Many around the world may joke that they should be allowed to vote in American elections because the results have as big an effect on them as they do on those who live in the United States. The actions of a unipolar superpower reverberate around the world and other countries are forced to respond.
But American voters almost never vote based on events happening in the world, on foreign policy issues or even on things that might affect future generations at home. Voting is an emotional, last-minute impulse. During times when there was consensus around the United States’ global roles and responsibilities, the vagaries of elections did not much alter the US approach to the world. But times have changed.
The election of Donald Trump to a second presidential term affirms a fundamental shift in America’s relationship with the world. In contrast to other empires, which tended to fall apart slowly over an extended period, Americans themselves have decided they no longer want to bear the burdens and distractions of global hegemony.
Americans are no longer confident in the promise and effectiveness of their institutional system, they reject the obligation of answering the world’s fire alarms, they are weary of bearing the cost of global security and they see clearly that other states are free-riding on US largesse. The US electorate has been consistently ahead of its politicians in its rejection of the role of ‘world policeman’.
The Biden administration’s claim that costs borne by the United States in these endeavours is more than returned by having global friends and keeping the wars ‘over there’ was not sufficient to overcome nagging doubts and grievances. Political gamesmanship over support for Ukraine and other conflicts contributed to the impression that American commitments were optional or, more problematically, ‘scams’ perpetrated by out-of-touch elites. Those living in other countries, and many living in the United States, might see these issues differently, but they do not vote or they do not vote enough.
Trump, and certainly his national security team, does not appreciate that he was put in power to dismantle US global hegemony. But Trump’s bullying transactionalism, his aversion to commitment, his penchant for tariffs and complete indifference to the potential impact that the United States has on other countries can have no other outcome.
It is obvious that permanent damage will be done to the United Nations, international economic institutions, multilateral organisations in which the United States is a member and any international effort to combat transnational challenges. The dissolution began during his first term and will be irreversible after the coming four years. The Americans who elected Trump as their standard bearer will cheer their demise.
But, more worryingly, Trump’s national security appointees will not accept the message the Trump electorate has sent them. They will cling to American primacy through ever-escalating military deployments under the rubric of ‘deterrence’.
Asian partners should steer clear of whiplash from the collision between Trump’s transactionalism and his national security team’s fever dreams. This means allies, especially those in the Pacific, can likely continue to count on US security backing, as long as they can demonstrate that they are not free riding. This has implications for Japan’s financing of its defence budget increase, for Taiwan’s defence reforms and for other partners stepping up their contributions to their own defence (including purchases of US weapons systems through deals like AUKUS).
Despite Trump’s claim that he ‘doesn’t start wars, he stops them’, his re-ascension likely portends more turmoil in the world. It is true that Trump’s political invulnerability may allow him to make big moves in foreign policy — cultivating personal diplomacy with North Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin or expanding Israel’s diplomatic space. But Trump relishes provoking others. His confidence in being able to avert wars by sowing fear is misplaced and likely to backfire. Biden’s modest stabilisation of US–China ties is unlikely to hold and Taiwan is a particularly hot potato in Trump’s hands.
The economic implications of the Trump term will of course be significant, especially for Asia — the most globalised part of the international trading system. The playbook here is familiar, and it revolves around tariffs and bilateral negotiations to increase US exports. It is not clear how much room this strategy has to run in Trump II, but a Trump administration may be more welcoming of foreign investment into the United States, which could alleviate pressure on trade for some countries or sectors.
There will be a further sharp disconnect of the US and Chinese economies. Trump and the Republican Congress are likely to invoke more tariffs, export controls and sanctions leading to global fragmentation, rising costs and slower growth. Businesses will face an ever more complicated picture and are already strategising how to adjust. Many countries in Asia are devising economic hedging strategies and will try to walk a middle line amid deteriorating US–China relations. Whether and how a Trump administration might impose costs for such an approach remains an open question.
We have already entered the transition to a post-Pax Americana world — Trump is an accelerant. This does not mean that the United States will disappear. It will remain the most powerful and wealthy country in the world. But it does leave a vacuum in the international arena and US partners will hopefully step in to provide leadership and public goods.
In this more fragmented, disordered world, US partners in Asia should also pursue more networked security cooperation and regional integration to safeguard peace and mitigate the negative effects of deglobalisation for their economies. Such measures are useful on their own merits, no matter who is in the White House, as the world is set to become a more difficult and dangerous place.
Susan Thornton is a former US diplomat and Senior Fellow at the Yale Law School Paul Tsai China Center.
The re-election of Donald Trump indicates a fundamental change in the United States' relationship with the world, reflecting a growing lack of confidence in international institutions, and a weariness of global responsibilities, likely leading to significant damage to multilateral organisations. Trump's characteristically transactional approach and aggressive tariff policies will spell trouble for Asia. The consequences of a second Trump presidency are likely to include increased difficulty in maintaining security cooperation, issues surrounding defence budget financing, economic impacts due to increased tariffs, and further disconnection between the US and Chinese economies.