China-led BRICS growth raises questions about shifting world order
Building loose international organizations may be key to navigating international politics in times of increasing polarization
BRICS has emerged as a significant international force since 2009 when it was established at a summit in Russia. What began as a five-member group encompassing Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa is now expanding with the integration of five new members and eight new partner countries. Even more countries may be joining in the next few years.
This growth raises essential questions about whether BRICS will challenge the leadership of traditional powers such as the US, the UK and the European Union.
But analysts are also questioning how united the bloc really is and whether a perceived lack of unity constitutes an obstacle to the bloc’s expansion. BRICS is undoubtedly diverse:
- Iran and Saudi Arabia compete as regional powers in the Middle East.
- Egypt and Ethiopia have had different conflicts around the Nile’s governance.
- The skirmishes between China and India are well known.
Yet, the bloc’s strength may reside in its capacity to integrate this diverse array of countries that are not fully aligned. Building loose international organizations may be the key to navigating international politics in these times of increasing polarization.
The rise of BRICS must be contextualised within the ongoing competition between the US and China. The rivalry between the world’s two largest economies is likely to intensify in the coming years, shaping the contemporary global order. China’s announcement of a record US$1 trillion trade surplus for 2024 and its solid 5% economic growth have bolstered the narrative that its development model represents an alternative to the US-sponsored neoliberal policies that have dominated much of the world in the past four decades.
Political leaders and economic elites worldwide are closely observing the US-China competition – and most countries strive to maintain an equidistant approach. Countries traditionally within the US sphere of influence, including Brazil and Peru, have been cautiously moving towards China, attracted by the economic opportunities the Asian giant offers. Others previously in China’s orbit, such as Vietnam, are working to maintain or expand their ties with the US.
China is unquestionably the driving force that holds BRICS together. Without China, it wouldn’t have come into existence. All BRICS countries share two key characteristics:
- They are Global South countries that do not belong to the traditional group of hegemonic powers.
- They have significant economic ties with China, especially through trade relations.
Belt and road
The official BRICS narrative emphasizes multilateralism, cooperation and fair global development. But in fact the group serves primarily as an instrument for China to project its power and influence. China achieves this through a combination of rhetoric and by using the bloc as a special trade platform linked to the Belt and Road Initiative.
BRICS seeks to position itself as an alternative to US hegemony, promoting free trade and multilateralism. In times of political turbulence and the growth of illiberal forces, this narrative serves as a powerful legitimizing tool for the group globally.
But the group’s diversity also poses significant challenges to its rise as an alternative to the US-led global order. It is unlikely that BRICS will evolve into a unified military alliance like NATO or a free trade area like ASEAN or the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (formerly NAFTA). The group’s diversity prevents it from acquiring these characteristics.
Aware of this, China strategically uses BRICS to increase its business opportunities and international influence. It maintains a fine balance between a loose bloc and a more solidified military or economic alliance. Contrary to case during the Cold War era, when the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, had well-defined spheres of influence, the current world order appears to be shaped by loose, interconnected international blocs.
Beijing’s prominence within BRICS is clear and unlikely to change. China accounts for two-thirds of both the group’s GDP and intra-BRICS trade. The country is the primary trade partner for Brazil, Russia, India, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Iran. China also holds significant investments in those nations. Russia is the largest recipient of Chinese foreign direct investment within BRICS with an accumulated stock of more than USU$10 billion.
Most BRICS member states are also directly or indirectly involved in Belt and Road. It’s true that the major Belt and Road projects are not taking place within BRICS countries – they are primarily in Central, South and Southeast Asia. But Egypt, Ethiopia, South Africa, Saudi Arabia and Iran also host Belt and Road initiatives. Alhough it is not an official Belt and Road member, Brazil has become a key partner due to its role as a central food supplier to China.
The figures highlight that expanding Brics is one of China’s foreign policy priorities. The country uses the group to project both economic and ideological influence. Donald Trump’s plan to impose trade tariffs on several countries, including China, is likely to prompt China to intensify this policy. It is a distinct possibility that the recent episode with Colombia, where the US president reportedly threatened to impose tariffs if Colombia continued to push back against deportation flights, could encourage more countries to seek closer trading relationships with China.
Strategic friendships
Some analysts correctly observe that BRICS is divided between anti-Western states and those that prefer to remain nonaligned. While the anti-Western group, led by Russia, advocates for a confrontational stance towards the US, the nonaligned countries – including India and Brazil – favor a more nuanced approach.
Analysts argue that the US should try to develop closer relations with non-aligned countries to influence internal BRICS debates. But this overlooks the fact that China is not only the de-facto leader of BRICS but also has an unequivocal strategy of favoring a nuanced approach toward the West based on multilateralism and free trade. So, despite what Russia may want, it’s unlikely that BRICS will assume a confrontational stance toward the West.
China knows that a non-confrontational approach is the best way to attract more countries and solidify BRICS as a loose bloc that advocates for more democratic global governance.
So far, this strategy appears to be working.
Gabriel Huland is a teaching fellow in the School of International Studies, University of Nottingham.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.