Why Have China and India Suddenly Come Together?
Detente at the border gives both countries one less thing to worry about.
In late October, just before the U.S. presidential election, India-China relations turned a corner.
In the first of two sudden developments, India announced on Oct. 21 an agreement with China on patrolling rights in Depsang and Demchok in eastern Ladakh along the two countries’ contested Himalayan border. These had been denied to India after a deadly military clash in the nearby Galwan Valley in June 2020. The resumption of both sides patrolling will be followed by the withdrawal of thousands of Chinese and Indian troops deployed in forward positions since the 2020 clash. This agreement came after stabilizing buffer zones were created at other conflict points in eastern Ladakh in 2021-22.
The second, almost simultaneous, development was the announcement that Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping would hold a bilateral meeting at the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia. That meeting was duly held on Oct. 23.
What caused this uptick in China-India relations? While there is no official account of the reasons, three factors may have led to a detente.
The first likely factor was economic. India’s economy is growing at an average of 7 percent per annum, but if it wants to raise GDP growth to 8-10 percent per annum, it needs critical Chinese products (metals, active pharmaceutical ingredients, and machinery and electricals) as well as Chinese investment. China’s growth range is trending to 3-4 percent per annum. India is becoming more attractive as an export and investment destination—it is closing in on Japan’s GDP—particularly as China’s economic ties with the West shrink from de-risking strategies.
A second possible factor propelling the detente is the realization that the two sides are in a stalemate. Unless China and India are looking to settle matters on the battlefield, the massive post-Galwan deployments are a waste of men, money, and material. Since both sides understand that a decisive military victory in eastern Ladakh is implausible, the deployments are militarily futile, and they have outlived their symbolic value as well.
In addition, both militaries face larger challenges. For India, a two-front conflict with China and Pakistan would be daunting. This could occur in two ways. The first is a terrorist strike from Pakistani soil that leads to an Indian surgical strike (as in 2016 and 2019) and then escalates to full-scale war. If the war turns against Pakistan, China might be prompted to intervene in Ladakh to slow down Indian forces. The second possibility of a two-front war is if a border incident between India and China in Ladakh escalates to war and Pakistan senses an opportunity to grab Kashmir. New Delhi needs to ensure that it avoids such a conjuncture. Historically, it has found it easier to deal with China than Pakistan, both diplomatically and militarily. In addition, to stabilize military relations with China is more urgent since the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is a far more formidable force than Pakistan’s.
For China, the primary military worry concerns the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea, especially if the United States becomes involved in a fight. Beijing therefore also wants to reduce the chances of a two-front confrontation. Stabilizing its western borders with India is easier than stabilizing East Asian conflicts that involve some combination of Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, and the United States.
The third possible cause of the detente is quite a different strategic worry—namely, the United States. India is a strategic partner of the United States, primarily because both countries look at China as a threat. Yet New Delhi is going through a rocky phase with Washington—over U.S. criticism of India’s democratic backsliding, human rights and minority protections and, most recently, allegations that Indian officials had a hand in an attempted assassination on American soil of a Sikh separatist activist. U.S. intelligence apparently also shared information with Canada over the killing of a Sikh separatist in British Columbia, which Ottawa says was organized by elements of the Indian government. By making up with China, the Modi government may well be signaling to the United States that it has other strategic options.
For China, relations with the United States have continued to slide under President Joe Biden—over trade and technology; internal issues such as Tibet and Xinjiang; Taiwan and the South China Sea; and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, a coalition comprising Australia, India, Japan, and the United States. It is in China’s interest to destabilize that coalition, and nudging India toward neutrality is one way of doing so. For Beijing, this is an opportunity to capitalize on New Delhi’s tendency to oscillate between rivalrous big powers as part of its nonalignment or strategic autonomy stance.
Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential election came after the China-India agreement on patrolling and the Xi-Modi discussions at the BRICS summit. With Trump in the White House, both New Delhi and Beijing may have additional reasons to cement their detente. Trump’s general volatility and his economic agenda of higher tariffs on countries that he thinks are not playing fair—a list that includes both India and China—are reasons for New Delhi and Beijing to come together. It gives them one less thing to worry about as they deal with a new, unpredictable U.S. administration; increases their diplomatic bargaining hand; and diversifies their economic relationships.
The first step has already been taken with the resumption of patrolling by both militaries in Depsang and Demchok and the attendant enabling protocols—smaller patrols, prior notification of patrolling, and more. What lies ahead of the two militaries is the resumption of patrolling in Galwan, Pangong Tso, and other flash points. Here, the stabilizing measure thus far has been buffer zones to keep the troops apart.
The buffer zones have been helpful. However, both sides may fear secret intrusions into these areas that then become permanent deployments. Monitoring the zones is therefore vital. Patrolling is one means of monitoring. Other means include ground and satellite sensors as well as drones. Drones in turn can be destabilizing since they can “wander” beyond the buffer zones. And, of course, they can carry weapons. So, talks will be necessary to determine if the buffer zones in Galwan, Pangong Tso, and elsewhere are enough.
It is worth noting that China, too, has sought patrolling rights in two areas of Arunachal Pradesh where India is in military control. New Delhi has resisted Chinese patrolling demands there, but these areas have been the site of face-offs in recent years, and pressures to allow PLA patrols will grow. If Indian resistance to a patrolling deal persists, we could well see military flare-ups there in the not-so-distant future. New Delhi may then find that it faces the same problem as in Ladakh: buffer zones or a patrolling deal. China may not raise the diplomatic and military stakes there for now, given the incipient detente, but it is unlikely to allow the matter to drop. The two sides will therefore at some point have to talk about friction points in Arunachal Pradesh.
A second step is to make a partial but real beginning on troop withdrawals. A long hard winter is ahead of the thousands of troops in Ladakh. While a complete pullback—so-called de-induction—cannot occur immediately, a positive move would be de-inducting a not-insignificant portion of the massive deployments. This would bring real and symbolic benefit. The phasing and sequencing of de-induction may not be strictly equal and reciprocal. De-induction is easier for the Chinese military given superior infrastructure and the flatter terrain in Tibet to which the PLA would return. It is harder for the Indian military because of poorer infrastructure and the twisting mountain roads that the retreating forces must traverse.
Finally, since there was probably an economic rationale for the detente, the normalization of economic relations needs to occur if both sides are to reap the full benefits of the agreement. Here, India needs to speed up permission for Chinese imports and investments that are not deemed a security risk. It also needs to ease visa restrictions on Chinese business executives and technical experts who service Chinese equipment in India. And China needs to do something about the huge trade imbalance with India, which irks and worries New Delhi. In 2023-24, the trade imbalance stood at $85 billion, in China’s favor. It is simply not enough for Beijing to assert that the problem is with Indian businesses that are uncompetitive. China needs to liberalize imports from India in areas where it is competitive: for example, agricultural products, pharmaceuticals, and information technology and related services. If Xi can do an economic deal with Trump, surely he can do one with Modi as well.
In short, even though China and India remain suspicious of each other, they have an opportunity to steer their troubled bilateral relationship to a more positive path.
This essay is a modified version of an essay published by the Asian Peace Programme at the National University of Singapore’s Asia Research Institute.
Kanti Bajpai is the Wilmar Professor of Asian Studies and vice dean of research and development at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.