While the Houthis are continuing to attack Israel and vessels in the Red Sea, the Iraqi front has been quiet since the cease-fire agreement with Lebanon was signed a month ago. Ostensibly, the basis for the cease-fire on this front is the principle of the "unity of fronts," which, theoretically at least, all Iran's proxies are committed to.
According to this principle, just as war is a common venture, so is a cease-fire. This principle, which the Houthis show no sign of adhering to, and which was led and coordinated by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, is based on a formula by which a cessation of the war in Gaza will entail a cease-fire on Hezbollah's part, but Nasrallah never made a commitment on behalf of other Iranian proxies.
More importantly, Hezbollah was compelled to agree to a cease-fire before one was reached in Gaza, with no certainty regarding if and when one will be reached there. In this situation, even before the successful move of the Syrian rebels who toppled the Assad regime, Iran's proxies faced a dilemma. Does a cease-fire in Lebanon oblige them even though the war in Gaza continues, or should they abide by the principle laid down by Iran, according to which each proxy is free to take action based on the circumstances prevailing in the country in which it operates.
This principle was designed to provide Tehran with room for denial and for dissociation from responsibility for the actions of its proxies, as if they are not coordinated and operated by Tehran. Iran thereby sought to protect itself from direct attacks. This is no longer sufficient for contending with the new reality in Syria.
Iran, most of whose forces withdrew or fled Syria, and which has lost its military bases there, has not yet had direct contact with the new Syrian leadership, and is now obliged to examine its moves in the region, not just in relation to Israel. It has to quickly shape a new strategy which will keep alive its ability to influence events in Lebanon and to look after the running expenses and the subsequent rehabilitation of Hezbollah.
A man pours water on a symbolic tomb erected after the assassination of Hassan Nasrallah, in Iraq, in November.Credit: Anmar Khalil/AP
It also has to contend with the loss of control in Syria, especially vis-à-vis Turkey's "friendly takeover," in the words of President-elect Trump, of Syria's power centers. It must also prepare for the possibility that European countries will again call on the UN Security Council to impose on it international sanctions, given its ongoing violations of the nuclear accord, and to protect assets it still holds, mainly its influence in Iraq.
The issue of a continued participation of pro-Iranian Iraqi militias in the war is an essential part of the web of Iranian considerations, and according to reports from Iraq and Lebanon, it seems that this issue has found a coordinated and consensual solution.
In an interview to the Iraqi news agency Shafaq News given by Kazem al-Fartousi, the spokesman of the Sayyid al-Shuhada militia, one of the armed militias belonging to the "supporting front," al-Fartousi said that the militia's operations against Israel were tied to operations carried out by Hezbollah in Lebanon. When a cease-fire agreement was reached, the Iraqi militia's operations ceased as well, he said. He added that there were partners in Iraq that had expressed their reservations about such operations, and that his militia needed to listen to them.
On Sunday, the Lebanese al-Akhbar website, which is close to Hezbollah, published a detailed and explicit report according to which all the militias had come to an agreement with the Iraqi government regarding the cessation of operations against Israel and on refraining from commenting on developments in Syria, "given the regional and international demands for dismantling the militias and handing their weapons over to states they were operating in." According to the source on which this report was based, a senior member of the Iraqi al-Nujaba militia had said that Iran had given it the freedom to make decisions with regard to developments in Syria.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (left) with his Iraqi counterpart, Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein, at a press conference, in Baghdad in December.Credit: Hadi Mizban/AP
Iraq is a key country for Iran, and it was the first country to recognize Iraq's government after the fall of Saddam Hussein. It rushed to set up consulates in the Kurdish region and became Iraq's ally and its most important trading partner. It thereby became the biggest beneficiary of the Second Gulf War. The coup in Syria now places Iran and the militias under its patronage, and Iraq's government, at an unprecedented crossroad.
During the first days of the insurrection, when it was unclear where the rebels were headed, and mainly, what success they were reaping, Iraq's government took a position of condemning the rebellion, demanding that it leave the situation in Syria intact. When the extent of the rebels' success became known, the government changed its stance and started adapting to the new situation, calling for establishing a country ruled by law in Syria, one which would protect minority rights.
In tandem, Iraq's prime minister, Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani, held a series of meetings with regional leaders in order to coordinate their positions. Iraq "hosted" 3,000 Syrian soldiers who had fled to its territory, but it very quickly ordered them to return to Syria after disarming them, planning to return their weapons to the Syrian government. Baghdad also found itself facing heavy international pressure, mainly American, asking Iraq to dismantle the "popular mobilization," including mainly the pro-Iranian militias.
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' Al Sudani with U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, in Baghdad, in December.Credit: AFP/-
The problem is that the Iraqi militias have become an integral part of the regime. The Islamic State takeover of large swaths of Iraq in 2014 and the pitiful weakness of Iraq's army brought about the decision to launch a "popular mobilization," based on a religious ruling promulgated by the senior Shi'ite cleric, Ali al-Sistani, in conjunction with the instructions of Iraq's prime minister at the time, Nouri al-Maliki. "The popular mobilization," which operated more than 70 militias, also engendered a group of pro-Iranian militias, which became part of Iran's "ring of fire."
These militias are not cut from the same cloth. Some of them are loyal to Ali al-Sistani, a vehement political and ideological opponent of the Iranian system of government. Others enjoy the patronage of politicians and clerics who are not necessarily supporters of Iran. However, the pro-Iranian militias are not only a military arm of Tehran. They serve as political leverage akin to that exercised by Hezbollah in Lebanon. The "popular mobilization" militias have become an official and inseparable part of Iraq's security forces, and these militias are financed by its state budget.
Iraqi army soldiers in a parade to mark the anniversary of the victory over ISIS, in Baghdad, in December.Credit: Ahmad Al-Rubaye/AFP
However, the pro-Iranian militias also have a parallel stream of funding, with Iranian supplies of money and arms. Some funding, perhaps the majority, is based on a forced takeover of many branches of the economy, including private "banks," bids for government-funded projects, oil terminals, the collection of transit fees and local taxes. This military-financial complex, operating according to the model set up by the Revolutionary Guards in Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon, has turned them into a parallel government with power and influence on the policies of the official government.
But, with power comes the responsibility to protect these assets. The need to balance the militias' internal Iraqi interests and those of Iran, and these interests and their involvement in international conflicts, such as the wars in Gaza and Lebanon, has produced more than a few conflicts. One result of these is that only some of the pro-Iranian militias took part in the "support front" or the "unity of fronts," in which they attacked Israeli and American targets, while other militias stayed on the sidelines.
An exhibition of weapons confiscated by Iraqi security forces, in Baghdad, on Monday.Credit: Ahmad Al-Rubaye/AFP
It's doubtful that Iraq's government can even declare its intention of dismantling these militias, let alone actually start to do this, without causing a political crisis with subsequent violent clashes in the streets. In order to avoid this, it must attain "military quiet" (for Iran as well), in order to offset not only international pressure, but also to prevent the possibility of an Iraqi civil insurrection by large sectors of the population who may draw encouragement from the success of such an insurrection in Syria. These are sectors which for years have been nurturing opposition to Iran's influence in Iraq.
The militias' decision, coordinated with Iran, to desist from firing at Israel and at American targets could, at least in the short run, give the governments in Iraq and Iran the political calm they need until things become clearer in Syria, and until President Trump takes over in the White House.