

134. "International Review," *Pravda*, December 10, 1978.
135. "The Law of Life and the Apostles of Nuclear Death," *New Times* (No. 22, 1979), pp. 8-9.
136. "The Difficult Road to Ratification," *New Times* (No. 33, 1979), p. 11.
137. "Does NATO Need the Euromissiles?," *New Times* (No. 44, 1979), pp. 4-5; and "Pentagon, NATO, and Euromissiles," *New Times* (No. 9, 1979), pp. 8-9. Also, "International Review," *Pravda*, December 2, 1979; December 16, 1979; and December 23, 1979.
138. "NATO: Myths and the Reality," *New Times* (No. 14, 1979), pp. 20-30.
139. "International Review," *Pravda*, August 12, 1979.
140. *Ibid.*
141. *Ibid.*
142. "Does NATO Need Euromissiles?," p. 5.
143. "The NATO Missile Frenzy," *New Times* (No. 48, 1979), pp. 4-5; and "Hegemonist Geopolitical Thinking," *New Times* (No. 50, 1979), pp. 18-19.
144. "NATO: Suicidal Risk," *New Times* (No. 52, 1979), p. 7.
145. See, for example, "International Review," *Pravda*, February 8, 1976; April 4, 1976; May 30, 1976; and August 26, 1979.
146. "CIA Subversion in Angola," *New Times* (No. 3, 1976), pp. 10-11; "The Battle for Angola," *New Times* (No. 6, 1976), pp. 8-9; "Imperialism Against Africa," *New Times* (No. 28, 1978), pp. 18-30; "Neo-Colonial Strategem in Africa," *New Times* (No. 35, 1978), pp. 18-19; and "International Review," *Pravda*, August 26, 1979.
147. The coverage during the latter part of 1978 and the early part of 1979 was quite extensive. For selected examples, see "Iran - Deep Crisis," *New Times* (No. 39, 1978), pp. 10-11; "Iran: Crisis Pitch," *New Times* (No. 51, 1978), pp. 10-11; "Iran - At the Crossroads," *New Times* (No. 2, 1979), pp. 8-9; and "Iran - The People's Wrath," *New Times* (No. 6, 1979), pp. 12-13.
148. "Imperialist Design in the Horn of Africa," *New Times* (No. 7, 1978), pp. 4-5.
149. This was not a new theme, as noted in our prior analysis. However, the scope of the attack against the CIA appears to have intensified during the 1976-1979 period.
150. "On the Trail of a President's Killers," *New Times* (No. 2, 1977), pp. 26-30.
151. *Ibid.*
152. "On the Trail of a President's Killers," *New Times* (No. 3, 1977), p. 30.
153. "Largely Silhouettes," *New Times* (Nos. 43, 46, and 50, 1979).
154. *Ibid.* (No. 43, 1979), p. 26.
155. *Ibid.*
156. *Ibid.*

CHAPTER IV

SOVIET COVERT POLITICAL TECHNIQUES, 1960-1980

This chapter examines the Soviet use of covert (i.e., secret) political techniques to promote and enhance the effectiveness of Moscow's overt propaganda. It will be shown that despite the emphasis on detente, movement toward an arms control agreement, and the presence of other "signs" of relaxation in East-West relations in the latter half of the 1970s, the Soviets continued to expand covert political activities directed against the United States and NATO.

As with overt propaganda, the purpose of secret political action is to persuade, manipulate, mislead, and deceive, and a close relationship exists between the two. The overt propaganda themes directed against the United States and NATO, described earlier, also were advanced through covert channels. Both overt and covert active measures are directly associated with Soviet foreign policy objectives.

Three specific Soviet covert techniques will be described in this chapter. While Soviet leaders engage in a variety of secret operations, here the focus is on international front organizations, agent-of-influence operations, and forgeries.

INTERNATIONAL FRONT ORGANIZATIONS

In an earlier chapter, political warfare was defined as the use of both overt and covert measures, including diplomacy and negotiations, to influence politics and events in foreign countries. The activities undertaken by Soviet-directed international front organizations fall somewhat toward the center of the overt-covert continuum of Soviet political actions. On the one hand, the

International Department (ID) of the CPSU's Central Committee coordinates the activities of these organizations. On the other hand, the fronts actively attempt to maintain an image of independence.

The origins of the post-World War II Soviet international front organizations can be traced to the 1920s, when the Communist International (Comintern) organized the first international fronts. Leading Comintern officials assigned an important role to these organizations, which were to function — in effect — as tools of Soviet foreign policy. This was described in the early 1920s by Willi Munzenberg, the Comintern expert on organizing international fronts (which he termed "Innocents Clubs"). In the view of Munzenberg:¹

We must penetrate every conceivable milieu, get hold of artists and professors, make use of theatres and cinemas, and spread abroad the doctrine that Russia is prepared to sacrifice everything to keep the world at peace.

In 1922, Karl Radek — a central figure in the Comintern's Executive Committee — spelled out the role which international fronts should play in the early foreign policy of the Soviet state. According to Radek, these organizations were to be employed against Soviet enemies "when we are lacking the necessary strength."² In other words, fronts were to serve as an indirect means of conducting an offensive foreign policy against much stronger opponents of the newly established Communist regime. In 1935, Comintern official Otto Kuusinen was more explicit: "We want to attack our class enemies in the rear. . . . But how can we do so if the majority of the working class youth follow not us, but, for instance, the Catholic priests or the liberal chameleons." The answer, according to Kuusinen, was "to create a united youth front."³

This commentary by leading officials of the Comintern provides an outline of the initial tasks assigned to front organizations: i.e., these bodies were to employ propaganda and undertake other political measures to promote Soviet foreign policy objectives within the borders of other nations. Judging from the activities of Soviet international fronts during the post-World War II period, it appears that Moscow continues to view these organizations as useful tools for the conduct of political warfare.

Following the conclusion of World War II, responsibility for directing and coordinating the front organizations was assigned to the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform).⁴ At its third meeting, in November 1949, the Cominform undertook an initiative leading to a "peace" campaign involving the new post-war fronts. (It should be noted that the initiation of this "peace" effort coincided with the first Soviet atomic test. Hence, at the precise time the Soviets embarked on a campaign to promote the disarmament of the West, they also were engaged in a buildup of their own nuclear forces that continues today.) The essential elements of this thrust were set forth in a report entitled "Defense of Peace and the Fight Against the Warmongers" by Mikhail Suslov, Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU (and later, until his death, a member of the Politburo).

Asserted Suslov in his report: "For the first time in history an organized peace front has arisen, which has made its aim to save mankind from another world war, to isolate the warmonger clique, and to ensure peaceful cooperation among nations."⁵ He went on to explain that "the peace movement arose as a protest movement of the masses against the Marshall plan and the aggressive Western union and the North Atlantic alliance."⁶ Suslov concluded by observing that "of great significance to the development of the peace movement" are the "Wroclaw Congress of Intellectuals for Peace . . . and especially the World Peace Congress in Paris and Prague . . . at which 600 million organizers for peace were represented."⁷

It was during this latter Congress, which met in April 1949, that the World Peace Council (WPC) was formed. Since its establishment, the WPC has been among the most important and active of the Soviet-directed front organizations. On foreign policy matters, the other fronts appear to follow the lead of the WPC. These organizations include the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY), the International Union of Students (IUS), the Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF), the Christian Peace Conference (CPC), and several other less active and less broadly-based groups.

The WPC has played a significant role in Soviet efforts to influence political developments in the West over the past thirty years. It is one of the instruments used by the Soviets to rein-

force their overt propaganda campaigns. This chapter includes an examination of the activities of the WPC and its interaction with other fronts. Before the major WPC propaganda campaigns are discussed, however, Soviet methods of controlling the WPC will be described. Similar methods apparently are used to control other international fronts.⁸

The Soviet Union and the World Peace Council

Moscow has adopted a low profile in its relations with international fronts. In the years immediately following World War II, the fronts were based in Western Europe. When they were "asked to leave" by Western governments, the fronts moved to neutral countries and to Eastern Europe. Moscow has not sought to have Soviet citizens installed as the presidents and chief administrative officers of these ostensibly non-governmental organizations. Nevertheless, several methods are employed to ensure that the CPSU retains control of the fronts — even though periodically (e.g., after the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968) constituent elements are not always as responsive as Moscow might wish.

Moscow exerts its influence in large part by controlling the leaders of both the WPC and its national affiliates. The Presidency, the Secretariat, and the Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council all are dominated by individuals sympathetic — if not completely loyal — to the CPSU. The overwhelming majority of persons in these WPC executive bodies are officials or nationals from the following types of countries and international organizations: the USSR and the East European bloc countries; Communist countries which are outside the Eastern bloc but loyal to Moscow; Soviet-backed guerrilla movements; non-ruling Communist parties in developed and developing countries that are linked to the CPSU International Department; and other Soviet-controlled international front organizations. Despite occasional difficulties, these officials almost always allow Moscow to have its own way.

The case of Romesh Chandra, the President of the WPC, is a good example. Chandra has been a member of the WPC's Presidential Committee since 1953. He is a long-standing member of the National Committee of the Communist Party of India,

one of the foreign Communist parties most loyal to Moscow over the years.⁹ For over a quarter of a century, Chandra consistently has promoted Moscow's foreign policy objectives. An article on the recent activities of the WPC which appeared in the ID journal *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (known in its English-language edition as *World Marxist Review*), is illustrative of Chandra's general posture. According to Chandra:¹⁰

The activities of the World Peace Council have acquired a new content: 700 million signatures were collected to the WPC's new Stockholm Appeal to Halt the Arms Race and handed over to UN Secretary-General Dr. Kurt Waldheim on the occasion of the Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament in May 1978. In Europe, the struggle to curb the arms race has become a mass demonstration against the deployment of new US missiles; in North and Latin America, in Asia and Africa it has developed into mass action against the arms build-up, against the military bases and stepped up tensions in the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf, and the Caribbean.

While in Chandra's view these Western defense measures were portrayed as seriously threatening world peace, by contrast the Soviet military buildup was described as contributing to the peace process. "The Soviet Union's military policy," Chandra stated, "fully corresponds to these goals. It is of a purely defensive character."¹¹

In addition to Chandra's position as President, the WPC Secretariat and Presidential Committee also are staffed largely by loyal supporters of the Soviet Union, who predominate in each of these bodies.¹² Selected every three years at an international congress of the WPC, the Presidential Committee is the organization's leading executive body. In the late 1970s, the Presidential Committee included 23 Vice Presidents, and representatives from over 100 national peace committees and national and international organizations and movements.

Of the 23 Vice Presidents, three were officials from the USSR, Poland, and East Germany. Three others — from Cuba, Vietnam, and Angola — represented Communist governments loyal to Moscow. Members of two other Soviet front organizations — the WFTU and the WIDF — held Vice Presidential positions. The African National Congress (ANC) of South Africa and the

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), both Soviet-backed guerrilla movements, were represented. Four Vice Presidential positions were held by the non-ruling Communist parties of the United States, France, Argentina, and Italy. Other Vice Presidents included representatives from national-level WPC affiliates in Lebanon, Egypt, and Iraq. As will be discussed below, the leadership of the national affiliates generally (but not always) is dominated by local Communist party members loyal to Moscow. The composition of the remainder of the Presidential Committee followed the same pattern. Included were three functionaries from the USSR, seventeen from the East European bloc, and six from Communist governments aligned with Moscow (two from South Yemen, and one each from Vietnam, Cuba, North Korea, and Mongolia). Five other members of the Committee were drawn from other international fronts (the CPC, the WFDY, the AAPSO, the IUS, and the WIDF), and three represented Soviet-backed guerrilla movements (the ANC, the Southwest African People's Organization [SWAPO], and the Zimbabwe Patriotic Front). Thirteen members came from non-ruling Communist parties connected with the ID, and three represented the generally pro-Soviet governments of Ethiopia, Syria, and Libya. Twenty national-level WPC affiliates also were represented.

The daily business of the WPC is conducted by its twenty-member Secretariat, headed by Chandra. During the latter half of the 1970s, key members of the Secretariat included functionaries from the USSR, Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Cuba.¹³

The Soviets appear to employ similar procedures to maintain influence over the national affiliates of the WPC. These national affiliates serve Soviet interests domestically, within their respective states, and support Moscow's positions abroad through attendance at international meetings.

A case in point is the US Peace Council (USPC), founded in 1979. Prior to the formation of this organization, various peace groups associated with the Communist Party of the USA (CPUSA) served as the American affiliate of the WPC. Throughout its history, the CPUSA has been one of the most loyal, pro-Soviet Communist parties in the world. Its leadership receives Soviet directives and funding on a regular basis.¹⁴ Since the late 1970s, the CPUSA has placed high priority on the issues

of arms control, disarmament, and the peace movement. Although operating with only a small membership, the organization has initiated letter-writing campaigns, sponsored and participated in demonstrations and rallies, formed coalitions with other organizations, and sponsored seminars and workshops to promote the Soviet position on disarmament and peace and to mobilize the American peace movement.

According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), during 1979 the CPUSA established a US chapter of the WPC.¹⁵ This apparently was one component of Moscow's increasing effort to exploit such popular causes as peace and disarmament in the United States. At its founding convention in November 1979, the USPC became an affiliate of the WPC, and the key leadership positions were given to CPUSA members.¹⁶ For instance, the Executive Director of the USPC, elected at the convention, is Michael Myerson. In 1982, the *Party Organizer* — an internal bulletin published by the CPUSA for Party members — identified Myerson as a member of the National Council of the CPUSA.¹⁷

WPC-related activities in the United States increased noticeably in the late 1970s. According to the FBI, "utilizing various symposia, conferences, demonstrations, and publications, the USPC persistently lobbied for the halt of American nuclear weapons production and deployment, particularly intermediate-range nuclear forces in Western Europe."¹⁸ These observations are borne out by a brief examination of USPC activities since 1979.

Both the USPC and the CPUSA have been actively involved in the nuclear freeze campaign in the United States. They were among the organizers of the campaign's first national strategy conference, held in Washington, DC in March 1981. Among those participating in this initial meeting were Oleg Bogdanov and Yuri Kapralov. Bogdanov, who usually resides in Moscow, is an ID specialist in active measures. Kapralov, also a KGB officer, has participated in a number of nuclear freeze activities in the United States.¹⁹

Since this initial strategy session, the USPC has taken part in a number of meetings and conferences, at which specific actions have been planned by various peace and disarmament groups. Thus far, the most important effort involved preparations for demonstrations to be held during the UN Special Session on

Disarmament in June 1982. According to the FBI, "nearly every instrument of Soviet active measures was directed toward infiltrating and influencing the June 12 Committee, the organization formed to plan and coordinate demonstrations" during the Special Session.²⁰ The USPC was especially active. One of its leaders, CPUSA official Sandra Pollock, served on the June 12 executive committee.

According to one public account, in addition to Pollock, "four other seats were held by Communists or fellow travelers who officially represented their unions but were backed for admission by the USPC." Furthermore, according to this account, the CPUSA and the USPC lobbied hard at executive committee sessions "to tone down the official rally call so that it was not equally addressed to the United States and the Soviet Union."²¹ A compromise apparently was reached in the executive committee to focus primarily on American responsibility for the arms race. This was reflected in the official position put forth by the committee prior to the demonstration:²²

The demonstration addresses all governments which have developed nuclear arms and which compete in the international arms race, but its primary focus is on the United States government. Possessing more nuclear bombs than all other countries combined and leading the technological, first-strike weapons race, the US government is the least willing to stop its nuclear insanity.

Beyond their involvement in the planning process, the WPC, the USPC, and the CPUSA also were actively involved in the actual June 12 demonstration and other events connected with the UN Special Session on Disarmament. From the registration list of non-governmental organizations at the Special Session, ten other Soviet-sponsored international fronts can be identified as participants. These include the AAPSO, the CPC, the IADL, the IOJ, the IUS, the WIDF, the WFDY, the WFTU, the IIP, and the World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW).²³

Since 1980, the USPC also has sponsored and planned visits to the United States for high-level WPC delegations. These groups have toured major American cities, addressing sizeable meetings of academics, students, women, and peace activists. The delegations have stressed the themes of peace, disarmament, and American responsibility for the arms race, and have urged those

they addressed to initiate letter-writing campaigns, rallies, and demonstrations.

In addition to providing direction and leadership personnel for the USPC, the CPUSA has been involved in establishing state and local peace committees. In 1980, for example, the Wisconsin Communist Party was instrumental in establishing a Peace Commission which organized local participation and support for USPC activities.²⁴ Among other objectives, local USPC affiliates seek to mobilize religious leaders, educators, and other public figures to endorse the nuclear freeze.

The WPC maintains ties with national peace committees (of which the USPC is just one example) in more than 130 nations throughout the world.²⁵ Through local Communist parties, Moscow not only seeks to control and utilize the national Peace Councils, but also to use the latter to control the international organization. When American Communist and WPC leader Myerson travels abroad to WPC meetings, for example, he usually does not deviate from Soviet policy.

Another method utilized by the CPSU to control the WPC, and many of its affiliates, is financial. Moscow provides the bulk of the funds for WPC activities. The available evidence strongly supports this conclusion, although how these arrangements operate is not completely clear.

In spite of the fact that the absence of financial information is used to discredit the organization, the WPC refuses to publish a detailed budget or to explain exactly how it receives its funds. It also refuses to allow any independent audit of its finances. These refusals have been used by the governments of both the United States and Britain to establish in the United Nations that the WPC in fact is funded by the Soviet Union. Indeed, in 1981 the organization was forced to withdraw its application for upgraded non-governmental classification with the Economic and Social Council of the UN (ECOSOC) when Western governments effectively maintained that WPC funds almost certainly were derived from the Soviet government.

The US government has gone even further, releasing its own calculations on WPC expenditures and revenue sources. Both the CIA and former Soviet bloc intelligence officers have maintained that the WPC is funded almost completely by Moscow. In 1980, the CIA calculated that the Soviets were spending \$63

million annually in support of thirteen major fronts. The WPC — with a full-time staff of 45 and an annual budget of approximately \$30 to \$40 million — reportedly absorbed the lion's share of this expenditure.²⁶

These general conclusions also are supported by Ruth Tosek, a former interpreter for several international fronts. In 1980, she wrote that based on her experience, "all funds of these organizations, in local and hard currency, are provided above all by the Soviet Union, but also by other East European satellite countries on the basis of set contribution rates, paid by the governments of these countries through various channels."²⁷

The evidence, of course, is not conclusive. It does indicate strongly, however, that Moscow and fraternal bloc Communist parties provide the major — if not the total — funding for the WPC.

Just how the Kremlin coordinates personnel and funding to turn the WPC in desired directions also is not clear. However, the major vehicles appear to be the International Department of the CPSU and the KGB. These functions apparently are carried out through: (a) ID personnel who are official WPC leaders (e.g., Deputy ID Chief V. Shaposhnikov) or ID personnel who coordinate front activities without official WPC roles (e.g., Y. F. Kharmalov), as well as Soviet personnel in the WPC Secretariat itself (e.g., I. Belyayev); and (b) ID coordination of the selection and financing of national Communist party leaders who support Soviet positions. The KGB assists by secretly financing and coordinating both national Communist parties and the WPC.²⁸

The WPC and the other international fronts have supported, almost unswervingly, Soviet public policy. From their origins in the 1940s through the early 1980s, these organizations almost never have deviated from the official Soviet line.

Early WPC Propaganda Campaigns

A principal purpose of the post-World War II Soviet-sponsored peace and disarmament movement has been opposition to American policy and the North Atlantic alliance. Soviet leaders have made this point repeatedly. Suslov, for example, maintained in 1949 that "the North Atlantic alliance of imperialists under the aegis of the USA represents a threat to all progressive

mankind."²⁹ Turning next to the question of means, Suslov noted that:³⁰

particular attention must be given to bringing into the peace movement trade unions and women's, youth, cooperative, sports, cultural and educational, religious, and other organizations as well as scientists, writers, journalists, cultural workers, members of parliament and other political and public men and women who come forward in defense of peace and against war.

Promotion of the "Stockholm Peace Pledge" was the first major campaign mounted by the WPC. Released in March 1950 by the WPC, the pledge stated:³¹

We demand the absolute banning of the atom weapon, arm of terror and mass extermination of populations. . . . We consider that any government which would be first to use the atom weapon against any country would be committing a crime against humanity and should be dealt with as a war criminal. . . . We call on all men of good will throughout the world to sign this appeal.

In November 1950, leaders at the Second Congress of the WPC, held in Warsaw, claimed that 500 million people had signed the Stockholm Pledge.³² The targets against which this effort was directed were the United States and NATO. Throughout the 1950s and the 1960s, the decades during which the United States held a nuclear advantage, "ban the bomb" — i.e., disarmament — was a central theme of Soviet propaganda.

Once the WPC peace and disarmament campaign was underway, other Soviet international fronts followed the lead of this group and organized similar propaganda efforts. During the 1960-1980 period, as will be demonstrated below, coordination of the propaganda themes and the political activities mounted by the WPC and other Soviet front organizations consistently occurred. During the early period of the peace and disarmament movement, the WFDY actively participated in the "Ban the Bomb" signature campaign. According to the July 1950 issue of the WFDY magazine, *World Youth*: "In the Soviet Union, the bulwark of peace, the Stockholm appeal is warmly supported by all the peoples, and millions upon millions of signatures have already been collected."³³ The apparently close association between the WFDY and the Soviet Union was described by Nikolai Mikhailov, a Soviet participant in WFDY activities:³⁴

It was not only the Komsomol [Young Communist League of the USSR] that helped the Soviet activists to organize the World Federation of Democratic Youth. We also got valuable assistance from the Party Central Committee: we were shown a correct approach to the problems of the youth movement. . . .

In addition to the involvement of the WFDY, the Communist-led trade unions organized by the WFTU also participated in the early peace and disarmament movement. According to Suslov:³⁵

The trade union centers affiliated with the WFTU are playing a big part in organizing the supporters of peace. They are the initiators of the national peace movements in many countries and of national peace committees. The trade unions have taken a leading part in the organization of protest strikes and demonstrations against the aggressive North Atlantic treaty, and in organizing nationwide petitions and other mass measures in defense of peace and the national independence and liberty of peoples.

Suslov also assigned a role to local Communist parties in this initial peace campaign, directing the "Communist and Workers Parties to head the fight for peace of all the mass public associations, and to lend it a purposeful and effective character."³⁶

With North Korea's initiation of the Korean War on June 25, 1950, the WPC (along with the other Soviet overt propaganda and covert channels) shifted its focus. From 1950 to 1953, the WPC concentrated on the issue of Korea. One of the major themes utilized by the Communist Chinese and the North Koreans during the war was the charge that the United States was waging germ warfare in Korea. This accusation was made, for example, in a telegram sent on February 25, 1952 by the People's Republic of China to Professor Frederic Joliot-Curie, President of the World Peace Council.³⁷ Joliot-Curie, a member of the French Communist Party, then organized a worldwide protest campaign, and sent telegrams to American officials censuring the use of germ warfare.

Further, on April 1, 1952, a meeting of the Bureau of the WPC (a WPC executive body) held in Oslo, Norway issued a protest against American use of bacteriological warfare.³⁸ On May 17, 1952, Dr. Heinrich Brandweiner, President of the Austrian Peace Council (an affiliate of the WPC), released material at a meeting held in Graz, Austria, purporting to prove the involvement of

the United States in germ warfare. This material then was published in pamphlet form by the Austrian Peace Council in June 1952. Much of the "evidence" contained therein consisted of claims made by the Chinese and Korean Communists, and "confessions" from American prisoners-of-war in Communist custody.

Assisting the WPC in the dissemination of the germ warfare charges were the WFDY and the IUS. A 1952 issue of the IUS magazine *World Student News* carried as a supplement the report of a "scientific commission" organized by the WPC to promote these allegations.³⁹ In the publication *World Youth*, the WFDY accused the United States of using science "to wage bacteriological warfare in Korea." The WFDY statement continued: "Their manner of waging war now consists of spreading insects infected with the bacilli of plague, cholera, typhoid, and other diseases among children, women, and the whole civilian population."⁴⁰

With the end of the Korean War, the WPC and the other Soviet front organizations turned their attention once again to the Western alliance. All the major instruments of Soviet foreign propaganda and political influence now were refocused on efforts designed to serve Moscow's major objective of splitting the United States and its NATO allies. In this connection, the activities of the WFTU were closely coordinated with those of the WPC. In 1961, the WFTU General Secretary declared to the Fifth WFTU Congress (held in Moscow) that active opposition to the United States and NATO constituted one of the organization's central responsibilities. He stated:⁴¹

It is essential to rouse the masses of the workers and peoples in all countries to act in unison against the policy of strength and the aggressive plans of the imperialists so as to avert the danger of war.

This explains why trade union organizations must use every opportunity to explain the origin of this danger and condemn the aggressive strategy being conducted by American imperialism against the socialist camp.

This strategy is carried out by the setting up of an ever-larger number of imperialist military bases and the activities of imperialist military blocs organized under the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) and the South East Asia [Treaty Organization] (SEATO), and the Middle East [Treaty Organization] (CENTO). These blocs are directed in the first place against the Soviet Union and the socialist countries, and against the national liberation movements and the independence of the people.

During the decade of the 1960s, the WPC continued to concentrate on opposition to all programs and policies of the United States and NATO. This focus has been authoritatively expressed by Chandra, President of the World Peace Council. Reflecting back on the decade, Chandra asserted in 1971 that "the greatest threat to peace both in Europe and other regions of the world is the US-dominated NATO alliance: Europe is divided into two military blocs." However, he continued, "the fangs of NATO can be felt in Asia and Africa as well . . . the forces of imperialism and exploitation, particularly NATO . . . bear the responsibility for the hunger and poverty of hundreds of millions all over the world."⁴²

The other Soviet front organizations followed the position set forth by the WPC. This is borne out, for example, by an examination of the final resolution on the United States and NATO issued by the Eighth Congress of the IUS in 1964. The resolution "requests the governments of the United States, Great Britain, and France immediately to proceed to liquidate their overseas military bases and to recall all troops stationed abroad," and "invites the national unions [that belong to the IUS] to voice their protest against the maintenance of overseas military bases and to manifest their full solidarity with the peoples fighting for the elimination of these bases."⁴³ (The resolution, it should be noted, fails to mention the presence of Soviet troops or bases in East Europe or elsewhere.) The statement concludes by asserting that "the main enemy of humanity and peace is imperialism, headed by the United States."⁴⁴ Materials published by the WFDY, the WFTU, and other fronts during this period reveal that these organizations also adhered to this stance.⁴⁵

The consistency during the 1960s between the propaganda line articulated by the WPC and other front groups, on the one hand, and Soviet overt propaganda, on the other, is readily apparent. In both cases, the Western alliance was characterized as an aggressive military bloc and the major threat to peace, while the forces and activities of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies were presented as a purely defensive effort.

The Vietnam War — A Major WPC Campaign

During the latter half of the 1960s and the early 1970s, the World Peace Council concentrated increasingly on the issue of

US involvement in Vietnam (as did Soviet overt propaganda). In 1971 Chandra outlined the work being done "against the US war in Indochina" by West European organizations affiliated with the WPC, and explained how these organizations combine the Vietnam issue with matters directly related to West European security. Chandra pointed out:⁴⁶

These movements are linking their struggle more and more with the problems of their own people, above all with the problems of European security of the ending of aggressive imperialist pacts and bases which affect the economies of their countries and the well-being of their peoples.

As part of its campaign against the United States and in support of North Vietnam, the WPC organized "The Stockholm Conference on Vietnam." Between 1967 and 1972, the Stockholm Conference met on an annual basis. Furthermore, it established working committees to conduct activities during the periods between conference meetings. The objective was to establish an organizational mechanism in Western Europe that could conduct active measures against US policy in Vietnam until the war ended. The meetings of this group generally were attended by representatives of the major Soviet international fronts. At the May 1969 meeting, for example, the World Peace Council was represented by a delegation of six, including Chandra. Members of the WFDY, the IUS, the WFTU, the IADL, and the CPC also were in attendance.

The program of action ordered at this gathering called for "an extension of activity against United States products such as petrol, firms providing goods, arms or services for the war in Vietnam such as Pan Am, and against other non-American firms supplying and feeding the war." Also recommended was "activity to isolate and subject to continuing protest and criticism representatives of the US government." In addition, it was decided, assistance should be given to "Americans abroad in refusing the draft, in defecting from the US armed forces, for carrying on propaganda within the army and for militant action against the Selective Service System." Such assistance might include "pressure for full political rights and security for defectors and draft resisters in various countries and an appeal to all countries to give political asylum to those who refuse to fight in Vietnam."⁴⁷

The World Peace Council provided guidance and support for the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam. Information Letter #2 of the Stockholm Conference, dated May 7, 1970, reported that the WPC Presidential Committee had unanimously adopted the following resolution the previous day at its meeting in Moscow.⁴⁸

The latest developments in respect to Indochina make it more imperative than ever before to stop the war of aggression waged by the United States. All organizations, all peoples of the world, who stand for peace, freedom and independence must unite in their effort to demand that the United States stop the war in Vietnam and the whole of Indochina.

In the Letter, it also was declared that:⁴⁹

The Presidential Committee of the World Peace Council strongly supports the decision for a worldwide mass campaign in favor of the Vietnam Appeal issued by the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, in combination with the "OUTNOW" project initiated by the US anti-war movement.

Further, the WPC Presidential Committee noted, "there are immense possibilities in a campaign like this . . . you have the opportunity to develop a campaign on an unprecedented scale."⁵⁰ A World Conference on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia organized by the Stockholm Conference was held on November 28-30, 1970. As at earlier meetings, most of the international Communist front organizations were represented. Chandra headed the WPC delegation. The Soviet Union also sent a delegation from the "Soviet Peace Fund."

Other components of the WPC campaign against the American involvement in Vietnam could be cited. The examples presented above, however, appear to be representative of the way in which the propaganda and political action campaign of the WPC was correlated closely with the overall Soviet program of overt and covert measures during this period. With the end of the Vietnam War, the fronts again shifted their main focus to NATO. Beginning in the mid-1970s, WPC activities concentrated first on the neutron weapon, and then on the modernization of NATO's nuclear forces.

The WPC Campaign Against the Neutron Weapon

Beginning in 1977, WPC propaganda was directed against the deployment by the United States of neutron warheads in Europe. As was described previously, a major campaign of overt propaganda against the neutron weapon also was carried out by Moscow during 1977 and 1978. (Evidently the great concern shown by the Kremlin leadership derived from the effect that deployment of this specific weapon would have on Warsaw Pact forces in the event of a war on NATO territory.) An examination of the materials used by the WPC in its anti-neutron weapon programs during these years reveals a close resemblance to the approach utilized by Moscow.

During September 1977, for example, the WPC published a pamphlet entitled "Neutron Bombs No!" In the introduction to the pamphlet, written by Chandra, it was argued:⁵¹

The worldwide campaign launched by the World Peace Council in August 1977 for the prohibition of the neutron bomb is the most powerful mass movement of recent times against weapons of mass destruction and for the ending of the arms race. The call of the World Peace Council has been supported actively by numerous international and national organizations representing literally tens of millions of people in all countries.

Chandra further observed that "in the NATO countries the protest movement has grown," and went on to assert:⁵²

in each country actions are especially directed towards demanding that the government concerned declare publicly its opposition to the placing of neutron bombs on its territory and demands that President Carter abandon his perilous policy of stepping up the arms race.

In a World Peace Council Appeal carried in the same pamphlet, the WPC further developed the arguments against deployment of the neutron weapon by labelling the armament a "dirty" weapon being cynically presented as a so-called 'clean' bomb by the United States administration."⁵³ The Appeal called for "worldwide actions during the fortnight from October 1-15 *Against the Neutron Bomb and All Other Weapons of Mass*

Destruction" (original emphasis), to be carried out by "all national peace committees, peace forces, political parties, and other national, regional, and international movements."⁵⁴ The pamphlet also contained statements against the neutron weapon from the WFTU, the CPC, the WIDF, the IUS, and the WFDY.

During 1978, a series of meetings, demonstrations, rallies, and other activities in opposition to the neutron weapon was organized by the WPC in Europe and the United States. From January 25 through January 28, for example, a meeting of the Bureau of the World Peace Council "dedicated to the review of the campaign to 'Ban the Neutron Bomb'" was held in Washington, DC.⁵⁵

On May 22, 1978, the World Peace Council took advantage of the Special Session on Disarmament of the UN General Assembly to present to Secretary General Waldheim what WPC leaders claimed were 700 million signatures in support of disarmament. In an accompanying statement, the WPC strongly criticized the American development of the neutron weapon and the stationing of cruise missiles in Western Europe.⁵⁶

Additionally, on June 3-4, 1978, a meeting of world parliamentarians in New York City organized by the WPC proclaimed support for the Special UN Session. A statement produced by this conference "declared that the production of the neutron bomb accelerates, in a tragic fashion, the arms race," and claimed that "this meeting appeals to parliamentarians and all other elected representatives of the people to reject the fabrication and deployment of the neutron bomb."⁵⁷

To coincide with these activities, the WPC newsletter *Peace Courier* carried numerous reports on the growing protest against the neutron weapon. Material presented in this newsletter closely paralleled reports found in such instruments of Soviet propaganda as *New Times*, *Pravda*, and Radio Moscow. A collection of articles from the *Peace Courier* then apparently was translated and reprinted for use in agitating against the neutron weapon in West Germany. A careful examination of the documentation is required before it becomes apparent that most of the material in this collection originated from international front sources.⁵⁸

Although the West German government had agreed to deploy neutron warheads, President Carter decided in April 1978 to

cancel deployment. With this decision, the WPC campaign against the weapon came to an immediate halt. When President Reagan took office in January 1981, however, the possibility of deployment reemerged. In early August 1981, articles began appearing in the American press stating that President Reagan had decided to continue development and production of the weapon. Channels of overt propaganda also chimed in. Almost immediately the charges and slogans which had characterized the 1977 campaign began to reappear. An August 11, 1981 article in *Radio Liberty* charged:⁵⁹

the horrendous decision to produce the neutron weapon is the latest step in the present US administration's adventuristic policy for the neutron bomb is one of the most refined and barbaric means of mass destruction. It is a weapon which produces an exceptionally high level of radiation, directed not against military targets or hardware but against human beings.

On August 13, 1981, TASS political observer Gennady Sidorov (in a TASS English-language transmission) asserted that "the leading circles of the United States are in the grips of dangerous insanity. This is the only way to assess President Reagan's position on the production of neutron weapons and the motivation which he is guided." Shishkin also referred to the decision to develop the neutron weapon as "a cannibalistic philosophy." The "cannibal" slogan was repeated the next day by Soviet nationalist Oleg Anichkin over Radio Moscow's Domestic Service. Anichkin charged:⁶¹

This form of weapon is intended purely for killing persons, i.e., for killing both civilians and military since it has only a radiation effect. This is why these weapons are so monstrously cannibal-like. Houses, various structures, military equipment remain unscathed. Only people will be killed. They will die at once or slowly and very agonizingly.

Similarly, the international front organizations immediately undertook a replay of the charges they had utilized during the 1977-1978 campaign. For example, as reported in the WFTU in August 1981 "sharply condemned the cynicism of the US President Reagan . . . as an act of hostility

Destruction" (original emphasis), to be carried out by "all national peace committees, peace forces, political parties, and other national, regional, and international movements."⁵⁴ The pamphlet also contained statements against the neutron weapon from the WFTU, the CPC, the WIDF, the IUS, and the WFDY.

During 1978, a series of meetings, demonstrations, rallies, and other activities in opposition to the neutron weapon was organized by the WPC in Europe and the United States. From January 25 through January 28, for example, a meeting of the Bureau of the World Peace Council "dedicated to the review of the campaign to 'Ban the Neutron Bomb'" was held in Washington, DC.⁵⁵

On May 22, 1978, the World Peace Council took advantage of the Special Session on Disarmament of the UN General Assembly to present to Secretary General Waldheim what WPC leaders claimed were 700 million signatures in support of disarmament. In an accompanying statement, the WPC strongly criticized the American development of the neutron weapon and the stationing of cruise missiles in Western Europe.⁵⁶

Additionally, on June 3-4, 1978, a meeting of world parliamentarians in New York City organized by the WPC proclaimed support for the Special UN Session. A statement produced by this conference "declared that the production of the neutron bomb accelerates, in a tragic fashion, the arms race," and claimed that "this meeting appeals to parliamentarians and all other elected representatives of the people to reject the fabrication and deployment of the neutron bomb."⁵⁷

To coincide with these activities, the WPC newsletter *Peace Courier* carried numerous reports on the growing protest against the neutron weapon. Material presented in this newsletter closely paralleled reports found in such instruments of Soviet propaganda as *New Times*, *Pravda*, and Radio Moscow. A collection of articles from the *Peace Courier* then apparently was translated and reprinted for use in agitating against the neutron weapon in West Germany. A careful examination of the documentation is required before it becomes apparent that most of the material in this collection originated from international front sources.⁵⁸

Although the West German government had agreed to deploy neutron warheads, President Carter decided in April 1978 to

cancel deployment. With this decision, the WPC campaign against the weapon came to an immediate halt. When President Reagan took office in January 1981, however, the possibility of deployment reemerged. In early August 1981, articles began appearing in the American press stating that President Reagan had decided to continue development and production of the weapon. Soviet channels of overt propaganda also chimed in. Almost immediately the charges and slogans which had characterized the 1977-1978 campaign began to reappear. An August 11, 1981 article in *Pravda* charged:⁵⁹

the horrendous decision to produce the neutron weapon is the latest step in the present US administration's adventurist policies, for the neutron bomb is one of the most refined and barbaric means of mass destruction. It is a weapon which produces an exceptionally high level of radiation, directed not against military targets or hardware but against human beings.

On August 13, 1981, TASS political observer Gennady Shishkin (in a TASS English-language transmission) asserted that "the ruling circles of the United States are in the grips of dangerous insanity. This is the only way to assess President Reagan's decision on the production of neutron weapons and the motives by which he is guided." Shishkin also referred to the decision to develop the neutron weapon as "a cannibalistic philosophy."⁶⁰ The "cannibal" slogan was repeated the next day by Soviet journalist Oleg Anichkin over Radio Moscow's Domestic Service. Anichkin charged:⁶¹

This form of weapon is intended purely for killing personnel, i.e., for killing both civilians and military since it has only a radiation effect. This is why these weapons are so monstrous and cannibal-like. Houses, various structures, military equipment, will remain unscathed. Only people will be killed. They will die either at once or slowly and very agonizingly.

Similarly, the international front organizations almost immediately undertook a replay of the charges they had utilized during the 1977-1978 campaign. For example, as reported in TASS, the WFTU in August 1981 "sharply condemned the cynical decision by US President Reagan . . . as an act of hostility towards

working people. . . . This attempt of the US administration to incite a new round of the arms race comes . . . when the Soviet Union . . . put forward concrete and constructive proposals in the interest of . . . removal of the danger of a world nuclear war."⁶²

The WPC also brought its forces into play in support of the Soviet position. According to the September 1981 issue of the *Peace Courier*:⁶³

The WPC condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the decision by US President Reagan. . . . This action defies overwhelming public opinion. . . . It is the latest step in the US drive for military superiority and thrusts the world even closer to a nuclear catastrophe.

The WPC then instructed its followers to utilize the full range of measures which had been successfully employed during the earlier campaign.

Recent WPC Campaigns Against NATO

In December 1979, in the face of the Soviet nuclear buildup, NATO decided (in response to a specific request from West Germany) to modernize its intermediate-range nuclear forces. Since then, one of Moscow's major international political campaigns has been to foster international opposition to this NATO decision. As in the case of the anti-neutron bomb campaign, the WPC followed the lead established by Soviet overt propaganda.

In the January 28, 1982 issue of *Pravda*, Moscow reviewed the recent achievements of the WPC in the campaign against NATO's INF modernization, and congratulated the Council on its efforts. "Representatives of sixty states taking part in the WPC Presidium Bureau session in Copenhagen resolutely expressed their support for the Soviet peace initiatives and appealed for the implementation of the dangerous Pentagon and NATO plans to be prevented," it was reported. *Pravda* also pointed to the success of the WPC in drawing two hundred thousand participants to a demonstration in Lisbon, and another two hundred thousand protesters to a rally in Norway.⁶⁴ The purpose of these demonstrations was to incite public opinion against NATO's plans, and ultimately to prevent INF modernization.

By mid-1980, a number of other Soviet fronts had joined the WPC in active opposition to NATO's decision. The WFTU, for example, organized an International Trade Union Round Table in Sofia, Bulgaria on September 26, 1980, to protest the suggestions set forth by the Carter Administration for improving West European defense capabilities. The meeting was opened by Ibrahim Zakaria, the General Secretary of the WFTU, who stated:⁶⁵

We are meeting at a crucial time for the whole of humanity. The alarming new spiral in the arms race poses extremely important tasks for the trade unionists of the whole world, regardless of their political orientation or international affiliations. We are impelled to work together to find common platforms and move forward in united actions.

Zakaria's commentary closely coincided with that of the Soviet delegate to the conference, who asserted:⁶⁶

the danger of a world nuclear war has become so much more likely that we may say it is virtually knocking at the doors. . . . Under these conditions the trade unions of all countries and, in the first place, those of Europe have to explain to the largest masses of the population the serious danger represented to the cause of peace by those NATO and Carter projects.

The World Federation of Democratic Youth also became actively involved in the campaign against NATO's plans for INF modernization. For example, the WFDY published a collection of documents in 1982 entitled *Youth for Disarmament — Facts, Arguments, Information*. This "fact book" apparently is designed for use in the ongoing debate being conducted in Europe. It is interesting to note that while the WFDY publication characterizes NATO's modernization program as very destabilizing to the European balance, it flatly asserts that "the balance of military power will not be disturbed by the [Soviet] SS-20."⁶⁷ The WFDY "fact book" in many respects parallels a WPC booklet entitled *The Global Military Buildup* (also published in 1982), and hence serves to illustrate how closely the propaganda of the WFDY mirrors that of the WPC.

In addition to promoting the Soviet position concerning West European defense policy, the WPC also provides support for

other Soviet foreign policy objectives. For example, the Soviet Union supports the PLO, and so does the WPC. The PLO in fact is officially represented in the Council, and provided a member to the WPC delegation which met in Geneva with UN Secretary General Waldheim in 1975.⁶⁸ In 1979 the WPC held an international conference to promote solidarity with the Palestinian people, and a central theme of the meeting focused on support for the PLO. As Chandra remarked at the conference:⁶⁹

Our conference not only extends its total and unconditional solidarity with the Palestine Liberation Organization; it also extends full support to the unity of the Arab governments and peoples who oppose the Pax Americana and the treachery which accompanies it and who are carrying forward the great cause of the Palestinian people.

Finally, when Soviet actions become the target of international criticism, the World Peace Conference may take steps to defend Moscow. For example, when the United States in 1980 and 1981 began to charge the Soviet Union with supporting international terrorism, the WPC convened a meeting of the Presidential Committee which met in Havana in April 1981, apparently to counter these accusations. Commenting on the deliberations of this gathering, Havana radio reported:⁷⁰

Within the framework of the WPC presidency meeting being held at Havana's Palace of Conventions, WPC President Romesh Chandra held a press conference during which he stated that the terrorists who place in jeopardy world peace are those who produce arms and promote the arms race, concretely the United States and its NATO allies. Chandra added that the statements by Leonid Brezhnev during the 26th CPSU Congress are sound and translate into the demand by world public opinion favoring peace.

AGENTS OF INFLUENCE

Of the various means employed by Moscow for conducting secret operations in support of foreign policy objectives, the agent of influence may be the most complex and difficult to document. In fact, even skilled counterintelligence officers find it very difficult to follow and unravel orchestrated agent-of-influence opera-

tions. As noted earlier, there are several different types of influence agents, including the unwitting but manipulated individual, the "trusted contact," and the controlled covert agent.

The agent of influence may be a journalist, a government official, a labor leader, an academic, an opinion leader, an artist, or involved in one of a number of other professions. The main objective of an influence operation is the use of the agent's position — be it in government, politics, labor, journalism, or some other field — to support and promote political conditions desired by the sponsoring foreign power.

Moscow utilizes agents of influence as one element of a carefully orchestrated effort. Insiders label this orchestration "*kombinatsia*". This refers to the skill of relating, linking, and combining various agents of influence (at various times and in various places) with special operational undertakings, in such a way as to enhance effectiveness. These actions comprise one more component of the joint overt-covert approach employed by the Kremlin.

The KGB generally is responsible for conducting these activities. The first phase entails the development of strong covert personal relationships with important figures in foreign societies. Once such a relationship has been established, the next step is to secure the active collaboration of the individual on matters of mutual interest. In return, the KGB will provide remunerations tailored to meet the specific needs or vulnerabilities of the person involved. In some cases, the form of compensation may simply involve money. However, for the individual who has achieved prominence, the rewards for serving as an agent of influence are more likely to entail assistance in the achievement of political or personal goals.

The Case of Pierre-Charles Pathe

One interesting recent case is that of Pierre-Charles Pathe.⁷¹ Because Pathe was prominent, operated over a long period of time, wrote a great deal, and was caught and tried, it is possible to trace many of his activities. (Interviews also were conducted in France with journalists and former French intelligence officials knowledgeable about Pathe and his 1979 trial and conviction.)

Pathe apparently came to Soviet attention when he wrote an article in 1959 praising the Soviet Union in glowing terms. An

invitation from the Soviet ambassador in Paris then led to a relationship between Pathe and the first of several KGB officers with whom he would collaborate. Although Pathe was asked to provide information on French politics and politicians, his major role was as an agent of influence in the media.

In 1961 Pathe began to publish — with Soviet encouragement — a confidential journal entitled *Center for Scientific, Economic, and Political Information*, and started to receive some financial support from Moscow at that time. In addition to producing his own journal, Pathe also wrote for a variety of other French mass media publications under the pseudonym "Charles Morand."⁷² It appears that the Soviets did not give completed articles to Pathe for publication; rather, he was provided with general instructions and thematic guidelines upon which to base his articles.

This sort of arrangement is not unusual, as will be discussed in the interviews in Chapter V with former Soviet bloc intelligence officers who handled agents such as Pathe. The relationship between a Soviet case officer and an agent of influence apparently is flexible and based on shared interests, especially when the agent is a prominent individual. Particularly in the latter case, the KGB provides general instructions rather than specific orders.

In 1976 Pathe launched a new biweekly newsletter entitled *Synthesis*, for which he received partial funding from the Soviets.⁷³ The newsletter focused on French, European, and international political, economic, military, and scientific issues. At its height, *Synthesis* included among its subscribers 139 Senators, 299 Deputies, 41 journalists, 14 ambassadors, and — interestingly — only 7 private individuals, for a total subscription of 500 in France. Through his newsletter, Pathe hence was reaching 70 percent of the Chamber of Deputies and 47 percent of the Senate. It of course is difficult to assess the degree of influence that *Synthesis* actually achieved.

In 1978 a young member of the French Parliament reported to French counterintelligence officers that he was being courted by a Soviet official, Igor Kuznetsov. The French intelligence community began to conduct surveillance on Kuznetsov. Despite his defensive efforts, eventually Kuznetsov inadvertently led French officials to his clandestine meetings with Pathe. The pair were arrested while passing money and documents. Pathe was publicly tried and convicted of espionage against the state. He admitted

to participation in clandestine meetings with the KGB, receipt of small sums of money for articles written on Moscow's behalf, and provision of political analysis to the Soviets. Pathe was sentenced to five years in prison.

In addition to his journals and the articles he published under a pseudonym, Pathe also had a personal role. According to the French news magazine *Paris Match*, Pathe — while not famous — did come to enjoy a certain reputation among journalists, who appreciated his drive and spirit, his analytical ability and clarity of thought, and his ability to write.⁷⁴ As the son of a French film pioneer, and the brother-in-law of a Minister, a French Ambassador to the United States, and the president of the state-owned Renault automotive firm, he was a Parisian insider. He knew people in public life across the political spectrum from de Gaulle to Mitterand. Furthermore, Pathe was in a favorable position to identify for the KGB journalists and politicians whom he judged recruitable, and he may have provided this assistance.

For almost two decades, Pathe served as a Soviet asset whose journalistic influence was reinforced by his personal contacts with figures in high places. It is important to keep in mind, however, that Soviet political operations involve a number of elements — both overt and covert, official and unofficial — aimed, in combination, at target individuals and groups. Pathe was not alone; rather, he should be regarded as one of a number of forces targeted at French leaders.

Pathe produced both covert propaganda and written disinformation on behalf of the Soviet Union. The Moscow-inspired articles which appeared in French mass media publications seem to fall within the category of covert propaganda. The newsletter *Synthesis* falls into the categories of both covert propaganda and disinformation. The targets of *Synthesis* did not comprise a mass audience, but were composed primarily of French journalists and the French political elite. The publication was selective and discriminating in manner, seeking to subtly mislead this elite audience.

Themes Appearing in *Synthesis*

This section analyzes almost all of the seventy issues of *Synthesis* published during its existence from 1976 to 1979. While

it is difficult to know exactly which items the Soviets promoted, our assessment of *Synthesis* reveals two general categories of propaganda and disinformation: the denigration of, and attacks on, Western interests and policies; and the defense of the USSR and its allies. Pathe's effort apparently was designed to omit from the publication any material which might render the USSR and its friends vulnerable to criticism, to mute that criticism which could not be avoided, and to include material which actively supported or defended the views of the Soviet Union and/or its allies.

Criticism of Western Interests and Policies

The subject matter of *Synthesis* directed against Western interests and policies can be divided into four basic themes. This overall pattern emerges quite clearly, and is very similar to patterns that are found both in the other examples of covert activity described in this chapter and in the content of overt propaganda analyzed earlier in this book. The four anti-Western themes include fostering mistrust among the NATO allies and their friends, denigrating Western weaponry and defense policies, criticizing French policy vis-a-vis American and NATO political and defense arrangements, and expressing distrust of and censuring the United States. (These themes are not presented in rank order according to their relative importance; all may have been equally consequential, and the four were closely integrated and often combined with one another.)

Fostering Western Disunity. Many articles in *Synthesis* were aimed at the creation of friction and distrust among the Western allies, with the underlying objective of weakening NATO. The publication thus fits directly into one of the major international political campaigns carried out by the Kremlin in the post-World War II period.

Pathe concentrated much attention in this regard on West Germany — a neighbor to France, and an obvious target. Suspicions that Nazi war criminals had survived to occupy positions in the West German government were raised. An April 1977 issue charged, for example, that “descendants of Hitler sleep in the Germany of today.”⁷⁵ German measures against terrorism were characterized as repressive, and terrorism itself was portrayed

as a sign of profound social crises in West Germany and as evidence of the excesses of the German character. West Germany was described as a state paralyzed by its complexes and by the presence of East Germany, which was depicted as a starkly contrasting model of order and stability.⁷⁶ Also conjured up were fears of a nuclear Germany, German economic domination, and special German-American ties.⁷⁷

Many of these charges, it is interesting to recall, appeared frequently in the various outlets of Soviet overt propaganda during the 1960s. However, by the late 1970s — as noted in the previous chapter — Moscow was portraying the Federal Republic in very different terms: it now was depicted as one of the principal forces of Western “realism”, and a main proponent of détente. It nevertheless appears that, in the Soviet view, anti-German sentiment continued to run high in France, and Moscow apparently believed that promotion of the Nazi theme remained a useful tool in preventing closer relations between Paris and Bonn.

With respect to employing NATO as a target of direct attack, Pathe and his sponsors seem to have exercised caution, for there appeared only one article in which the continuing utility of and need for NATO was forcefully rejected.⁷⁸ The offensive mounted by *Synthesis* against any closer French relationship with NATO must be regarded, however, as an attack against the latter (see below). Moreover, the epithet — “Atlanticist” — thrown by Pathe at President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing was both anti-NATO and anti-American in intent.⁷⁹ This indirect attack against the Western alliance also was carried out through articles stressing the lack of common interest and solidarity between France and NATO. The Western heads of state who participated in the London Summit of 1977, with the exception of those from the United States and France, were depicted as having renounced any foreign policy of their own.

In a May 1977 article, France was pictured as the particular target of an “underhanded” American economic war, and West Germany was dubbed “the milk cow of American suzerainty.” US deficits in the balance of payments, the article asserted, allow Washington to “suck the substance” of other states. Europe should cease making unnecessary concessions to the United States, *Synthesis* continued, and should deal with Washington on a strictly

give-and-take basis in economic matters. The article concluded by charging that for years the United States has exploited its European allies (West Germany more than the others), and that Europe has served as a US economic protectorate.⁸⁰

A February 1979 issue of the newsletter argued that Britain's special relationship with the United States had brought London no good, and — on the contrary — had benefitted only Washington. Britain's international standing, it was charged, had been reduced to that of a political and financial satellite of the United States. Additionally, the American-Italian plan for cooperation on arms production and sales was described as a poor model to follow, since it was not an agreement between equals.⁸¹

This basic line of criticism never varied in its general parameters, and *Synthesis* carried no articles acknowledging the existence of common interests between France and the United States, or — more broadly — between Europe and the United States. (It goes without saying that no mention was made of a shared interest among these countries in facing the Soviet challenge.) By contrast, as will be demonstrated below, Pathe appeared to exclude or downplay any differences between the West European states, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and its friends, on the other. This point is made here to emphasize a key fact: not only should what actually appears in *Synthesis* often be regarded as a form of disinformation, but also what does not.

Western Arms and Defense Policy. Articles also appeared frequently in *Synthesis* which focused on criticism directed at Western defense policy — a thrust closely associated with the theme of fostering Western disunity. The treatment accorded both of these themes in *Synthesis* paralleled and reflected commentary which appeared in the channels of Soviet overt propaganda, as well as the propaganda efforts and political actions carried out by the WPC and other international front organizations. This apparently close coordination among measures executed through various overt and covert channels is revealing, and serves as an indication of the way in which all means deemed effective are utilized in Moscow's international political campaigns and operations.

Synthesis carried a number of articles raising questions — some fundamental — about the necessity of Western defense policies and new Western armaments. (It should be noted that at no time did a similar treatment of Soviet military developments appear, to put the issue into perspective; rather, as will be demonstrated below, the publisher of the newsletter engaged in a consistent effort to downplay Soviet defense questions.) In the single article devoted exclusively to NATO, for example, Pathe asserted that many French politicians were of the view that NATO no longer served any purpose and should be dissolved.⁸²

Doubts frequently were raised about the willingness of the United States to defend Western Europe, given the risk of a nuclear attack on the American homeland. In a January 1979 issue, Pathe made the argument that American and Soviet leaders would employ nuclear weapons only if their own territories were directly attacked.⁸³ In an article on the French nuclear force, Pathe argued that the key to the credibility of this force resides in the fact that it exists solely for the defense of France itself; hence, he continued, a conventional Soviet attack would risk nuclear war only if it were to extend beyond Germany and penetrate into France.⁸⁴

Other issues contained descriptions of the neutron weapon as an inhumane and useless armament, adding nothing constructive to the existing NATO arsenal. The United States was portrayed as having unleashed a major propaganda effort to convince the West Europeans that the neutron weapon in fact is a conventional weapon, and that the use of the armament would not entail stepping over the nuclear threshold. However, Pathe asserted, even the West Germans — whom the Americans were attempting to reassure with this weapon — now had come to understand its real meaning.⁸⁵ In an article published in March 1978, Pathe expressed surprise at the fact that several NATO countries were enthusiastic about the cruise missile. This missile, he charged, would change none of the conditions in a nuclear war, and did nothing to reinforce the defense of those countries which already had nuclear missiles.⁸⁶

Two factors should be kept in mind during an analysis of the material on Western defense arrangements which appeared in *Synthesis*. First, at no time did Pathe mention the large Soviet missile deployments and other aspects of the significant strengthening

of Soviet military power underway during this period. Second, it should be noted that the withdrawal of France from the military wing of NATO in 1966 constituted a great strategic benefit to the Soviet Union and a serious loss to NATO. The degree to which Soviet active measures played a role in de Gaulle's decision has never been analyzed. What Pathe (an active Soviet agent of influence at the time) and others were writing and saying during the period preceding French military withdrawal from NATO might provide clues to additional Soviet channels of disinformation operating at that time. Understanding Pathe's efforts is facilitated by bearing in mind the strategic results of France's partial disengagement from the Western alliance.

French Relations With the West. A central focus of Pathe's work, through the vehicle of *Synthesis*, concerned the positions taken by France on European defense matters and on Western cohesion and cooperation. *Synthesis* carried a number of articles peppering the administration of President Giscard d'Estaing with attacks and warnings regarding these matters. Emphasis was placed on developments which might, in Pathe's view, weaken the independence of French policies or suggest a move toward rapprochement with the United States and NATO. It should be noted that while serving as a Soviet agent, Pathe actively participated in the Gaullist Movement for the Independence of Europe, which he helped to organize.

Early in the life of the newsletter, articles appeared in *Synthesis* criticizing the French government for alleged subservience to the United States and accusing Giscard d'Estaing of being an "Atlanticist". The French President was scolded for joining others at the London Summit of 1977 in renouncing any foreign policy other than that of the United States. Pathe also made the argument that a Soviet invasion of West Germany would not result in a nuclear war, because the United States would not sacrifice its own cities to nuclear destruction in order to defend the Federal Republic. He further alleged that the belief held by de Gaulle that Western Europe cannot depend on the American nuclear umbrella was becoming more widely accepted.⁸⁷

Another issue of *Synthesis* criticized the intervention of France in Chad, the Sahara, and Zaire as serving no French interests,

but only those of other Western states. It was alleged that the West is interested only in the raw materials of Africa. Readers were instructed that no great issues divide France and the USSR; neither, it was asserted, does any true political rivalry exist between these states, since they are not powers of the same order. Pathe also declared that the extended nuclear deterrence policy of Giscard d'Estaing — which called for the possible use of nuclear weapons in circumstances other than a direct threat to French territory — was not credible to the Soviets, and was designed only to reassure the West Germans.⁸⁸ (This commentary constituted one variation of a theme often utilized by Pathe — i.e., the assertion that a Soviet advance into West Germany would not set off a nuclear war.)

In an April 1979 article, Pathe argued that American cruise missiles would in no way enhance the defense of such countries as France, which already possessed a powerful arsenal of missiles. French industry and the French government, Pathe warned, should stay away from joint arms production agreements with the United States, since such arrangements might serve to weaken a strong and independent French industrial system.⁸⁹

The American Target. Since World War II, Moscow has regarded the United States as its main opponent and the principal obstacle to the achievement of Soviet policy objectives. It therefore is not surprising that an important part of Pathe's work (in conjunction with other overt and covert activities) focused on portraying the United States as the major cause of international instability and the primary threat to world peace. This anti-American thrust has been evident in the themes contained in *Synthesis* already examined in this chapter. Additional articles appeared in the newsletter, however, which treated various events and policies concerning the United States in an even more direct manner, comprising some of the least subtle of Pathe's writings (and presumably reflecting the attitudes of his Soviet sponsors). The principal themes utilized by Pathe in this effort are outlined (not necessarily in the order of their importance) in the paragraphs which follow.

First, Pathe contributed to the major Soviet propaganda campaign directed against the CIA from 1976 to 1979. American intelligence and security services were portrayed in *Synthesis* as hav-

ing no redeeming features. Two of the major objectives of a June 1977 article on the assassination of President Kennedy were (a) to create the impression that ultimate power in the United States lies in the hands of the director of the FBI, and (b) to expound the view that the killing of the President could not have occurred without the knowledge of the FBI head, since the latter wished to have the President out of the way.⁹⁰

In another issue, Pathe charged the American intelligence services with helping the former Iranian Prime Minister escape from Iran, and with attempting to create disorder in Khomeini's Iran. Additionally, Pathe asserted, secret clauses involving the CIA were contained in the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt. Pathe further asserted that one reason why the United States needs a favorable balance of payments is to pay for its intelligence activities abroad.⁹¹ For the most part, *Synthesis* concentrated only on certain alleged US intelligence activities, rather than replaying the unfavorable publicity regarding American intelligence which was generated by investigations in the United States. (This latter material was used in Soviet overt propaganda, as noted in the previous chapter.)

Another subject emphasized by Pathe was American economic policy and the existence of a fundamental conflict of economic interests between the United States and the West European countries. This rivalry was projected by Pathe in various ways. The issue of US restrictions on landing rights for the Concorde in the United States was presented as representative of American efforts to maintain a quasi-monopoly of the airlines industry and to hurt its sales in other countries.⁹² The United States was said to oppose free trade more than any other member of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), and was accused of doing everything possible to keep the Common Market impotent.⁹³ Additionally, Pathe stated categorically, there is no natural need for European trade with the United States. By contrast, he asserted, European and Soviet economic interests are complementary, rather than competitive.

Pathe's targets also included the policies of the United States outside of Europe. Singled out for special emphasis was Latin America; and a number of articles in *Synthesis* were critical of US policies in this region, raising doubts about American motives and purposes. It is worthwhile to note that Pathe in a March 1978

article ignored the question of Cuba's totalitarian form of government and any negative lessons to be derived from the Cuban experiment. Castro's totalitarian rule was accepted as necessary, in part, to destroy the former army and security organizations as a means of forestalling anticipated American attempts to overthrow his government.⁹⁴

In the same article, the rest of Latin America was characterized as being under the influence of the United States, with most government administrations, police forces, and armies totally subordinated to the American "special services." The United States exerts the power of a "colonizer" over the region, it was argued; and the armies of Latin American countries were described as praetorian guards and the true guarantors of American suzerainty. Additionally, a highly critical and polemical account of American intelligence activities in Latin America written by Philip Agee, a former CIA officer, was recommended as an authoritative source on these matters.⁹⁵

With respect to US actions regarding the Middle East, Pathe labelled the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt as a "non-conference."⁹⁶ In an April 1977 article, American policies toward Iran during the rule of the Shah were portrayed as profiting the West, at the expense of the Iranian people; and Iran was described as a country with an "American" king. The language used by Pathe to describe US policy around the globe occasionally was quite strong and even extreme. Pathe claimed, for example, that "the American empire for thirty years was constructed by force and corruption."⁹⁷

American institutions presented an additional target for Pathe, and questions were raised in *Synthesis* about the democratic credentials of the United States. According to a June 1977 issue of the newsletter, the American democracy has evolved into a "police democracy" — though admittedly not one resembling that imposed earlier by the Soviet "NKVD."⁹⁸ (The use of the term "NKVD" may signify reference to the Stalinist era, and an effort to distinguish between that period and the present.)

Inevitably, *Synthesis* carried commentary on America's black racial problem. In another article in this same issue, Pathe reiterated the claim that major organizations in the United States continue to reject any participation by blacks. Killing is an American political method for dealing with the country's black

population, it was charged, and the assassination of President Kennedy was depicted as representing an "essential aspect of American democracy." The article also made derogatory assertions concerning the American press, the White House, the FBI, the Warren Commission, and other aspects of American society.⁹⁹

A September 1976 article claiming that US leaders had shown little concern for human rights in countries "they controlled" for thirty years was used to question the sincerity of the United States in the human rights area. Additionally, the American press was accused of following the official government line regarding other US sins of omission and commission.¹⁰⁰

Defending Soviet Policy and Objectives

The second broad theme evident in *Synthesis* — support for and defense of the policies, practices, and institutions of the Soviet Union and its allies — can be divided into two major categories. The first is active advocacy, as opposed to silence, on subjects of critical importance to the Kremlin. As noted earlier in this chapter, downplaying matters and issues which adversely affect the USSR, or adopting a position of deliberate silence regarding these topics, are techniques frequently employed by Pathe. These practices are not confined to those matters in which the USSR is directly involved. One should note, in this regard, the way in which Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's peace initiative to Israel was handled in *Synthesis*. However, active advocacy signifies a higher degree of issue importance. The second major category encompasses attacks against those persons, groups, and states which compete with the USSR or are considered an ideological threat.

When these two categories are considered, the sponsorship and purposes of *Synthesis* come into clear focus — and the publication is revealed to be more than the product of an eccentric, anti-American Gaullist. The strident tone of some of the articles related to this second broad theme betrays a commitment to a point of view that might raise suspicions regarding their actual authorship, even if one were not aware of Pathe's status as a Soviet agent. This stridency also results in the loss of any subtlety of approach.

Supporting Moscow. *Synthesis* supported and defended the Soviet Union and its friends in a number of articles. In a June 1978 issue, the nuclear threat posed by the USSR was downgraded, and Pathe asserted that Moscow would never use nuclear weapons unless Soviet territory were attacked. Pathe's denial of any rivalry between France and the Soviet Union was noted earlier in this chapter. American fears of Communism in Italy and France are unfounded, Pathe also argued, in light of its record in the trade unions and local governments of these countries. Pathe went on to claim that the Soviet Union interferes only in areas "already destabilized" by others, and becomes involved without sending troops; in other words, he asserted, the USSR does not destabilize.¹⁰¹

In Pathe's view, for example, Soviet and Cuban involvement in Angola came after the interference of the CIA. Additional arguments made by Pathe included assertions that the Western states — and not the Soviets — were in Africa to acquire raw materials; that leaders in Peking deliberately created differences with the USSR as an outlet for internal discontent; that trouble in Yugoslavia would begin only as the result of a Western-supported Croatian independence movement; and that Western colonial criteria were not applicable to Soviet Central Asia.¹⁰²

Pathe defended Moscow in a number of other situations in which Soviet and Western interests clashed. The argument was made that the Soviet Union had never intended to devote resources to a space effort, and that the United States was responsible for the militarization of outer space. Pathe further charged that the Soviet nuclear-powered satellite which fell from space into Canadian territory may have been intercepted by US killer satellites.¹⁰³ It also was claimed that charges of Soviet and East European infiltration of de Gaulle's entourage and of the French intelligence service (the SDECE) were American-inspired.¹⁰⁴ The articles on the satellite and on the charges of infiltration carried the earmarks of an attempt to stem the criticism levelled against the USSR in the aftermath of these events.

Similarly, friends and allies of the Soviet Union were solicitously supported and praised, and their positions were justified, in the pages of *Synthesis*. Pathe defended Vietnam, for example, by arguing that the boat people fleeing Indochina in fact were middle class, and that the ongoing problems in Indochina

stemmed from previous American actions. China's 1979 attack on Vietnam was called unsupportable, and pro-Soviet Vietnam was praised.¹⁰⁵ Another Soviet ally, East Germany, was singled out for special commendation. This contrasted with Pathe's treatment of West Germany. East Germany was described as stable, afflicted with few problems, enjoying economic progress, and in a position to teach Western Europe some lessons. East Germans were said to regard the Berlin Wall as a defense against infiltration "by American imperialists and their satellites in Bonn." Likewise, the repression of Cuba under Castro was depicted as necessary for the defense of that country against American intelligence activities.¹⁰⁶

With respect to events in Cambodia, *Synthesis* undertook a flagrant shift in position to conform with Moscow's line. A September 1977 article expressed reservations about charges then circulating concerning the extent of the horrors taking place under the Pol Pot regime, and raised doubts regarding the accuracy of the enormously high figures estimating how many had been killed. The extreme measures employed by Pol Pot were portrayed as typical of what occurs when an "ancient regime" is replaced. The great population transfers were necessitated, it was argued, by the country's inability to feed its large urban population.¹⁰⁷ By January 1979, the newsletter's line on this subject had altered drastically, reflecting changes in Soviet foreign policy. The Pol Pot regime now was seen as inhuman. The December 1978 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia was praised. From this new perspective, Pathe suddenly came to view the forced movement of population in Cambodia as something pushed to absurd limits.¹⁰⁸

A similar shift in attitude was apparent in Pathe's handling of events in Iran. *Synthesis* initially was supportive of the Khomeini regime, and spotlighted the role of the Marxists in bringing down the regime of the Shah.¹⁰⁹ Shortly thereafter, however, Khomeini turned against the Marxist groups, and *Synthesis* took a critical stance toward the new ruler in response to this policy.¹¹⁰

Defamation of Moscow's Ideological Opponents. The absence of a fine and delicate hand often can be seen in *Synthesis*. Nowhere was this more apparent than in the newsletter's attacks

on ideological opponents within the Marxist-Leninist camp. Clearly manifest in these attacks were fears of the dissent and the challenges to the USSR that might be mounted by other Communist governments asserting the correctness of their ideological positions.

One of the principal targets, of course, was China. Pathe's criticisms of the Peking regime at first were careful. Earlier issues of the publication voiced the theme that China now follows the same road to economic development as does the USSR, suggesting the rejection of Mao's cultural revolution. By late 1978, however, the criticisms levelled against Mao's economic, cultural, and political policies had become more vigorous. By March 1979, in the aftermath of China's attack on Vietnam, Pathe's strong charges against Peking had all the signs of having been composed in Moscow.¹¹¹ At that time, China was described as having "lived in the absurd in words and actions" for twenty years. Chinese foreign policy and the Chinese press were excoriated, and the attack on Vietnam was condemned. Pathe further accused China of having informed the United States of its intentions, and having received Washington's tacit approval for the attack on Vietnam. Finally, Pathe portrayed in bleak terms the Chinese demographic problem and the country's prospects for industrialization.

An article at the end of 1978 was critical of Rumania and Communist Party leader Nicolae Ceausescu. It attacked the Rumanian regime for its anti-Soviet positions and xenophobia. References were made to nepotism involving Ceausescu's wife, brother, and other figures — a practice, Pathe asserted, which is hardly tolerated elsewhere in the Communist world. The article discounted the significance of Rumania's alleged independence in foreign affairs, in view of the country's geographic proximity to the Soviet Union.¹¹²

Soviet dissidents and emigres comprised another unconcealed object of attack and defamation. Here the Soviet hand appeared evident — either betraying a possible failure of judgment on the part of Pathe's Soviet handlers regarding how best to treat this theme, or reflecting panic in Moscow. Commentary was devoted to the failure of Soviet emigres to integrate into Israeli life; and it was asserted that Soviet adults find it difficult to adjust to the capitalist world, since the "Homo Sovieticus" fashioned by the

Soviet regime is a quite different being.¹¹³ It appears that Moscow had lost patience with anti-Soviet attacks in the West stemming from Soviet dissidents.

Continuing this line of criticism, Pathe downplayed the revelations of the Czech defector Karel Kaplan, and warned of the dissemination of false information by Western intelligence services. Pathe also spoke of the lack of influence exerted by Soviet dissidents in the Soviet Union. The Western press chooses to ignore the truth of this situation, he charged, and prefers to live with its prejudices. Pathe then went on to assert that flattery in the West was turning Soviet emigres into "wrecks" (*epaves*), 90 percent of whom cannot adapt to Western society.¹¹⁴ In an article on the CPSU, *Synthesis* again criticized Soviet emigres and dissidents, accusing them of presenting a false picture of the Communist Party and calling into question their impartiality. The same article described emigre opponents of the Soviet regime as "fish out of water" and "officers without troops," incapable of forming a real opposition. The only opposition in the USSR, Pathe stated, is found among isolated intellectuals.¹¹⁵

The pattern apparent in *Synthesis* of strong reaction to ideological issues, or to subjects touching upon the *raison d'être* of a Communist society, was evident in articles concerning the anti-Marxist French philosophers known as "the new philosophers." The newsletter characterized their views as nihilistic, and asserted they were focused on secondary matters. Pathe commented, for example, that "the way they keep returning to the subject of the Gulag is laughable."¹¹⁶ Another attack referred to their ignorance of real problems as "abysmal", their "elegant discourses" as displaying great confusion, and their rhetoric as anarchic. The article raised questions regarding how these philosophers can discourse on oppression in societies far away, and pronounced that the logical conclusion of their ideas is "political terrorism." In the USSR, it was added, the members of this school are laughed at.¹¹⁷

Another theme in *Synthesis* was the issue of human rights raised by the Carter Administration. During the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (the "Helsinki Conference"), which began in 1977, Pathe warned that the Soviets would air the West's "dirty linen" in a massive way if the latter continued to interfere in what should be regarded as internal Soviet matters.¹¹⁸ When

confronting criticism of the USSR and its friends on such specific issues as human rights, an apparent defensive measure employed by Pathe involved discrediting the reliability and accuracy of the French media, and — more generally — the Western media. This tactic also served the transparent purpose of deflecting attacks by asserting the impeccability of the critic's moral credentials.

Pathe therefore stressed the thesis that the Western press is unreliable on many matters and is silent on others, and is subject to a wide variety of extraneous pressures (including those of circulation requirements). Reference was made to the venality of the French press, and to its past history of relations with foreign powers. The French press was called to account for a barrage of stories concerning human rights in distant countries characterized by differing cultures, where France could not hope to have any influence.¹¹⁹

Another comment referred to gaps in Western press information on the USSR which "reach the level of disinformation."¹²⁰ In discussing a United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) resolution on the subject of press communications, Pathe discounted as dishonest Western arguments about the lack of freedom of the press in Soviet bloc countries.¹²¹ Finally, *Synthesis* also carried complaints that the Western press lionizes Soviet dissidents and emigres, and prefers not to seek the truth.¹²²

SOVIET FORGERIES

From the earliest days of the Bolshevik regime, forged documents have been employed by Moscow to discredit and deceive opponents. For example, forgeries played an important role in the "Trust" operations of the 1920s, elaborate and highly successful schemes devised by Felix Dzerzhinsky (founding director of the Cheka) for luring important counterrevolutionaries back to their capture and death in Russia, and — later on — for discrediting anti-Soviet groups in Europe. The "Trust" also helped disseminate Moscow's message that the new Bolshevik regime was too strong to be subverted by "renegade" groups. Dzerzhinsky in effect created a fake counterrevolutionary organization (known as the "Trust") for these purposes. Skilled agents were dispatched to Europe to approach emigre opposition leaders. To convince

these leaders of the legitimacy of this organization, a number of tactics were employed, including forged letters, instructions, and agreements.¹²³

During the years from 1960 to 1980, forged documents continued to play a role in Soviet covert activities; and forgeries appear to have been coordinated with other overt and covert techniques, and closely related to specific Soviet objectives. During the early 1960s and the latter half of the 1970s, many forged documents were targetted against the United States and NATO. Selected samples of forged materials from both periods, particularly those aimed at the United States, have been declassified by the CIA. They have been published in Congressional hearings, along with explanations of how each document came to be identified as a forgery.¹²⁴ As far as can be determined, these CIA assessments have not been challenged. (It should be noted that the CIA may not have made available all the forgeries in its possession, and the US government may not have discovered all the forgeries disseminated by the Soviets.)

As has been the case since the late 1950s with certain other Soviet disinformation tactics, forgeries are formulated and executed through Service A of the KGB's First Chief Directorate. In addition to conducting its own forgery operations, Service A also directs and supervises the forgeries and other disinformation activities that are carried out by the intelligence services of the East European satellites. Ladislav Bittman, a former Czech intelligence officer who specialized in disinformation operations, has described the relationship between the KGB and the bloc intelligence services as follows:¹²⁵

The East German, Czechoslovak, Polish, Hungarian, and Bulgarian services are subordinated formally to their governments, but they are directed mainly by the KGB. Moscow is informed about every operational detail of their activities . . . Russian advisors influence the planning of each operation and assess the results. No important decision is made without them.

During the period under examination in this study, many of the forgeries that were directed against the United States took the form of authentic-looking but false US government documents and communiques. These falsifications fall into two

general categories: (a) altered or distorted versions of actual US documents the Soviets have been able to obtain (usually through espionage), and (b) documents which are entirely fabricated. These anti-US forgeries are aimed at both the political elites and the general populations of the various target states.

Regardless of the type of forgery employed and the intended target, the general thrust of these falsified documents has been consistent. In using this technique, Soviet leaders apparently sought to portray the United States as the major threat to peace, to create suspicion and discord in relations between the United States and its West European allies, and to characterize US policy in the Third World as imperialistic. These themes are evident both in the forgeries which occurred in the early 1960s, and in those which have appeared since the mid-1970s.

Soviet Forgeries During the Late 1950s and the Early 1960s

During the late 1950s and the early 1960s, a number of forgeries designed to pass as official documents and communications of the US government were identified.¹²⁶ They followed three general patterns.

First, the United States was presented as the major threat to world peace. As was demonstrated in the previous chapter, this theme also dominated the overt propaganda in both *New Times* and *Pravda's* "International Review" during 1961 and 1962. A false State Department directive ordering US diplomatic missions abroad to exert all possible efforts to sabotage negotiations for a summit conference serves as an illustration of how forgeries were used to emphasize this theme.¹²⁷ The forged State Department document was designed to mirror commentary appearing in Soviet overt propaganda during the early 1960s, which constantly asserted that the United States was doing everything possible to sabotage all negotiations with the USSR, especially on disarmament matters.

Another forgery related to Moscow's attempt to portray the United States as the major enemy of peace amplified the spring 1960 propaganda windfall resulting from the U-2 incident. A forged memorandum from US Air Attache Emmens to Ambassador MacArthur in Tokyo outlined alleged secret plans of the American government to conceal U-2s in Japan for renewed flights over the USSR and China.¹²⁸

Other forgeries singled out the US Strategic Air Command (SAC) as an important element of the dangers emanating from the United States. SAC personnel were portrayed as a highly psychotic group, capable of initiating a nuclear war at any moment. An example is provided by a forged letter purportedly from Assistant Secretary of Defense (Health and Medical) Frank Berry to the Secretary of Defense. The fabrication asserted that 67.3 percent of all SAC flight personnel were psychoneurotics, with such symptoms as phobias, unaccountable animosity, and irrational behavior. It further stated that "moral depression is a typical condition of all crew members making flights with atomic and H-bombs."¹²⁹ The fabricated letter from Berry was followed by a series of bogus letters ostensibly written by unidentified "neurotic US pilots" exhibiting these traits.¹³⁰

A second group of forgeries was designed to reveal the imperialist plans and ambitions of the United States in the Third World. This thrust again paralleled a major theme appearing in Soviet overt propaganda. While many of these forgeries were targeted on the political elites of specific countries, others focused on a much wider audience. A fabricated letter from Nelson Rockefeller to President Dwight Eisenhower serves as an illustration. The letter, which appeared during the late 1950s, purportedly contained a plan for American manipulation of military and economic aid in an effort to gain world hegemony. A portion of the forgery read:¹³¹

To put the policy in a nutshell — our policy must be . . . "global": i.e., include political, psychological, economic, military, and special methods integrated into one whole. In other words, the task is to hitch all of our horses in a single team. . . . Provided all of the recommendations are carried out the result would be not only to strengthen the international position of the US as a whole but would also considerably facilitate the fulfillment of any military tasks that may confront the US in the future.

Examples of more narrowly-crafted fabrications include items ostensibly revealing American plans to manipulate the leaders of, and politics in, Third World nations. Evidence of Washington's aims in this area was "unveiled" in the form of forged cables from the American Embassy in Djakarta containing

proposed plans to overthrow Indonesian President Sukarno.¹³² Other forgeries purported to reveal American plots to depose Sihanouk of Cambodia and Nasser of Egypt.¹³³ Another false document contained instructions from the United States Information Service (USIS) advising that the officials of one Asian country should be pressured to verbally attack other Asian countries. Additionally, a forged letter from the Undersecretary of State to the US Ambassador in Leopoldville stated that the United States had successfully recruited Premier Moise Tshombe as an agent.¹³⁴

Third, forgeries were used in an attempt to provoke discord among members of the Western alliance. A letter ostensibly sent from the Head of the Political Section of the US Embassy in West Germany to the State Department, for example, was intended to show that the United States looked favorably on neo-Nazi organizations in West Germany.¹³⁵ This fabrication thus amplified the Nazi-revanchist theme that dominated Soviet overt propaganda directed at West Germany during this period.

Soviet Forgeries Since the Mid-1970s

Since 1976, the main thrust of Soviet forgeries has been directed at compromising the position of the United States in Western Europe, and at provoking disharmony in the Western alliance. These falsifications have stressed the American nuclear threat to Europe, the plans and involvement of the United States in manipulating internal European politics, and American measures devised to damage the economies of the European states. A second focus has concentrated on undermining US relations with Third World countries, especially in the Middle East. Finally, it appears that a few forgeries have been intended to deflect attention from Soviet activities outside the borders of the USSR.

In the previous chapter it was observed that a key theme of Soviet overt propaganda during the 1976-1979 period was the charge that in the case of nuclear war in Europe, the United States planned to sacrifice its NATO allies in order to save itself. This theme also appears in Soviet forgeries, in a more crude and provocative manner. During 1980, for example, Moscow began to resurrect a number of forged American and NATO documents that had first been used in Europe during the late 1960s and the

early 1970s. The introduction to this collection of forgeries, which were published in a single pamphlet by an unidentified group in England under the title "Holocaust Again in Europe," followed the same Soviet propaganda themes aimed at sowing discord among the member states of NATO.

In attempting to invalidate the basis for NATO's plan for modernization of its intermediate-range nuclear forces, the authors of the pamphlet noted: "NATO modernization strategy turns essentially on two beliefs — first, the Warsaw Pact has a superiority in the European theatre and, second, that it seeks political objectives which could only be secured by use of that superiority."¹³⁶ According to the authors, "neither belief is valid. The essential balance between NATO and Warsaw Pact forces in Europe is a matter of record." The second belief was characterized as "even more laughable," and the authors went on to argue that "militarily, the political advantage theory collapses because it is based on the false premise that tactical nuclear strikes can comprise the sum total of a nuclear war."¹³⁷

These assertions led to the reiteration of another key theme of Soviet overt propaganda: "there is no Soviet threat, there is a real American threat to Europe."¹³⁸ This threat was said to derive from an American strategy for the European theatre that is dominated by preparation for war, rather than for the defense of Europe, and from Washington's view of "nuclear war confined to Europe as no more than the ultimate extension of the 'little wars' of the post-WWII variety."¹³⁹

Furthermore, the forgery purported to demonstrate clearly that "when a European-based nuclear war is effectively unbridled," the leaders of the United States "believe they can escape the consequences and, most importantly, they believe they can reap all the possible benefits."¹⁴⁰ The Soviet Union, on the other hand, aimed to convince the West European members of NATO that "the installation of nuclear medium-range missiles in Europe is a trap for the Europeans themselves, one from which only the Americans can gain." Such an installation would mean for Europe "being burnt, blasted, and shocked out of existence in the process."¹⁴¹

A number of other forgeries provided variations on the theme of American willingness to sacrifice its NATO allies. An authentic, unclassified US government map was misrepresented, for exam-

ple, so that the Pentagon could be charged with targetting Austrian cities and facilities for nuclear destruction in the event of war in Europe.¹⁴² A fabricated letter ostensibly written by the US Defense Attache in Rome contained language denying "rumors suggesting the death of children in Naples could be due to chemical or biological substances stored at . . . American bases near Naples."¹⁴³ A forged letter allegedly sent in 1976 to NATO Secretary General Joseph Luns by Supreme Commander Alexander Haig stated that NATO strategy demands further attention to "the limited use of US nuclear forces in Europe in an emergency."¹⁴⁴ A bogus letter was written on official NATO stationery bearing the forged signature of the NATO Secretary General. In the letter, the US Ambassador to NATO was informed that the Belgian Defense Ministry had compiled files on journalists who opposed deployment of the neutron bomb, implying that they would be punished. (This forgery appeared during the massive Soviet campaign of overt propaganda against the neutron weapon.)¹⁴⁵

A second group of Soviet forgeries directed against the United States and NATO since the mid-1970s purported to provide "evidence" of direct and unscrupulous American attempts to manipulate the internal politics of Washington's European allies. A case in point is a 1978 fabrication entitled "Intelligence Collection Requirements." This document, which first appeared in a Greek newspaper (*To Vima*), allegedly presented instructions from the US Defense Intelligence Agency in connection with American spying on 43 Greek political parties and organizations.¹⁴⁶ At approximately the same time, Greek opposition leader Andreas Papandreu presented to the Greek Parliament a copy of what turned out to be a forged State Department telegram purportedly outlining an American policy favoring Ankara in the Greek-Turkish dispute.¹⁴⁷ The purpose behind both forgeries apparently was to create strains in the relations between Greece and the United States, thereby weakening the coherence of the NATO alliance.

Greece continued as a target of Soviet forgeries during the early 1980s. A falsified letter from Undersecretary of State William Clark to the American Ambassador to Greece, Monteagle Stearns, ostensibly recommended that Stearns should utilize a study sponsored by the State Department on the "Current Political Situa-

tion" in Greece. The study, purportedly endorsed by Clark, suggested that the United States might support a military coup in Greece in order to preserve its military bases.¹⁴⁸ The relationship of the United States with Spain also became a subject of Soviet fabrications, and a forged letter from President Reagan to King Juan Carlos was designed to reveal to the latter that a number of his close advisors opposed Spain's entry into NATO.¹⁴⁹ Finally, in addition to these forgeries emphasizing US manipulation of European politics (and the forgeries stressing the American nuclear threat to Europe, described earlier), a few falsifications appeared during this period which allegedly revealed American plans to manipulate and create crises within the European economies.¹⁵⁰

A second major thrust of Soviet forgeries in the years since 1976 has been an attempt to undermine the policies and reputation of the United States in the Third World. A series of statements against Egypt's President Sadat were falsely attributed to important US government officials, including Vice President Walter Mondale and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, in an attempt to hinder US-Egyptian relations.¹⁵¹ Similar forged documents were aimed at undermining US policies in Latin America and Africa.¹⁵²

A third major category of forgeries which appeared during this period can be seen as attempts on the part of Moscow to justify or to redirect international attention away from certain Soviet actions outside the borders of the USSR. For example, a forged 1980 State Department telegram, supposedly found in the aftermath of a fire at the American Embassy in Islamabad, made the claim that a regular CIA courier to former Afghan President Hafizullah Amin had disappeared.¹⁵³ The purpose of the fabrication apparently was to link Amin to the CIA, a charge that had been made in the Soviet media after Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan. This forgery was followed in 1981 by the appearance of an altered, unclassified CIA map of Afghanistan. The story accompanying the map, which first appeared in an Indian newspaper, alleged that the map provided evidence of CIA involvement with the Afghan guerrillas. Purportedly contained in the map were specific targets selected by the CIA for destruction by the guerrillas (e.g., power stations, airfields, mines, etc.).¹⁵⁴

This brief examination suggests that since 1976, Soviet forgeries have become more sophisticated and of a higher quality than the forgeries which appeared in the late 1950s and the early 1960s. Additionally, the main target of these efforts has shifted somewhat, with more emphasis devoted in recent years to relations between the United States and its NATO allies. Other important aspects of this area of Soviet active measures have remained basically consistent, however. First, Soviet forgeries have continued to parallel — although in a more crude and slanderous manner — major themes of overt propaganda carried in *New Times*, *Pravda*, and Radio Moscow. Second, the forgeries studied by the present authors apparently were intended to serve important objectives of Soviet foreign policy. (Certainly this was the case with respect to the recent series of fabrications directed toward provoking suspicion and dissension in the relations among the NATO allies.)

Whether or not a forged document is acquired, accepted, and published in the non-Communist media as authentic continues to depend on the content of the material, the method whereby it surfaces, and the overall sophistication of the document. As far as can be determined from the forgeries reviewed above, the Soviet record in this respect is mixed. In some cases, such as the forged Presidential letter to King Juan Carlos of Spain, press commentary either ignored the document or noted that it was bogus. Other falsified documents, however, received varying degrees of press coverage.

One of the most successful Soviet efforts involved a forged US Army Field Manual (FM 30-31B). This manual purportedly provided guidance to Army intelligence personnel regarding interference in the affairs of the host country, the subversion of foreign officials and military officers, and the use of extreme leftist organizations to safeguard American interests in friendly nations where it appears that Communists may enter the government.¹⁵⁵ First mentioned in 1975 in a Turkish newspaper, this document was reprinted in two Spanish publications in 1978, and since that time has been the subject of articles published in more than twenty countries, including the United States.

NOTES

1. Based on confidential Comintern documents first published in 1924 in German by the German Trade Union Federation (ADGB), under the title "The Third Column of Communist Policy - IAH (International Worker's Aid)." Quoted in English in *Labour Magazine* (December 1924). The quotations were authenticated by Willi Munzenberg's widow, Babette Gross, in her book entitled *Willi Munzenberg - A Political Biography* (Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1974), pp. 121 and 133.
2. *Fourth Congress of the Communist International*, Abridged Report of Meetings Held at Petrograd and Moscow, November 7-December 3, 1922 (London: Communist Party of Great Britain), p. 53.
3. *Seventh Congress of the Communist International*, Abridged Stenographic Report of Proceedings, July-August 1935 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1939), p. 489.
4. As previously explained, in 1957 the International Department of the CPSU's Central Committee took over the responsibility for coordinating and directing the international front organizations.
5. *Meeting of the Information Bureau of Communist Parties - in Hungary in the Latter Half of November 1949*, published by the journal *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy* (the Cominform organ), printed in the USSR, 1950, p. 48. Reprinted by the Communist Party of the USA under the title *Working Class Unity For Peace* (New York: New Century Publishers, 1950).
6. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 49.
8. See Roy Godson, *Labor in Soviet Global Strategy* (New York: Crane, Russak and Co., forthcoming [1984]).
9. *Documents of the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of India, 1971* (New Delhi: Communist Party Publications, 1972), p. 414.
10. Ramesh Chandra, "Postponing or Eliminating the Threat of War," *World Marxist Review* (January 1981), pp. 31-35.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
12. *The World Peace Council: What It Is and What It Does* (Helsinki: World Peace Council, 1978).
13. *Ibid.* During the 1980-1983 period, the membership of these WPC bodies remained relatively the same. See *World Peace Council List of Members, 1980-1983* (Helsinki: World Peace Council, 1982). See also the data and analysis in Wallace H. Spaulding, "The Communist Movement and Its Allies," in Ralph M. Goldman, ed., *Transnational Parties* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983).
14. US Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Soviet Active Measures," 97th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, DC: GPO, 1982), pp. 198-236.
15. US Congress, House, *Congressional Record*, 97th Cong. 2nd Sess., 1983, P.H.-1791. (*FBI Intelligence Division Report on Soviet Active Measures Relating to the US Peace Movement.*)

16. US Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Soviet Active Measures," p. 203.
17. *Party Organizer*, Vol. XVI (Nos. 4, 5, 6, 1982), pp. 48-49. An article by Myerson discusses the work of the CPUSA and the US Peace Council which was directed at the 1982 UN Special Session on Disarmament.
18. *FBI Intelligence Division Report on Soviet Active Measures*.
19. *Ibid.*
20. *Ibid.*
21. Ronald Radosh, "The Peace Council and Peace," *New Republic* (January 31, 1983), p. 16.
22. *FBI Intelligence Division Report on Soviet Active Measures*.
23. US Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Soviet Active Measures," p. 298.
24. *Party Organizer*, Vol. XVI (No. 1, 1982), p. 31.
25. *The World Peace Council: What It Is and What It Does*.
26. US Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive)," 96th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington DC: GPO, 1980), p. 79.
27. Letter to the editor from Ruth Tosek, *New Statesman* (October 17, 1980), p. 22.
28. For information on International Department officials serving as WPC officers and attending WPC meetings, see the WPC publications previously cited. On the subject of ID control of WPC President Ramesh Chandra and the WPC Secretariat, see US Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "The CIA and the Media," 95th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions (Washington, DC: GPO, April 20, 1978), p. 571. On Soviet control and financing of national Communist parties (particularly the CPUSA) and on KGB involvement, see US Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Soviet Active Measures," pp. 22, 56-57, 70, 165-167, and 202-235.
29. A number of peace activists who have worked for or with the WPC and other fronts also have maintained that Moscow exerts overwhelming control over these organizations. See, for example, statements by Richard K. Ullman, former Vice President of the Christian Peace Conference, in his *Dilemmas of a Reconciler: Serving the East-West Conflict* (Wallingford, PA: Pendle Hill, 1963); and Jiri Peikán, former head of the International Union of Students, in his article "The Struggle for Socialism in Czechoslovakia," *New Left Review* (January-February 1972). E.P. Thompson, a British proponent of unilateral nuclear disarmament, also has warned anti-war activists to beware of the WPC. (*The Guardian* [London], February 18, 1981.)
30. Probably the best single secondary source on ID and KGB manipulation of the WPC and its American and European affiliates is John Baron's *The KGB Today* (New York: Reader's Digest Press, 1983). For a contrary view, see Frank Donner, "But Will They Come?," *The Nation* (November 6, 1982), pp. 456-465.
31. *Meeting of the Information Bureau of Communist Parties*, p. 36.

30. *Ibid.* p. 53.
31. *In Defense of Peace* (April 1950), p. 2.
32. World Peace Movement, *Resolutions and Documents* (n.p.: Secretariat of the World Council of Peace, 1955), p. 47.
33. *World Youth* (July 1950), p. 2.
34. Nikolai Mikhailov, *We Live to Bring Peace* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency, [circa late 1960s]), p. 15. An editorial in the April 1950 issue of *World Youth*, the WFDY magazine, revealed that "the Soviet people, led by Stalin, is [sic] now at the head of the camp of peace and democracy."
35. *Meeting of the Information Bureau of Communist Parties*, p. 54.
36. *Ibid.* In what must be characterized as a revealing explanation of the Communist "peace offensive," Maurice Thorez, head of the French Communist Party, and Palmiro Togliatti, head of the Italian Communist Party, announced that they would welcome the Soviet army when it entered their countries, "in its battle against the aggressor." See *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy* (March 1 and 15, 1949).
37. *Schwarzbuch Über den Bakterienkrieg* (Blackbook on Germ Warfare) (Vienna: Osterreichischen Friedensrat [Austrian Peace Council], June 1952), p. 2.
38. *World Peace Movement Resolutions and Documents*, pp. 102-103.
39. *World Student News* (No. 11, 1952), p. 5.
40. *World Youth* (July 1952), p. 3.
41. Louis Saillant, *The WFTU and the Tasks of the Trade Union Movement*, Report to the Fifth Congress of the WFTU, Moscow, December 4-16, 1961 (London: WFTU Publications Ltd., 1961), pp. 20-21.
42. *Assembly of the World Peace Council, Documents*, Budapest, May 13-16, 1971 (Helsinki: World Peace Council, 1971), p. 54.
43. *World Student News* (Nos. 11-12, 1964), p. 8.
44. *8th International Union of Students Congress, Resolutions* (Sofia, Bulgaria: November 28-December 10, 1964), p. 8.
45. See, for example, *Documentary Record, WFDY Executive Committee Meeting*, Moscow, November 16-18, 1972 (Budapest: WFDY, 1973), p. 72.
46. *Assembly of the World Peace Council, Documents*, Budapest, May 13-16, 1971, p. 43.
47. Mimeographed documents appended to a letter of Bertil Svahnstrom, chairman of the International Liaison Committee of the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam, May 23, 1969.
48. *World Peace Council Information Letter #2* of the Stockholm Conference (Stockholm: World Peace Council, May 7, 1970), p. 5.
49. *Ibid.*
50. *Ibid.*
51. *Neutron Bombs No!* (Helsinki: World Peace Council, September 1977), pp. 6-7.
52. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
53. *Ibid.*, pp. 39-40.
54. *Ibid.*, pp. 50 and 53.

55. *New Perspectives* (March 1978), p. 6.
56. *World Peace Council and Disarmament* (Helsinki: World Peace Council, May 27, 1978), pp. 1, 7, and 8.
57. *World Peace Council and Disarmament* (Helsinki: World Peace Council, June 8, 1978), p. 4.
58. *Stoppt die Neutronen Bombe* (Stop the Neutron Bomb), published by SEW-Hochschulgruppe (Socialist Unity Party West Berlin, High School Group), circa mid-1978.
59. Moscow TASS International Service in Russian, August 10, 1981, translated in *FBIS Daily Report*, Soviet Union, Vol. III (August 11, 1981), p. AA1.
60. Moscow TASS, August 13, 1981, translated in *FBIS Daily Report*, Soviet Union, Vol. III (August 14, 1981), p. AA4.
61. Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, August 14, 1981, translated in *FBIS Daily Report*, Soviet Union, Vol. III (August 17, 1981), p. CC7.
62. Moscow TASS in English, *FBIS Daily Report*, Soviet Union, Vol. III (August 19, 1981), p. AA3.
63. *Peace Courier* (September 1981), p. 1.
64. *Pravda*, January 28, 1982, p. 1. Translated in *FBIS Daily Report*, Soviet Union, Vol. III (February 2, 1981), p. CCI.
65. *International Trade Union Round Table, Detente-Conversion-Disarmament* (Prague: WFTU, 1981), p. 6.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
67. World Federation of Democratic Youth, *Youth Disarmament - Facts, Arguments, Information* (Budapest: WFDY, 1982).
68. *Peace Courier* (August 1975), p. 1.
69. *Rights of the Palestinian People - Key to Peace in the Middle East*, International Conference of Solidarity with the Palestinian People, Basle, Switzerland, May 4-6, 1979 (Helsinki: World Peace Council, May 1979), pp. 11-13.
70. Havana Domestic Service in Spanish, April 21, 1981, translated in *FBIS Daily Report*, Latin America, Vol. VI (April 22, 1981), p. 2.
71. See *Paris Match* (July 11, 1980); and the *Daily Telegraph*, July 14, 1980. See also US Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Soviet Active Measures," pp. 42-43.
72. These include *Realite, Liberation, France-Observateur, L'Evenement, Le Nouvel Observateur, Option*, and *Vie Ouvrier*.
73. *Synthesis* was published bimonthly from July 1976 until the arrest of Pathe in July 1979 - a period of almost exactly three years. The length of the newsletter averaged eight legal-size pages. Each issue contained three to five articles on political, economic, military, and scientific subjects. The content and themes of these articles are analyzed later in this study.
74. *Paris Match* (July 11, 1980).
75. *Synthesis* (April 20, 1977).
76. *Ibid.* (February 20, 1978).
77. *Ibid.* (August 20, 1977 and February 20, 1978).
78. *Ibid.* (January 5, 1978).

79. *Ibid.* (December 5, 1976).
80. *Ibid.* (May 20, 1977).
81. *Ibid.* (February 5, 1979).
82. *Ibid.* (January 5, 1978).
83. *Ibid.* (January 20, 1979).
84. *Ibid.* (March 5, 1977).
85. *Ibid.* (April 20, 1977 and April 20, 1978).
86. *Ibid.* (March 5, 1978).
87. *Ibid.* (March 5, 1977).
88. *Ibid.* (September 20, 1977).
89. *Ibid.* (April 5, 1979).
90. *Ibid.* (June 5, 1977).
91. *Ibid.* (March 20, 1979).
92. *Ibid.* (November 5, 1976 and November 20, 1977).
93. *Ibid.* (April 5, 1977).
94. *Ibid.* (March 20, 1978).
95. *Ibid.*
96. *Ibid.* (March 20, 1979).
97. *Ibid.* (April 5, 1977).
98. *Ibid.* (June 5, 1977).
99. *Ibid.*
100. *Ibid.* (September 5, 1976).
101. *Ibid.* (June 20, 1978).
102. *Ibid.*
103. *Ibid.* (February 20, 1978).
104. *Ibid.* (May 20, 1977).
105. *Ibid.* (March 5, 1979).
106. *Ibid.* (February 20, 1978).
107. *Ibid.* (September 5, 1977).
108. *Ibid.* (January 20, 1979).
109. *Ibid.* (February 5, 1979 and February 20, 1979).
110. *Ibid.* (March 20, 1979).
111. *Ibid.* (March 5, 1979).
112. *Ibid.* (December 20, 1978).
113. *Ibid.* (March 20, 1978).
114. *Ibid.* (November 5, 1977).
115. *Ibid.* (May 20, 1978).
116. *Ibid.*
117. *Ibid.* (June 5, 1978).
118. *Ibid.* (May 5, 1978).
119. *Ibid.* (July 20, 1978). See also *Ibid.* (November 5, 1978).
120. *Ibid.* (November 5, 1978).
121. *Ibid.*
122. *Ibid.* See also *Ibid.* (November 5, 1977).
123. Geoffrey Bailey, *The Conspirators* (New York: Harper, 1960), p. 306.

124. The Soviet forgeries reviewed in this study are drawn from US Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act, "Communist Forgeries," 87th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: GPO, 1961); US Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive)"; and US Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Soviet Active Measures."
125. Ladislav Bittman, "Soviet Bloc 'Disinformation' and other 'Active Measures'," in Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Uri Ra'anana, and Warren Milberg, ed., *Intelligence Policy and National Security* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1982), p. 217. Also see Jan Sejna, *We Will Bury You* (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1982), for a discussion by a former Czech General about how political warfare fits into overall Soviet strategic planning.
126. US Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act, "Communist Forgeries."
127. *Ibid.*, p. 22.
128. *Ibid.*, p. 56.
129. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
130. An excerpt from one of these letters reads: "I am an American pilot who lost a friend flying over Eastern Germany. I intend to get my revenge by dropping an atomic bomb on Soviet territory." *Ibid.*, p. 92.
131. *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.
132. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
133. *Ibid.*, pp. 12, 13, 18, and 31.
134. *Ibid.*, pp. 7 and 9.
135. *Ibid.*, pp. 20 and 30.
136. US Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Soviet Active Measures," p. 77.
137. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
138. *Ibid.*, pp. 78-79.
139. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
140. *Ibid.*, p. 83.
141. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
142. *Ibid.*, p. 91.
143. US Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive)," p. 137.
144. US Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Soviet Active Measures," pp. 122-124.
145. US Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive)," p. 133.
146. *Ibid.*, p. 122.
147. *Ibid.*, pp. 122-123.
148. US Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Soviet Active Measures," pp. 119-121.
149. *Ibid.*, p. 95.

150. In 1967, for example, there appeared a doctored US State Department airgram to members of several West European governments instructing the recipients to collect information on ways to bribe European officials, and to develop other ways to damage or eliminate foreign trade competition. The original document simply contained worldwide economic information for Fiscal Year 1975. US Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive)," p. 102.
151. *Ibid.*, pp. 147 and 153-156.
152. *Ibid.*, p. 125; and US Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Soviet Active Measures," pp. 111-119 and 133-135.
153. *Ibid.*, pp. 89-90.
154. *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94. Another example was a fabricated US-Swedish mailgram which allegedly revealed a US-Swedish agreement providing for American use of Swedish facilities at Karlskrona for reconnaissance purposes. One purpose of the mailgram may have been to distract world attention from the recent violation of Swedish territorial waters by a nuclear-armed Soviet submarine. *Ibid.*, pp. 105-110.
155. US Congress, House, Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery Offensive)," pp. 86-101.

CHAPTER V INTERVIEWS WITH FORMER SOVIET BLOC INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS

This chapter contains interviews, conducted separately, with two former Soviet bloc intelligence officers who specialized in active measures during the 1960s and the 1970s.

Ladislav Bittman served as a career Czech intelligence officer from 1954 until 1968. During this period, he spent eight years abroad directing and recruiting spies, and for two years (1964-1966) held the post of Deputy Chief of the Disinformation Department (Department Eight) of the Czech intelligence service. From 1966 to 1968, Bittman operated in Vienna under diplomatic cover as a press attache of the Czechoslovakian Diplomatic Mission, attempting to manipulate the Austrian press and directing agents of influence. In August 1968, in the aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact forces, Bittman crossed the West German border and asked US authorities for asylum. He now lives in the United States.

Stanislav Levchenko worked for the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee from 1965 to 1971, assisting with the direction of Soviet international front organizations. He joined the KGB in 1971, and in the fall of 1972 became a case officer of the Japanese Desk of the 7th Department of the KGB's First Chief Directorate. In February 1975, Levchenko was assigned to the Tokyo residency of the KGB to work in political intelligence; and in early 1979, he became the active chief of the Tokyo KGB residency's active measures group. In October 1979, Levchenko contacted US officials in Japan and requested asylum. Like Bittman, he now lives in the United States.

These two former specialists in active measures provide another level of information regarding how the Soviet bloc sought to in-