Europe Is Caught Between Trump’s Disruption and China’s Status Quo
Since U.S. President Donald Trump took office, his representatives have goaded Washington’s European allies with open displays of support for European far-right parties and harsh criticism for what they characterize as the European Union’s over-regulation of business and lax regulation of migration. That reached a peak at last week’s Munich Security Conference, which was full of drama and surprises on both those fronts, as well as the Trump administration’s newly announced approach to NATO and the war in Ukraine, where Trump signaled his intention to exclude Washington’s European allies from talks with Russia to end the hostilities.
Simply put, the U.S. is now the global order’s disruptor. As a result, China sees an opportunity to regain favor in Europe after years in which Beijing’s pro-Russia stance on Ukraine alienated many of its European partners. Europe now finds itself caught between a bombastic United States under Trump and a status-quo China that seeks to stabilize relations.
The fact that the Trump administration delivered its disruptive message in such a harsh and even irresponsible manner underscores the difficult set of choices facing the EU. Trump is demanding that Europe become more like the United States. He wants Europeans to rebuild their militaries, deregulate their economies and legitimize voices of dissent on the right. At the same time, if that results in a more independent and internally unified Europe, he expects it to also be a Europe that hews to the values of the Trumpist Republican Party.
Meanwhile, Beijing is making an alternative offer of maintaining the status quo. China wants Europe to stay the same: dependent on China economically for trade and investment, and lacking unity so that Beijing can take advantage of its internal differences and disagreements. But the EU has been working to reduce its dependency on China in recent years, or at least it has become more alarmed about it, so doubling down on that path now seems inconceivable.
These choices were made plainly visible in Munich, where U.S. Vice President JD Vance denounced Europe’s approach to political norms and free speech in an address delivered to its very leaders. Rather than focus on areas of mutual concern and even agreement between the U.S. and Europe, such as the need for deregulation and increased productivity, Vance attacked the EU’s political values, especially its attempts to constrain the political space of extremist political parties and speech. “[W]hat no democracy, American, German or European will survive, is telling millions of voters that their thoughts and concerns, their aspirations, their pleas are invalid or unworthy of even being considered. Democracy rests on the sacred principle that the voice of the people matters. There is no room for firewalls.”
The United States’ polarizing approach could drive Europe toward the Chinese offer of mutual benefit and cooperation. Unfortunately for Europe, the China option brings its own risks of economic dependency.
Vance also took the controversial step of meeting with Alice Weidel, the co-leader of the Alternative for Deutschland, or AfD, the far-right political party that is currently polling in second place ahead of Germany’s snap parliamentary elections this weekend. All of this was preceded by Elon Musk’s own video appearance with Weidel in January at an AfD campaign rally, where he called on Germany to get over “past guilt.”
Vance’s criticism of Europe was met with outrage and denunciations. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz criticized him for interfering in the country’s domestic politics. Although the center-right Christian Democratic Union leads in the polls, the AfD is not far behind. So there’s a possibility that Vance and Musk’s clear support for the Afd could change the outcome of Sunday’s vote, with one German commentator calling Vance’s speech a “campaign gift” to the AfD.
By contrast, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi played the opposite role at Munich, that of the consummate diplomat there to reassure and assuage the concerns of Beijing’s European partners. Wang pledged that China was committed to leading the world toward a multipolar world in which Beijing will be a “factor of certainty” and “strive to be a steadfast constructive force in a changing world.” He promised that China would uphold international law and work together with the EU as a partner to tackle climate change, and he even offered Europe the opportunity to link up with the Belt and Road Initiative—China’s massive global infrastructure project—to realize economic growth and development. China, according to Wang, “is providing the greatest certainty in this uncertain world.”
Unfortunately for the U.S., the Trump administration’s impolitic, over-the-top approach could backfire even though on economics and security, there is more consensus between Washington and Brussels than meets the eye. Mario Draghi, the former Italian prime minister and European Central Bank chief, has called for drastic reforms in the EU to restore its competitiveness and productivity, which has failed to keep pace with either the U.S. or China. Writing in the Financial Times the same day as Vance’s speech, Draghi called out the EU’s high internal barriers to trade and regulatory hurdles as worse than any tariffs that Trump has threatened.
Will Vance’s criticism of Europe’s postwar “firewall” to exclude far-right parties from government—with some notable exceptions—lead to a seismic shift in German politics? Will calls for EU regulatory reform and a more unified funding structure be invigorated by pressure from the “ugly Americans”? Or will the United States’ polarizing approach drive Europe toward the Chinese options for mutual benefit and cooperation promised by Wang?
Unfortunately for Europe, the China option brings its own risks of economic dependency. Europe’s economic relationship to China has changed dramatically over the past 10 years. China is no longer the junior partner in key sectors, such as automotives. Instead, European car companies are more dependent than ever on the Chinese market, even as their sales continue to decline. Unable to make a quick transition to electrification, as China has done, companies like Volkswagen have been forced to cut production in Europe. And the EU has been unable to counter China’s growing competitive advantage in areas where it once dominated. It did not develop an industrial policy like former U.S. President Joe Biden’s Inflation Reduction Act. It has also not used tariffs as aggressively as the U.S. to protect key industries.
As a new report on the “second China shock” that is currently sweeping across Germany industry put it, “a spectre is haunting the country – the spectre of deindustrialisation.” If the EU renews and reinvigorates its economic cooperation with China without measures to protect its own industries, it faces mounting competition from an industrial base that is more productive, less expensive and supported by state subsidies and other backing well beyond what European firms enjoy. Already, Volkswagen has signaled that it would support Chinese EV companies taking over its plants in Europe that have been stalled by weak demand.
Europeans face difficult choices, made more difficult by the Trump administration’s decision to push them not just on economics and security, but also on their politics of social inclusion and speech moderation. A Europe that is more unified and independent would work to the benefit of Europe and the United States. Unfortunately, Trump’s messaging could backfire and lead Europe toward China’s orbit.
Mary Gallagher is the Marilyn Keough Dean of the Keough School of Global Affairs at the University of Notre Dame.