Chinese public opinion may have bearing on Asian security
Author : Kalpit A Mankikar
Published on Nov 11, 2024
Tsinghua University’s 2024 public polls reveal valuable insights into how the Chinese perceive the global security issue and China’s future trajectory
Image Source: Getty
This is the 167th in the ‘China Chronicles’ series
The Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS), a security-focused think tank affiliated with Tsinghua University, has surveyed Chinese citizens' worldview. It seeks to decipher what the outlook of the Chinese is towards the world at large—how they want the Communist Party of China (CPC) to tackle security issues; how other nations fare in the Chinese scheme of things; most importantly, how they view China’s relations with the United States, at a time when a new American president has been elected.
The study finds that nearly 50 percent of those surveyed in the 18-44 age bracket are cynical about the security situation across the world. This is a substantial increase compared to the 2023 report where only 20 percent of the respondents in the same age group stated that the world was “less safe” and “unsafe.” In fact, nearly 60 percent of those surveyed have a pessimistic view of the next five years, incidentally when a new presidential term commences in Washington. The 2024 findings mirror the official line enunciated during this year’s plenary session, which sees the CPC elite discussing China’s future trajectory amidst regional conflicts that have been erupting at regular intervals, and as international issues becoming more severe.
The Center for International Security and Strategy (CISS), a security-focused think tank affiliated with Tsinghua University, has surveyed Chinese citizens' worldview.
In contrast to this gloomy view towards the global security situation, almost 70 percent of the respondents asserted that Beijing is “secure” at a time when the world is in flux. A similar number of respondents assess that the nation’s security has improved compared to five years ago. There is also a feeling of ascendency with nearly 90 percent sanguine that China’s weight in the world has increased over the last five years. Commensurately, 60 percent believe that America’s influence has declined over the same period.
In the Chinese worldview, hurdles to the nation’s rise lurk amid the positive sentiment. External parties seeking to intervene in the Taiwan dispute and the souring Sino-US relations top the list of challenges for the Chinese people. The spectre of “international financial or economic crisis,” “industrial decoupling,” involvement of “non-regional countries” in the South China Sea, and the use of Artificial Intelligence in both the military and civilian domains also worry the Chinese in 2024. In the previous year, the Chinese had listed “pandemics” and “disputes over territory” as their top concern.
With respect to the international weight of important nations, India seems to be rising in the Chinese firmament. On the question of the most influential players in the global scene, India did not find a place in the Tsinghua University 2023 survey . This year, as many as 16 percent of the respondents see India as having a “considerable influence.”
External parties seeking to intervene in the Taiwan dispute and the souring Sino-US relations top the list of challenges for the Chinese people.
The Chinese view of the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Palestine conflicts is interesting. In the case of the former, around 55 percent think that either both sides are culpable, or external parties bear the primary responsibility. For the latter, nearly 40 percent hold Israel accountable, while the corresponding figure for Hamas is merely five percent. Around 42 percent absolve Russia of responsibility, blaming the war on “other third parties,”and around 16 percent pin responsibility solely on Ukraine. Only 6 percent believe Russia has the primary responsibility. This translates into nearly 66 percent of respondents having a favourable view of Moscow, whereas Washington and Tokyo are seen in poor light.
Given China’s economic troubles, nearly 65 percent of the interviewees want the state to prioritise the domestic agenda. Consequently, the number of people who want a more “proactive” foreign policy dipped from 78 percent last year to 73 percent in 2024. As a result of this, there is a greater focus on leveraging economic statecraft over military power to achieve foreign-policy objectives. Compared to other groups, youth are keen that China’s external approach should be through diplomacy and “cultural power.” Despite China’s belligerent approach in the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea, students are not in favour of using military force as a primary driver of China’s foreign policy goals. However, an overwhelming 78 percent of respondents endorse the People’s Liberation Army instituting military bases across the world, keeping in mind its own security considerations. At the same time, there is a significant reduction in support for military deployment in foreign theatres to 76 percent from 92 percent earlier.
There is a greater focus on leveraging economic statecraft over military power to achieve foreign-policy objectives.
For the average Chinese citizen, China’s relationship with America is also significant. In light of the great-power contestation taking place, around 90 percent of those surveyed said that China’s development is being contained by Washington. Further, around 40 percent expressed fears that the US is attempting to conduct peaceful evolution in China, which denotes a combination of economic measures, ideological subversion, and leveraging disgruntled elements to depose the Party.
Each scrap of information from an authoritarian regime must be carefully analysed to read between the lines. In his book, ‘Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China's Japan Policy,’ James Reilly argues that China has been able to create a “responsive authoritarianism” framework to accommodate and act on public sentiment, which helps it shape policy outcomes. Thus, it is no surprise that the dim view of Tokyo expressed by Chinese citizens in Tsinghua University’s survey comes amid the targeting of Japanese expatriates living in China, the most recent being the stabbing of a 10-year-old Japanese boy in Shenzhen. This anti-Tokyo sentiment establishes potential top-down and bottom-up linkages between the rulers and the ruled with respect to China’s external outlook.
China gauges that Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te is pushing a notion of “two states,” seeking to sever ties with the mainland. It also seeks to underscore America’s role in “promoting Taiwan’s independence.”
The Party has complete informational dominance, and such surveys build validating loops between the elite and the people. In their study, titled ‘Assessing Public Support for (Non-)Peaceful Unification with Taiwan: Evidence from a Nationwide Survey in China,’ academics Adam Y. Liu and Xiaojun Li asked the Chinese people to evaluate which policy option they found acceptable from an array ranging from—full-scale war, military coercion, economic warfare and sanctions, status quo or separation—in resolving the Taiwan question. In contrast to the perception that there was a great deal of support for the use of force to settle the cross-straits dispute, merely 55 percent of the people surveyed across the nation backed the reunification of Taiwan through military means. Around 33 percent of the respondents in China found the use of force to reintegrate Taiwan “unacceptable.” Around 57 percent and 58 percent of those in the mainland supported the use of economic sanctions and military coercion short of a full-scale conflict, respectively. Around 55 percent were comfortable with the current status quo between Beijing and Taipei. This stasis is in contrast to Beijing’s posture, which seeks to attack Taiwan’s sovereignty, as evidenced by its direct military coercion on occasions that symbolise “nationhood”, like the Presidential address and the National Day this year. China gauges that Taiwan’s President Lai Ching-te is pushing a notion of “two states,” seeking to sever ties with the mainland. It also seeks to underscore America’s role in “promoting Taiwan’s independence.” Beijing’s equivalence with respect to external players meddling in Ukraine and Taiwan is intended to effectively mobilise public opinion in the cross-straits dispute. In this endeavour, Japan’s proposal to build a treaty alliance in Asia on the lines of NATO and America’s regime-change exercise in China is grist to the mill for Beijing. In the coming months, one will have to keep a close watch on Beijing’s messaging to its people since it may have a bearing on Asian security.
Kalpit A Mankikar is a Fellow with the Strategic Studies programme at the Observer Research Foundation