[Salon] The rigged deal




The rigged deal

Al-Qassam Brigades hand over 3 female Israeli hostages to Red Cross at al-Saraya as part of 1st phase of ceasefire and prisoner swap deal between Israel and Hamas, in Gaza City, Gaza on January 19, 2025 [Dawoud Abo Alkas/Anadolu Agency]

It seems that reaching a prisoner exchange deal and a ceasefire in Gaza is closer to being accomplished this time than ever before. The core terms of the deal have not differed much from those presented in previous attempts, which Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu often sabotaged by fabricating reasons to prevent their success, as noted by Israeli critics familiar with the negotiations. It appears that Donald Trump’s threats to ensure the deal was finalised before he assumed office were the primary and direct reason for Netanyahu’s approval this time.

This deal comes against the backdrop of significant events in Palestine, and may create future implications that cannot be ignored. Its implementation will unfold under Trump’s presidency, during which he has plans and objectives for the region that may shed light on how this deal will progress in the coming days. Furthermore, these developments are a part of broader regional changes that are likely to influence the outcomes of the deal’s implementation.

Perhaps the most immediate achievement of this deal is the cessation of the bloodshed in Gaza that has persisted for over 15 months amid international silence, ignoring the brutality of these crimes. Without this deal, the suffering of more than 2 million Palestinians—whose lives, safety and dreams are shattered every moment—would remain unaddressed. The recently announced terms of the deal suggest that the Israeli government failed to achieve the objectives it set for the war it waged on Gaza, starting 8 October of last year.

The declared goals of that war, frequently emphasized by Netanyahu and other Israeli officials, were to defeat Hamas, retrieve the captives in Gaza by force and ensure security control over Gaza after the war. However, the deal speaks of an exchange process, as Hamas has demanded since the beginning of this conflict. Although Hamas initially called for “emptying the Israeli prisons”—releasing all Palestinians from Israeli jails—the current deal seems to fall short of this demand. The deal outlines a phased exchange of Israeli captives in Gaza in three stages, in return for Palestinian prisoners, including individuals Netanyahu and other Israeli leaders previously refused to release.

Hamas has, in this deal, avoided loopholes from past agreements that enabled the re-arrest of released Palestinian prisoners, a practice known as the “revolving door”. However, a major shortcoming of this deal is that some released Palestinian prisoners will be denied the right to live in their homeland.

The Israeli military has failed to eliminate Hamas’s military capabilities. Its fighters continue to launch rockets from Gaza, as well as acts of resistance, inflicting casualties among the Israeli army. Israeli estimates of the damage to Hamas’s military strength vary, and it is difficult to make accurate and definitive assessments, particularly given the army’s admission of its inability to locate all the tunnels in Gaza, which have proven to be more complex than anticipated.

Israeli leaders believe that Resistance factions in Gaza continue to renew their forces and capabilities. According to the terms of the deal, the Israeli government has also failed to maintain a security control approach over Gaza, post-war. Despite the Israeli military’s repeated claims of intent to retain control of the “Netzarim” Corridor, which has been expanded and fortified, and “Philadelphi Corridor”, separating Gaza from Egypt—an area Netanyahu refused to withdraw from during the previous deal—the current agreement promises a gradual withdrawal from both Netzarim and Philadelphi. It also permits displaced residents to return to their homes in northern Gaza.

Thus, the approach of maintaining control over parts of the Gaza Strip has been removed from the current deal. However, it must be noted that maritime, aerial and border control still represent forms of Israeli Occupation and dominance.

It is no secret that Trump pressured Netanyahu to finalise the current deal. Media reports from Hebrew outlets revealed that Netanyahu faced intense pressure from Trump’s envoy, Steve Witkoff. Although Trump seems to be aiding Netanyahu in extricating himself from the Gaza quagmire and saving face, his actions align with his broader goals. Trump has not hidden his desire to end wars in the Middle East and Ukraine, both before and after his election victory, consistent with his aims to reduce tensions, withdraw from global hotspots and prioritise economic deals and financial gains—objectives he hopes might earn him a Nobel Peace Prize.

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However, Trump’s steadfast support of the Israeli Occupation is notable, based on his unprecedented policies during his previous term in favour of Israel. Trump broadly supported the Israel war on Gaza, encouraging Netanyahu to expedite the accomplishment of war objectives. He also stood firm against anti-war demonstrations in the US. Over a year since the war broke out, Netanyahu has been unable to achieve these aims, now looking distant in the face of ongoing attrition.

Every day, the Israeli army loses soldiers and more detainees in the Gaza Strip, in addition to economic losses. The internal situation in Israel is also unraveling, characterised by deepening divides between political factions and rising street protests. Lastly, with the crimes against Gaza continuing in the name of the Israeli Occupation, so does the international reputation of this regime diminish day by day.

From Trump’s perspective, freeing the remaining live captives in Gaza, ending Israel’s continuous human, economic and international drain, may be seen as serving Israel’s interests.

Regionally, Trump may be relying on political pathways to secure victories for Israel following the military failures. This might become apparent after the current deal’s completion. Trump hinted at this approach after sharing a video of Jeffrey Sachs, a well-known American academic, warning against being dragged into fulfilling Netanyahu’s and Israel’s objectives of waging a war with Iran. Sachs highlighted the broader issue of Israel’s grip on US foreign policy, as previously discussed in Stephen Walt and John Mearsheimer’s book, “The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy”. However, Trump is likely focused on avoiding Netanyahu’s bloody tendencies to escalate wars in the region.

Trump recognises that the Middle East today is not the same as it was in 2020. The aftermath of the Gaza war has shaken the balance of power and deterrence in the region in favour of Israel, particularly with the fragmentation of Iran’s axis and its wavering positions following Hezbollah’s losses in Lebanon and the fall of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime in Syria. The dramatic developments in the region cannot be ignored. The ceasefire in Lebanon appears to be unilateral on Lebanon’s side, where Israeli continues to violate Lebanese sovereignty. Similarly, Israel continues to encroach upon Syrian sovereignty, occupying more of its lands without a Syrian response, amid significant internal turmoil.

Developments in Lebanon may offer insights into these shifts. After the ceasefire with Hezbollah, Lebanon elected and appointed a president and a prime minister, both of carrying visions that clash with Hezbollah’s, particularly regarding the implementation of UN Resolution 1701, the withdrawal of Hezbollah forces to the north of the Litani River and the restriction of possessing weapons to the state and Lebanon army.

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Although Lebanon’s internal political landscape is still evolving after the war, Western powers are banking on dismantling Hezbollah’s military strength, especially following the fall of the Assad regime and Iran’s withdrawal from Syria. This could serve as a political model for what is being planned for Gaza, as evident in the insistence on excluding Hamas from governance in the post-war and drying up its resources, similar to the approach taken towards Hezbollah.

The third phase of the Gaza deal, designated for reconstruction, might jeopardise Gaza’s future, with conditions tied to the nature of governance arrangements and its interlocutors. Trump could link the developments in Gaza’s deal to Israel’s normalisation with Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom has called for an end to the Gaza war and has linked normalisation to progress toward establishing a Palestinian State. Trump may leverage the Gaza deal and humanitarian relief efforts to achieve a normalisation agreement.

These efforts might also assist Trump in advancing his stance toward Iran, as he has already declared his intention to sign an agreement limiting Iran’s regional influence and nuclear military activity while avoiding war—a scenario he deems most favourable. Nevertheless, the internal dynamics and the will of nations and their peoples remains the decisive factor in shaping policies and decisions. In Palestine, it is evident that unity and a shared national decision to confront the challenges and schemes against Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank alike are the only viable paths forward.

In Lebanon, Prime Minister, Nawaf Salam, has emphasized that an agreement with Hezbollah to establish a political course acceptable to all Lebanese is essential for managing the country’s affairs. While it is still too early to predict the outcomes, Lebanon’s unity is particularly crucial now for overcoming its crises.

In Saudi Arabia, while interests with the US remain significant, they may not be pursued at any cost. The Saudis opted for reconciliation with Iran through Chinese mediation in 2023 and are no longer interested in joining the US in pressuring Iran, especially given the pragmatism of their policies, the relative decline of US influence, and the erosion of collaboration with Israel to counter Iran. The priority has shifted toward fostering cooperation and peace with all regional countries to achieve their economic ambitions. Demanding and emphasizing  justice for the Palestinian cause could serve as an additional tool for the Kingdom to solidify its leadership position in the region.

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The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.



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