The Houthis Are Undeterred
Military escalation will not end the group’s terror campaign.
The U.S. mission to deter and degrade the Houthis is not working. In the last week of 2024, the militant group launched a new wave of missile and drone attacks on Israel and shipping lanes in the Red Sea which led to strikes by the United States on military targets on the coast of Yemen. All told, in December alone, the Houthis fired on several U.S. Navy and merchant ships, and conducted ten drone and missile attacks on Israel. Israel and the United States retaliated five times in total, knocking out port and energy infrastructure and Houthi military positions, but the Houthis continue to fire back. In the process, friendly fire brought down a U.S. FA-18 fighter jet, thankfully sparing its crew. This cost-benefit ratio is not sustainable. Houthi operations and ambitions have not been seriously eroded, but U.S. military readiness and reputation have. Washington needs a new strategy, one that is focused on the sources of the Houthis’ growing power and not simply on its symptoms on display in the Red Sea.
Just over a year ago, in December 2023, Washington established a multinational operation to defend merchant ships and restore freedom of navigation in the wake of Houthi attacks that threatened some 12 percent of global shipping transiting through a chokepoint known as the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. The Houthis maintain that their aim is forcing Israel to end its war in Gaza, but they have indiscriminately targeted international shipping. After a United Nations Security Council resolution—adopted last January, though China and Russia abstained—failed to stop the Houthi campaign, Washington and London added an offensive dimension, Operation Poseidon Archer, to erode Houthi military capabilities. These U.S.-led operations, however, received little support from partners inside and outside the region—not even from those hurt the most. All the while, Russian and Chinese flagged ships, the illicit traders serving these nations, and Iran sail largely unbothered after paying or negotiating for safe passage.
In August, nine months into the U.S. military campaigns, the head of the U.S. Navy in the Middle East, Vice Admiral George Wikoff, publicly declared that U.S. defensive efforts and strikes will not deter the Houthis. “The solution is not going to come at the end of a weapon system,” he said. Little has changed that conclusion. Attacks on shipping have dropped largely because there are fewer targets—shipping is down by around two-thirds—but freedom of navigation has not been restored. Sporadic attacks, including claims of a December 27 strike on a Maersk container ship in the Arabian Sea and a December 31 assault on the USS Harry S. Truman, continue to force most Western shipping to take lengthier, more expensive but safer routes around Africa’s southern tip.
Meanwhile, the Houthis have stepped up direct missile and drone attacks on Israel in recent weeks. These have received less attention than the Red Sea strikes, but the Houthis have fired more than 200 missiles and 170 drones at Israel since Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023 attack. Nearly all attacks on Israel have been intercepted, but one Israeli has been killed and dozens wounded—mostly from falling debris and increasingly frequent dashes to shelters. Near-daily attacks have prompted Israeli to call for a coordinated multinational response and warn the Houthis that they will suffer the same fate as Hamas and Hezbollah—both of which have seen their operational capacity decimated by punishing Israeli airstrikes.
Such dire threats and military escalation will not end the Houthi campaign, however, because the Houthis believe they are winning. Unlike the regime in Tehran or Hezbollah, the Houthis have little to lose materially or reputationally. Yemenis do not receive or expect the Houthis to provide services like food, medical care, or education. In any case, after nearly a decade of bombings from Saudi Arabia, the Houthis are dug in and can absorb intense attacks—while their importance and popularity have soared with each blow.
The Houthis are the only member of Iran’s Axis of Resistance to have emerged from Oct. 7 stronger, wealthier, and emboldened. No longer content to focus their sights just on Yemen, their growing ambitions to fill the void left by Iran’s crumbling axis cannot be ignored. With new recruits, filled coffers, and closer ties, including reported assistance from Russia, this expansionist Houthi resistance movement threatens to fuel new conflicts that pose risks to U.S. forces and partners in the region and possibly beyond. The Houthis have already linked up with al-Shabab, the al Qaeda affiliate based in Somalia, and become the main source of ammunition in East Africa, deepening their destabilizing influence in a region already suffering from a convulsion of violence. They have also threatened to resume attacks on Saudi oil and port infrastructure, which could roil global oil markets, and have previously launched multiple ballistic missile and drone attacks on the United Arab Emirates.
While the Houthis can continue their attacks with relatively cheap drones and missiles and endure counterattacks indefinitely, the United States is burning through billions of dollars and years worth of production of scarce munitions that would be needed to fight a war in the Pacific. Washington may be spending as much as $570 million per month on a mission that has failed to move the needle on the threat. These operations have drained readiness by forcing U.S. Navy ships and aircraft carriers to extend deployments, leading to time-consuming repairs, shrinking the available fleet, and shortening vessel lifespans. Personnel burnout also risks mistakes.
The benefits of U.S. military activities against the Houthis are ambiguous. U.S. trade does not rely heavily on Persian Gulf routes, and U.S.-flagged ships have avoided the area entirely since January 2024, with just three recent exceptions. Even with most commerce diverted for a year, the Red Sea disruption has had little lasting effect on U.S. oil prices or inflation. Moreover, continuing a multinational campaign that has failed to attract support from most allies and partners or achieve the stated goal of protecting freedom of navigation makes Washington look impotent at best.
The incoming U.S. administration must replace the existing flailing military campaign with an enduring solution that strangles Houthi revenue sources; holds the group’s main sponsor, Iran, accountable; and demands that allies and partners take a greater, and eventually a leading, role in these efforts and in protecting regional shipping. This will not be quick or easy, but the Houthi challenge will only grow without a refocused strategy.
Most importantly, the next administration will need to throttle the Houthis’ military resupply and their income, which they use to fund local arms production and other enterprises. A U.S. naval quarantine, as some have suggested, is not realistic; only around 20 Iranian smuggling vessels were caught between 2015-2024. Further U.S. sanctions will not help either because Houthi income sources—illicit trade and draconian domestic taxation—remain largely outside the international financial system.
More feasible is the focus on Houthi finances; service providers like brokers, flag states, owners, and classification societies; and transit points in collaboration with regional, European, and Asian partners. U.S. President-elect Donald Trump could leverage his strong personal connections with regional leaders to push Oman, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and India to crack down on Houthi financial backers and logistics nodes. A Houthi containment policy also dovetails with concerns of European and other coastal states about the growing network of sanctions-evading Russian and Iranian oil tanker shadow fleets that threaten maritime safety. Reducing the scope of this illegal shipping would cut off an important Houthi revenue stream and decrease the oil income on which Moscow and Tehran depend.
Washington should build a truly multinational naval presence better designed to interdict Houthi supply lines and share the burden of defending navigational freedom. This will be more palatable and feasible if it is built on the U.S.-led Combined Maritime Forces, which is comprised of 46 countries and is focused on anti-piracy and countering smuggling, than as a separate Houthi-specific mission. Negotiating with regional partners to get their buy-in, and terms, for participation will be necessary. One step might include helping Riyadh jumpstart its moribund regional council, established in 2020, to address piracy and smuggling. Other steps include fostering collaboration with and between Brussels and New Delhi to reinforce their recent and existing maritime security operations in the area and making Turkey’s role more central, given its growing influence in the Horn of Africa. While stepping up these multilateral efforts, the United States must right-size its own naval presence, removing carrier strike groups but maintaining a smaller force that is fit for purpose, such as a few guided missile destroyers bolstered by smaller patrol craft and plentiful sea and air drones.
Efforts must also bolster Yemeni groups, particularly the internationally recognized government, that oppose the Houthis. Regional states could help build their defenses to prevent the Houthis from seizing Yemen’s oil and gas fields, which would resource the group’s regional aspirations. Washington may have to act as a catalyst, such as backing the Yemeni government’s efforts to cut off Houthi access to the international banking system. Ultimately, though, regional governments must lead.
Not least, the U.S. role should be an extension of a broader strategy to weaken Iran’s regional influence. This will mean holding Iran, the key enabler of Houthi actions, accountable for the group’s attacks through economic and diplomatic penalties. The United States and Israel should coordinate any further military strikes on Houthi capabilities, and military action should be precisely targeted to maximally disrupt Houthi operations, without civilian harm. Covert operations are preferable, for example against Iranian intelligence ships and key Houthi leaders and financiers. This would deprive the Houthis of the legitimacy they receive from withstanding airstrikes while potentially achieving similar effects. Intelligence sharing among the U.S. and its partners to inform such operations must be expanded and broadened. Such interlinkages can extend Washington’s reach at low cost and build regional ties, including between Israel and Arab partners, designed to endure long after the Houthi campaign is brought to an end.
It’s time to end the U.S. military’s Red Sea campaign—but discounting the Houthi threat entirely would be strategically foolish. Left unchecked, the Houthis could easily derail Trump’s other Middle East priorities, including expanding the Abraham Accords and containing Iran. Ultimately, it will be in Trump’s interest to take the challenges in Yemen seriously and chart a course to managing them.
Beth Sanner is a former deputy director of national intelligence at ODNI and served as President Donald Trump’s intelligence briefer during his first term.
Jennifer Kavanagh is director of military analysis and a senior fellow at Defense Priorities. She is also an adjunct professor at Georgetown University. X: @jekavanagh