What FOCAC 2024 Reveals About the Future of China-Africa Relations
China’s domestic situation and its engagement with Africa indicate a drastic shift in China’s checkbook diplomacy approach.
In early September 2024, China gathered fifty-three high-level African delegations—thirty-six of which were led by heads of state and prime ministers—to the ninth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit. Few countries can pretend to have such convening power, especially when it comes to Africa. Given the regularity of FOCAC meetings, even during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the enthusiasm and high attendance it elicits among African leaders, it has become the preeminent Africa plus one summit. (“Africa plus one” refers to bilateral gatherings between Africa and some other country, the oldest being the France-Afrique summits that started in 1973). Twenty-four years after the first FOCAC summit in 2000, this year’s summit was undoubtedly one of the most scrutinized. Both the slump in Chinese lending in Africa in the past seven years—despite a $4.6 billion jump in 2023—and China’s domestic economic slowdown, as well as the turbulent geopolitical environment, caused questions about the future of Chinese engagement in the African continent.
Numbers, particularly China’s financial commitment to Africa, have become the measuring stick by which the media and analysts assess the vitality of Chinese-African relations. That would explain why Chinese President Xi Jinping’s financial promises in his keynote speech—$50.7 billion in total over the next three years—made headlines around the world. However, a narrow focus on these numbers oversimplified a FOCAC summit that offered a more complex long-term and expanding Chinese vision in Africa.
Beyond attendance, some aspects of FOCAC 2024 pointed to a new era in the China-Africa relationship: the elevation of China-Africa bilateral relations to what Xi called an “all-weather China-Africa community with a shared future for the new era,” the prospect of a new China-Africa trade and investment agreement, and China’s commitment to training African leaders. A close look at China’s domestic situation and its engagement with Africa indicate a drastic shift in China’s checkbook diplomacy approach toward Africa, which has earned China the political support of African countries in multilateral institutions on issues related to China’s core interests such as the “One China” principle.
Large Turnout at the Benchmark Africa Plus One Summit
Scrutiny and criticism of the recent proliferation of Africa plus one summits did not deter African heads of state from participating in FOCAC 2024. There are now at least seven of these summits, including Italy-Africa, Indonesia-Africa, South Korea-Africa, EU-AU, U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, and Russia-Africa, among several others. Yet, few Africa-plus-one summits elicit as much attention as FOCAC. Therefore, despite having valid political reasons to shun this year’s summit, such as the dramatic decline in Chinese loans to the continent in recent years and China’s reluctance to respond to several countries’ requests for infrastructure financing, many African leaders attended FOCAC 2024. Notably, Kenyan President William Ruto—who in April 2023 criticized Africa plus one summits, urged Africa’s fifty-four heads of state not to respond to these invitations, and said the continent should be represented by the African Union commission—was in Beijing making the case for new Chinese funding in Kenyan infrastructure.
At FOCAC 2024, Xi held bilateral meetings with each of the African heads of states and governments in attendance. He reaffirmed China’s support for each country’s development, making specific commitments regarding tourism support, infrastructure construction, and digitalization in some cases. In several meetings, he stated that this year’s FOCAC would be a turning point and a defining moment in China-Africa relations. In turn, many of the African leaders in bilateral meetings and the final declaration restated their commitment to Beijing’s “One China” principle, recognizing Taiwan as an integral part of mainland China.
China Aims to Strengthen Political Alliances in Africa
With China set on shaping, or what it describes as “reforming,” the institutions of global governance, FOCAC 2024 illustrated Chinese efforts to build and strengthen alliances with African countries to achieve this goal. In recent years, China has announced several global initiatives that aim to set new norms in international affairs. Beyond the Belt and Road Initiative, which launched in 2013 and has received the most attention in Western media and policy circles, other potentially equally important initiatives that have eluded media attention include the Global Development Initiative (GDI), launched in 2021; the Global Security Initiative (GSI), in 2022; and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), in 2023. In this vein, a central narrative throughout FOCAC 2024 was “building and strengthening alliance.” This narrative appeared in various elements of the summit, including in its theme “Joining Hands to Advance Modernization and Build a High-Level China-Africa Community with a Shared Future;” Xi’s keynote address, which mentioned common past and struggles and historical brotherhood relations; and the two final declarations. The summit was also marked by the overall characterization of China-Africa relations being elevated to, in Xi’s words, “an all-weather China-Africa community with a shared future for the new era.”
China communicated clearly to African countries that it regards them as allies and partners in an increasingly turbulent global order. During his keynote speech, Xi announced the elevation of China’s bilateral relations with all African countries that recognize the People’s Republic of China (all fifty-four countries with the exception of Eswatini) to at least the “strategic level.” He also elevated the relationship with the entire African continent to “an all-weather China-Africa community with a shared future for the new era,” conveying that China counts on the continent’s help to build a new era of international relations.
This call for a “new era” came against a backdrop of perceptions in many parts of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East about an inconsistent so-called rules-based order that seems to cater to great powers’ interests rather than adhering to unbiased international laws. For instance, the devastating war in Gaza, mentioned in the final FOCAC declaration, is thus regarded as the latest example of the inconsistencies and dysfunctions of the rules-based order.
Reinforcing what has long become an intrinsic part of China’s diplomatic discourse in Africa—long-standing friendship, a shared past of tribulation, and a fight for freedom—and recalling the negative impact of the West’s approach to modernization, Xi sought to lay the foundations for the legitimacy of the shared future between China and Africa in a “new era.”
China’s Modernization Approach
China’s approach to modernization under Xi and his predecessor is nothing short of a call for a non-Westernization of a country’s development and industrialization. Though “modernization” was mentioned thirty times in Xi’s keynote speech and forty times in the Beijing Action Plan 2025-2027, no clear definition was provided during the summit to clarify what the term entails. Indeed, one would have to dig through reams of China’s official documents to understand the concept. The “Chinese Way to Modernization: the Way Forward,” published by the National Development and Reform Commission, gives the best indication of what China’s vision of modernization is about. It is a call for the “right to industrialize” according to one’s own cultural, historical, and social background without being forced to follow Western social, economic, cultural, and political model and norms.
Consequently, in FOCAC 2024, the word modernization is used not only in its economic dimension but also in its ideological dimension. As much as the summit emphasized the need for industrialization, including the modernization of agriculture in Africa, it also mentioned modernization as an approach to political and social governance, with both parties acknowledging each other’s right to pursue their own approach to modernization. On its industrialization dimension, China committed to help Africa reach advanced digitization; it proposed a China-Africa Action Plan for Digital Cooperation and Development. There was also a commitment to modernize Africa’s agriculture through training and technology transfer.
Tapping Into African Frustrations with the Prevailing Global Governance Model
Surfing on the continent’s frustration with the Western democratic model and a modernization process often perceived as Westernization, Xi questioned the universality of the current modernization narrative, saying “Modernization is an inalienable right of all countries. But the Western approach to it has inflicted immense sufferings on developing countries.” He proceeded to offer an alternative that does not necessarily involve mimicking the Chinese model but rather fosters the emergence of diverse and varied governance models whose proliferation would no longer make the Western democratic model the norm. He stated, “We should jointly advance modernization that is just and equitable. In promoting modernization, we should not only follow the general rules, but also act in light of our national realities.”
Xi’s message is likely to have some resonance on a continent that, though firmly attached to democracy, is becoming increasingly disillusioned with the Western model. Results of a 2024 survey of young people in sixteen African countries by the South Africa-based Ichikowitz Family Foundation revealed a high approval rate for China (82 percent), ahead of the United States (79 percent) and the European Union (76 percent). When asked about their “appetite for democracy” the survey revealed a strong attachment to democracy as a model of governance (69 percent). Yet, when asked if Western-style democracy is suitable in Africa, a large number (60 percent) disagreed, saying instead that “Africa countries need to create their own democratic structures and systems.” Criticisms of American influence included political interference and a “lack of respect for my country’s values and traditions.” A 2022 Friederich Nauman Foundation survey of African decisionmakers showed similar results, with respondents praising China’s perceived non-interference in internal affairs in contrast to the EU’s perceived approach of interference.
At the same time, some African intellectuals have called for an authentic African political system in the following pieces (first two titles translated): “Africa and Its Democracy Culture” by Crisantos Obama Ondo in 2021, “Apply Democracy in Africa” by Henri Nzeke in 2017, and “Compatible Cultural Democracy: The Key to Development in Africa” by Daniel Osabu-kle in 2000. These calls illustrate frustration toward a model of Western liberal democracy, promoted in the early 1990s in the wave of democratization on the continent, that failed to deliver peace, stability, and development in Africa.
China’s call for a new era taps into another frustration of the African continent toward the international community at large and its governance institutions. The UN Security Council, where the continent does not hold a permanent seat, embodies an international system that has left Africa on the sidelines of major decisions, even for crises that unfold on the continent, such as the imposition of a no-fly zone on Libya in 2011. The long-ignored call for a reform of the Security Council has received some semblance of support in recent years, yet it is not decisive. The recent U.S. proposal to offer the continent two permanent seats without veto power is just the latest attempt to accommodate a frustrated continent committing to deep reforms. It is worth noting that China’s support of Africa’s call for Security Council reform, although regularly expressed and reiterated in the Beijing Declaration, remains just as vague. China’s call for “special arrangements on the U.N. Security Council reform to meet Africa’s aspiration” might as well be not so different from the U.S. proposal.
Leveraging Africa to Weaken the Legitimacy of the Rules-Based Order
By identifying itself as a country of the Global South, China cleverly portrays itself as a victim of the rules-based order that is perceived to serve the interests of a few countries rather than the entire international community. And it is that rules-based order that China seeks to change by proposing a new set of norms and rules. One way to do this is to weaken a large group of countries’ adherence to its principles. Where better than Africa to find a group of countries desperately calling for changes and reforms?
China sees Africa as a continent where it can promote the content of its initiatives, such as the GSI, the GDI, and the GCI, and offer a vision of the new norms it intends to establish by reforming the international system. This explains the priority given to the GCI in the first measures of the FOCAC Action Plan 2025–2027. These measures flesh out China’s GCI in Africa by putting in place a governance platform to encourage “governance experience-sharing between China and Africa” and leverage the African Leadership Academy in Dar-es-Salaam to “invite 1000 African political party personages to China for exchanges.” With these measures, China aims to promote political systems and success stories stemming from its model.
These efforts at advancing the GCI in Africa could be viewed as a confirmation of China’s attempt to export its political system. Yet, the more accurate assessment is that China is promoting a variety of governance models and approaches to development and modernization with different norms and values that will ultimately undercut the universality of the current Western-led international order, norms, and values. Lower adherence to and increased questioning of these Western norms would weaken their legitimacy. The erosion of this legitimacy would then further call into question what is perceived by many African and Global South countries as excessive Western interference in their domestic politics and sovereignty in the name of defending democracy, freedom, and human rights. In these countries’ eyes, these norms have justified democratizing wars and support for insurrectionary movements while maintaining and reinforcing the principle of respect for state sovereignty in its strictest sense.
In this vision of the international system, China is positioning itself as Africa’s development partner and international ally. However, denouncing the flaws of the current order will not be enough to win the continent’s support for its project. China needs to offer practical solutions that enable Africa to overcome the structural challenges that have long made it a global charity case. For the continent to align with China, solutions need to be offered. Hence, there is a need for China to position itself as the continent’s development partner.
Thus, besides the billions of dollars proposed, which will be difficult to track, one ought to pay close attention to other development initiatives such as vocational training centers, agricultural support, medical cooperation, rural project development, and green energy development that will impact millions of lives.
The final declaration states, “China is ready to negotiate and sign the framework agreement of China-Africa Economic Partnership for Shared Development with interested African countries, work for more flexible and practical trade and investment liberalization arrangements, and seize the initiative by opening itself wider to African countries, so as to provide long-term, stable and predictable institutional safeguard for economic and trade cooperation between China and Africa.” This hints at the establishment of an economic and political cooperation agreement similar to the Cotonou Agreement that the EU signed with Africa and the Caribbean. So far, it is unclear whether such agreement will be signed at the bilateral or multilateral level with regional bodies or the AU. Such agreement may have a wider impact on China’s ability to shape the continent’s economic and political landscape.
Conclusion
Although all the initiatives announced at FOCAC 2024 are included in the 2025–2027 action plan and China expressed determination to achieve them, there is no guarantee that they will be explicitly endorsed by all or most African countries. Many African countries have, on numerous occasions, expressed their unwillingness to pick sides in what is perceived to be a new Cold War between the United States and China. Many countries might therefore avoid openly aligning with Beijing’s agenda, because it is perceived as being anti-West. As much as they wish to reform the international system or do away with perceived Western interference in how they govern, they are more likely to tread carefully so they are not perceived as having picked sides against their Western partners.
Moreover, as much as China wants to change the rules of the international system, there is no certainty that the new environment will be fairer or more advantageous for Africa. Chinese interests are at the heart of these initiatives. Any long-term and strategic engagement with China will have to be thought through in terms of the long-term gains for each African country and the entire continent.
China has made a lot of promises and engagements regarding Africa’s industrialization and development, yet the continent will have to be more proactive to ensure that these promises are fulfilled. One of the main issues of the engagements coming out of FOCAC 2024 has been the difficulties in tracking implementation and thus evaluating the successes or failures of initiatives. This issue is not unique to Chinese engagement in Africa but applies to other Africa plus one summits as well. However, it is worth noting that in the FOCAC action plan, both parties agreed to strengthen the follow-up and evaluation mechanisms and further substantiate and institutionalize FOCAC.
An important question remains about how the West, specifically the United States, will react to China’s expanded Africa strategy. It seems there is a lack of coherent and comprehensive U.S. strategy to engage with Africa in a way that the continent sees it as an ally for the future. China’s forward-looking vision, which includes industrialization, international system reform, and a new mode of governance, is forward-looking and drastically contrasts with the retrospective-oriented and status quo U.S. approach of preserving the current rules-based order that most African countries are just not enthusiastic about. Countering China in Africa, as many decisionmakers and analysts in Washington would like to do, would require a more positive vision for future relations with Africa and more concrete offerings beyond the fixation on governance lectures to bolster the relationship. Shallow reforms of the UN Security Council or the World Trade Organization might not be enough to convince a continent that has seen its fair share of the double standards of the current rules-based order.
The coming months and years will reveal if Beijing has convinced African leaders and how many will adhere to its vision of change. In the meantime, one thing is certain: China is all-in on Africa.
Christian-Géraud Neema
Nonresident Scholar, Africa Program