Why political Islam has withstood decades of repression
Political Islam has become a driving force against the status quo in many Arab countries - the primary recourse for populations to voice dissent, reject their living conditions and seek political alternatives.
Historically, Arab states have faced significant challenges in their quest to eradicate this movement. For decades, political Islam has been a persistent adversary, prompting regimes to raise the question: why does this opponent refuse to disappear?
Have all means been exhausted to defeat it, eliminate it, and create alternatives, whether secular or religious? Has every method been employed, from brute force to containment, militarisation or political manoeuvring?
What is the secret behind the resilience of this movement, which has perplexed the West and is viewed by Israel as a lurking threat - one potentially more dangerous in the long term than existing Arab regimes?
Many researchers and experts who have repeatedly predicted the demise of political Islam, from the mid-1990s to after the Arab Spring, have misjudged and misanalysed the situation.
Every time they appear to be facing significant setbacks or diminishment, Islamists return anew with fresh strategies, approaches and leadership. This has compelled scholars to repeatedly revisit and attempt to understand this phenomenon, its roots and its wider contexts.
When Arab regimes marginalise Islamic forces through political processes - either by excluding them or weakening them at the ballot box - armed factions emerge, believing that weapons and revolution are the only viable alternative for confronting the status quo.
After the Islamic State group receded temporarily, Hamas returned to the forefront with operations such as the 7 October 2023 attack, shaking Israel and the entire world.
The only alternative
When the Arab world remains silent amid Israel’s massacre of the Palestinian people in Gaza, this gives momentum to a new wave of radical Islamism, as we have seen in decades past. A case in point is the success of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in toppling the Assad regime in Syria last month.
Islamists are no longer just local players; they have become significant regional actors, and integral to international politics. The rise of HTS is tied to Turkey’s role in the region, while the Iranian axis extends to Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza (parts of which are more closely aligned with Ankara than Tehran).
It is evident that nearly a decade and a half after the Arab Spring and the counterrevolutions, Islamists have neither disappeared nor retreated.
This is not because they are exceptionally strong, nor because they offer forward-looking projects with viable solutions and promising horizons, but rather because they represent the flip side of the crisis of the official Arab order in terms of political legitimacy.
Islamists remain, for now, the only available alternative for angry and disillusioned Arab populations. Governments that have traded democracy and freedom for security have humiliated Arab citizens, while failing to provide comprehensive stability in the economic, social and political realms.
These governments have offered nothing to the people of Gaza in the face of Israel’s genocidal war, even as Arab populations have borne hefty costs - sacrificing their welfare and freedoms - under the pretext of building strong armies and modern weaponry. The tactic of demonising Islamists is no longer convincing to a younger generation that carries the burden of these regimes’ failures. They no longer see the status quo as preferable to change.
Contrary to Karl Marx’s famous statement that “religion is the opium of the people”, the emotional and religious appeal employed by Islamist movements in their rhetoric against the existing order has come to resemble a form of liberation theology.
This will remain particularly true as long as Arab regimes fail to offer credible options for democracy, freedom and social justice - or even to address external and regional challenges.
Questions about religion
Meanwhile, other political forces, including liberals and leftists, remain incapable of presenting popular alternatives to political Islam, which has remained the dominant popular force in many countries for several decades.
Another strength of political Islam relates to unresolved questions about the relationship between religion and the state in the Arab and Islamic world. This ambiguity serves as a source of power for Islamist movements, allowing them to leverage religion in opposition to secular movements.
This is particularly relevant today, given that various surveys conducted in the region indicate that religion remains a potent force in Arab society. Attempts at secularisation over the course of many decades have largely failed, as they have often been imposed in a top-down, coercive manner.
As Nader Hashemi argues in his important book Islam, Secularism, and Liberal Democracy, the path to moving beyond political Islam is not through exclusion, marginalisation, imprisonment or even exile, but rather through greater integration into the political process. It also involves reconciling Islamic discourse with pluralism, realism and democracy - the primary missing element in this equation.
Many Arab states have attempted to pull the rug out from under Islamists’ feet by restructuring the religious sphere through laws and regulations related to issuing religious edicts, delivering sermons in mosques, and providing religious guidance, thus granting the state ultimate control over this domain while depriving Islamists of influence. Saif el-Din Abdel Fattah, an Egyptian political scientist, has described such policies as “the nationalisation of religion”.
Furthermore, many Arab governments have sought to restore the prominence of official religious institutions, after sidelining them for decades, in an effort to have these bodies address religious matters within Arab societies. There has also been contemplation of a “Sufi alternative”, focusing on spiritual aspects detached from politics, as a substitute for political Islam.
It is evident, however, that most of these policies have not succeeded - and political Islam continues to be the greatest challenge facing Arab governments today.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.