U.S.-Latin America Policy Just Saw an Unprecedented Week of Chaos
In terms of U.S. policy towards Latin America, last week was one of those “weeks where decades happen.” While the apocryphal quote often misattributed to former Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin is overused, it’s fair to say that, prior to last week, no week since the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, has shifted U.S. foreign policy in the region so dramatically. The movement and chaos that defined last week’s policy swings indicate that Latin America will face significant challenges over the coming four years from its northern neighbor.
It started with a deportation flight from the United States to Brazil. The plane operated by a contractor had numerous mechanical problems, leading to engine failures and overheating on board. When it made an emergency landing in Manaus, the Brazilians on board insisted on leaving the flight. Images on social media of Brazilians exiting the plane in handcuffs and reports of the rough conditions they faced angered the Brazilian government and public. Deportation flights occurred regularly during the administration of President Joe Biden, but none of them threatened the safety of passengers as the Jan. 25 flight seemingly did.
Colombian President Gustavo Petro, one of the rare leaders who spends as much time on social media as U.S. President Donald Trump, saw the treatment of those Brazilians and withdrew landing authorization for a U.S. military flight with Colombian deportees on board that was already en route Sunday morning. He did not want Colombians being treated poorly and he did not need images to appear in the local media that could harm his already weak image. Petro’s move led to a day-long standoff in which Trump threatened sanctions, tariffs, and visa restrictions. Hours later, Petro backed down on many of the issues in dispute, agreeing that Colombia would accept, manage, and pay for deportation flights. Trump declared victory and proclaimed that similar policy bullying would target any other leader who opposes his deportations.
Meanwhile, the deportation agenda hovered over numerous other policy decisions across the week. Trump canceled humanitarian parole for migrants from Cuba, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, then canceled temporary protected status for Venezuelans. This means hundreds of thousands of migrants who were previously in the U.S. legally will soon have their legal status revoked. Immigration agents in the U.S. were given quotas and told they will face potential professional repercussions if they do not detain enough migrants each day and week. The administration continued to negotiate with El Salvador’s President Nayib Bukele about the potential that his country will take additional deportees of other nationalities. It promised to use facilities at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to hold up to 30,000 undocumented migrants who cannot be deported to their home countries.
Beyond the deportation agenda, Trump also pressed forward with a pause in all foreign assistance. Though some limited waivers were granted for health-related programs, the pause means that almost two dozen of Colombia’s Blackhawk helicopters are grounded, U.S. cooperation on economic development has been frozen, and democracy promotion programs across the hemisphere have ended with no sign as to when they will resume. The pause creates doubts among U.S. allies about the reliability of the U.S. as a partner and leaves enormous space for China and others to step in and demonstrate that they can be better allies.
Even as he negotiated that agreement with a former antagonist in Caracas, Trump pushed forward with plans to implement 25 percent tariffs on Mexico and Canada, two of the United States’ closest allies.
Secretary of State Marco Rubio attempted to strike a different tone than the president. An op-ed by Rubio in the Wall Street Journal highlighted the administration’s focus on Latin America and promised to bring “greatness” to the Americas. Rubio’s trip to Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic, which began Saturday, was intended to demonstrate the importance of Central America to the new Trump agenda in the hemisphere.
Before Rubio could reach Panama, he was overshadowed by a trip from a different Trump advisor. Special Envoy Ric Grenell boarded a flight to Caracas Friday and met with Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro. The photo of the handshake and announcement of a negotiated deal demonstrated a shift from Trump’s first term policy of maximum pressure against Venezuela’s president, who has stolen the two previous Venezuelan elections. Grenell returned to the U.S. with six US citizens being held hostage by Maduro and a promise that Venezuela would accept deportation flights.
Even as he negotiated that agreement with a former antagonist in Caracas, Trump pushed forward with plans to implement 25 percent tariffs on Mexico and Canada, two of the United States’ closest allies and trading partners, as of the beginning of February. There is a sad irony that previous administrations thought heavy crude from Canada could help replace sanctioned Venezuelan oil, but now Venezuelan oil funding the Maduro regime will replace the Canadian oil that is more expensive due to tariffs. In justifying the tariffs, Trump claimed that both neighbors of the U.S. failed to act on fentanyl and accused the Mexican government of cooperating with drug cartels.
Amid all the news above, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth threatened in a televised interview to use military force against Mexico’s cartels and the story barely made a wave because so much was going on. While Republican pundits made similar comments during last year’s campaign, the fact a sitting defense secretary threatened to use the military against a neighbor is an escalation on par with Trump threatening to retake the Panama Canal during his inaugural address. The potential for a U.S. military operation in Mexico remains one of the top risks for the region moving forward.
On its own, any one of these events from last week would have marked a momentous shift in U.S. policy towards Latin America and would be newsworthy enough for its own column. The combination of all of these events hitting in a single week is overwhelming. Trump’s policies are sure to change again, but last week’s events point to at least three conclusions that will apply to Trump’s second term moving forward.
First, a unified regional response is unlikely. As Trump threatens sanctions, tariffs, and military conquest, it would be logical for Latin America and the Caribbean to unite to counter those threats. A coordinated diplomatic effort would be more effective than every country negotiating with the Trump administration by itself. However, last week the region demonstrated that it will not do that. Honduran President Xiomara Castro called for a meeting of all of Latin America’s leaders under the guise of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, or CELAC, to coordinate a response to the events in Colombia. Almost nobody agreed to show up, forcing her to cancel the meeting. Every country is acting alone, trying to get the best deal for themselves.
Second, the region should expect the reshuffling of traditional allies and antagonists of the United States across the hemisphere. It’s not just that countries are acting alone, but Mexico and Colombia are being outmaneuvered by Venezuela in terms of their relationship with the Trump administration. While some of Trump’s moves were announced during the campaign and expected in recent weeks, it is still shocking to see traditional Latin American allies of the United States be among the first targeted and punished while countries like Venezuela appear to be rewarded and treated better. No country’s previous standing, agreements, or treaties with the U.S. seem to matter in the new environment.
Third, the speed and chaos of policy changes are likely to continue to cause complications. The U.S. has long been influential in Latin America, but rarely has it driven day-to-day events and crises across multiple countries in the way that occurred last week. Governments’ resources and attention will be stretched. Political opponents of sitting presidents will look for opportunities to highlight weaknesses. Trump seems to enjoy shaking up the status quo and basking in the spotlight as the center of events, so the United States is likely to be the center of many simultaneous domestic political discussions across the entire hemisphere for months to come.
James Bosworth is the founder of Hxagon, a firm that does political risk analysis and bespoke research in emerging and frontier markets, as well as a global fellow at the Wilson Center’s Latin America Program. He has two decades of experience analyzing politics, economics and security in Latin America and the Caribbean.