When Israel and Turkey go to war
Israel-Turkey edging dangerously toward armed conflict in post-Assad Syria, putting US and NATO in the uncomfortable middle
Over the next three months, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu will have a policy window in which to try to go for broke in Syria.
The key question that he has to ask himself is whether his government should be content with the current state of affairs or whether it is worth the risk of pushing back against Turkish expansionism now rather than later.
From an analytical point of view, there is plenty of uncertainty surrounding the various foreign actors operating on the ground in Iraq and Syria. This includes the question of what role the Turkish Armed Forces may seek to play in their near abroad now that Bashar al-Assad has fallen.
That is an important question to ask. The Nagel Commission recently assessed that the risk of direct conflict between Israel and Turkey is real. This has led a number of prominent Israelis to call upon their own government to prepare for a war with Turkey.
In the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria, also known as Rojava, Assad’s fall provided a similar policy window for Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan to take the fight to American-backed Kurdish forces in Rojava.
Since the fall of Assad, these Kurdish fighters have been on the receiving end of targeted attacks by the Turkish Armed Forces and their proxy militias. Now, Turkey is threatening a full-scale military operation against these US allies unless they step back and accept Ankara’s terms for the future of Syria.
It is not an exaggeration to say that Turkish expansion poses an existential threat to the NATO alliance as it now stands. Over the last couple of years, Turkey and the United States have been perilously close to direct conflict in Syria on several occasions.
Under the Biden administration, the US military took the extraordinary measure of shooting down an armed drone of their NATO ally when it flew within 500 meters of American military forces. That marked what was noted as “America’s first-ever use of military force against Turkey.”
In the aftermath of that attack, at least one Washington-based think tank sparked serious discussion about whether it was time for the White House to push for Turkey’s suspension from NATO.
While that didn’t happen, the Turkish expansionism accommodation stance has crumbled in mainstream American foreign policy circles over the past year.
Israel’s Netanyahu administration is therefore faced with a puzzling state of affairs. The new pro-Islamist regime in Damascus says they want peace with Israel. However, that peace would come at a heavy cost for Israel’s national security and foreign policy interests.
Not only would it risk the collapse of the resistance of pro-Western factions across Syria, it would also risk the establishment of a Neo-Ottoman sphere of influence along Israel’s northern border. The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces and the Trump administration will have hard choices to make as well.
Without the full-scale backing of the United States, it is doubtful that American-allied Kurdish forces could survive a full-scale assault by the Turkish Armed Forces and Turkish-allied Syrian militias.
Meanwhile, the Trump administration will have to consider how to deal with the precedents of Turkish Armed Forces and The Organization (Turkish Intelligence) targeting American military forces and its allies in Iraq and Syria.
The Syrian Democratic Forces will be hoping that the Trump administration will view these precedents through the lens of “Making the American Military Great Again.” If so, then it is hard to imagine how the Trump administration could accommodate armed Turkish expansionism after Turkish Armed Forces effectively pointed guns at American soldiers.
The problem for the Syrian Democratic Forces is that it may take a few months for the Trump administration to develop a coherent approach to Syria. In the meantime, the Turkish Armed Forces could seek to force their hand by launching a full-scale assault on Rojava.
This leaves the Syrian Democratic Forces with no other option than to turn to the Israelis. The question now is how will the Netanyahu administration respond.
One option would be to provide the Syrian Democratic Forces with enough political, military and intelligence support to be able to expand Rojavan territory all the way to the Mediterranean Sea.
That move would be welcomed by the Syrian Democratic Forces since an independent state of Kurdistan probably could not survive without a guarantee of maritime access. And, none of its neighbors would appear willing to grant such access on favorable terms.
That move would also provide Israel with a heavily militarized exclusion zone between Turkey and the new regime in Damascus. And that, in turn, would give Israel much more leverage to try to shape the future of Syria.
The problem is that it would risk a direct confrontation between the Israeli Defense Forces and Mossad on the one hand, and the Turkish Armed Forces and “The Organization”, on the other. And that would pose an existential threat to NATO as it stands today.
Consider the following scenarios. In the first, Israel launches a direct attack on the Turkish Armed Forces. In that case, Turkey would argue that NATO Article 5 provisions would require other NATO member states to come to their self-defense.
In the second, Turkey launches a direct attack on Israeli Defense Forces. In that case, Israel would argue that the United States should expel Turkey from NATO.
These scenarios present three problems for Turkey. First, most of the NATO member states would probably be unwilling to join a military offensive against a Major Non-NATO Ally. The only exception would be an extraordinary circumstance such as an unprovoked attack. Those conditions probably would not be met in the first scenario.
Second, there would be strong support for the preemptive suspension of Turkey from NATO among the other military alliance’s member states. That would avoid ever having to answer the uncomfortable question of whether to come to Turkey’s self-defense in the first scenario.
Third, there would be strong support in Washington for coming to the self-defense of Israel in the second scenario. While the Department of Defense and intelligence community will not want to engage in direct confrontation with their Turkish counterparts, they will be receptive to supporting Israeli efforts to impose serious consequences in the event of a direct attack.
For these reasons, Prime Minister Erdogan should seek to de-escalate rising tensions with Israel as soon as possible, unless he is already committed to pursuing a non-NATO future for his country.
Michel Walsh is a Visiting Scholar at the University of California, Berkeley.