The Hostage Deal Requires Israel to Accept Establishing an Alternative Rule in Gaza
In two weeks, the first phase of the cease-fire agreement signed between Israel and Lebanon will end, and by January 27, Israel is expected to withdraw from all Lebanese territory. On Friday, an agreement was signed with Hamas, after an agonizing and tortuous process, the second deal Israel is signing in order to end the war that began on October 7.
Even though the first agreement is with a state, Lebanon, and the second is with an organization, the two agreements are in practice deals between Israel and organizations defined as terror organizations, since in both cases, the objective is to set legal restraints on the military maneuverability of organizations, not states, and in both cases, the consent and approval of these organizations is required.
In both cases, the intervention and pressure of foreign states was necessary in order to get to the signing stage. Each one grants Israel the freedom to act militarily against any violation, and both agreements are couched in international diplomatic frameworks which are supposed to monitor and guarantee that these agreements are not breached.
Seemingly, the opening conditions for embarking on negotiations were different in essence. Nasrallah did not hold 250 kidnapped hostages who could have served as bargaining chips. He did however prevent tens of thousands of Israelis who had been displaced from their homes in the north of the country from returning, effectively turning them into hostages in need of a cease-fire.
Hamas, on the other hand, ceased to be a threat which could prevent residents of border communities from returning to their homes, but it will continue to hold some of the hostages until the end of the first phase of the deal. The release of all hostages will be predicated on another agreement which guarantees that the war ceases permanently.
Israeli soldier in southern Lebanon earlier this week.Credit: Naama Grynbaum
Another basic difference relates to the aims of each agreement. In Lebanon, Israel wishes to have Hezbollah disarmed, but is making do with the retreat of the organization's military forces beyond the Litani River, leaving the disarming of Hezbollah to the Lebanese army.
Israel is also not demanding the organizational dissolution of Hezbollah as a political entity or demanding its exclusion from Lebanon's government or parliament. In Gaza, disarming Hamas is the sole mission of Israel, which wishes to totally destroy the organization, not only as a military force , but as a governing entity.
The paradox is that in contrast to the agreement with Lebanon, which can be presented as an agreement with a state, in Gaza, Israel is signing a deal with an organization which, as far as Israel is concerned, is not meant to exist after all the hostages are returned, and its lifespan will now depend on how long it keeps holding hostages.
Thus, while in Lebanon the life expectancy of Hezbollah depends on Lebanese political elements and on leverage it can use against them, the situation of Hamas is completely different.
Under an existential threat posed by Israel, Hamas will need to maintain the human shield provided by the hostages in order to continue and survive as an organization, unless at the second stage of negotiations it attains conditions that will ensure its survival and continued hold on Gaza.
Israel obviously has the option of giving up on the rest of the hostages and making do with the ones to be released over the next seven weeks, then resuming an endless war in Gaza. However, it cannot continue to assume that President Trump will continue to show patience without opening the gates of hell, this time aiming at Israel, if a continued war means the evaporation of the chances of normalizing Israel's relations with Saudi Arabia.
The other option which Israel insists on rejecting is to establish in Gaza a Palestinian governing body that will manage civil services and distance Hamas and other gangs from humanitarian aid convoys, while rehabilitating the Gaza Strip's infrastructure.
Palestinian rule in Gaza has good chances of mobilizing an international and Arab force which will afford it military backing, such as offered by at least one country, theUnited Arab Emirates, which is a signatory to a peace agreement with Israel.
The presence of such a Palestinian governing apparatus will not interfere with Israel's being allowed to act against any operations against it emanating in the Gaza Strip, just as it is doing in the West Bank or as is permitted in the agreement with Lebanon.
One should remember that such an outline of focused military operations meant to thwart operations against Israel were suggested by the defense establishment several months ago, during discussions over relinquishing control of the Philadelphi corridor.
Netanyahu rejected that proposal and insisted on full and unlimited control of the corridor, which he called the "foundation of our existence." He also insisted on fully controlling the Rafah border crossing. Now, when a withdrawal from the Philadelphi corridor and the Rafah border crossing are an inseparable part of the hostage deal, the shelved outline for focused military operations will apparently be revived.
However, this will not suffice for preventing the continued civil rule of Hamas, not only over humanitarian aid convoys, which will grow significantly to 600 trucks a day entering the Gaza Strip, providing the organization with a significant source of revenues.
In order to prevent such a development, Israel must strive to have the ruling body in the Gaza Strip be as similar as possible to the one in Lebanon, in which a state is the official party, the only recognized one authorized to bear arms, the one responsible for the implementation of agreements and for managing the state.
Lebanon is not a model of an authoritative state and its army is not a powerful player that can on its own contend with armed internal subversion, such as the one threatened by Hezbollah. Lebanon is a failing state, bankrupt and corrupt, with its infrastructure in shambles. Only recently has it managed to elect a president and prime minister, and it still doesn't have a functioning government.
Displaced Palestinian children sit under hanging laundry outside their tent in Deir al-Balah in the central Gaza Strip, Thursday.Credit: AFP/EYAD BABA
But these poor characteristics did not bother Israel when signing a deal with the country. The U.S. administration did not demand that it implement far-reaching reforms before it recognized its authority and representability, just like it didn't set a condition of removing Hezbollah representatives from the government.
Moreover, the most important assets Lebanon has is the willingness of many states, Arab and Western, to help in its rebuilding and in establishing the public legitimacy it will have to rely on if it shows an ability to deal with crises and present its citizens with a trustworthy political and economic horizon.
People in Lebanon celebrate the nomination of Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, at Martyrs' Square in Beirut, Monday.Credit: AFP/ANWAR AMRO
A similar structure could be established in Gaza too, even if it's not called a state. As in Lebanon, and the occupied territories, the Palestinian Authority does not meet the standards of a model state. Its public legitimacy is non-existent, its coffers are empty, corruption is part of its essence, its leadership is divided, and in contrast to Lebanon, it doesn't even have a recognized military force.
But it is the most experienced body in the civil administration of millions of inhabitants, its infrastructure is functioning, its police have authority, its courts, welfare, education and health services provide services that can sometimes compete with the ones received by citizens of Lebanon. Like the Lebanese government, the Palestinian Authority does not possess military capabilities which allow it to militarily confront Hamas.
But in contrast to Lebanon's government, which sees Hezbollah as an inseparable part of of the country's governance, the Authority, and particularly its head, Mahmoud Abbas, present a consistent and resolved stance against the inclusion of Hamas in the governing apparatus. Dozens of rounds of discussions meant to create a framework of shared rule with Hamas all ended in failure. A unity government established in 2017 collapsed within two years, and reconciliation agreements signed by the Palestine Liberation Organization and Hamas after the demise of that government remained on paper only.
Mahmoud Abbas in 2022.Credit: Danil Shamkin / NurPhoto / NurPhoto via AFP
The latest Egyptian initiative for creating a "committee of civil control" in the Gaza Strip was rejected by Abbas, who in doing so evoked much anger in Egypt. Abbas is worried that such a committee would officially sever the link between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank and undermine the legitimacy of the Palestinian government and the exclusive role of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. He mainly worries that Hamas will find ways to control the operations and budgets of such a committee.
Israel's insistence on preventing the Authority from setting foot in Gaza with the argument that it is a "terrorist authority" is not only deceptive, since Israel has no problem in continuing its coordination with that same "terrorist authority" on civil matters and in security operations in the West Bank. This opposition rests on the same ideology and strategy which gave Hamas its ruling status in Gaza, under the aegis and with the support of Israel.
Such conceptions are meant to sever the link between Gaza and the West Bank and undermine the PLO's and the Palestinian Authority's status as representatives of the entire Palestinian nation, thereby foiling any attempt to hold diplomatic negotiations aimed at establishing a Palestinian state.
The absurd result is that Israel is deliberately planning to foil the chances of establishing a Palestinian ruling body that could neutralize Hamas' influence, and is ready to sign an agreement that will allow Hamas to recover and control the aid pipeline and civil infrastructure, just so that Gaza continues to be delinked from the West Bank. In his Bar-Ilan [University] speech, Netanyahu determined several basic principles for recognizing a Palestinian state.
He said that "we cannot be expected to agree in advance to the principle of a Palestinian state without ensuring the demilitarization of such a state. In such a vital issue for Israel's existence, we must first receive assurances for our security needs. We therefore ask our friends in the international community, headed by the U.S., for the essential thing needed for Israel's security: an explicit commitment that in a permanent peace deal, territory held by the Palestinians will be demilitarized.
That means no army and no control over air space, with effective monitoring that will prevent the introduction of weapons – a true monitoring, not like the one now prevailing in the Gaza Strip…without that, sooner or later we will have another Hamas-stan here, and to that we cannot agree." He later determined that "above all, Palestinians have to decide between peace and Hamas. The Palestinian Authority must impose law and order in the Gaza Strip and overcome Hamas. Israel will not sit around the negotiating table with terrorists who wish to destroy it."
Ultimately, Israel helped a lot in establishing a Hamas-stan in Gaza, it negotiated with terrorists and signed agreements with them. Now there are circumstances which could allow a different alternative for managing the Gaza Strip. All that's required is a suitable Israeli ideology.