Syria: caught between Türkiye and Israel
Summary: with the victory of the Salafist HTS in Syria both Türkiye and Israel see opportunities to accelerate their regional ambitions but the two may be heading toward an intense new rivalry.
Today’s newsletter is a transcript edited for length and clarity of our 8 January podcast with the Turkish writer and analyst Aslı Aydıntaşbaş. You will find the full podcast here.
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The fall of Assad surprised many observers, but I wonder if it surprised President Erdoğan and I wondered too how deep is Turkish support for HTS.
Türkiye and the Erdoğan government did not expect the offensive to be this successful. They never expected Damascus would fall; they thought maybe in the northern Aleppo countryside HTS would push back the regime a little bit. But lo and behold, within a week Damascus fell. So that was a surprise to Ankara, one that they were delighted with. Now HTS, since 2017, has established a modus vivendi with Türkiye and has been running a proto-state on the Turkish border heavily relying on Turkish support. It is not a Turkish proxy, but it's a group that developed a very close and functional relationship with Ankara. HTS could not have survived in Idlib without Türkiye’s approval. Now, that does not mean they were backed in the way some of the Turkish proxy groups such as the Syrian National Army are. Those groups are funded, organised and run by Türkiye. HTS is different. Obviously by now our listeners know their story: Jolani having initially joined ISIS and then al Qaeda, and then breaking up with both organisations and evolving into HTS and establishing his own Salafist regime.
So how did Ankara respond to this Salafist regime led by Jolani, that’s his nom de guerre, he's now reverted to his real name, Ahmed al Sharaa?
Over the years I've been talking to Turkish officials and diplomats about HTS and there has been a level of discomfort but with that also - not really an ownership - but a sense that they could get what they want out of HTS and guide them when necessary. HTS ran its state in an illiberal fashion as a conservative hamlet, one Türkiye was okay to live with. It ran its affairs on its own, with the shura and councils and its own legislature according to Salafist principles, largely in a very conservative fashion, but it did learn to cooperate and coordinate with Türkiye.
What does President Erdoğan see when he looks at this suddenly changed political landscape in Syria. Does he see this as one of the really big wins of his career?
He does. I think it's a huge win for Erdoğan, and that's how he sees it, of course. You know, there's a very exaggerated sense of the conquest of Syria in the Turkish media landscape nowadays, particularly among Erdoğan supporters and in the pro-government media. And that's wrong. Türkiye did not conquer Syria and while the downfall of the regime certainly provides huge openings and opportunities for Türkiye, Syria's story is yet to be written. We're hoping the fighting phase is over. We're hoping that this country can now have an upward trajectory, that it can put its house in order, that there can be an inclusive government in Syria. But it's too early to say definitely. I think there's no doubt Erdoğan is able to leverage the HTS win domestically, to say we have stood on the right side of history and won. And I think he will be able to tell his constituencies in the next election we have achieved this incredible strategic shift and caused the downfall of the regime in Syria. Now, of course, this is all aligned with the political philosophy he has been promoting very consistently over the past decade that Türkiye needs to have a zone of influence in its neighbourhood. And that national security does not stop at Türkiye's border. Therefore you have seen and you and I have discussed Türkiye establishing bases in in Qatar, in Somalia, various Turkish military incursions in Iraq, Libya, Syria and so on. So after the fall of the regime in Damascus, President Erdoğan came out and gave a big speech, which very much sums up his policies. And he said, Türkiye is bigger than Türkiye. This is our destiny. Some call it neo-Ottomanism. Others call it more of a desire for great or at least middle power status. It is clear to me that he is using the current geopolitical mayhem to win big time his bet on regime change. Now what Türkiye has not won, and I think that will be very decisive, is the economic story. Again, we have yet to see what will happen. Türkiye would benefit enormously economically if it could take part in the reconstruction of Syria. And one way or another, it will, but it won't be able to pay for it because of the economic situation. So in a sense, Erdoğan, in order to turn this strategic success into an economic win for Türkiye, would need to find a way of working with the West and big donors, including Gulf Arabs, and to position Türkiye as a big player in reconstruction.
What is Erdoğan planning to do about the Kurds? Is he going to go in hard and hit them in Syria? Is he going to go after the SDF? Is he going to wait to see if Trump pulls out the American troops and then make a move?
So as you say, he has a number of options. Over the past year, it's been hardline policies and basically seeing Syrian Kurds, who are US allies, but affiliated also with the PKK, no doubt, so seeing the autonomous Kurdish administration in Syria as a national security threat, and coupled with hard line policies at home that has led to the imprisonment of quite a few Kurdish politicians, I'm talking about hundreds, and the end of the peace process with the PKK. But now there's interesting signals, surprising signals. Back in October, Erdoğan’s ultra nationalist ally Devlet Bahçeli, the leader of MHP - known as the Grey Wolves - this ultimate Turkish nationalist leader has come out with a surprising initiative that suggested the resumption of a peace process with the PKK, or rather with imprisoned PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan. It came out of the blue and at the time people didn't quite understand where this was coming from, especially from Bahçeli this 78 year old hardcore nationalist whose life has been dedicated to ending the peace process with the PKK. This architect of the hardline policies, all of a sudden, talked about Öcalan and starting a new process, perhaps even allowing Öcalan to come out and go into house arrest in Ankara. He spoke in the Turkish parliament, calling for the end of the fighting, calling for PKK to disband itself. Now, it made little sense in October. But all of this makes more sense now. And there is a quiet process. Everybody is very cautious. It's not really a peace process but the government pursuing a deal with Abdullah Öcalan based on returning to the logic of the previous peace process, which went from early 2010 until 2015 or so. And the assumption is Türkiye has two options: forever fighting the Kurds or doing a deal and expanding or solidifying its zone of influence on its southern flank with the Kurds.
What is behind the shift?
The new trigger and what seems to have motivated the Turkish government is a renewed Israeli interest in the Kurds. Now this sounds crazy to a lot of people but there's a huge paranoia in Türkiye and among the governing elite that Israel is essentially rallying behind the autonomous Kurdish region and they're going to push for a free, independent Kurdish state, and that with the Trump administration coming into power, they are able to actually play the Kurdish card in order to weaken Türkiye.
Interesting.
Yes and in the words of Bahçeli and Erdoğan, “consolidate the home front.” That's shorthand for a reconciliation process with the PKK. Now that's still very, very far from happening. They're not talking about a democratisation process but somehow the PKK laying down arms, Öcalan being put under house arrest and Ankara opening up space for Kurdish politics. You know, there could be all types of spoilers, but if it were to happen, it would be the end of a significant conflict and a big boost to Erdoğan. But I've been through these before in the past and getting hopeful only to be let down. So it's a great idea, but we have to see whether or not the parties are ready for this. And of course, the real space where the rubber hits the road is Syria, whether or not they'll be able to agree on some type of governance model for Syria and Syrian Kurds.
So a lot of political gamesmanship at play and the big player is Trump. Do you think he will pull US troops out of Syria?
Donald Trump could pull out or could decide to keep US troops in. There are different ideas within the US government on how to tackle the Kurdish piece of the Syrian puzzle and how long to stay, whether or not to stay, and so on. I think the tendency on the part of the bureaucracy is to stay until there is some emergence of some type of inclusive Syrian governance structure and a constitution where there's a room for the Kurds. But of course Donald Trump could come in and say on day one I'm pulling out US troops. It's hard to know what he will do on this issue.
I suppose we could say that one of the things he's talked about is he's going to be the president of peace. He's going to bring peace to Ukraine. He's going to bring peace to the Israel-Palestine conflict. But then I think Israel is a wild card and how is Erdoğan going to respond? Right now, you've got Israeli troops with their tanks parked on the lawn. They're in Syrian territory right now. And the temptation must be - because Netanyahu is being pushed hard by his far right ministers Smotrich and Ben-Gvir - to take and hold Syrian territory. How dangerous is this?
I think it's very dangerous. And you're right Israel is the wild card. What just happened is quite phenomenal. Syria has just become the primary theatre of contestation between Türkiye and Israel. In the past there have been diplomatic spats. But this is now taking on a different nature, in more of a kinetic space with the Israelis grabbing territory, destroying whatever is left of the Syrian military but also positioning themselves diplomatically, at least, as a supporter of Syrian Kurds. And I think all of these three elements of what Israel is doing are problematic for Türkiye but the last one is particularly troublesome.
Having said that, I do hope there will be some de-escalation at some point. This is a very dangerous situation for everyone involved, mostly the Kurds, because you have Ankara now seeing Israel as its primary strategic rival. We're going to see that rivalry play out in the decisions taken by the Trump administration and I do hope that Kurds don't become yet another element in the rivalry. That's putting a target on their back that could really trigger a Turkish backlash
But let me end by saying I want to be hopeful about Syria and Türkiye, about Turkish- Kurdish reconciliation in Türkiye. It’s hard to say the glass is half full, but let's say it is and let's focus on the thought it is possible to build. Syrians have suffered enough, really enough, and they do deserve a chance now, and I do hope that Turkish-Kurdish peace can be part of it. The story is yet to be written, but let us start with the glass half full and try to build on it. I hope that's what Turkish leaders and Kurds and other players in Damascus and elsewhere end up doing.
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