HTS executing Syrian civilians accused of working with Russia in Idlib in 2019 [photo credit: Ebaa News Agency]
Economic recovery
Economic recovery is key to the new government’s survival. To encourage
trade, the government has reduced customs tariffs in formerly
regime-held areas. This, however, inadvertently led to discontent in
Idlib, where traders previously enjoyed minimal tariffs and therefore a
competitive advantage over the rest of Syria. Despite the tariff
reductions, and despite a significant appreciation of the Syrian pound
(from 15,000 to 11,000 to the US dollar), prices have continued to rise.
Temporary subsidies on basic commodities such as bread and fuel have
been put in place, but maintaining these measures in the long term will
be financially unsustainable.
Service delivery remains a key barometer of progress.
Energy-generating ships have been leased from Türkiye and Qatar to boost
electricity production. Their impact remains limited, however, due to
the dilapidated state of the national grid. Al-Sharaa has inherited a
state that has not had any major infrastructure upgrade since the 1970s.
Damascus’ sewage networks date back to the French mandate. Promises of
Saudi, Qatari, and Turkish investment in major infrastructure projects
have been made but actual outlays will depend on political factors that
might take months or even years to mature. Gulf and Turkish investors
meanwhile will likely insist on concession agreements, often associated
with high prices. A partnership on reconstruction between the government
and UNDP is said to be on the cards. Without a lifting of US and EU
sanctions, and a massive cash injection, however, Syria will likely be
unable to do more than limp on in survival mode.
Playing the patriotic card, the new government has reached out to
expatriate Syrian businessmen, urging them to return and invest. The new
leadership’s desire to retain state control over key sectors like oil
and telecoms, however, conflicts with the hopes of investors, who prefer
an open-market approach. Businessmen in Damascus and Aleppo meanwhile
fear that they could be superseded by rivals more closely aligned with
HTS. The monopolies enjoyed by the Watad oil company (the head of which
is now the oil minister), and the SyriaPhone telecoms company (headed by
a close associate of the new leadership), has done little to allay
fears that the culture of mahsubiat (patronage) – key to controlling the economy under the Assads – is likely to persist with the new regime.
Circles of trust
The way that Syria is now governed is characterised by
hyper-centralisation, with decision-making concentrated within a small
circle around al-Sharaa that does not exceed 5 to 6 individuals.
Lower-ranking HTS leaders and apparatchiks lack the autonomy to act
without direct orders from the top, a matter that insiders say has
stifled initiative and innovation. It has also kept away those who are
not HTS members who would otherwise support the new regime. The reason
for this style of leadership lies in how al-Sharaa approaches the
delicate matter of loyalty.
Three concentric circles of trust exist: the inner circle is
comprised of long-time HTS members and those involved in the Syrian
Salvation Government who have sworn a personal oath of allegiance.
Military, security, and international relations remain under their
exclusive control. The middle circle includes figures who are recognised
for their opposition to the Assad regime but are not HTS members (and
crucially not members of groups opposed to HTS). Their involvement is
limited to either bureaucratic functions like staffing governorships and
service ministries or as members of government-supported NGOs with
specific remits. The outer circle consists of secularists, civil society
activists, and members of political opposition groups with ties to the
West. These are perceived as adversaries and the chances of their
meaningful inclusion in the new government are minimal.
The exclusion of perceived adversaries from the Sunni community, and
key social groups like the Christians and Druze, could result in
long-term instability and a lack of legitimacy for the new regime.
Already 300,000 civil servants – mostly Alawites accused of
double-dipping into the public purse – have been sacked. Fostering
national unity will nevertheless require a more inclusive governance
model that accommodates a wider spectrum of political voices. That might
still happen in due course, but while the deep state is being created
an exclusionary attitude will likely persist.
The much-anticipated national dialogue conference – initially
scheduled for early January, then postponed to mid-February – has now
been delayed indefinitely. It has become increasingly clear that
organising such an event will be far more complex than al-Sharaa had
envisaged. The original plan was to establish a pliant preparatory
committee, populate the conference with supporters of HTS and uninformed
participants, and proclaim the revolution’s triumph. This would have
been accompanied by a dissolution of the Syrian People’s Assembly,
dismantlement of all regime security agencies, a suspension of the 2012
constitution, and disbandment of the Baath Party along with all armed
factions, including HTS itself. The parliament was to be replaced by an
advisory council composed of individuals closely aligned with the
current leadership.
It has become apparent, however, that such a carefully stage-managed
event would not pass muster, either domestically or internationally. The
government now recognises that proceeding with the conference under
those terms would do more harm than good. Instead, it has gone ahead
with the above measures by fiat and shelved a national dialogue for the foreseeable future.
The political void
Despite notable progress in military and security matters, and some
success on the economic and diplomatic fronts, the new leadership
remains conspicuously reluctant to engage with politics in its classical
sense. Discussions around checks and balances, free and fair elections,
the role of civil society, and constitutional reforms are notably
absent. Equally, the state’s relationship with Islam remains shrouded in
ambiguity. The leadership relies on vague references to the
establishment of a "just national state" – a concept that remains
stubbornly undefined.
This deliberate ambiguity is not without risk. In the absence of a
coherent political narrative – however ideological – it creates a vacuum
that competing factions with divergent visions for Syria's future could
readily exploit. The reluctance to articulate a clear political
identity appears to stem from a desire to avoid alienating key
supporters or inviting unwelcome scrutiny from the West. Without a
structured political roadmap to guide Syria’s transition, however, the
new regime risks stalling its quest for international legitimacy and
recognition, which are essential for securing sustained support from
both domestic constituencies and Western capitals.
The government's preference for opacity, offering little more than
superficial social media soundbites and generic slogans, leaves many
Syrians – particularly the educated middle class – struggling to discern
the regime's true direction. This may be intentional, fostering a
climate of uncertainty to keep the population in a state of perpetual
anticipation. The result is a fragmented public, divided between those
who prioritise economic and service-related concerns and those who,
subscribing to the adage that "man shall not live by bread alone," fear
the emergence of a new authoritarian order atop the ruins of the old
dictatorship.
For these latter, the spectre of a governance model akin to China's –
offering economic opportunity but little in the way of political
freedoms – is deeply troubling. Indeed, many Arab states have embraced
such a model. However, Syria’s case is different. For a significant
segment of the population, the downfall of the Assad regime was meant to
herald a "second independence": a moment of genuine political renewal
and democratisation.
Al-Sharaa may believe that maintaining a degree of ambiguity allows
him to consolidate control over the state’s key institutions and
construct a deep state that would ensure long-term political stability.
Certainly, Syria’s turbulent experiment with democracy in the late 1940s
and 1950s serves as a cautionary tale of the perils of introducing
democratic governance too swiftly, without an established supportive
institutional framework. Furthermore, the experiences of Syria’s Sunni
majority over the past 13 years bolster the argument that minority rule
enforced by coercion must not be repeated – a scenario that, in their
view, can only be prevented by ensuring Sunni dominance within state
institutions.
Yet, the emerging deep state’s top-down ethos and exclusivist
tendencies risk alienating even key Sunni constituencies. Many Syrians
viewed the collapse of the Assad regime as an opportunity for a new era
of citizen participation and accountability. Should the new leadership
persist in avoiding substantive political engagement, it may erode the
goodwill it now enjoys, reinforcing the growing perception that the
sacrifices of recent years have yielded little more than rebadged
authoritarianism.
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