Türkiye stands to gain should a new and stable Syria emerge
Summary: Türkiye’s President Erdoğan knew before it happened that
HTS would launch its offensive against the al-Assad regime but he will
have been surprised at the speed of the victory and now must weigh up
how to play it to his best advantage.
We thank Joshua Levkowitz for today’s newsletter. Joshua is a Middle
East analyst and researcher based in Istanbul. His work has been
featured in The Atlantic, Foreign Policy, and Al-Monitor, among others.
It took Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad and his allies four years to
take back Aleppo after losing it to Syrian opposition forces back in
2012. He lost it in just four days in November. A week later, he lost
the capital and fled the country. The offensive came as a surprise to
most, but not to Türkiye who has strong influence over the rebels.
Ankara is now the primary foreign benefactor across key Syrian cities including Idlib, Aleppo, Hama,
and Damascus. The question now is how Turkish President Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan will play his strengthened hand in Syria’s nearly fourteen-year
civil war. Will Türkiye focus on its allies securing what had been
Syrian government-controlled areas? Or will Erdoğan push for a greater
focus on the areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF),
made up primarily of Kurds, that he deems as an existential security
threat on Türkiye’s southern border? How will these changes enable the
Turkish government’s plan to repatriate millions of Syrians on its soil?
Even in what has been an unprecedented year that has seen conflicts
raging across the Middle East the significance of the sudden rout of
regime forces cannot be overstated. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) under Abu
Mohammed al-Jolani was the lead rebel force but it was joined by the
Ankara-backed Syrian National Army and other rebel factions.
Türkiye had intervened to delay
the offensive on more than one occasion. But the decision to give the
greenlight came after Erdoğan had nothing to show for the offer he extended to al-Assad to hold talks last July. Türkiye hosts
more than 3 million Syrian refugees who, after years of xenophobic
attacks have become a major target for much of the Turkish population
and a political cudgel that Erdoğan’s rivals are using against him.
Getting the refugees out of the country and back into Syria is for him a
top priority. But it was one not shared by al-Assad. Most recently, in
November, he snubbed
the Turkish president once again after Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin
Salman requested that the two meet. This appeared to be the final straw.
The HTS victory also comes amid wider regional dynamics. Israel’s
campaign against Hezbollah and Iran had severely downgraded their
ability or willingness to protect the regime. Russia, al-Assad’s other
major patron, has been tied down with its war in Ukraine and had grown
increasingly frustrated by al-Assad’s recalcitrance toward normalising
ties with Türkiye, a NATO member and the most significant of Syria’s
neighbours that had yet to normalise relations with the Assad regime.
The Kremlin had viewed such a move as yet another way to drive wedges
into the NATO alliance.
Lastly, the window was closing before the incoming US administration
under President Donald Trump returned to power. In 2019, Trump had ordered
the withdrawal of American troops from northeastern Syria. US forces
partner with the Kurdish-led SDF in the fight against the Islamic State.
Trump’s decision was later overturned, and these troops continue to act
as a deterrent against Türkiye’s ambitions. Ankara views the Kurdish
regions in Syria as an extension of the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK), a
group that fights for Kurdish autonomy and is banned in Türkiye as a
terrorist organisation. With HTS capturing
Damascus on December 8th, Erdoğan will now need to decide how to best
secure his major goals: to weaken the SDF and remove the refugees from
Turkish soil.
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On Tuesday night the Israeli Navy carried out a large-scale operation to destroy the former Assad regime's navy fleet in Syria
Hundreds of Syrian refugees gathered
at the Cilvegozu and Oncupinar border crossings a day after rebels
seized Damascus. While Turkish officials have not provided figures on
the number of Syrians who have departed, they announced plans to open a
third border crossing ahead of anticipated congestion. "We will also
manage the processing of immigrants' voluntary returns in a way
befitting our hosting" Erdoğan said.
Turkish municipalities run by the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), including in Ankara,
have launched campaigns to encourage the departure of Syrian refugees.
In recent elections, the CHP made the return of the refugees back to
Syria a key part of its platform.
Meanwhile government-backed media outlets have portrayed
HTS as a local actor committed to the well-being of the Syrian people
rather than a global jihadist threat. It echoes the same line that HTS
and its leader Abu Mohammed al-Jolani have presented to the world and
makes the removal of the refugees politically palatable.
Domestically, Erdoğan will undoubtedly receive a major boost through
the return of Syrian refugees. Another benefit will accrue: his cronies
in the construction sector are set to become fabulously wealthy in the
reconstruction of Syria. The stocks of major Turkish cement and
construction companies surged the day markets opened after the fall of the Al-Assad government.
While the Biden administration has not been clear
on these recent developments, a reflection of the confusion that has
characterised its Middle East policy, the war had long strained
US-Turkish ties. The removal of al-Assad can turn the page in this
relationship, offering Erdoğan a fresh opportunity with the incoming
Trump administration. Furthermore Erdoğan after long being vulnerable to
Putin’s policies in Syria has now gained the upper hand over Russia.
Set against those wins however is Israel’s response. The Israelis too
were caught flatfooted by the speed of the HTS victory. They have
reacted with a massive retaliation invading Syria on the ground and
through the air destroying much of the former regime’s military hardware
including its naval fleet. Israel’s stated position is that it could
not allow Syria’s new Islamist rulers access to weaponry that could be
used against it. The Turks have responded with a strong condemnation of Israel’s actions.
However, it remains unclear how much control Ankara has over events
that are moving very quickly especially as Erdoğan seeks to avoid direct
conflict with foreign states. The Turkish president has a tricky path
to navigate but he has little choice but to support a post-Assad Syria
in its transition. If not, the situation can quickly turn against
Türkiye and create problems anew for Erdoğan—the same ones he has been
having to deal with over the last decade.
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