It Is Not Too Late: A Case for Long-Range Strikes Against Russia
President
Joe Biden's decision to loosen restrictions on the use of U.S.-supplied
long-range missile systems could give Ukraine a window of opportunity
to make strategic gains in its war against Russia.
By Douglas Lute - November 26, 2024
With
President-elect Donald Trump set to take office on January 20, little
time remains to make a definitively positive impact on the war in
Ukraine. The Joe Biden administration can accelerate authorized and
appropriated military support over the next sixty days, reducing the
backlog of promised capabilities. American contractors can be deployed
to Ukraine to sustain U.S. systems. Yet with two months remaining, the
oft-repeated line that there is no silver bullet for Biden to
dramatically change the momentum of the war rings true—with one
potential exception: a campaign of long-range strikes to isolate the
Russian army occupying Ukraine.
The Situation
As
the fighting in Ukraine grinds through its third year, the battlefield
stands in rough stalemate. Both sides stagger from military force and
materiel losses. Yet, the raw reality in this war of attrition gives an
unmistakable advantage to Russia. Indeed, while recent events appear to
signal a gradual shift in Russia’s favor, it remains true that tactical
gains on the ground—in the Donbas for Russia and in Kursk for
Ukraine—have not produced strategic momentum for anyone.
Over
the course of the war, the United States and its fifty-nation coalition
have kept Ukraine alive with historic levels of military assistance.
But that Western support has consistently been an ongoing exercise in
self-doubt. Incrementalism became the hallmark of Western support early
on. At first, small arms and ammunition flowed in, followed by
shoulder-fired anti-tank and anti-air missiles. Over time, more
sophisticated air defense, artillery, armored vehicles, and, eventually,
F-16 fighter aircraft made their way to the battlefield. But each
decision to intensify materiel support to the Ukrainians came only after
time-consuming bureaucratic discussions, options papers, and roundtable
decision-making, followed by further delays in actually delivering
systems to Ukrainian forces. Moreover, the West’s commitment to support
Ukraine “as long as it takes” has often been too little, too late,
providing just enough for Ukraine not to lose, but not enough for
Ukraine to win.
The best opportunity for a decisive Ukrainian win
on the battlefield to date was the counteroffensive Kyiv conducted in
mid-2023. Yet, chiefly because of Western incrementalism, that chance
was squandered. Russian occupiers had months to prepare defenses in
depth, and Ukraine’s forces lacked sufficient combined-arms capabilities
and training to exploit their gains. In one of the toughest battlefield
tasks—deliberate assaults on prepared defenses—the Ukrainians failed to
crack the Russian lines and regain significant ground. Since then, a
bloody stalemate has set in.
Policy Concerns
Western
leaders have explained their cautious incremental support in at least
three ways. First, they wanted to avoid dramatically escalating the war,
possibly provoking Russia to use nuclear weapons. Second, they had
serious concerns regarding the Ukrainians’ ability to make effective use
of the equipment they were being given. Third, they harbored doubts
about the effects of those transfers on the readiness of their own
forces.
Initially, escalation concerns dominated. The fear was
that Russia could feel forced to escalate dramatically in response to
Ukrainian gains, perhaps even crossing the nuclear threshold. After
nearly three years of battlefield experience, however, it is now clear
that Russia will stay conventional, using every means in its arsenal
short of its nuclear weapons to strike Ukraine, even when declared red
lines are crossed. Yes, after repeated battlefield setbacks, Russia has,
in fact, responded with massive attacks on Ukrainian civilians and
infrastructure. Yet there has been no evidence of a move toward using
nuclear weapons, despite humiliating losses by Russia in the early weeks
around Kyiv, the 2022 collapse around Kharkiv, the withdrawal from
Kherson, the defeat of the Black Sea fleet in Crimea, Ukrainian attacks
on military targets inside Russia, and, most recently, the occupation by
Ukrainian forces of Russian territory in Kursk. Putin has repeatedly
mentioned Russia’s nuclear capabilities, announced revisions to Russian
nuclear doctrine and used nuclear-capable missile systems with
conventional payloads to attack Ukraine. Nonetheless, nuclear
deterrence appears still to work—likely due to a combination of the
early American refreshing of the consequences of crossing the nuclear
threshold combined with Chinese and Indian warnings to Russian President
Vladimir Putin not to cross the nuclear red line.
The second
repeated explanation for cautious incremental support has cited the
limits of the Ukrainian ability to absorb increased assistance. Again,
the experience of the past three years refutes this argument. Ukraine
has repeatedly received, integrated, and crafted innovative adaptations
of Western military systems at rates unknown even among the nations
providing the systems. Perhaps the most compelling example is the
integration of a wide array of air defense capabilities into a
nation-wide system defending against Russian attacks on civilian
targets—attacks that are unprecedented in scale, scope, and duration. In
a literal fight for its life, Ukraine has repeatedly proven its ability
to make effective use of every capability provided.
Third,
Western leaders have paused in providing military assistance to Ukraine
to consider the readiness of their own national forces. This issue
applies most critically to “low density, high demand systems,” such as
Patriot air defense and long-range precision-strike systems. Such
concerns are legitimate, but risks to readiness can be mitigated, if not
eliminated entirely. For example, the Biden administration
reprioritized Patriot missile sales to third countries, placing Ukraine
at the top of the list and deferring delivery to others, with no
obviously adverse consequences to those third parties. Ultimately,
decisions hinge on what risks to accept when weighed against giving
Ukraine what it needs today.
Attacking Russia’s Weakness
Providing
Ukraine significant quantity of long-range, precision-strike systems
and permitting their use on military targets inside Russian can still
make a significant difference. While Ukraine has struck targets inside
Russia using its own systems, those efforts have been insufficient in
scale and scope to have an operational impact. If accurate, reports that
President Biden has removed some geographic restrictions on Ukraine’s
use of U.S. systems is a step in the right direction. To be sure, a
campaign of precision strikes inside Russia alone will not win the war,
but it could shift the momentum on the battlefield in Ukraine’s favor,
moving Kyiv and its supporters to a position of strength when meaningful
negotiations can be set up.
The
reason such a campaign holds promise has to do with the nature of the
five hundred thousand Russian soldiers occupying Ukrainian sovereign
territory. The Russian army reflects Russian society: top-down control,
indiscipline, and corruption. The war in Ukraine reveals the futility of
Putin’s ten-year investment program to modernize his army. Nothing has
succeeded—not organizational reform, the introduction of new equipment,
or enhanced training. The Russians have failed on every front. Almost
three years after the February 2022 invasion Russia has suffered an
estimated six hundred thousand casualties, and its occupying force
either remains entrenched behind deep defensive belts or launches
human-wave assaults that yield only tactical gains. Russia fields a
large but low-grade force: poorly equipped, poorly trained, poorly led,
motivated by coercion, and undisciplined in the extreme.
Moreover,
the Russian army relies on resupply from Russia by way of a network of
railroads. Rail-based logistics dominate because Russian military
doctrine prioritizes mass, and supplies need to traverse the extended
distances within Russia and beyond. Only railroads can fill the demand,
and railroads are vulnerable to long-range strikes. Physical
infrastructure—track, bridges, tunnels, switching stations, engine
yards, diesel fuel depots—can be struck and restruck to isolate the
occupying Russian army. The most obvious such target is the Kerch Strait
bridge, connecting Russia to the occupied Crimean Peninsula. This
bridge and rail constitute a key lifeline for the Russian forces
occupying sovereign Ukrainian territory. Similarly, other rail lines
supply the Russians occupying four provinces of mainland Ukraine.
Operational Benefits
Long-range
strikes into Russia open several opportunities for Ukraine. The
operational objective of a long-range strike campaign would be to
isolate the Russian occupying army by attacking its low-quality force
dependent on rail resupply while avoiding the strength of the dug-in
Russian defenses along the frontline. Russia cannot mitigate its
vulnerabilities in the near term. Degrading Russian logistics will take
on an amplified significance as winter weather sets in and much of the
infrastructure of the occupied territory has been destroyed. Isolation
from logistics can lead to additional degradation of the Russian forces,
potentially including desertions, revolts against leaders, and even a
collapse of military forces, making continued occupation untenable. Of
course, a potential Russian army collapse would severely challenge the
Kremlin politically and serve to dramatically shift the momentum in
favor of Ukraine, setting the stage for meaningful negotiations.
The
Biden administration could set this campaign in motion now and the
Trump administration could use it—or even the threat of it—to pursue the
president-elect’s election campaign promise to end the war. The single
most important resource to this end is the U.S. ATACMS—Army Tactical
Missile System—a ballistic missile with a roughly two hundred–mile range
that is already in the hands of the Ukrainian army but in insufficient
quantity and with restrictions placed on its use against targets inside
Russia. If the United States took the lead, other long-range missile
systems from France and the United Kingdom that have been provided to
Ukraine could contribute to the campaign. Germany, too, could be
persuaded to join the effort by providing Ukraine its Taurus missile
system.
A Window of Opportunity
Early
concerns about potential Russian escalation if U.S. systems strike
inside Russia are now less compelling given the experience of the past
three years. Most recently, Ukrainian forces operated U.S. combat
vehicles in the Kursk province of Russia without a change in Russian
escalation. There can be no concern about Ukraine’s ability to absorb
sophisticated capabilities as they already have employed ATACMS (albeit
in limited numbers). The risk to U.S. military readiness remains a
concern but several facts
can help place this concern in perspective. More than 3,700 ATACMS have
been produced over the past 30 years, yet only approximately 600 have
ever been fired by U.S. forces in combat. Roughly five hundred new
ATACMS are produced each year. Some missiles are now approaching
obsolescence as they are replaced by newer models. Thus, it seems safe
to estimate that the United States holds enough ATACMS to support
Ukraine and still remain ready for other contingencies. Moreover, beyond
the United States, eight other countries (including four NATO allies)
also have the capability and six more countries are contracted to
receive ATACMS (including three NATO allies and even forty missiles
destined for Morocco). Concerns over degrading U.S. readiness can also
be addressed if the United States were to authorize those nations with
systems to provide them to Ukraine and by deciding that scheduled
contract deliveries will be amended to prioritize Ukraine, as was done
with Patriot missiles.
In sum, there is no silver bullet, no
single military capability to ensure a positive outcome for Ukraine. War
is not that simple. It is also true that war requires adaptation. There
are viable campaign adaptations that could still change the momentum in
Ukraine’s favor, even in the next two months, moving it away from a war
of attrition that ultimately favors Russia and placing Ukraine in a
position of greater strength when meaningful negotiations become a
possibility. It is not too late to do the right thing and give Ukraine
what it needs.
Douglas E. Lute is the former U.S. ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).