[Salon] First Reflections on the Shape of Peace for Ukraine

FM: John Whitbeck

After yesterday's statements by President Trump and Secretary of Defense Hegseth, there is genuine hope for peace in Ukraine for the first time since April 2022, when Boris Johnson descended upon Kyiv to prevent a peace agreement (https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/na-peregovorah-iz-rosiyeyu-ukrayinska-delegaciya-oficijno-pr-73933) which had been almost fully negotiated between Russia and Ukraine but was deemed by Western leaders to be contrary to their own interests.

While I have no claim to be an expert on Russian or Ukrainian matters, I have read a great deal written by people who do have such a claim and am therefore taking the liberty of sharing some preliminary thoughts on how, now that the United States has opted for radical "common sense" and a preference for imminent peace over perpetual war, a durable peace might take shape.

It is widely recognized that territorial acquisitions have never been the primary Russian objective in this conflict. Indeed, Russia's formal annexation in September 2022 of the four Russophone-majority oblasts (two of which it had recognized as independent states three days before launching its "special military operation") may well have clarified, defined and constructively limited its territorial ambitions.

As a practical matter, it would make no sense for Russia to seek or attempt to rule over Ukrainians who hate everything Russian (its history, language, literature, music, religion ...), as the great majority of Ukrainians outside those four oblasts and Crimea appear to do, and one may legitimately wonder why western Ukrainians have ever been eager to fight to the last Ukrainian in order to rule over people whom they clearly detest.

More important for Russia has been ruling out NATO membership for Ukraine, something that was never more than purely rhetorically on the table -- never a genuinely realistic possibility -- but that Trump has now taken definitively off the table.

Having achieved that objective and particularly if he achieves progress on the overarching Russian goal cited below, it is possible that President Putin, in order to achieve a definitive and durable peace agreement and not just a fragile ceasefire or armistice, might show flexibility on the borders of the four contested oblasts, three of which are still not under full Russian control, accepting the battlefield lines of control, potentially subject to some geographically rational adjustments, such as the Dnipro River as a border, with a view to producing "sensible" borders less likely to give rise to any future dispute.

Of course, the overarching Russian goal has always been to negotiate a new European mutual security architecture, under which all countries in Europe would feel secure and none would feel threatened.

It was in this context that, in late 2021, Russia presented to NATO a draft agreement which was intended to serve and could have served as the starting point for potentially constructive negotiations.

Unfortunately, the Biden administration, clearly preferring war to being perceived to make any meaningful "concession" to Russia, dismissed this Russian initiative with contempt, refusing even to discuss it and thereby leading President Putin, who could not ignore the build-up of Ukrainian troops along the lines of control in the two oblasts partially controlled by secessionist forces since 2014, to conclude that he had no alternative but to recognize those two oblasts as independent states and to launch his "SMO".

President Trump, notwithstanding his many irrationalities in other areas, appears genuinely to prefer peace to war and not to view security for everyone as constituting a threat to American "national security".

It would therefore not be surprising if President Putin were now to resubmit Russia's 2021 draft agreement, subject only to any essential updates, to the new American president and if the new American president were to agree to discuss it.

Two further thoughts:

(1) On March 30, 2022, just before Boris Johnson's peace-prevention mission to Ukraine, I wrote the following in one of my messages:

"Achieving a near-term ceasefire and an eventual negotiated peace agreement will require both the Russian and the Ukrainian governments to be able to save face by claiming 'victory' or at least some measure of success. While this is not easy, I believe that it may now be possible.

"An essential aspect of mutual 'victories' is maintaining the two countries' distinct narratives regarding Russia's objectives in invading Ukraine.

"To its own people, Russia has always presented its primary objective, in addition to achieving neutral, non-NATO status for Ukraine, as being the full 'liberation' of the Donbass. It has presented any military action elsewhere in Ukraine as being intended to degrade the Ukrainian military's capacity to resist the 'liberation' of the Donbass, which would, indeed, have been a rational military strategy. It has now announced the 'successful' completion of Phase 1 of its 'special military operation' and its intention to focus henceforth on its 'primary objective'. If it achieves both Ukrainian neutrality and some measure of territorial success in the Donbass, the Russian government can present this result to its own people as a victory.

"Ukraine and the West have asserted that Russia has sought -- and expected -- to conquer the entirety of Ukraine and effect a regime change in a matter of days. Whether or not this was ever the Russian intention, it is clearly not a possibility now. The Ukrainians, including those in portions of the Donbass not previously controlled by Russian separatists, have impressively resisted the Russian invasion. If the fighting ends with only relatively minor potential territorial losses in the Donbass, the Ukrainian government can present this result to its own people and the world as a heroic victory.

"Both sides should and must be permitted to maintain their own 'victory' narratives."

Thanks to Western intervention and insistence, the fighting did not end, and Russia has achieved some considerable additional measures of territorial success in the two oblasts connecting the Donbass to Crimea, but I still believe that the cause of peace requires permitting both sides to maintain their own 'victory' narratives.

(2) Since President Trump has wisely chosen not to assume "ownership" of this war, moving immediately to seek to end it, he has no need to worry about saving face in the face of a disappointing outcome. However, President Zelensky and the European "leaders" who have gone all-in behind President Biden, particularly if they and their countries are to be of limited relevance to the terms of any peace agreement, must feel such a face-saving need.

In this context and in light of the position of the new U.S. administration, they might now see at least personal benefits in proposing a "democratic solution" to the conflicting sovereignty claims along the lines outlined in my article published in March 2023 (https://www.counterpunch.org/2023/03/17/a-democratic-end-to-ukraines-war).

Since Russia's position has improved significantly over the past two years, it is unlikely that it would now agree to permit such democratic choices (except, perhaps, in the portions of the four contested oblasts over which it does not yet exercise full control), but there should at least be face-saving advantages in proposing such democratic choices for those proposing them, and saving face for anyone involved in this unnecessary and misbegotten war can only help to facilitate the decisions necessary to bring it to a prompt end.