December 03, 2024
Hon’ble Speaker,
I
rise to apprise the House of some recent developments in the India
China border areas and their implications for our overall bilateral
relations. The House is aware that our ties have been abnormal since
2020, when peace and tranquility in the border areas were disturbed as a
result of Chinese actions. Recent developments that reflect our
continuous diplomatic engagement since then have set our ties in the
direction of some improvement.
2.
The House is cognizant of the fact that China is in illegal occupation
of 38,000 Sq. kms. of Indian territory in Aksai Chin as a result of the
1962 conflict and the events that preceded it. Furthermore, Pakistan
illegally ceded 5180 Sq. kms. of Indian territory to China in 1963,
which had been under its occupation since 1948. India and China have
held talks for multiple decades to resolve the boundary issue. While
there is a Line of Actual Control (LAC), it does not have a common
understanding in some areas. We remain committed to engaging with China
through bilateral discussions to arrive at a fair, reasonable and
mutually acceptable framework for a boundary settlement.
3.
Hon’ble Members would recall that the amassing of a large number of
troops by China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Eastern Ladakh
in April/May 2020 resulted in face offs with our forces at a number of
points. The situation also led to disruption of patrolling activities.
It is to the credit of our armed forces that despite logistical
challenges and the then-prevailing Covid situation, they were able to
counter-deploy rapidly and effectively.
Hon’ble Speaker sir,
4.
The House is well aware of the circumstances leading up to the violent
clashes in Galwan Valley in June 2020. In the months thereafter, we were
addressing a situation that had not only seen fatalities for the first
time in 45 years, but also a turn of events serious enough for heavy
weaponry to be deployed in close proximity to the LAC. While a
determined counter deployment of adequate capability was the
Government’s immediate response, there was also the imperative of a
diplomatic effort to defuse these heightened tensions and restore peace
and tranquility.
Hon’ble Speaker sir,
5.
The contemporary phase of our ties with China dates back to 1988, when
there was a clear understanding that the Sino-Indian boundary question
will be settled through peaceful and friendly consultations. In 1991,
the two sides agreed to maintain peace and tranquility in the areas
along the LAC pending a final settlement of the boundary question.
Thereafter, in 1993, an Agreement was reached on the maintenance of
peace and tranquility. Subsequently in 1996, India and China agreed on
confidence building measures in the military field.
6.
In 2003, we finalized a Declaration on Principles for our Relations and
Comprehensive Cooperation, which included the appointment of Special
Representatives. In 2005, a protocol was formulated on Modalities for
the Implementation of Confidence Building Measures along the LAC. At the
same time, the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the
settlement of the boundary question was agreed to.
7.
In 2012, a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination (WMCC)
was established. And a year later in 2013, we reached an understanding
on border defense cooperation as well. The purpose of my recalling these
agreements is to underline the elaborate nature of our shared efforts
to ensure peace and tranquility. And to emphasize the seriousness of
what its unprecedented disruption in 2020 implied for our overall
relationship.
8.
The situation arising after our counter-deployment in 2020 called for
multiple set of responses. The immediate priority was to ensure
disengagement from friction points so that there would be no further
untoward incidents or clashes. This Sir, has been fully achieved as I
will explain. The next priority will be to consider de-escalation, that
would address the massing of troops along the LAC with associated
accompaniments. It is also evident that the management of the border
areas will require further attention in the light of our recent
experiences.
9.
In all of this, we were and we remain very clear that the three key
principles must be observed in all circumstances: (i) both sides should
strictly respect and observe the LAC, (ii) neither side should attempt
to unilaterally alter the status quo, and (iii) agreements and
understandings reached in the past must be fully abided by in their
entirety.
10.
Hon’ble Members would appreciate that as a result of the sustained
tension and specific developments in the border areas, our overall
relationship with China was bound to be impacted adversely. In the new
circumstances, it was obviously not possible to continue the normal
exchanges, interactions and activities as in the past. In this regard,
we made clear that the development of our ties were contingent on the
principles of mutual sensitivity, mutual respect and mutual interests.
11.
Throughout this period, Hon’ble Members would also be aware that
Government has maintained that India-China relations cannot be normal in
the absence of peace and tranquility in the border areas. The
combination of a firm and principled stance on the situation in the
border areas as well as our clearly articulated approach to the totality
of our ties have been the foundation of our engagement with China for
the last four years. We have been very clear that the restoration of
peace and tranquility would be the basis for the rest of the
relationship to move forward.
12.
Since 2020, our engagement was therefore focused on that objective.
This took place at various levels, involving different arms of the
government. I myself have had meetings with my Chinese counterpart, as
indeed has my senior colleague, Raksha Mantri ji. Our NSA has also
engaged his Chinese counterpart, both being the Special Representatives
on the boundary question.
13.
More detailed discussions were conducted by the Working Mechanism for
Cooperation and Coordination (WMCC) at the diplomatic level. Its
military counterpart was the Senior Highest Military Commanders meeting
(SHMC) mechanism. The interactions were naturally very tightly
coordinated with the combined presence in the negotiations of both
diplomatic and military officials. Since June 2020, 17 meetings of the
WMCC and 21 rounds of SHMC have taken place.
Sir,
14.
In this background, I would like to inform the House today about the
agreement reached on 21 October, 2024 regarding Depsang and Demchok. The
twin considerations of an unstable local situation and an impacted
bilateral relationship were clearly the drivers for these recent
endeavors. These two areas have been the focus of our discussions in
both WMCC and SHMC with the Chinese side since September 2022, when the
last disengagement agreement was concluded at Hot Springs area.
15.
In the lead up to the October 21 agreement, I had discussed both the
specific disengagement issue as well as the larger relationship with my
Chinese counterpart in Astana on 4 July and Vientiane on 25 July. Our
National Security Advisor and his Chinese counterpart also met in St.
Petersburg on 12 September. The problem in these two areas pertained
primarily to obstructions of our long-standing patrolling activity. In
Demchok, there was also the question of access by our nomadic population
to traditional grazing grounds, as well as to sites of significance to
the local people.
16.
As a result of this recent understanding arrived at after intensive
negotiations, resumption of patrolling to the traditional areas is
underway. It was initially tested by sending out patrols for
verification of disengagement on the ground and is being followed up by
regular activities as per the agreed understanding.
17.
Following the October 21 understanding, Prime Minister and President Xi
Jinping had a meeting on the sidelines of the BRICS Summit in Kazan on
October 23. They welcomed the understanding and directed the Foreign
Ministers to meet and stabilize and rebuild the relationship. The
Special Representatives are also to oversee the management of peace and
tranquility besides exploring a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable
solution to the boundary question.
18.
In pursuance of that, I recently held discussions with FM Wang Yi again
on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in Rio de Janeiro on November 18,
2024.
19.
Raksha Mantri has also met the Chinese Defense Minister Dong Jun at the
ASEAN Defence Ministers (ADMM+) meeting in Vientiane on November 20,
2024. The two Ministers discussed progress on the recent agreement on
disengagement, the need to address de-escalation and the requirement of
strengthening confidence building measures. They agreed on the
importance of continuing meetings and consultations at various levels.
Sir,
20.
The House will remember that the October 21, 2024 agreement is the
latest in the series of understandings in regard to the resolution of
the situation at various friction points in Eastern Ladakh. In the
aftermath of events in May/June 2020, and the initial disengagement in
Galwan Valley in July 2020, there was a Foreign Ministers meeting in
Moscow on 10 September, 2020.
21.
The Government’s position at that time was that the immediate task was
to ensure a comprehensive disengagement of troops in all the friction
areas. It was also emphasized that the large concentration of troops
along the LAC was not in accordance with the 1993 and 1996 Agreements.
The Indian side, it was made clear, would not countenance any attempts
to change the status quo unilaterally. We also expected that all
agreements and protocols pertaining to the management of the border
areas would be scrupulously followed.
Sir,
22.
Through you I would like to inform the House, that disengagement has
now been achieved in full in Eastern Ladakh through a step by step
process, culminating in Depsang and Demchok. With the task of
disengagement completed, it is now our expectation that discussions
would commence in regard to the remaining issues that we had placed on
the agenda.
23.
For the benefit of Hon’ble Members, I would also flag for your
attention the previous positions articulated by the Government in
Parliament previously on this issue. On 15 September, 2020, Raksha
Mantri ji had made a detailed statement on Chinese attempts to
transgress the LAC and the appropriate response given by our armed
forces. On 11 February, 2021, Raksha Mantri ji again briefed the House
about our disengagement agreement in the North and South banks of the
Pangong Lake.
24.
Thereafter, in August 2021, a third phase of disengagement took place
in the area of Gogra, whereby troops would henceforth be in their
respective bases. The next step took place in September 2022, pertaining
to the Hot Springs area. Again, forward deployments ceased in a phased,
coordinated and verified manner, resulting in the return of troops to
their respective areas. The most recent October 21, 2024 agreement comes
in the wake of the earlier ones. It completes the first phase of what
we had agreed to in Moscow in September 2020.
25.
As Members are aware, there is a long history of frictions,
transgressions and face offs in several sectors of the India-China
border. This goes back to Barahoti from 1954, to Longju in 1959, to
Sumdorong Chu from 1986-1995 and Depsang in 2013, amongst others. In the
past, earlier Governments have agreed to a range of steps to defuse
situations that have arisen at different times, including offers on our
side to create de-militarized zones, limited non-patrolling zones,
relocation or withdrawal of posts, disengagement of troops and
dismantlement of structures. Different locations have seen different
solutions being examined.
26.
Where the October 21 understanding is concerned, our objective has been
to ensure patrolling as in the past to the relevant patrolling points,
as well as resumption of grazing by our civilians as per longstanding
practice. This is indeed what we have agreed upon in regard to Depsang
and Demchok.
27.
In a few other places where friction occurred in 2020, steps of a
temporary and limited nature were worked out, based on local conditions,
to obviate the possibility of further friction. This, I must stress,
applies to both sides and can be revisited as the situation demands. In
that sense, our stance has been resolute and firm and serves our
national interest fully.
28.
The ensuring of our national security in this manner is the result of
cumulative and coordinated endeavors of many parts of the Government,
obviously centered around our defense and security forces. The
competence and professionalism of our services in this period was
displayed in our speedy and effective counter-deployment. In the
negotiations with China, the defence and diplomatic arms worked in
lockstep to ensure that our national interests were comprehensively met.
Sir,
29.
In that context, the House would also recognize that there has been a
significant improvement in the border infrastructure which has made such
effective counter-deployment possible. This is reflected, amongst
others, in the increase of border infrastructure allocations in the last
decade. The Border Roads Organization (BRO) alone has incurred three
times the expenditure level of what it was a decade ago. Whether it is
the length of the road networks, of bridges or of the number of tunnels,
there has been a substantial increase over the earlier period.
30.
Notable milestones in recent years include the Atal Tunnel to Lahul
Spiti, the Sela and Nechiphu Tunnels to Tawang, the Umlingla Pass road
in Southern Ladakh and the extended opening of the Zojila Axis. Work is
progressing on some strategically important roads and air fields in
Ladakh. The adoption of new technologies in high altitude, remote,
inaccessible and permafrost areas has also been significant. All of this
reflects the Government’s firm commitment to protecting our borders and
ensuring that our armed forces get the facilities and the logistical
support that they deserve.
31.
Finally Sir, let me share with Hon’ble Members our expectation
regarding the direction of our ties with China in the near future. Our
relationship had progressed in many domains, but was obviously
negatively affected by recent events. We are clear that the maintenance
of peace and tranquility in border areas is a pre-requisite for the
development of our ties. In the coming days, we will be discussing both
de-escalation as well as effective management of our activities in the
border areas.
32.
The conclusion of the disengagement phase now allows us to consider
other aspects of our bilateral engagement in a calibrated manner,
keeping our national security interests first and foremost. In my recent
meeting with FM Wang Yi, we reached an understanding that the Special
Representatives and the Foreign Secretary level mechanisms will be
convening soon.
33.
I thank you Sir and the Hon’ble Members for their attention and am
confident that the Government has their full support in addressing the
complexities of this important relationship.