As the relationship between the United States and China continues to deteriorate, and with the looming return of former President Donald Trump to the White House promising the possibility of further escalation, countries in Southeast Asia are increasingly worried about having to choose between the two giants. But with the exception of the Philippines, none of the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN, want to explicitly align with the United States. Indeed, nearly all of them are historically known for hedging between great powers.
In exploring their options to avoid being completely caught up in U.S.-China tensions, many Southeast Asian states are eagerly building robust ties with Asia’s middle powers—Japan, Australia, South Korea and, to some extent, India—as well as outside powers like Russia and the European Union.
If these smaller Southeast Asian states are expanding their economic and security partnerships, it is not just to resist pressure from the U.S. to join an anti-China coalition, pressure that is likely to increase under a second Trump administration. It is also to create checks and balances against China under President Xi Jinping. Xi’s increasingly aggressive rhetoric and actions in disputed regional waters like the South China Sea have already raised concerns in the region. Now there are fears that he may use further coercive activities as the Chinese economy falters.
With Trump now headed back to the White House, they must add to those concerns the worry that the moderate stability they enjoyed during the administration of President Joe Biden—despite some complaints about Biden ignoring parts of the region—will now give way to economic and security chaos.
Building security ties with a range of middle powers serves several purposes for smaller regional countries. It reduces their reliance on U.S. and Chinese arms sales and security cooperation, further blunting the ability of both giants to pressure them. In the event of a U.S.-China crisis, and especially if it comes to being pressured to enter an eventual conflict, it offers options for avoiding a zero-sum choice between Washington and Beijing. And particularly important for the region’s democracies, powers like Japan and the European Union are far more popular among publics than the U.S. and China, which can make it easier for regional governments to work with them.
In addition to offering Southeast Asian states more hedging room against zero-sum regional politics, these links also broaden their investment opportunities. This is especially important given Washington’s increasing focus on luring companies to invest domestically—which will now be exacerbated by Trump’s obsession with tariffs—and Beijing’s shift toward more modest outbound investment amid a struggling Chinese economy.
Meanwhile, for the middle powers now cultivating ties with Southeast Asian states, these links allow them to promote their own outbound investment and defense industries. In the past decade, Japan in particular has become far more assertive in Southeast Asia, increasingly expanding its arms exports to the region, while also providing an alternative source of economic assurance for regional states. Indeed, the 2024 State of Southeast Asia survey published by the ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute identified Japan as “the most trusted and strategically relevant middle power to ASEAN.”
In addition to offering Southeast Asian states more hedging room against zero-sum regional politics, links with middle powers also broaden their investment opportunities.
In recent years, Japan aggressively cultivated recently inaugurated Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto while Prabowo served as the country’s defense minister under his predecessor, former President Joko Widodo, known as Jokowi. Japan, which already has a decades-long relationship with Indonesia, has pledged to upgrade security ties with Jakarta. Prabowo will almost surely welcome this move, given that he appears ready to play a bigger role in foreign policy than Jokowi and more willing to assertively defend Indonesia’s South China Sea claims against Beijing’s encroachment.
Though Prabowo will continue to nurture Indonesia’s ties with China developed under Jokowi—he traveled to Beijing two weeks ago to solicit investment—deepening ties with Tokyo would be consistent with his stated interest in cultivating a variety of partners to diversify Jakarta’s diplomatic portfolio. Prabowo may also understand that boosting ties with Japan is a way to reassure the U.S. that he, too, shares concerns about Beijing’s regional security posture, while allowing him to avoid the appearance of catering to Washington, which is highly unpopular in Indonesia today, especially due to its support for Israel’s war in Gaza.
In addition to helping Southeast Asian states balance their security interests, Japan was also the largest country donor of development aid in the region from 2015 to 2022. Tokyo may not be able to offer splashy projects like Beijing or Washington, but it has distinguished itself as a reliable partner in the provision of public goods.
In addition to Japan, Australia has increasingly played a role as a regional power providing alternatives for security cooperation. Again, despite historically prickly ties between Jakarta and Canberra, Prabowo has been a leader in this regard. In August, as president-elect, Prabowo met with top Australian officials in Canberra to increase defense cooperation. Australia is set to hold its largest-ever military exercises with Indonesia in November and recently announced it also would also partner with the Philippines on joint maritime patrols of the South China Sea.
India’s rise as a middle power has also offered another balancing option for Southeast Asia, with RAND’s Derek Grossman even arguing that India is becoming a “strategic actor” in the region. India has become a defense supplier to Vietnam, and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim visited New Delhi in August to strengthen economic and security ties, at a time when Anwar and the Malaysian public have soured on the U.S., in large part due to the Gaza war. India’s membership in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—alongside the U.S., Japan and Australia—offers another avenue for cooperation, and Southeast Asia’s political elites seem more open to the prospect of working with India via the Quad, as it is known, than they once were.
Prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Moscow was Southeast Asia’s largest weapons supplier. Although this trend has slowed considerably in the past few years, some of the more authoritarian states in the region continue to use Russia to balance against China’s influence. Vietnam in particular has long relied on Russia for its defense base. In June, then-Vietnamese President To Lam—he has since relinquished the position while continuing to serve as the Communist Party’s secretary-general—conducted a state visit to Moscow, where he signed deals on oil and gas exports, arms transfers and more. Myanmar’s military junta, meanwhile, has obtained specialized surveillance drones from Russia in its civil war against resistance forces and ethnic armed organizations, even as China seems to be increasingly angry at the junta for the chaos it has created.
At the most recent ASEAN Summit in October, the attendance of representatives from Australia, Japan and South Korea—along with Russia, India and the EU—demonstrated the value middle powers place on ties with Southeast Asia. Conversely, the smaller states of the region will continue to develop ties with middle powers to pursue their interests and maximize their geopolitical room for maneuver. With the U.S. and China attempting to force Southeast Asian governments to choose, many are instead increasingly looking for a third option.
Joshua Kurlantzick is senior fellow for Southeast Asia and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Abigail McGowan is a research associate for Southeast Asia and U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations.