Lessons unlearned, as Israel’s war against Hezbollah is starting to mirror its 2006 defeat
“Convinced they could force Hezbollah to disarm and withdraw from southern Lebanon by initiating an effects-based air campaign, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) began pounding targets across Lebanon. Although initially taken aback by the destructive air strikes, Hezbollah unleashed its own attack within 24 hours, launching an extensive rocket barrage from southern Lebanon into Israel. Despite Israel assuring the United States of a “quick and decisive” resolution to the conflict, Hezbollah’s short-range Katyusha rockets continued to rain down on the Israeli population.
As days went by, it became increasingly apparent to both the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and western military analysts that the IAF was having little effect on Hezbollah’s rockets. When the IDF reluctantly moved its ground forces into southern Lebanon, the apparent ineffectiveness of the operation and the stubborn resistance of Hezbollah fighters stunned military observers worldwide.”
Although the above excerpt could well have been written about the current war on Lebanon by the US-backed Israeli army, it is, in fact, an analysis of the 2006 July warfought between the occupation state and the Hezbollah resistance movement.
Originally published two years after the war by the US Army Combined Arms Center (USACAC), We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War by Matt M. Matthews also notes that “By the time the United Nations (UN) cease-fire went into effect on 14 August 2006, many military analysts were convinced the IDF had suffered a significant defeat.”
Tel Aviv has spent nearly two decades supposedly learning from past mistakes in planning its next major confrontation with Hezbollah. Initially, it appeared that Israel had rectified its approach by opting for far-reaching strategic moves rather than limited tactical gains. This was evident with the pager and radio attack, which took out hundreds of Hezbollah operatives and hampered communication, followed by the targeted assassination of the movement’s top leadership, including Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah.
Before Hezbollah even had a chance to recover, the occupation army, supported by unprecedented intelligence, eliminated Nasrallah’s cousin and likely successor, Hashem Safieddine. This was coupled with intense bombing of Beirut, particularly the Hezbollah stronghold of Dahiyeh, causing significant civilian casualties, similar to the previous war and on a smaller scale compared to the ongoing situation in Gaza.
These major setbacks for Hezbollah have led some to prematurely argue that Israel, rather than repeating the same mistakes as in 2006, is actually adopting a different approach. Last month’s edition of the pro-Israel Fathom Journal seems to think so, in a piece headlined 2024 is not 2006. This time Israel is beating Hezbollah. While there is some credence to the claim that the aforementioned “destabilisation of Hezbollah before a ground confrontation, and the intelligence-led Israeli campaign that brought it about, is a night-and-day difference to the situation in the summer of 2006,” the author is under the delusion that “The same categorical difference between 2006 and the present can be seen in Israel’s ground operations in the south.”
However, according to Daniel Sobelman, an international security expert at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the occupation forces are undergoing a similar experience to the 2006 war. “They’re [Hezbollah’s fighters] entrenched in underground facilities and they’re playing a defensive game,” he told CNN, adding that “it doesn’t matter how many of them you kill, still (in a guerilla war) the weaker side ultimately wins by imposing a sustained accumulation of costs.” Sobelman said this is exactly what happened in 2006, when the occupation state was not able to achieve a decisive victory despite its superior capabilities.
Throughout the current conflict, and as with 2006, Hezbollah has continued to employ Katyusha rockets in addition introducing several advanced weapons systems not previously utilised such as long-range Fadi Rockets, Iranian-made Almas-1 Missiles, Fateh 110 and Jihad-2 short-range ballistic missiles, and harder to detect drones, such as the Mirsad-1 used at the dining hall of the Golani Brigade’s training base in Benyamina, south of Haifa and the residence of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Caesarea. What is noticeable, here is that unlike in 2006, where “Syrian rockets played the major role in the campaign, while Iranian rockets were practically absent from it,” there is evidently greater involvement of Iranian-origin weaponry.
Hezbollah, under the leadership of Nasrallah’s successor Sheikh Naim Qassem has taken “all defensive measures to engage in a prolonged battle, preventing the enemy from achieving its goals.” According to its Operations Room, has since last month, coinciding with Israel’s “limited” invasion of South Lebanon, killed over 100 occupation soldiers and wounded over 1,000 others, in addition to destroying dozens of Merkava tanks and other military vehicles.
Much like in 2006, Hezbollah made effective use of guerilla warfare tactics and strategic use of its arms, heading towards a political victory. In the previous war, Israel’s objectives were to secure the release of two captured soldiers alive and destroying the resistance movement – they failed on both counts. Hezbollah on the other hand, avoided disarmament, enhanced its regional prestige, and strengthened its standing among its domestic base and presence near the border.
Now, Israel appears determined to dismantle Hezbollah by targeting the rest of its leadership and infrastructure, bombing Beirut and much of southern Lebanon, including civilian and heritage sites. However, Israel’s desperation is becoming evident, with recent actions including the assassination of Hezbollah’s head of media relations, Mohammed Afif, seemingly indicating they are running out of high-value military targets. Crucially, there are no signs of returning the “displaced” settlers to the north, something Nasrallah vowed would not happen just before his martyrdom.
As acknowledged by The News York Times: “Israel has failed to eliminate the short-range rockets that the Lebanese militia fires into the northern half of the country, according to U.S. officials. As long as the rocket fire continues, Israel’s campaign is unable to fulfill one of its main goals — securing northern Israel so that tens of thousands of residents can return home there.”
Yet one striking parallel that has been overlooked was when, after a 39-minute widespread overnight raid on 12-13 July 2006, Israeli military Chief of Staff Dan Halutz told then Prime Minister Ehud Olmert that “all the long-range rockets have been destroyed…We’ve won the war.” However, Hezbollah subsequently carried out extensive long-range rocket strikes into the north of the occupation state.
In the current conflict, prior to his dismissal, former Defence Minister Yoav Gallant claimed late last month that Hezbollah had lost over 80 per cent of its long-range rockets since the start of the war. However, just this month, Hezbollah successfully struck greater Tel Aviv “with a volley of qualitative missiles and a squadron of attack drones.” Additionally, a rocket barrage targeted several military sites, coinciding with senior White House envoy Amos Hochstein’s visit to Beirut for talks with Lebanese officials regarding a ceasefire.
Despite this, the Netanyahu government continues to press on, seemingly committed to deploying the Dahiyeh doctrine, now that it is losing whatever strategic edge it had achieved just two months ago. Although such a move is unlikely to bring about a political victory and instead further isolate the occupation state.
With International Court of Justice (ICJ) arrest warrants issued for Netanyahu and Gallant, an eventual ceasefire, much like in 2006, will likely result in another political victory for Hezbollah, and an equally humiliating defeat for Israel—this time without the long-time Hezbollah leader who had vowed that the movement would continue until the occupation army ended its genocidal campaign in Gaza.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.