Opinion | How Trump’s isolationist US will open doors for China
A US pullback from Europe, Nato and Asia means less pressure and more room for China to attain its trade and security goals
Donald
Trump’s second term as president will not just reshape US policy, it
will fundamentally transform geopolitics. Embracing protectionism,
isolationism and nationalism, he intends to freeze multilateralism and
redirect American resources to domestic priorities. If his first term is
any guide, the fallout will be predictable.
Protectionism will be the cornerstone of Trump’s strategy. With
higher tariffs, sanctions and export controls, trade wars are inevitable. The US-China
technological conflict
will intensify and Europe will be caught in the crossfire. As
Washington decouples further from Beijing, Brussels could bear the
brunt, especially as China eyes the European Union as a key market to
redirect its supply chains to.
Europe
may be forced into a closer relationship with China, unable to
antagonise both powers. The European Commission under Ursula von der
Leyen will struggle to keep aligning with US policy, especially if
Trump’s far-right allies gain influence in European capitals.
Trump’s isolationism is a defining feature of his foreign policy. He has
made it clear: “I’m not going to start a war. I’m going to stop wars.” His
promise to resolve the Ukraine war, combined with his
close ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin, risks sidelining Europe, forcing it to confront volatility alone.
Nationalism
drives Trump’s military and economic policies, putting America first at
the expense of global alliances. By focusing resources domestically, he
reduces the likelihood of conflict but risks sidelining regions like
the Indo-Pacific.
Global reaction to Trump's win in the US presidential election
Tensions
with partners at Nato and in Southeast Asia, Taiwan and the rest of
East Asia are inevitable. In this zero-sum geopolitical environment,
China stands to gain from reduced Western pressure, enjoying more room
to expand its influence.
Trump’s
election has solidified the view that Americans back the “Make America
Great Again” agenda, and shifting away from global commitments. The
dispatch is undeniable – the United States rejects its role as the
world’s safety net. This marks a seismic change in the global order.
The most consequential decisions may centre on the futures of
Nato and
Taiwan.
Concerns are growing across Europe and among US allies in Asia, as the
transatlantic security alliance faces potential destabilisation,
straining Indo-Pacific partnerships and weakening Taiwan’s security.
Trump’s quid pro quo mindset – where loyalty carries a price tag rather
than a shared purpose – risks these alliances.
European
institutions have developed contingency plans yet no clear strategy
seems to exist. The European Commission has shown little coherence in
its China policy, often following the White House. Recent commissioner
hearings revealed a leadership struggling to present a unified stance.
Why the EU, US are concerned about China’s overcapacity
Nato’s
future hinges on Trump’s handling of the “China threat” and Europe’s
willingness to follow his lead. Brussels has not forgotten past insults
and threats. Trump’s calls for higher defence spending overlook that
budgets have risen since Russia invaded Ukraine.
And his
rhetoric in February
– labelling underspending Nato members as “delinquent” and suggesting
Putin should “do whatever the hell” he wants – could embolden Russia.
However, the extent to which Trump and Putin could build a new era in
Russian-American relations, potentially sidelining China, remains
uncertain.
Whatever
happens, Europe is at a crossroads. An American pullback appears
likely, forcing the EU to choose between two options. One is an
existential crisis where security is exposed. The other is a
transformative opportunity whereby Europe takes charge of its defence,
reducing its reliance on fluctuating US policies.
This could also redirect Nato’s attention back to the Atlantic, stripping away the
ideological emphasis on China.
For Beijing, a Washington retreat would be a strategic win, easing
Western pressure and giving greater space to its South China Sea goals.
South Korea, Philippines share ‘common understanding’ on South China Sea
Trump’s
belief that allies should pay for US protection could extend to
countries like the Philippines, Japan and South Korea. American security
commitments may become contingent on financial contributions, breaking
decades of bipartisan commitment to defending allies. In the case of
Taiwan, Trump has
suggested defence fees.
But
this reorientation doesn’t grant China free rein in the region. Biden
has strengthened alliances in the Asia-Pacific through the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Aukus and closer ties with
Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. These remain a counterbalance, but their future hinges on how the next administration designs priorities.
As
the US steps back from its multilateral commitments, China is primed to
seize the opportunity, positioning itself as a champion of
multilateralism. With the Belt and Road Initiative, Brics, Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, China
is strengthening its influence, particularly in the Global South.
Furthermore,
China may decide to deepen trade and investment ties with an EU facing a
less reliable partner in the US. Sensing an opportunity, Beijing could
abandon its
divide-and-conquer approach, opting instead to offer Europe support.
China is poised to advance its
key security objectives,
with both businesses and the government shouldering the costs of its
geopolitical and security expansion. For the leadership in Beijing, as
China’s economic growth slows, a gift has come from the heavens: reduced
US backing for Taiwan and South China Sea allies, and a Nato not just
weakening, but likely to abandon any opposition to Chinese ambitions.
With Trump in charge, China looks set to gain heft in the bipolar world
heralded by Yan Xuetong.
Sebastian
Contin Trillo-Figueroa is a geopolitics analyst with a specialisation
in EU-Asia relations, who serves as a consultant for public- and
private-sector organisations, in particular