[Salon] Any Agreement Between Israel and Lebanon Will Require a Silent Partner: Syria's Bashar Assad

[Chas Freeman <cwfresidence@gmail.com>]

https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/2024-11-19/ty-article/.premium/any-agreement-between-israel-and-lebanon-will-require-a-silent-partner-bashar-al-assad/00000193-41cb-d20b-ab9f-f1eb01640000

Any Agreement Between Israel and Lebanon Will Require a Silent Partner: Syria's Bashar Assad

IIt is impossible to get Iran out of Syria, but a confluence of interests between U.S. President-elect Donald Trump and the Syrian president could help resolve one of the key elements of a cease-fire deal between Israel and Lebanon: preventing arms smuggling to Hezbollah

Zvi Bar'elNov 19, 2024

The return of U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein to Beirut on Tuesday after receiving Lebanon's response to the cease-fire agreement, is already being interpreted as another "proof" of real progress toward closing a deal with Israel.

The "positive atmosphere" and "optimism," in the words of Lebanon's Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, who is negotiating on behalf of Hezbollah, and the surfeit of details that are being published about the agreement's content, suggest that a signing could take place "within days."

On the face of it, "only" two key issues remain in dispute between Israel and Lebanon: Israel's insistence on freedom of action should Hezbollah violate the agreement, and the establishment and composition of an international supervisory committee.

However, according to Lebanese reports at least, there are more than a dozen additional matters at play. Some are symbolic, aimed at preserving Lebanon's sovereignty and national dignity, while others are practical and will require resolution and mutual agreement before the deal can be finalized.

Residents and rescuers gather at the site of an Israeli airstrike that hit a building in central Beirut's Ras el-Nabaa neighborhood, Lebanon, Sunday.Credit: Bilal Hussein/APThe disputed issues include Lebanon's demand to prohibit Israeli surveillance and reconnaissance flights over its airspace and to ensure that any party – not just Israel – has the right to self-defense in the event of a violation.

Additionally, any response by either side would require prior consultation with the supervisory committee, which itself would be obligated to consult with the involved parties.

The supervisory committee's composition will remain limited to representatives from Lebanon, Israel, the UN, the U.S., and France, without further expansion. The role and format of UNIFIL would remain consistent with the framework established under UN Security Council Resolution 1701, both in terms of its size and powers.

A Lebanese demand includes barring Israel from requesting the supervisory committee's permission to target sites in Lebanon or to act against activities on Lebanese territory, as such actions would infringe on Lebanese sovereignty. Lebanon is also seeking provisions to allow the return of displaced citizens immediately after the cease-fire takes effect, to prevent Israel from establishing a defensive buffer zone in southern Lebanon.

FILE PHOTO: Members of the United Nations peacekeepers (UNIFIL) look at the Lebanese-Israeli border, in the town of Marwahin, in southern Lebanon, October.Credit: Thaier Al-Sudani/Reuters

Additional points of contention include the release of Lebanese prisoners detained by Israel during the conflict and a guarantee that Lebanon will retain sole authority over post-conflict reconstruction. This includes ensuring Israel has no influence over the nature of reconstruction efforts or the sources of funding.

This clause is particularly critical for Hezbollah, as it would enable Iran to funnel funds under the guise of reconstruction aid. Such financial support would bolster Hezbollah's position as the faction fulfilling its commitments to assist the Lebanese people affected by the war, thereby reinforcing its influence and legitimacy within the country.

Most of these demands, including the supervision mechanism and Israel's insistence on "freedom of action," rebranded as "self-defense," are unlikely to derail the agreement as both Israel and Lebanon appear committed to reaching a deal.

However, the familiar dynamics of negotiation – where each side seeks to claim victory by securing significant concessions from the other – are likely to prolong discussions. This will involve multiple exchanges of drafts, with wording being "sharpened," "polished," and "refined," resulting in delays that could cost more lives among soldiers and civilians alike.

It is worth remembering that the legal frameworks accompanying Resolution 1701 in 2006 offered limited utility when it came to implementation.

While the final agreement will formally be signed by the Lebanese government, its essence lies in being a pact between Israel, Hezbollah, and Iran. Its primary aim is to curb Hezbollah's activities in southern Lebanon and facilitate the return of displaced civilians on both sides of the border. However, the political standing of Hezbollah and Iran in Lebanon, as dominant forces capable of shaping national policy, is unlikely to be diminished.

As part of the deal, the Lebanese army is expected to reinforce its presence by recruiting over 6,000 additional soldiers, securing increased funding for equipment and arms, and deploying along the border. This would fulfill key provisions outlined in both Resolution 1701 and its precursor, Resolution 1559 from 2004.

However, it is doubtful whether this army will be able to – or even be ordered to – disarm Hezbollah and neutralize the military threat it poses to Lebanon domestically.

Hezbollah spokesman Mohammad Afif, during a press in south Beirut, November.Credit: AFP/Anwar Amro

This is likely to be one of the agreement's critical vulnerabilities. Although the Lebanese government, in accordance with previous UN resolutions, is obligated to prevent the entry of arms and munitions into the country except for those designated for its army, the true test of both the state and the emerging agreement will be the government's ability to identify and block Hezbollah's weapons supply routes, whether by land from Syria or by sea.

A key question for Israel and the international guarantors of the agreement – particularly the United States – is whether the smuggling of illegal arms into Lebanon would constitute a breach of the agreement. If so, this could grant Israel formal legitimacy to take military action within Lebanese territory, potentially jeopardizing the agreement's stability and enforcement.

To enforce this aspect of the agreement, Israel may require the cooperation of a "silent partner" in Damascus. To date, Israel has acted with near-impunity, primarily in Syrian territory, to disrupt weapons supply routes.

Recent reports indicate that Israel even approached Russia, requesting it to prevent arms transfers through Syria. However, Russia's response was dismissive. Alexander Lavrentiev, Russia's envoy to Syria, reportedly rejected the request, stating that it falls outside the mandate of Russian forces in Syria, whose mission is to combat terrorism, not to police arms transfers.

Moreover, agreeing to such a request would necessitate Russia setting up roadblocks and supervising border crossings – measures that would require the approval of the Assad regime.

Meanwhile, Israel has recently expanded the scope of its operations in Syria, conducting strikes across multiple regions, including Damascus, Idlib, Homs, and Hama. These strikes have targeted a range of sites, from Hezbollah operatives to specialized installations, but also resulted in the deaths of Syrian soldiers. In an uncommon move, Israel even struck Latakia, near the Russian-controlled Khmeimim Air Base.

Funeral procession of the Palestinian militant group Islamic Jihad who were killed last week in an Israeli airstrike, in Damascus, Syria, Monday.Credit: Omar Sanadiki/AP

Syrian President Bashar Assad needs no strong reminders to understand the risks posed by Iran's presence in Syria or the fact that the country has become a transit route for Iranian arms heading to Lebanon.

However, his economic dependence on Iran – supplying between a quarter and half of Syria's fuel needs and providing credit lines to sustain the regime – leaves him little room to demand the withdrawal of Iranian forces.

Conversely, Assad has resisted most attempts by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps' Quds Force and Hezbollah to use Syria as a launchpad for attacks against Israel.

Notably, he has also maintained a policy of neutrality regarding the war in Gaza. Far from participating in the so-called "unity of fronts" strategy within Iran's "ring of fire," Assad and Syrian state media have largely ignored Hamas, while Syrian security forces have actively suppressed demonstrations of support for Gaza in refugee camps. When Iran explored the possibility of relocating Hamas' leadership from Qatar to Syria, Assad unequivocally rejected the idea.

Assad, who last year was reinstated into the "Arab fold" and the Arab League after being suspended in 2011, now controls over 70 percent of Syria – primarily due to extensive Russian, rather than Iranian, military support.

He may see a potential opportunity to restore his standing with the United States, particularly following President-elect Donald Trump's victory. This shift comes as Arab nations have reestablished ties with Damascus, and seven European countries, led by Italy, have recently drafted a proposal to "review European Union policy toward Syria." The proposal aims to renew diplomatic relations with Assad's regime, partly as a strategy to facilitate the repatriation of millions of Syrian refugees currently residing in Europe.

Although Trump was the president who approved the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act in 2019, imposing severe sanctions on Syria, he was also, and appears still to be, the president who sought to withdraw the 900 U.S. troops stationed in Syria.

Achieving that goal would require Trump to seek Syria and Turkey's cooperation in safeguarding the Syrian Kurds, a key U.S. ally in the fight against ISIS.

It is possible that Trump, known for his affinity for "big deals," might "review" U.S. policy toward Syria and propose a strategy that wouldn't necessarily remove Iran from Syria, but could aim to prevent the transfer of weapons from Syria to Lebanon. This approach could position Assad as a "silent partner" in any future agreement related to Lebanon.