[Salon] Trump, Greenland and others



The Spectator

January 12th 2025

https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/consider-trumps-worldview/

Give Trump's Realism a Chance

Anatol Lieven

In one place at least, the reaction to Trump’s threats to annex Greenland, Canada and the Panama Canal has been one of unequivocal joy. That is Russia – and for obvious reasons. Most Russians have long seen U.S. language about the “rules-based order” as a mere mask for U.S. empire and U.S. national interests. In their view, Trump has now removed the mask.

Even more importantly, for the Russian establishment Trump’s words are a confirmation that he and Putin see international affairs in very much the same way: as a matter of spheres of influence, transactionalism, and the ruthless defence of national interests.

During the Ukrainian revolution and the Russian intervention in Ukraine in 2014, German Chancellor Angela Merkel reportedly said that Putin was not in touch with reality and was “living in another world”. Trump lives in the same world. This raises a horribly disquieting question for British and European elites: What if Putin and Trump (and Xi Jinping, Narendra Modi and Mohammed bin Salman) are in fact in closer touch with actual reality than European establishments have been for the past generation and more, and are therefore better placed to agree among themselves?

After all, these leaders are in good company: Their coldly Realist view of the world was first formulated intellectually by Thucydides more than 2,400 years ago. What if a better basis for international peace is a respectful understanding that states will define their interests for themselves; and a prudent awareness where they see those interests as vital, and feel strong enough, they will go to war to defend them?

 The liberal internationalists like Merkel (who permeate the Western-educated classes and formulate the rhetoric of Western governments) see this as a world-historic regression and tragedy. And so it may turn out to be. This is not however fore-ordained. We should be willing to consider the possibility that Trump’s approach may form a better basis for world peace than that pursued by the U.S. and its European satellites since the end of the Cold War; though only if (and it is a colossal if) Trump is willing to understand and respect the vital interests of other major states, and is truly anxious to avoid more (domestically unpopular) wars. If so, it is highly unlikely that Russia or China would run the existential risks of attacking US vital interests as defined by Trump.

 For it is hardly as if the US liberal internationalism of recent decades has been successful in preventing wars, reducing international tension or even (outside the former Yugoslavia) in ending humanitarian catastrophes. On the contrary, it has contributed to a number of catastrophes. This is of course largely due to recalcitrant international realities; but it is also because liberal internationalism became completely entwined with the “Wolfowitz Doctrine” of 1992 – adopted to a great extent as the standard operating procedure of every subsequent US administration - whereby the United States should be the sole hegemon, not merely in the world as a whole, but in every region of the world.

 This would be in the name of spreading “freedom”, but would be pursued if necessary through the exertion of military force and economic pressure. No other country would possess any influence beyond its own borders except what was allowed by Washington. All states would be required to change their domestic political systems and policies in accordance with U.S. ideas and wishes. This was the mailed fist behind Fukuyama’s “End of History”.

 This is really the kind of thing you expected to hear in the penultimate scenes of the old James Bond movies, when the arch-villain, having tied James up, cackles, “Now that you are at my mercy, Commander Bond, I vill reveal to you my brilliant plan to dominate ze vurld, kha kha kha!”

 It should always have been apparent to anyone with the slightest sense of history or ability to see the world through the eyes of non-Western nations, that this US plan would be rejected by most states and would lead to extreme tension and the risk of war with Russia, China and any other state which believed that it had a historic right and a vital interest in exerting influence beyond its borders – and a vital interest as defined by itself, not the United States.

 The Wolfowitz Doctrine formed the basis for the later “Bush Doctrine”, which Senator Teddy Kennedy described as “a call for 21st Century American imperialism that no other nation can or should accept.” Its goals are also now quite clearly far beyond the diminished military and economic capability of the United States, let alone Europe. Since liberal internationalism has so clearly failed, maybe it is time to give Trumpian Realism a chance.

 For the EU, Trump’s renunciation of liberal internationalism is the most terrible shock. Let us hope however that it may be a salutary one, that could help to save the EU, at least in a remodified form. For the EU, which in its first decades was an immensely valuable institution, has in recent years launched itself on a potentially suicidal path through its own version of the liberal internationalist megalomania that led the US astray.

 The EU tried to turn itself from a loose confederation of nations into a form of supra-national state, but lacking any basis of popular legitimacy – whether national or democratic – for this programme; it abolished internal borders between EU states without securing the external ones; it fantasised the infinite fungibility of societies, cultures and populations, and in the process demanded that eastern European nations founded on ethnic nationalism agree to accept their ethnicities’ short-term dilution and long-term abolition; it relaxed its rules for membership for the sake of wider and wider expansion; and it tried to insist that countries outside the EU and NATO observe the same rules as members of those groups. And now it is even dreaming of itself as some sort of military superpower, although most of its “soldiers” could be kindly described as subsidised backpackers.

 Having presented this defence of Trump, it is now necessary to qualify it. If Trump’s blustering threats extract concessions from Denmark, Panama, Canada and Mexico (the latter especially in the field of controls on migration), then they can be said to serve American interests. It is however also quite obvious that Trump loves bluster for the sake of bluster and has no interest in controlling his rhetoric. Calling Canada “the 51st State” and renaming the Gulf of Mexico “the Gulf of America” achieves nothing except to strengthen national resistance to American demands.

 It also goes without saying that if Trump really annexed Greenland through force or economic blackmail, or (as he has also threatened to do), launched cross-border military strikes on Mexican drug cartels, this would be a disaster for the US, that would push countries in Europe into the arms of Russia, and in Latin America into the arms of China. In the case of Greenland at least, it is also quite unnecessary. The Danes and Greenlanders are hardly going to reject US demands for more military bases or more mining concessions in Greenland.

With regard to Greenland in particular, there is one more crucial point to be made. I have presented Trump’s thinking as rational in the context of ancient and universal thinking about state interests and relations between states. But what if there is now a new universal factor that threatens to make all these paradigms irrelevant in the long term? The whole cause of the new US and international security and commercial interest (not only on the part of Trump) in Greenland and the Arctic is the opportunities and challenges created by the melting of the polar ice due to anthropogenic climate change.
Further melting of the Greenland ice cap, contributing at least 18cm to sea levels by 2100 according to ISMIP6 models (regarded as highly conservative by an increasing number of experts), will disrupt ocean currents (including the Gulf Stream) and weather patterns, and represent climate change that organised states – including the US – will struggle with. When Trump is ancient history, his posthumous defence will be that he wasn’t that much more deluded than most other contemporary leaders.


Dr Anatol Lieven,
Director, Eurasia Program,
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft



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