New graduation ceremony for Huthi fighters that are part of its
al-Aqsa Flood special forces, which is part of its al-Quds Brigade in
the Central Military District of Yemen [photo credit: Ansar Allah]
How significant is the Gaza conflict in al-Qaeda ideology and propaganda?
Palestine is always at the heart of what drives al-Qaeda as an
ideology. It's front and centre of its propaganda and it's what it uses
to globalise its jihad. Gaza has become a hook for jihad, one that
al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, particularly, is harnessing to fuel
their narratives. And it's helped them revive because the way each video
ends is on the phrase ‘we're coming, Aqsa, Jerusalem, we're coming’ and
that now has a whole new meaning.
So is AQAP - al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula - regrouping?
Well, it's certainly active, or at least propaganda and attacks and
activity are all happening under the al-Qaeda label. But it's difficult
to know just how similar al-Qaeda today is to the group that existed 10
years ago. I think one element to bring out here is that there does
appear to be some kind of tactical collaboration between al-Qaeda and
the Huthis. Now that does sound counterintuitive because of what we know
to be sectarian divisions. The Huthis are on the Shia side of the
spectrum and the al-Qaeda franchises, of course, on the extreme Sunni
jihad side of the spectrum. So they're not natural partners. But in some
cases, your mutual enemy is stronger than your mutual enmity.
What evidence are you seeing of collaboration?
Well, first of all, it's striking that there have been no al-Qaeda
attacks whatsoever against the Huthis for two and a half years. Since
June 2022, their sole target has been Southern forces who collaborate
with the Yemeni Government, nominally, but they are separatist forces in
the South of Yemen. The Huthi MO of drone activity and drone strikes
seems to have been transferred to al-Qaeda. There's been a great
increase in al-Qaeda drone strikes in the last couple of years. And a
couple of other things: there was a statement put out by al-Qaeda at the
beginning of August last year, after the Israeli air strikes on
Hodeidah and that statement could have been written by the Huthis
themselves. It talked about the need to defend the Red Sea and keep it
for Islam, calling it an Islamic sea and criticising Israel for its
bombing. What this says is that sometimes partnerships are pragmatic and
that necessity overrides immediate ideology. So I would watch this
space, and there are a couple of things that I'd worry about. If these
two groups are indeed collaborating then I'd watch out for two al-Qaeda
anniversaries. There might be attacks planned. One is the end of March,
which marks 10 years since al-Qaeda overran Mukalla in 2015 and another
would be October this year because that is the 25th anniversary of the
al-Qaeda bombing of the USS Cole off the coast of Aden which could
provoke some kind of maritime attack to commemorate that.
And do you think this reconstituted al-Qaeda has that sort of capability now?
Well, I don't think that it's particularly strong on its own, there
is infighting, and the activity is quite diffuse, but with a bit of
external help, I can imagine that it's possible.
Donald Trump has declared he wants to be the peacemaker. Now the
Saudis have been very keen for some time to have a peace deal with the
Huthis and to get out of the Yemen quagmire they walked into back in
2015. But the Huthi leadership is being coy about signing a deal. Where
do you see this all headed in the next few months and could AQAP attempt
to upend a peace deal?
There's a real dilemma here. Saudi Arabia has been trying to exit the
Yemen war by reaching an agreement with the Huthis that would pave the
way for a United Nations-led road map. But this looks increasingly
unlikely. The road map doesn't include a Huthi ceasefire in the Red Sea.
The problem here is that, on the one hand, if the Saudis sign that deal
and get out of Yemen, then the Huthis can make a run for it, grab more
territory and escalate. And the road map is really problematic now
because any power sharing agreement that leaves the Huthis, at least in
their current form and under their current leadership, in charge of
parts of the Red Sea coast simply isn't acceptable because they can
always hold shipping to ransom. And on the other hand, if the goal posts
are changed on the peace deal and the road map, the Huthis are unlikely
to take that very well and they could easily revert to including Saudi
as a target. And that's very worrying for Saudi because they've seen all
of these drones and missiles being lobbed over their territory towards
Israel, and of course, they themselves suffered over 1000 drone and
missile attacks from the Huthis between 2015 and 2022 when an uneasy
truce was signed.
So the challenge is that the Huthis are under pressure but they're
not under enough pressure to just compromise and cave in. It's very
unlikely that Israeli air strikes, US air strikes, UK air strikes can
make a difference, at least not in the short term. Okay Israel was quite
successful with Hamas and with Hezbollah but the challenge of the
Huthis is quite different. For starters, they're much further away, over
2000 kilometres away. They're not neighbours. The Huthi terrain is
mountainous. They have strongholds. The size of the terrain held by the
Huthis is massive. It's about 20 times the size of Lebanon, it's about
500 times the size of Gaza. And the population that the Huthis control
is much bigger. Roughly 20 million people live in Huthi areas. So there
does need to be some kind of regional coalition if the Huthis are going
to be significantly challenged and it probably would need to involve
ground forces. So I think there's a good chance that the civil war in
Yemen may re-escalate.
And al-Qaeda in all of that?
Al-Qaeda is not a big player. It's not a big deal in its own right.
It becomes, however, a useful tool for other actors in the conflict to
use, particularly to use as a proxy giving the Huthis plausible
deniability. If the war re-escalates inside Yemen, then al-Qaeda, bits
and pieces of it, could prove a very useful foil for the Huthis to use
within the South and particularly within the Southeast of Yemen.
You’ve painted a rather scary scenario where we could see boots
on the ground, military action from the Israelis, from perhaps the Gulf
states, from even the Americans despite Trump's declaration of wanting
to be the peacemaker? What about solutions? After 10 years of civil war,
the people of Yemen have suffered so much. Do you see any bright spots?
Well, I think there are several things that we could do. I think the
will is there now, internationally and inside Yemen, within the
anti-Huthi camp, to sort this out finally. And we understand that the
Huthis really are a problem. They've got international attention. So
what needs to be done? First of all, sidelining the hardliners within
the Huthi movement, promoting the moderates. And that requires a mix of
measures, not just kinetic. Second, they have to close down Huthi
sources of funding. The FTO (Foreign Terrorist Organisation) designation
might help with that but the Huthis do have workarounds. You’ve got to
align the regional actors to unite the anti-Huthi forces inside Yemen so
they have a common goal and to support a united Presidential Leadership
Council. And finally, we've got to tackle Huthi propaganda. Unless we
tackle the Huthi propaganda machine I don't think we're going to get
anywhere fast and certainly nowhere in the long term.
How good is their propaganda?
The Huthis have an incredible machinery of social media channels, TV
stations, a website and this means that the areas which they control are
simply not getting alternative world views and interpretations. It's
not just that they're putting out news and statements but their material
is really culturally attuned. There's lots of poetry and songs and the
constant repetition of this, the mono-messaging, the simple concepts,
catchy tunes, bold lyrics this sinks in and it's a recipe for ongoing
cycles of violence that are going to outlast any peace agreement, even
if one comes to pass. So, okay I understand why one needs to focus on
taking out missile launchers and weapons arsenals but we also need to
take out the apparatus that indoctrinates the forthcoming generations.
Arguably that's more important. So this whole propaganda, this winning
of hearts and minds, needs a lot more attention. And without addressing
this the conflict may diminish but it's never going to end.
And Palestine is such a lightning rod. So is it not the case that
were there to be a solution for the Palestinians that lightning rod
would be taken away?
I think that's right. I think that removing the main ingredient of
propaganda, i.e. taking out the Palestinian issue by enabling
Palestinian statehood would go a long way towards turning extremist
narratives, whether they're from the Huthis or al-Qaeda, into damp
squids. It takes away their ace card.
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