awareness of emergencies; the "Influence Movement Cognition and Perception" project can automatically detect and track geopolitical influence indicators in multi-language and multi-platform information on social media, and explain and predict public reactions. The Ukrainian crisis is filled with a large number of covert propaganda operations by the US military, such as raising robot farms to post in bulk to increase the visibility of pro-Ukrainian topics; instigating competition and sanctions among social media platforms, and adjusting algorithms to promote or suppress specific content; organizing online water armies to spread false news or misleading content that is beneficial to Ukraine and produced using deep fake technology; and linking platforms to implement selective control, censoring, controlling, marking or deleting content posted by Russian accounts to block information questioning the United States.

美军隐蔽宣传行动数智化转型的主要阶段

The main stages of the digital transformation of the US military's covert propaganda operations

美军隐蔽宣传行动的数智化转型并非一蹴而就，而是经历了一个较为长期的探索过程，可大致分为三个阶段。

The digital transformation of the U.S. military's covert propaganda operations did not happen overnight, but rather went through a relatively long process of exploration, which can be roughly divided into three stages.

策略形成期“9·11”事件后，美国政府设立“战略影响办公室”来影响国外决策者和公众舆论，美军也开始重点关注网络舆论活动，重视引导目标受众，影响其心理认知。2004年，美国防委员会发布《战略传播研究报告》，要求整合原有的心理战、信息战、意识形态斗争、公共外交等零散资源，提高美军战略传播能力，筹划设计在网络时代改变“美国形象”、拓展“话语霸权”的舆论传播策略。次年，美军中央司令部向阿联酋首都迪拜派驻“舆论影响小组”部队，引导当地媒体在网络上发布有利于改善美军形象的消息。2006年，美军发布《四年防务评估报告》，提出“要在长期战争中取得胜利，最终取决

于美国及其国际合作伙伴所开展的战略传播活动”。2007年，美参谋长联席会议将“宣传”定义为“支持国家目标的任何形式的传播，旨在影响任何群体的意见、情绪、态度或行为”。2008年，美国防科学委员会在《战略传播报告》中提出，“媒体是决定性的对抗平台。虚拟冲突和‘认知伤害’与现实冲突、现实伤害一样重要”。2010年，《美国国家安全战略》提出，美国必须开展更为有效的“战略传播”。2010年，美军出台《社交媒体的战略、方法和程序》等系列政策法规，为借助网媒实施战略传播、打击网络空间舆论对手积极谋局布势。2011年，美军各军兵种陆续出台各自的社交媒体管理规定。这一时期，美军高层积极转变思想，对网络舆论所蕴含的巨大战争价值的认识不断加深，不断规划其能力建设、全面发展的蓝图。

Strategy Formation Stage. After the September 11th incident, the US government established the "Office of Strategic Influence" to influence foreign decision-makers and public opinion. The US military also began to focus on online public opinion activities, attaching importance to guiding the target audience and influencing their psychological cognition. In 2004, the US Defense Committee issued the "Strategic Communication Research Report", requiring the integration of the original psychological warfare, information warfare, and ideological warfare. The U.S. military used scattered resources such as the struggle and public diplomacy to improve its strategic communication capabilities and to plan and design a public opinion communication strategy to change the "American image" and expand "discourse hegemony" in the Internet era. The following year, the U.S. Central Command sent a "public opinion influence team" to Dubai, the capital of the United Arab Emirates, to guide local media to publish news on the Internet that would help improve the image of the U.S. military. In 2006, the U.S. military released the Quadrennial Defense Review, which stated that "victory in a long-term war ultimately depends on the strategic communication activities carried out by the United States and its international partners." In 2007, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff defined "propaganda" as "any form of communication that supports national goals and is intended to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and In 2008, the US Defense Science Committee stated in its Strategic Communication Report that "media is a decisive confrontation platform. Virtual conflict and 'cognitive damage' are as important as real conflict and real damage." In 2010, the US National Security Strategy stated that the United States must carry out more effective "strategic communication." In 2010, the US military issued a series of policies and regulations such as "Strategy, Methods and Procedures for Social Media" to actively plan and deploy strategies to use online media to implement strategic communication and combat cyberspace public opinion opponents. In 2011, the various branches of the US military successively issued their own social media management regulations. During this period, the top US military officials actively changed their thinking and recognized the huge war value contained in online public opinion. The knowledge of the Party and the government is constantly deepening, and the blueprint for its capacity building and comprehensive development is constantly being planned.



2008年3月6日，美军第10山地师第350战术心战

On March 6, 2008, the 350th Infantry Division of the U.S. Army

部队士兵在伊拉克村庄投放传单

Tactical Psychological Warfare Troops drop leaflets in Iraqi village

力量壮大期美前国防部长罗伯特·盖茨表示，社交媒体是“美国的重要战略资产”。美军凭借国家战略体系的持续完善，依托网络信息领域的技术支撑，不断挖掘在网络域围绕舆论宣传展开作战行动的价值，持续提升“社交媒体战略”的地位。2006年底，美国防部组建“网络媒体战部队”，全天候执行互联网舆论任务，将全球主流社交平台视为战场，对抗“不利于美军和美国利益的宣传报道”。2009年，美军网络司令部宣布成立，此后网络部队规模逐年壮大。2010年，美国防媒体局正式运行，大量倾向于军方或被军方认可的媒体网站成为美军信息传播的重要平台和渠道。与此同时，美军将《联合心理作战条令》更名为《联合信息支援行动条令》，明确规定“随着信息环境的发展，心理战产品的分发形式从传统的印刷物和广播扩展到了因特网、传真信息、文本信息和其他新兴媒体”。2010年，美特种作战司令部开始运营“网络倡议”影响项目，在世界各地部署了数十个“军事信息支援行动小组”实施隐蔽宣传，成立所谓的“民间”媒体网站，如“东南欧时报网”“中亚在线”等，吸引当地网民关注，隐秘灌输西方意识形态。这一时期，从顶层条令到末端部队、从军方部门到民间资源，所有的网络宣传力量都在迅速聚集，美军的网络舆论传播实力大增。

Strength growth period. Former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that social media is "an important strategic asset of the United States." The US military, relying on the continuous improvement of the national strategic system and the technical support of the network information field, continues to explore the value of launching combat operations around public opinion propaganda in the network domain and continuously enhance the status of the "social media strategy." At the end of 2006, the US Department of Defense organized the establishment of a "cyber media warfare unit" to carry out Internet public opinion tasks around the clock, regard the world's mainstream social platforms as battlefields, and fight against "propaganda reports that are not conducive to the interests of the US military and the United States." In 2009, the US Cyber Command was announced, and the size of the cyber force has grown year by year since then. In 2010, the US Defense Media Agency officially started operation, with a large number of military or Media websites recognized by the military have become important platforms and channels for the dissemination of information by the US military. At the same time, the US military renamed the "Joint Psychological Operations Directive" to the "Joint Information Support Operations Directive", which clearly stipulates that "with the development of the information environment, the distribution of psychological warfare products has expanded from traditional print and broadcast to the Internet, fax information, text information and Other emerging media. In 2010, the U.S. Special Operations Command began to operate the "Cyber Initiative" influence project, deploying dozens of "Military Information Support Action Teams" around the world to carry out covert propaganda and set up so-called "civilian" media websites, such as "Southeast European Times" and "Central Asia Online", to attract the attention of local netizens and secretly instill Western ideas. During this period, from top-level regulations to terminal troops, from military departments to civilian resources, all online propaganda forces were rapidly gathering, and the U.S. military's online public opinion dissemination capabilities increased significantly.



美国前国防部长埃斯珀

Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Mark Esper

加速释能期为了应对中俄日益强大的网络信息能力，美军不断放松其在网络信息环境中实施作战行动的约束条件。2019年，时任国防部长马克·埃斯珀签署了一项秘令，将美国与中俄间的竞争提升到主动作战的优先地位，指挥官在对这些对手实施认知战时能够避开国务院。2019年末，美国会通过一份法律，授权美军可在“信息环境”中实施旨在“打击他国恶意宣传”的秘密影响行动，为美军发起隐蔽宣传行动铺平道路。2022年，美国国防部发布《社交媒体网络使用管理政策指令》推动社交媒体“武器化”，利用网络平台开展曝光、披露及挑拨离间等活动。2023年初，美军在《联合竞争概念》中写道，“美军可利用社交媒体散播虚假信息、将虚假叙事伪装成新闻以及类似的颠覆活动来破坏中俄社会信任和政治基础”。2024年7月美海军陆战队发布《欺骗》条令，明确了在社会层面展开隐秘信息战，“向外国受众传递选定的信息和指向，以影响其情绪、动机、客观推理，最终影响外国政府、组织、团体和个人的行为”。这一时期，美军已经建立起与其指挥组织架构相匹配的媒体宣传矩阵，网络传播能力朝着全维全域深化拓展，呈现新的“非对称”优势。

Accelerated energy release period. In response to the growing cyber information capabilities of China and Russia, the U.S. military has been relaxing its constraints on conducting combat operations in a cyber information environment. In 2019, then-Defense Secretary Mark

Esper signed a secret order that elevated the competition between the United States and China and Russia to a proactive combat priority, allowing commanders to bypass the State Department when conducting cognitive warfare against these opponents. At the end of 2019, the US Congress passed a law authorizing the US military to carry out secret influence operations in the "information environment" to "combat malicious propaganda from other countries", paving the way for the US military to launch covert propaganda operations. In 2022, the US Department of Defense issued the "Social Media Network Usage Management Policy Directive" to promote the "weaponization" of social media and use online platforms to launch. In early 2023, the U.S. military wrote in its Joint Competition Concept that "the U.S. military can use social media to spread false information, disguise false narratives as news, and similar subversive activities to undermine the trust and political foundation of Chinese and Russian societies." In July 2024, the U.S. Marine Corps issued the "Deception" directive, which clarified the. At the social level, the US military launched covert information warfare, "delivering selected information and directions to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, motivations, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals. "During this period, the US military has established a media propaganda matrix that matches its command and organizational structure, and its network communication capabilities have been deepened and expanded in all dimensions and domains, presenting a new "asymmetric" advantage.

数智时代美军实施宣传行动的特点

Characteristics of the US military's propaganda operations in the digital age

数智时代美军隐蔽宣传行动已从“由人主导实施”走向“由人幕后操纵”，并向着“算法自主设计”演进，通过对社交媒体资源的垄断性利用和人工智能技术的创造性使用，构设有利于己的舆论环境，对目标国展开隐蔽宣传，呈现以下特点。

In the digital age, the U.S. military's covert propaganda operations have evolved from "implemented by humans" to "manipulated by humans behind the scenes" and are evolving towards "autonomous design of algorithms". Through the monopolistic use of social media resources and the creative use of artificial intelligence technology, it has constructed a public opinion environment that is beneficial to itself and carried out covert propaganda against the target country, presenting the following characteristics.

技术赋能精确生产 在人工智能技术的加持下，美军大幅减少了人员和成本的投入，体现在以下方面。一是压缩周期加速输出，生成式人工智能可快速生成符合美军隐蔽宣传主题的文字、图像、音视频等数字产品，在短时间内持续更新引发信息洪流，增加特定信息的可见度和影响力。二是按需定制宣传内容，根据各类受众的习惯、偏好，加入能引起情绪波动、感官刺激或思想冲突的元素。三是隐秘触达目标群体，通过选择偏好算法、平台推送机制将“宣传弹药”推送至特定对象，在网络的各个层级打造“影响力中心”，提高不同受众关注、转发、响应的意愿。四是虚实混杂真伪难辨，虚假信息呈现出多模态特性

，更具有迷惑性、复杂性，能有效突破传统的审查手段和检测方法，受众无法通过直觉、常识或经过简单学习自主辨别内容的真伪。五是精准把握受众心理，通过搜集互动数据、分析留言内容、实时情感计算，及时掌握受众的情感变化，便于调整后续宣传策略，快速满足受众的需求与期待，引导受众自主编织“信息茧房”。

Technology enables precise production. With the support of artificial intelligence technology, the US military has significantly reduced its investment in personnel and costs, which is reflected in the following aspects. First, it compresses the cycle and accelerates output. Generative artificial intelligence can quickly generate digital products such as text, images, audio and video that conform to the US military's covert propaganda themes. Continuous updates in a short period of time trigger a flood of information and increase the visibility of specific information. The second is to customize the promotional content on demand, adding elements that can cause emotional fluctuations, sensory stimulation, or ideological conflicts according to the habits and preferences of various audiences. The third is to secretly reach the target group, push the "propaganda ammunition" to specific objects through the selection preference algorithm and platform push mechanism, and create "influence centers" at all levels of the network. Improve the willingness of different audiences to pay attention, forward, and respond. Fourth, the real and the fake are mixed and it is difficult to distinguish the true from the false. False information presents multimodal characteristics, which is more confusing and complex. It can effectively break through traditional censorship and detection methods. The audience cannot independently distinguish the authenticity of the content through intuition, common sense, or simple learning. Fifth, accurately grasp the audience's psychology, through By collecting interactive data, analyzing message content, and performing real-time sentiment calculations, we can timely grasp the emotional changes of the audience, facilitate the adjustment of subsequent publicity strategies, quickly meet the needs and expectations of the audience, and guide the audience to independently weave an "information cocoon".

行动实施更趋隐蔽 首先，多重手段掩匿美军身份：一是通过国防承包商或秘密资助的方式建立代理网站、媒体平台，吸引特定人群注册、使用，培植专属追随者；二是利用既有平台，如国际主流社交媒体平台、加密或非加密通信平台、特殊用户群体平台替代社交媒体平台，通过机器人农场、虚假账号展开行动；三是借助有特定象征意义或权威性的真实账号传播议题、左右舆论，如被黑客攻击得到的账号、收买有影响力的社交账号。其次，传播模式隐秘不易察觉。受众对社会公共事务中重要事件的认知和判断与传播媒介的报道活动之间存在着高度对应关系。传播媒介给予的强调越多，受众对该事件的重视和印象就越深。美军使用社交媒体机器人，在多个社交媒体平台上，协调发布相同或相似的内容，形成“放大室”效应，模糊来源和动机，使得内容和账号不具有指向性和对应性。利用社交媒体平台的流行标签提高曝光率，在标签中使用缩写或变体来稀释和污染真实标签，影响搜索结果。使用机器人和脚本等自动化工具，增加帖子的点赞、分享和评论数量，通过维持活跃度、累积存在感、增加信任度，提升账号排名。将传播内容伪装成普通信息“去敏”，用娱乐诙谐的方式“暗喻”，通过资助短视频和网剧制作公司，隐射社会热点、讽

刺政府部门、擦边敏感事件、植入西方价值，平台检测算法难以识别和定性，受众的思想在“嬉笑怒骂”中被慢慢腐蚀。再次，行动链路复杂难以检测。行动的策划与实施涉及多个参与者、多层链路、多个平台，在不同阶段会启用不同的技术、动用不同的资源、瞄准不同的对象。追溯困难、鉴定复杂，很难单纯因为美军资助了某些网站或参与了某项宣传，便能证明其是幕后主使。

Actions are being carried out more covertly. First, they use multiple means to conceal the identities of the US military: first, they use defense contractors or secret funding to establish proxy websites and media platforms to attract specific groups of people to register and use them, and cultivate exclusive followers; second, they use existing platforms, such as international mainstream social media platforms, encrypted or non-encrypted communication platforms, and special user group platforms to replace social media platforms. , using robot farms and fake accounts to carry out actions; thirdly, using real accounts with specific symbolic meanings or authority to spread topics and influence public opinion, such as accounts obtained through hacker attacks and buying influential social accounts. Secondly, the communication mode is secretive and difficult to detect. The audience's cognition and judgment of important events in social public affairs are closely related to the communication media. There is a high correspondence between the reporting activities of the media. The more emphasis the media gives, the more attention and impression the audience will have on the event. The US military uses social media robots to coordinate the release of the same or similar content on multiple social media platforms, forming an "amplification room" effect, blurring the source and motivation, making the content and account have no direction. Use popular tags on social media platforms to increase exposure, use abbreviations or variations in tags to dilute and pollute real tags, and affect search results. Use automation tools such as robots and scripts to increase the number of likes, shares, and comments on posts, and improve account rankings by maintaining activity, accumulating presence, and increasing trust. The dissemination content is disguised as ordinary information to "desensitize" and "implied" in an entertaining and humorous way. By funding short video and web drama production companies, it alludes to social hot spots, satirizes government departments, touches on sensitive events, and implants Western values. The platform detection algorithm is difficult to identify and characterize, and the audience's mind is slowly corroded in "laughing, scolding, and anger". Again, the line and dynamic links are complex and difficult to detect. The planning and implementation of the action involves multiple participants, multiple layers of links, and multiple platforms. Different technologies, resources, and targets are used at different stages. Tracing is difficult and identification is complex. It is difficult to prove that the US military is the mastermind simply because it funded certain websites or participated in a certain propaganda.

宣传效果事半功倍 首先，从影响范围来看，由有限拓展至无限，不再受制于地理边界。一旦某种策略或技术在“认知试验场”中被证实有效，美军将迅速复制并同时作用于多个目标。其次，从时间成本来看，由长期浸润转向短期获利。冷战时期的隐蔽宣传行动需要较长的经营周期，“宣传弹药”的投放很难取得立竿见影的效果。数智时代，借助类GPT技术

，内容的生产用时压缩至“秒级”，一句言论、一副图片、一段视频能迅速引发舆论风暴，获得即时反馈。再次，从目标受众来看，由精英阶层转向普罗大众。过去美军实施隐蔽宣传的对象可能更多针对精英群体，但在数智时代，目标受众变得更加广泛，尤其是普通民众以及社会弱势群体。后者对信息的辨别能力相对较弱，更容易受到虚假宣传的影响。最后，从地位作用来看，随着时代的发展，隐蔽宣传行动的职能定位正由辅助作用转向主导作用。网络域作战属性的提升，使得隐蔽宣传行动变得更具进攻性，例如21世纪以来美方通过社交媒体成功策动了多场颜色革命。尽管媒体不时曝光美军行为，但美军仍可以合理否认、逃脱追责，即使社交平台封禁相关账号、删除特定内容，换号重来易如反掌。

The publicity effect is twice as good with half the effort. First, from the perspective of the scope of influence, it has expanded from limited to unlimited, and is no longer restricted by geographical boundaries. Once a strategy or technology is proven to be effective in the "cognitive testing ground", the US military will quickly copy it and act on multiple targets at the same time. Second, from the perspective of time cost, it has shifted from long-term infiltration to short-term profit. Covert propaganda operations during the Cold War required along period. In the digital age, with the help of GPT-like technologies, the time required to produce content is compressed to "seconds". A statement, a picture, or a video can quickly trigger a storm of public opinion and receive immediate feedback. Again, from the perspective of the target audience, the target audience has shifted from the elite to the general public. In the past, the U.S. military The targets of covert propaganda may be more targeted at elite groups, but in the digital age, the target audience has become wider, especially ordinary people and vulnerable groups in society. The latter have relatively weaker ability to discern information and are more susceptible to false propaganda. Finally, from the perspective of status and role, with the development of the times, the functional positioning of covert propaganda actions has changed. The role of the US military is changing from supporting to leading. The improvement of the combat attributes of the cyber domain has made covert propaganda operations more offensive. For example, the US has successfully instigated many color revolutions through social media since the 21st century. Although the media has exposed the US military's actions from time to time, the US military can still reasonably deny and escape accountability, even if the social platforms ban the relevant accounts and delete the content. For specific content, it is easy to change the number and start over.

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