07
FEB
2025
In Syria, the leadership of the long-standing jihadist militia Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) has so far succeeded in soliding its power. HTS leader Ahmed al Sharaa is on 29. He was also authorized to establish a new Legislative Council, which is to serve until a new constitution comes into force. 1] Al Sharaa had already said that the development of the new constitution would take about three years; elections could possibly be held in four years. This means that democratic life is likely to be eliminated for the coming years. It is not foreseeable whether the transitional government will succeed in keeping Syria's diverse population together. Critics accuse her of "building informal power structures and a deep state". 2] This also refers to the fact that the transitional government is largely composed of the HTS-dominated circle, which ruled the Idlib Governorate from 2017 to 2024 with harsh repression and excluding non-Sunnite parts of the population.[ 3] Thus, Prime Minister Muhammad al Bashir had already served as Prime Minister in Idlib; Foreign Minister Asaad al Shaibani was already responsible for external contacts there. The complete takeover of power by the ropes from Idlib is already causing discontent.
In addition, there are increasing tensions between different population groups. Already in January, there had been disputes between members of the Sunni majority and the Alawite minority. On 31. According to the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), Sunni armed men committed a massacre of the Alawite population of a locality in Hama's governorate on January; ten Alawites were murdered. 4] Fears that religiously motivated violence could swell are increasing. In addition, there are serious differences between the transitional government under Al Sharaa and the Kurdish population in the north of the country, who also fear attacks by Turkish armed forces and pro-Turkish militias. The relevant Kurdish organizations, such as the PYD (Partiya Yekîtiya Democrat, Party of the Democratic Union) and the associated armed associations, the YPG (Yekîneyên Parastina Gel, People's Defense Units), demand autonomy for the Kurdish population of northern Syria. Al Sharaa rejects autonomy and also urges the YPG to fully integrate into the Syrian armed forces to be re-builded. The YPG rejects this with reference to their protective function for the Kurdish minority. 5]
Apart from initial internal policy determinations, the transitional government has begun to set the course for foreign policy. Last Sunday, Al Sharaa made his first visit abroad to the Saudi Arabia office. On Tuesday, his second trip abroad was to Turkey. Previously, on 30. January, he had received the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al Thani, in Damascus. Turkey and Qatar have already supported HTS in Idlib from 2017 - financially, logistically, militarily - and have stable channels of influence. Saudi Arabia had officially ceased its support for the Syrian opposition in 2017 and in 2023/24 even resumed relations with Syria's then-President Bashar al Assad, but is now trying to influence the Syrian transitional government - also to establish itself in Syria in the regional influence struggle against Iran. Damascus hopes that Riyadh will primarily receive financial support for reconstruction and diplomatic assistance in an effort to shake off the sanctions imposed by the United States and the EU. The Syrian transitional government, on the other hand, wants help from Turkey in training and rearming its new armed forces. In fact, Ankara and Damascus are already working on a roadmap for the development of the Syrian army and on a bilateral military agreement. 6]
Government advisers in Germany and foreign policy experts in the EU insist that Berlin and Brussels should rely on close cooperation with Ankara, Riyadh or Doha in their pursuit of influence in Damascus. As Development Minister Svenja Schulze reported in December, Berlin has secured good relations with Idlib over the years by providing funds for aid projects there (german-foreign-policy.com reported [7]). However, even if the transitional government in Damascus recruits itself to a large extent from the then ruling circles in Idlib, this is apparently not enough to exert influence to the desired extent. The Berlin Stitung Science and Politics (SWP) therefore says that one should cooperate with Turkey in "the reorganization and reconstruction of Syria". "A first field of cooperation" could be, for example, "joint humanitarian aid and re-ebuilding projects for the reintegration of returnees". 8] In addition, the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) states that the EU will not be the most important player in Syria in the near future, but it can take a "common position" with the Arab Gulf States in shaping the future of Syria. 9]
In recent days, Berlin and Brussels have intensified their activities to exert influence in Syria. Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier visited Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Turkey this week to discuss the situation and prospects of Syria. 10] Chancellor Olaf Scholz addressed all this on Tuesday in a phone call with the Emir of Qatar.[ 11] EU foreign ministers decided on Monday to suspend some sanctions against Syria – for example in transport and finance, as well as in terms of energy infrastructure – for a year for the time being; this is considered necessary to initiate a semi-regulated reconstruction of the country. However, the EU will also create a mechanism that will make it possible to immediately re-enforce the sanctions. 12] In addition, the EU is campaigning for the Syrian transitional government to dissolve Russia's naval base Tartus and its air base Hmeimim. Damascus has avoided this so far. On Wednesday, French President Emmanuel Macron had a telephone conversation with Al Sharaa and invited him to Paris for an undetermined time in the coming weeks. 13] France thus gains a head start over Berlin in the quest for influence in Syria.
More on the topic: Race for Syria and Race for Syria (II).
[1] Syria's Ahmed al-Sharaa named president for transitional period. aljazeera.com 29.01.2025.
[2] Christoph Ehrhardt: Ahmed al-Sharaa consolidates his rule in Syria. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 31.01.2025.
[3] S. on upheavals in Syria (II).
[4] Tony Gamal-Gabriel: Syria's Alawites mourn their dead after revenge attacks. al-monitor.com 05.02.2025.
[5] Ghazal Golshiri: En Syrie, les défis du général kurde Mazloum Abdi : « Nous ne demandons pas la sécession, mais une autonomie renforcée » du Rojava. lemonde.fr 15.01.2025.
[6] Ezgi Akin: Turkey, Syria draft road map to strengthen Syrian military: What we know. al-monitor.com 06.02.2025.
[7] S. about the race for Syria.
[8] Yaşar Aydın: Syria: What role do Turkey and Germany play? swp-berlin.org 02/06/2025.
[9] Emily Tasinato: All change: How Europeans and Gulf Arab states can promote Syria's political transition. ecfr.eu 03.02.2025.
[10] Steinmeier in the Middle East. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 05.02.2025.
[11] Chancellor Scholz telephones the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa al Thani. bundesregierung.de 04.02.2025.
[12] EU wants to temporarily suspend sanctions against Syria. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 28.01.2025.
Adam Lucente: Macron invites Syria's Sharaa to France for first EU visit: What to know. al-monitor.com 05.02.2025.