Throughout
my nearly four decades in uniform, I frequently worked alongside the
professionals of the US Agency for International Development. From my
first forward deployment, as a junior officer detailed to painting
orphanages in the Philippines, I deeply admired these dedicated civil
servants.
Especially
toward the end of my career — as senior military assistant to Secretary
of Defense Don Rumsfeld, as a four-star admiral in command of US
Southern Command, and then as supreme allied commander at the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization — I relied on USAID for short- and
long-term reasons. In combat areas, USAID workers helped create security
for my troops in the field. Over the long term, they provided stability
by helping prevent disease outbreaks, famine and more — and the fights
and chaos that so often follow.
What USAID does is not charity. While its actions almost always have
humanitarian benefit, ultimately the agency is all about helping the men
and women of the Departments of Defense and State do their jobs and get
home safely. Defense, diplomacy and development — the “three Ds” — work
best together.
Last
week, President Donald Trump essentially canceled USAID. The
administration ceased almost all funding, put thousands of workers on
leave and ordered those based abroad to return to the US within 30 days.
(A federal judge has partially blocked Trump’s orders.) Now, Bloomberg News reports,
the administration is considering shifting USAID’s taxpayer funds to
invest in private-sector projects overseas alongside institutional
investors.
While
the agency’s critics cite inefficiency and waste, the amount of money
and people is actually tiny — a budget of less than $40 billion and
10,000 workers (compared to the Defense Department’s $850 billion and
nearly 3 million active, reserve and civilian employees). By shutting
down the agency to trim a small amount of spending, the administration
risks incurring significant long-term costs.
Why
do I feel so strongly about this? I could provide hundreds of examples,
but here are three that stick in my mind, from the war-torn and
turbulent countries of Colombia, Iraq and Haiti.
During
my tenure in the late 2000s at US Southern Command, in charge of all
military activity south of the US, Colombia was at the top of my worry
list. The massive flow of cocaine and other drugs was killing tens of
thousands of Americans either through overdoses or gang violence.
Over
time, we delivered security in Colombia not by sending hundreds of
thousands of US troops, but by using a small number of forces (typically
less than 1,000 at a time) and hundreds of USAID employees. Slowly, the
efforts of development workers did more than the military to dismantle
cartel influence.
USAID
affected the battlefield by reintegrating more than 13,000 demobilized
guerilla fighters back into Colombian society. I saw child soldiers who
had been kidnapped by the guerrillas reunited with their families. Aid
workers helped increase the stability of the eventual peace deal by
helping bolster economic development and the rule of law, so that 1.2
million hectares of land could be returned to rightful owners. USAID
helped reduce rural poverty by 30% and gave people alternatives to
fighting or exporting drugs.
Those
successes in turn helped US security by undermining drug gangs,
improving economic conditions with a strong trading partner (the US has a
trade surplus with Colombia) and shrinking the flow of cocaine to North
America — all without massive US spending or significant Department of
Defense engagement.
Or
consider Iraq. After US forces deposed the dictator Saddam Hussein in
2003, we found a society in complete turmoil, with massive internal
divisions. Simply walking away was not an option: because of a moral
imperative to help average Iraqis, the enormous oil reserves of the
country, and the likelihood it would become a breeding ground for
further terrorist organizations.
In
order to help the nascent Iraqi military, the Pentagon needed not only
training missions, but also to help develop governance, human rights and
rule of law. So, we turned to USAID, and again found a willing and
capable partner.
On my visits to the NATO training mission in Baghdad (working with my US Army 3-star subordinate), I saw firsthand the results of the work done by the Iraq Governance and Performance Accountability directorate.
It leveraged USAID-sponsored classroom and practical exercises to
improve the behavior of the Iraqi government and military, and provided a
model we later used in Afghanistan.
It
was hot, dusty work in unglamorous conditions, but today the Iraqi
security forces — while far from perfect — are credible partners with US
Central Command in the fight against the remnants of the Islamic State.
Finally,
Haiti is a strong example of direct benefit to the US. In the 1980s,
massive boatlifts brought tens of thousands of Cuban and Haitian
refugees to Florida. Fleeing instability, criminality and failing
infrastructure of their islands, they were willing to risk dangerous
voyages on unstable rafts to make it to our shores. This put
considerable strain on Florida’s economy.
When a massive 7.0 earthquake devastated Haiti in early 2010, I had just
departed as head of US Southern Command. From a distance I watched with
immense pride as the US military and USAID stepped up together. Some
250,000 residences and 30,000 commercial buildings — as well as most
government ministries and the headquarters of the UN stabilization
mission — were flattened. The risk of human catastrophe, one that could
have spilled into Florida and the rest of the US, was real.
Almost
every military senior responder — starting with the on-the-ground
commander, General Ken Keen — will tell you the real heroes were from
USAID. Their efforts
were integral in preventing a mass exodus, and the costs were pennies
on the dollar compared to caring for Haitian migrants who would have
flooded into south Florida.
“In
Haiti, the USAID team worked seamlessly with American military partners
from Lieutenant General Keen down to more junior officers and enlisted
service members across the island,” Rajiv Shah, then the agency’s
administrator, said later. “The same was true in Afghanistan during the
war, Liberia during the Ebola pandemic, and elsewhere.” He’s right.
I
could continue to provide example after example — in Africa, the
Philippines, the Balkans and elsewhere — to make the case for keeping
USAID. Should there be vigilance to reduce waste, abuse or frivolous
projects? Of course. But dismantling an organization this vital to US
national security will damage our standing in the world and negatively
affect us at home.
Here’s
the bottom line: If you want to try to save money by cutting USAID, you
will only end up spending more on costly Pentagon programs. Like smart
preventative medicine, the work of USAID nips problems in the bud before
they need very expensive major surgery. Maintaining a strong and
capable USAID is both the right thing to do and the smart one.
Stavridis is dean emeritus of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University .
He is on the boards of Aon, Fortinet and Ankura Consulting Group, and
has advised Shield Capital, a firm that invests in the cybersecurity
sector.