Exploring New Frameworks for Taiwan-China Relations: Associated Statehood and Confederation
The Taiwan-China relationship remains one of the world’s most intricate geopolitical challenges. Taiwan operates as a de facto independent state with a democratic government and a flourishing economy, while China regards it as an inseparable part of its territory. Stabilising Taiwan’s sovereignty through an arrangement of associated statehood of confederation may offer a means to settle the complex and enduring matter equitably.
An earlier analysis examined reunification prospects through frameworks such as a Chinese Commonwealth, drawing on Deng Xiaoping’s Six Conceptions as a foundation for fostering cooperative ties. Expanding on these ideas, Deng Xiaoping’s 1983 “One Country, Two Systems” principles and George Yeo’s 2023 concept of a “Chinese Commonwealth” underscore peaceful reunification by granting Taiwan significant autonomy under Chinese sovereignty.
To summarize, Deng Xiaoping’s 1983 articulation of six principles for the peaceful reunification of mainland China and Taiwan—known as Dengs Six Conceptions—formed the cornerstone of the “One Country, Two Systems” framework. These principles sought to balance national unification with Taiwan’s unique social and political identity: These principles underscored Deng’s vision for peaceful reconciliation by accommodating Taiwan’s autonomy while pursuing national unity.
However, this contrasts with Xi Jinping’s 2019 five-point proposal, which acknowledged the need for a Taiwan-specific solution distinct from the Hong Kong-Macau model. Xi’s approach reflects an evolution in Beijing’s strategy, shaped by contemporary political realities and Taiwan’s democratic identity. These five points, emphasising peaceful integration while maintaining firm commitments to national sovereignty, are:
Promoting China’s Rejuvenation and Peaceful Reunification: Xi framed the reunification of Taiwan as integral to the broader goal of China’s national rejuvenation, positioning it as a shared endeavor for people on both sides of the strait.
Exploring a Distinct “Two Systems” Solution for Taiwan: While rooted in the principles of “One Country, Two Systems,” Xi proposed a framework tailored to Taiwan’s unique circumstances, distinguishing it from the arrangements in Hong Kong and Macau.
Upholding the One-China Principle: Reaffirming the necessity of the one-China principle, Xi emphasized its role in preserving the path toward peaceful reunification and preventing fragmentation of sovereignty.
Deepening Cross-Strait Integration: Xi advocated for expanded economic, social, and cultural integration to create a robust foundation for eventual unification.
Strengthening People-to-People Bonds: He highlighted the importance of fostering closer ties between the populations of Taiwan and mainland China to build mutual trust and commitment to peaceful unification.
Xi underscored that the principles of “peaceful reunification” and “one country, two systems” remain the preferred approach for achieving unification. This is reflected in the discomfort with a ‘Chinese Commonwealth’ by Beijing.
However, Xi reiterated that while China seeks a peaceful resolution, it reserves the right to use force, primarily as a deterrent against external interference and movements advocating for Taiwan’s independence. This duality reflects Beijing’s strategic calculus: promoting integration while safeguarding sovereignty through both diplomatic and military preparedness.
Key to this is the US reponse to the changes in the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. There are no signs either the US or China will reach consensus on a conceptual “Chinese Commonwealth”. And the Washinton’s Taiwan window is closing as Chinese military strength.
Adapting these principles to contemporary realities, especially in light of the geopolitical volatility and heightened China-US competition under the Trump regime, may open new pathways, particularly through configurations such as associated statehood and confederation.
While these models emphasize coexistence and mutual benefit, they must be reimagined to address Taiwan’s democratic maturity and evolving security concerns. Insights from global arrangements provide a valuable foundation for exploring these alternatives.
New Zealand’s relationships with the Cook Islands and Niue demonstrate how smaller entities can maintain internal autonomy while partnering with a larger state on defence and foreign policy. Similarly, the U.S. Compacts of Free Association with Pacific island nations of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM), Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) and the Republic of Palau show how sovereignty can coexist with mutual defence arrangements and economic partnerships.
The models of associated statehood practiced by New Zealand and the United States under the Compact of Free Association (COFA) provide important insights into balancing autonomy with strategic interdependence. While both models share core similarities in granting self-governance to associated states, they diverge significantly in their treatment of sovereignty, citizenship, and international representation.
Autonomy: Both frameworks emphasize self-governance. The Cook Islands and Niue independently manage their domestic affairs, free from New Zealand’s direct intervention. Similarly, under COFA, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands, and Palau maintain full control over their internal governance.
defence and Foreign Affairs: In both arrangements, the larger state assumes responsibility for defence and aspects of foreign affairs. New Zealand handles these responsibilities for the Cook Islands and Niue upon their consent, while the United States provides defence services to COFA states. However, both models impose certain limitations on the associated states’ international engagements to align with broader strategic priorities.
Sovereignty and International Status: Sovereignty distinguishes the two models. The Cook Islands and Niue are recognized as sovereign states in free association with New Zealand, enabling them to sign treaties and join international organizations independently, though they forgo UN membership to retain New Zealand citizenship. Conversely, COFA states such as the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau are fully sovereign UN members with the freedom to manage their foreign relations independently.
Citizenship: Citizenship arrangements further illustrate their divergence. Residents of the Cook Islands and Niue hold New Zealand citizenship, granting them rights such as unrestricted movement and residency in New Zealand. In contrast, COFA citizens are not granted U.S. citizenship but are allowed to live, work, and study in the United States visa-free, reflecting a distinct approach to mobility and legal status.
For Taiwan, an associated statehood framework would necessitate robust safeguards to protect its democratic institutions and technological leadership. Clear boundaries must be established to define its relationship with Beijing, ensuring that Taiwan retains meaningful autonomy while fostering cooperation on shared interests. Drawing lessons from the New Zealand and COFA models, Taiwan’s framework would need to address its unique political and security concerns while respecting its distinct identity and aspirations.
These global examples of associated statehood highlight the potential for innovative arrangements that balance autonomy with mutual benefit, offering potential pathways for addressing complex geopolitical challenges like the Taiwan-China relationship.
A more ambitious approach to reimagine Taiwan-China relations is through the confederal model, with a Greater Chinese Union encompassing Taiwan, mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau. Modern examples like Belgium’s regional autonomy system and the UAE’s balanced federal structure demonstrate how distinct political entities can maintain sovereignty while cooperating on shared interests.
This framework could transform the “one China” concept into a voluntary union of equals, where each member retains full domestic autonomy while collaborating on matters of mutual benefit. Such an arrangement would preserve Taiwan’s self-governance while creating mechanisms for regional cooperation.
Modern confederal arrangements are rare due to their inherent instability and tendency to evolve into centralized federal systems or dissolve. However, some examples exhibit confederal principles to varying degrees, offering insights into power-sharing between central authorities and autonomous regions.
The European Union (EU) is a notable quasi-confederation, where member states retain sovereignty but delegate specific powers to central institutions where they are pooled. Unlike traditional confederations, some EU decisions are binding on member states, creating a hybrid model of governance that balances centralized authority with state autonomy. However, this balance often leads to tensions, particularly during crises like Brexit or economic disputes.
Within the EU, Belgium offers a model of semi-confederal federalism, divided into three regions and linguistic communities, each with its own parliament and powers over education, transportation, and economic policy. The reliance on consensus among these autonomous regions often results in political gridlock, illustrating the difficulty of balancing regional autonomy with national unity.
The Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), formed after the Soviet Union’s collapse, functions as a voluntary association of former Soviet republics. Members collaborate on economic, political, and security issues while retaining full sovereignty, but the CIS has limited binding power, often operating more as a diplomatic forum than an integrated system.
In contrast, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) demonstrates a federal system with confederal traits, where each emirate retains significant autonomy over resources, governance, and economic policies, while the central government handles defence, foreign policy, and national security.
Contemporary examples, such as Belgium and the UAE, demonstrate how confederal principles can address regional diversity while maintaining national cohesion. Despite the persistent challenges of weak central authority, sovereignty disputes, and instability that often plague confederal systems, these models provide valuable insights into managing complex political landscapes and balancing sovereignty with collective governance, particularly for regions seeking innovative solutions.
Confederal systems face persistent challenges, including weak central authority where inefficiencies in decision-making can undermine functionality, sovereignty disputes where divergent interests lead to tensions over the balance of power, and instability where they are prone to dissolution or transformation into more centralized frameworks. However, contemporary instances offer key lessons on how they can work.
Belgium’s decentralised governance accommodates deep linguistic, cultural, and regional divisions, creating a structure resembling confederal principles. The reliance on consensus often results in gridlock, illustrating the difficulty of balancing autonomy with national unity.
In contrast, the UAE’s significant autonomy of emirates within a nominally federal system reflects confederal traits, demonstrating how historical and economic factors can shape governance. The ability of emirates to manage resources and economic strategies independently shows how confederal principles can coexist with a unified identity.
These contemporary models like Belgium and the UAE demonstrate how confederal principles can address regional diversity while maintaining national cohesion. Despite the persistent challenges, they offer valuable insights into managing complex political landscapes, particularly for regions seeking to balance sovereignty with collective governance.
Takeaways: Belgium’s Semi-Confederation & UAE’s Confederation-Like Autonomy
Belgium’s governance structure reflects confederal characteristics due to its deep regional divisions between the Flemish, Walloon, and Brussels-Capital regions. These divisions are driven by linguistic, cultural, and economic disparities, resulting in a unique model of decentralized governance.
Belgium’s governance structure reflects confederal characteristics due to its deep regional divisions between the Flemish, Walloon, and Brussels-Capital regions. These divisions, driven by linguistic, cultural, and economic disparities, have resulted in a unique model of decentralized governance.
Belgium is divided into three distinct regions, each with its own parliament and government controlling areas such as education, transportation, and economic policy. The federal government’s authority is limited, handling only national defence, justice, and foreign affairs.
In addition to these territorial divisions, Belgium recognizes three linguistic communities – Dutch, French, and German – each with powers over cultural and language-related matters. This dual-layered system of regions and communities grants substantial autonomy to subnational entities within the Belgian state. The federal government’s limited powers and reliance on consensus among the regions further reflect a confederal approach, often leading to political deadlock as regional interests clash and require negotiation.
Belgium’s decentralization is also evident in the parallel institutions operated by its regions and communities, such as separate public broadcasters and education systems. While officially a federal state, Belgium’s governance structure, with its high degree of regional autonomy, closely resembles confederal principles, making it a unique case study in power-sharing arrangements.
Meanwhile, the UAE, officially a federation, exhibits confederal traits due to the significant autonomy granted to its seven emirates, particularly Abu Dhabi, Dubai, and Sharjah. Each emirate retains substantial control over its own affairs, including local governance, natural resources, and law enforcement. For instance, Abu Dhabi controls its oil reserves, while Dubai manages its trade and economic policies independently.
The UAE federal government oversees defence, foreign affairs, and some national policies, but the emirates retain considerable independence in how they implement or negotiate these federal directives. This decentralized structure reflects confederal elements, where the member states (in this case, the emirates) hold more power than the central authority in specific domains. This is further evident in the divergent legal systems maintained by each emirate, with Dubai and Abu Dhabi operating independent courts for certain areas, underscoring their autonomy within the federation.
The wealthier emirates, such as Abu Dhabi and Dubai, also pursue independent economic strategies with little direct control from the federal government. This allows each emirate to maintain its distinct economic identity while contributing to the broader federal structure. The UAE’s balance between federal authority and emirate independence underscores its confederal-like nature, where strong regional autonomy coexists with a unified national identity.
Both Belgium and the UAE highlight how confederal traits can emerge in systems seeking to balance regional autonomy with overarching governance. In Belgium, linguistic and cultural divisions necessitate decentralized governance, while in the UAE, historical and economic factors have shaped a highly autonomous system within a federal framework. These examples provide valuable lessons for managing diverse interests while maintaining a unified state.
Associated statehood and confederation are distinct arrangements – the former involves a smaller state delegating specific powers to a larger sovereign partner, while the latter represents equal sovereign states collaborating without hierarchical relationships.
Taiwan’s semiconductor industry presents a complex strategic factor – its “Silicon Shield” can serve as both protection and vulnerability. However, as former US National Security Council member Matthew Turpin argues, semiconductors are not Beijing’s primary motivation. Rather, he states: “The Chinese Communist Party desires to take Taiwan because it is a threat to the legitimacy of the party. It demonstrates that the Taiwanese people can have a prosperous democracy without a Leninist Vanguard party leading them.”
Taiwan’s successful democratic model thus represents an ideological challenge to the CCP’s political legitimacy. This underlying tension, combined with deep-seated mistrust between Beijing and Taipei, complicates negotiations over Taiwan’s status.
A “Greater Chinese Union” could theoretically offer a solution, built on principles of autonomy and voluntary cooperation. However, given the CCP’s history of strategic maneuvering in both domestic politics and international relations, any agreement would require robust safeguards including:
- International guarantors
- Clear legal frameworks
- Regular independent reviews
- Comprehensive transparency measures
For Taiwan, the path forward requires balancing pragmatism with core principles. Any arrangement must protect:
- Democratic institutions
- Economic independence
- Technological leadership
- De facto sovereignty
The Taiwan-China relationship stands at a critical juncture where traditional strategies may no longer suffice. Innovative diplomatic solutions beyond traditional frameworks are required. Exploring models like associated statehood or confederation offers a pathway not just for managing conflict but for redefining the terms of engagement in a way that respects Taiwan’s democratic ethos and economic prowess while acknowledging China’s sovereignty concerns.
Associated statehood suggests a framework where Taiwan could maintain significant autonomy in internal affairs while benefiting from security and economic partnerships with China. This model would require stringent safeguards to ensure Taiwan’s democratic institutions remain intact and its technological leadership unthreatened, balancing the need for security with the preservation of identity.
A confederal approach, envisioning a “Greater Chinese Union” where Taiwan enjoys full internal sovereignty while participating in a broader, cooperative framework with other peers, necessitates reimagining what “one China” means. The inherent challenges of confederal systems — including weak central governance, sovereignty disputes, and potential for instability — must be thoughtfully addressed.
Taiwan must leverage its economic clout, democratic values, and international partnerships to maintain autonomy, even as it confronts the reality of being an ideological threat to the CCP’s political legitimacy and the complexities of its “Silicon Shield.”
A durable solution requires robust global guarantees and legal frameworks to protect Taiwan’s technological leadership and democratic institutions. Success hinges on pragmatic diplomacy – Taiwan safeguarding its core interests while exploring cooperation, and China recognizing that a peaceful resolution through innovative governance best serves its long-term national rejuvenation goals. This could set a vital precedent for resolving complex territorial disputes through dialogue, not force.
The path forward demands a nuanced balance of pragmatism and principle. Taiwan must steadfastly defend its democracy, economy, and technological edge, even as it prudently explores cooperative avenues. China, in turn, must recognize the strategic and ideological value of a peaceful settlement that aligns with its ambitions without undermining Taiwan’s autonomy.
Ultimately, Taiwan’s status will be determined by political will, innovative diplomacy, and a genuine commitment to dialogue from both sides. The potential for peaceful, prosperous coexistence could set a global standard and foster stability, cooperation in the Indo-Asia Pacific. Failure risks a destabilising confrontation with incalculable consequences.