https://asiatimes.com/2025/01/us-air-superiority-vs-china-dissolving-in-plain-sight/
US air superiority vs China dissolving in plain sight
China’s ultra-long-range missiles and precision strike capabilities exposing US vulnerabilities and outdated Cold War-era doctrine
Emerging ultra-long-range counter-air missiles and long-range precision strike capabilities are poised to redefine air superiority, forcing the US and its allies to rethink strategies against increasingly sophisticated adversaries like China.
In a December 2024 report to US Congress, the Department of the Air Force said that adversaries are set to field counter-air weapons guided by space-based sensors with ranges exceeding 1,000 miles (1,600 kilometers), creating unprecedented threats to traditional air operations.
The report highlights China’s investment in long-range precision systems, including intercontinental hypersonic vehicles and a diverse arsenal of air, land and sea-launched missiles. Those weapons, supported by advanced space-based targeting, pose risks to key assets such as tankers, which have traditionally operated with impunity.
Further, the report says that by 2050, forward airbases and fixed sites will become increasingly vulnerable to continuous precision strikes, requiring significant changes in US Air Force strategies. It emphasizes that counter-air threats will deny sanctuaries at any range, forcing reliance on episodic air superiority and distributed capabilities.
The report underscores the necessity of integrating space-based surveillance and targeting systems while addressing the challenge of adversary space-based weapons, including potential hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV) or nuclear-capable systems.
It says that the US Air Force must modernize its concepts, technologies and force structures to remain effective and counter these evolving threats, which will heavily rely on space and information dominance.
In March 2024, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that Chinese scientists have designed a surface-to-air missile (SAM) with a kill range exceeding 2,000 kilometers, according to a peer-reviewed paper published by the Journal of Graphics.
The research team, led by Su Hua at Northwestern Polytechnical University, claims the missile can target early-warning aircraft and bombers, potentially altering regional conflict dynamics, the SCMP report said. The missile, measuring eight meters and weighing 2.5 tons, uses a solid rocket motor for vertical launch and a ramjet engine for upper-atmosphere propulsion.
SCMP says real-time data from reconnaissance satellites will guide the missile, switching to its sensors for final targeting. It notes that the development is part of China’s broader “anti-access/area denial (A2/AD)” strategy, aimed at countering US military capabilities in hotspots like the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.
The report adds that the missile’s design emphasizes low production costs and operational convenience, aligning with the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) requirements.
This development, alongside other new and emerging technologies, challenges longstanding concepts of air superiority. In an October 2024 Finabel report, Marek Gallo mentions that the idea of air superiority, once pivotal in Western military doctrine, faces obsolescence in modern warfare as advanced air defense systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) and electronic warfare (EW) reshape battlefields.
Gallo says that traditional air supremacy, characterized by uncontested control of the skies, is increasingly unattainable in conflicts involving technologically advanced adversaries. He says the ongoing Ukraine war highlights this shift, where both sides achieve only temporary “windows of opportunity” rather than sustained dominance in the air domain.
He also points out that the emergence of the “air littoral”—a contested zone from ground level to 10,000 feet—has intensified the challenge, with drones and EW compressing the airspace into a fiercely competitive subdomain.
He says this new reality underscores the necessity of integrating air and ground operations through centralized command structures and joint operations, particularly in Suppression and Destruction of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD/DEAD) campaigns. Gallo argues that the Ukraine war demonstrates that achieving limited, situational air superiority, rather than absolute dominance, is the future of air power.
In line with that analysis, Peter Porkka and Vilho Rantanen advocate for an air force capable of supporting operations in contested airspaces in a September 2024 War on the Rocks article.
Porkka and Rantanen emphasize the need for NATO to develop capabilities to counter anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategies and suppress enemy air defenses. They cite the challenges faced by both Russia and Ukraine, noting the effectiveness of ground-based air defenses and the limitations of air superiority in resolving battlefield stalemates.
They propose a shift towards enhancing joint force support in contested environments. The writers argue that NATO should prioritize investments in capabilities such as drones, satellites, long-range precision fires and EW, all of which offer significant operational benefits, rather than pursuing traditional air superiority.
Emphasizing the vulnerability of forward US air bases, Asia Times recently reportedthat US airfields in the Pacific are critically vulnerable to China’s advanced long-range aviation and missile capabilities, risking devastating losses before a potential conflict even begins.
The PLA has vastly outpaced US efforts to harden airfield infrastructure, doubling its hardened aircraft shelters to over 3,000 and adding extensive runways, while the US has added only two since the early 2010s. This disparity leaves US airbases dangerously exposed to precision missile strikes, with most aircraft losses in a potential conflict expected to occur on the ground.
China’s fortification efforts are designed to enable sustained air operations under attack, posing a potential strategic advantage. In contrast, US reliance on Cold War-era approaches and minimal investment in airfield resilience increases operational risks and incentivizes Chinese aggression.
In a July 2024 article for the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, J Michael Dahm mentions that the US Air Force has to adapt to the strategic challenge of under continuous fire while maintaining operational capacity.
Dahm notes that the PLA has developed advanced reconnaissance and long-range precision-strike capabilities aimed at crippling US airpower by targeting critical infrastructure, runways and grounded aircraft, necessitating a paradigm shift in airbase defense.
Dahm says that for the US to sustain effective combat sortie generation, it must adopt a multifaceted approach, combining active defenses like layered kinetic and non-kinetic systems with robust passive measures such as early warning systems, hardening of facilities, and rapid runway repair.
Moreover, he argues that adopting the Agile Combat Employment (ACE) concept, which disperses air assets across multiple bases, could reduce vulnerabilities.
Dahm stresses that US Congress and Department of Defense (DOD) support in funding and policy clarification is imperative for enhancing airbase resilience and maintaining deterrence against adversaries.
Without these reforms, he warns that the US Air Force risks operational paralysis, leaving US and allied interests vulnerable to aggression and jeopardizing the prevailing global balance of power.