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New tensions have expedited Tokyo’s long-term plans.
By: Geopolitical Futures
Japan’s military
had a busy 2024, and all indicators point to an even busier 2025. The
year was punctuated by an announcement from Prime Minister Shigeru
Ishiba that Tokyo would increase military spending, engage in more
multilateral military exercises and sign additional defense agreements
with regional allies – all in an effort to deter aggression from China,
Russia and North Korea.
Geography largely
explains why Japan is often at odds with its neighbors. The Japanese
archipelago blocks the Korean Peninsula and the southernmost point of
Russia from direct access to the Pacific. It does likewise for the
northeastern Chinese regions around Shanghai. More, Japan itself has few
natural resources – it has to import them from elsewhere – making it
disproportionately reliant on the same sea lanes. Historically, this
reliance on others for resources has compelled Japan to seek territory
by force in mainland Asia, creating historical grievances that exist
even today. Add to this the fact that Japan is Washington’s most
steadfast ally in the Asia Pacific, and you can see why it butts heads
with its neighbors.
And tensions are
certainly high today. After Russia invaded Ukraine, Washington built a
coalition of countries willing to put sanctions on the Russian economy –
in which Japan was an early participant. One of the ways Russia
responded to the sanctions was to increase military posturing in the
Pacific, including exercises on the disputed Kuril Islands, joint
maneuvers with China’s military and sending aircraft over the Bering
Strait. (The Kuril Islands, which are disputed by Japan, are vital to
Russia’s ability to maneuver from Vladivostok to the Pacific.) China,
for its part, has increased its military presence in the South China Sea
and its posturing toward Taiwan. Beijing depends on maritime access,
especially in the South China Sea, to support its export-oriented
economy and to maintain its position over Taiwan. (This is to say
nothing of the potential resources that can theoretically be mined in
the South China Sea.) Then there is North Korea, whose missile tests
tend to take place over the Sea of Japan. The government in Pyongyang
has allied itself with Russia, sending troops to the battlefields in
exchange for food and electricity. Taken together, these actions remind
Tokyo of how vulnerable it is in the region.
This
vulnerability likely accounts for why its military posture has changed
so dramatically throughout history. For much of its history, Japan has
used its island geography as insulation against threats. However, there
are two major exceptions to this rule: the invasion of Korea in the 16th
century and the expansionism leading up to World War II, both of which
were precipitated by a perceived scarcity of resources. The latter era
was characterized by the Japanese occupation of the Korean Peninsula,
Manchuria, a large swatch of mainland China’s coast and modern-day
Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia and the Philippines. After World War
II, Japan was forced to demilitarize, and elements of pacifism were
enshrined in its constitution. (Even today, Japan’s military is known as
the Self-Defense Forces.) Tokyo’s close relationship with Washington
made it so that it didn’t need an offensive military of its own. But now
that the U.S. is trying to reduce its military footprint in certain
parts of the world, it wants its allies to assume more responsibility in
ensuring stability. Hence the efforts by Tokyo to rebuild its military.
But
remilitarization doesn’t necessarily mean aggression. In fact, Japan’s
behavior clearly shows that Tokyo is pursuing a policy of denial
deterrence, which essentially forces enemies to look at Japan’s military
and decide the benefits of attack aren’t worth the costs. The strategy
suits Japan for several reasons. One, the country’s geographic position
naturally blocks vital sea lanes. Two, the strategy accommodates Japan’s
national security needs without running afoul of its constitutional
constraints, which still allow the military to participate in
“collective self-defense” with its allies. Three, it lends itself to and
benefits from increased cooperation with regional partners. Japan
recently signed a comprehensive strategic partnership with Vietnam,
participated in military drills with South Korea and conducted training
operations with India, Australia, the Philippines, South Korea,
Singapore, the United States and several others.
The fourth and
perhaps most important reason is that the numbers do not favor Japan,
especially from an offensive position. Its military consists of about
260,000 troops, about 540 tanks, 720 aircraft (including 320 fighter
jet), 154 naval vessels with 22 submarines and one light aircraft
carrier. For comparison, China boasts 2 million active-duty soldiers
with 4,950 tanks, more than 3,300 aircraft, some 370 warships with 60
subs (12 of which are nuclear-powered) and two aircraft carriers.
Russia’s and North Korea’s militaries are also much larger. Japanese
demographics are also bad: Its aging population will prevent it from
reaching Chinese, Russian or North Korean numbers anytime soon, and
recruitment efforts have fallen short of expectations. (Japan was 50
percent short of its recruitment goal for last year.)
Japan has looked
to its allies – and technology – to try to overcome these shortcomings.
It has a defense agreement with the United States whereby it hosts
55,000 U.S. troops and a U.S. carrier strike group, and the U.S.
supplies Japan with weapon systems that are generally regarded as more
advanced than the Chinese systems to compensate for a lack of manpower.
Japan is also working with Italy and the United Kingdom to develop
modern fighter jets to replace its F-2s. And it recently announced joint
development and production of Australian frigates to reinforce ties and
raise Japan’s naval capabilities.
Crucially,
modernizing a military is not without challenges. One of the biggest
constraints Japan faces is the value of the Japanese yen, which is at a
38-year low. The government is taking steps to reverse the fall, but
doing so will take time. And until the yen gets stronger, military
purchases will be all the more expensive. This explains why the
parliament has recently approved a budget that will levy a 4 percent tax
rate on corporations and a 1 percent rate on personal income to pay for
additional defense spending. The prime minister’s goal is for military
spending to reach 2 percent of gross domestic product by 2027.
Winston Churchill
said that having a large and efficient military acts as a deterrent to
foreign forces, noting that “War will be avoided, in present
circumstances, only by the accumulation of deterrents against the
aggressor.” But the second part of his quote is perhaps even more apt
for modern-day Japan: “If our defenses are weak, we must seek allies.” |