World Politics Review 11/14/24 |
| International Atomic Energy Agency Director-General Rafael Grossi meets with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Tehran, Nov. 14, 2024 (AP photo by Vahid Salemi). |
|
Iran: Rafael Grossi, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA—the U.N.’s autonomous nuclear watchdog—met with Iran’s foreign minister and nuclear chief in Tehran today in an effort to restore cooperation between the IAEA and Iran. The visit comes as some European countries are pushing to pass a resolution that would put additional pressure on Iran to cooperate at an IAEA Board of Governors’ meeting next week. (AP) |
|
Our Take: Iran’s nuclear program has been back in the spotlight for much of this year, largely because of Tehran’s involvement, by proxy and directly, in the regional war with Israel. Now, though, the looming return of President-elect Donald Trump to the White House has made that spotlight even brighter. |
|
After all, it was Trump’s decision in 2018 to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal—officially known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA—that freed Tehran from the constraints that agreement placed on its nuclear program. Since then, Iran has built up its stockpile of enriched uranium well above what it would need for a nuclear warhead, while enriching uranium closer to weapons-grade levels and using previously forbidden advanced centrifuges to do so. |
|
Once U.S. President Joe Biden took office, it seemed that Washington and Tehran may be able to revive the deal. But indirect talks to do so eventually broke down in 2022, in part because of shifts in Iranian domestic politics that brought to power hardliners on engagement with the West. |
|
So far this year, the signals from Tehran on its nuclear program have been mixed. A reformist, Masoud Pezeshkian, was elected Iranian president in July, seemingly opening once again the possibility of more cooperation with the IAEA and more dialogue with the West, especially if VP Kamala Harris had won the U.S. presidential election. Since then, though, not only did Trump win reelection, but regional conflicts with Iran’s client militias across the region escalated to include another exchange of direct strikes between Israel and Iran. |
|
Historically, Iran has only negotiated over its nuclear program from a position of strength—Iran’s foreign minister said as much today—which is what makes this situation complicated. Tehran is in a position of strength in terms of its nuclear capabilities, which are advancing rapidly, but not in terms of its regional position, with its military capabilities—and those of its clients—outclassed by Israel in recent months. |
|
As a result, while Tehran may continue to engage more with other Middle East powers, like the Gulf states and Egypt, it is unlikely to do the same with Washington absent some broader framework of reassurance. That seems even more unlikely to be on the table once Trump takes office. Of course, Trump’s mercurial nature means that it can’t be ruled out, but considering the bipartisan support in Washington for a confrontational approach to Tehran—and the lack of any vocal lobby in favor of closer ties—the odds are slim. |
|
What this means for Iran’s nuclear program is uncertain. There has been some alarmist speculation in recent months that Iran will push ahead to quickly build its own nuclear weapons as a deterrent against Israel. But it is worth noting that doing so would raise even further the risk of a military confrontation with Israel and the U.S., which Iran does not appear to be seeking. It is more likely that Iran will instead continue making incremental advances in its nuclear program to achieve not a “nuclear breakout,” but rather greater leverage if and when Tehran and the West do eventually choose to reengage. |