Shabwa governorate, which includes the main road from Saudi Arabia to
Aden, was contested between the Huthis and their opponents until late
2021 when they were expelled by UAE and STC aligned forces, supported by
the Amaliqa and Tareq Saleh’s NRF. Awadh al Awlaqi, a separatist was
then appointed as governor leaving the governorate a site for a muted
struggle between the STC separatists and the ‘mainstream’ unitary IRG.
Hadhramaut is large and holds hydrocarbon resources and their export
facilities. Historically it has three main parts, the scarcely inhabited
plateaux north and south of the Wadi [valley] with Seiyun as its
capital, and the coastal region with Mukalla the main port and capital
of the governorate. For the past three years it has been the focus of
competition between the unitary IRG which controls the wadi and most of
the plateaux and the coastal strip under UAE-supported Elite Forces more
or less aligned with the STC. Vice President Faraj al Bahsani was both
governor and head of the Second Military region when the PLC was formed
in April 2022 but was then removed from both these positions. He has
aligned with the STC, thus strengthening this faction within the PLC. By
contrast the ‘wadi and desert’ is semi-autonomous with a Deputy
Governor in charge and is the base for the First Military Region,
accused by the separatists of being ‘northern’ and Islah dominated.
For the past three years or so, the struggle for control of the
governorate is simultaneously between the interior, including the border
crossing with Saudi Arabia, under the leadership of President al Alimi
and his supporters, more closely aligned with the Saudis, and the
coastal areas under Emirati and STC influence. Both Yemeni sides have
set up ‘tribal organisations’ which claim to represent the governorate
as a whole. To overcome these rivalries, the Saudis supported the
creation of the Hadhramaut National Council in 2023, a model which they
are trying to reproduce in other governorates.
One important reason for the complexity in Hadhramaut is that historically sada
[descendants of the Prophet] have been the most powerful political
element in the governorate while the numerical majority of the
population are low status agriculturalists who are not tribesmen. Hence
the tribes are less powerful than they would like and is assumed by the
external forces. Another major reason is that fundamentally, all
Hadhramis are primarily loyal to Hadhramaut itself; none of them want to
be ruled from Aden or elsewhere by the likes of the STC whom they
consider to be uncouth. In addition, Hadhramaut is the only governorate
of the country which has a sufficient economic base to be
self-sustaining should the country fracture even further.
The main asset of the far eastern al Mahra governorate is its
position on the border with Oman which wants to retain influence,
despite competition from both Saudis and Emiratis, the former currently
having the upper hand. The al Mahra leadership is aligned with the IRG
as a whole and avoids conflict with the southern separatists. It has no
representative on the PLC.
President of the PLC, Rashad al Alimi, former minister of the
Interior was without any military force of his own when he was appointed
in 2022. Since then, the Saudis have set up and equipped the National
Shield Forces (Republican Decree 18 of 2023), which they finance and
which is deployed mainly in Hadhramaut, along the border with Saudi
Arabia and in Aden. The two remaining members of the PLC, Abdullah al
Alimi [no relation to the president] from Shabwa and Othman Mujalli from
Saada also lack military forces. This divided PLC is complemented by a
formal government, since February this year led by Prime Minister Ahmed
Awadh bin Mubarak, with ministers who have little power given the dire
financial situation [see our posting of September 20 2024]
and either work from Aden under pressure from the STC or spend much of
their time abroad. Currently bin Mubarak’s relationship with the
President is reputed to be under considerable stress. As usual, we can
conclude by remembering that the leadership’s ongoing disunity worsens
living conditions for millions of Yemenis.
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