How Taliban-led Afghanistan fits into Saudi Arabia’s reform agenda
In December 2024, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia announced the resumption of its diplomatic mission in Kabul. The development came about three years after Saudi Arabia closed its embassy in Kabul after the Afghan Taliban took over in 2021. This demonstrates a change in Saudi Arabia’s policy and willingness to engage with the Afghan Taliban. However, strengthening the bilateral relations between both countries depends on whether or not the Taliban regime can find relevance in Saudi Arabia’s modernisation agenda. This factor is set to influence the future trajectory of Saudi-Afghan relations.
Historically, Saudi Arabia was a close ally of Afghanistan. During the Soviet-Afghan war, the country provided necessary resources and funds to the mujahideen against the Soviets. A civil war soon followed the Soviet’s withdrawal from Afghanistan and the capture of Kabul by the Afghan Taliban in 1996. Saudi Arabia was one of three countries that recognised the new government in Afghanistan, with the other two being the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and neighbouring Pakistan.
However, a setback in relations emerged in 1998 when Saudi Arabia asked the Afghan Taliban to extradite Osama Bin Laden, leader of Al-Qaeda. Taliban refused this demand, which significantly deteriorated relations, and Saudi Arabia halted funding for the group. After Al-Qaeda’s 9/11 attacks, both Saudi Arabia and the UAE cut all ties with the Afghan Taliban. Saudi Arabia also reported two weeks after the terror attack that the Taliban government had not responded to any warnings to stop harbouring radical elements. It was important for the Kingdom to appear distant to both the Afghan Taliban and Bin Laden to avoid any responsibility relating to the 9/11 attacks.
In 2008, Saudi Arabia brokered talks between the Taliban and the Afghanistan government. The talks were held in Mecca during Ramzan and were hosted by the Saudi King Abdullah Bin Abdul Aziz. The main objective was to negotiate a peace deal between both sides to lay down the weapons and mainstream the Taliban in the Afghan government. Although the negotiations failed, the fact that the Saudi government directly engaged with the Taliban represented a shift in their policy.
In 2017, Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS) initiated a reformist campaign to remove the taboo of Islamist extremism attached to the country and present a more moderate version of Islam in the hope of attracting foreign tourism and deradicalising the Muslim communities. MBS reduced several barriers to women’s liberation in Saudi society, removed restrictions on festivities and stopped funding to foreign mosques and seminaries. The primary objectives of this reformist agenda were to present a tolerant and moderate image of Islam to the Western audience and remove Saudi Arabia’s association with extremist ideologies and groups such as Al-Qaeda.
The Saudi position on Afghanistan was partially anti-Taliban, condemning the use of violence and radical interpretation of Islam. In 2018, Riyadh hosted a two-day international conference of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to promote peace and stability in Afghanistan. The conference was attended by religious scholars from various Muslim countries who condemned the use of religious legitimacy in committing violence by the Taliban. The conference aimed to present both a more moderate version of Islam and the Kingdom’s renewed diplomatic approach towards Afghanistan. Since 2021, Saudi engagements have been minimal and only focused on humanitarian aid and disaster relief assistance. MBS used the country’s influence in OIC and the Islamic Development Bank to establish the Afghanistan Humanitarian Trust Fund and facilitate humanitarian assistance to the country.
It is evident after three years that the Afghan Taliban are the reality and neighbouring, especially Muslim, states must engage with them. For Saudi Arabia, humanitarian assistance and the ambit of the OIC office cover areas where the Taliban may participate more formally. Though Taliban-led Afghanistan may not completely comply with the Kingdom’s reformist agenda, Saudi Arabia can create opportunities for pragmatic engagement. It can use its unique position as a custodian of two holy sites to engage with the Taliban, especially in matters of development and trade.
Although the resumption of its diplomatic mission in Kabul represents a pragmatic step towards normalisation with the Afghan Taliban, the Kingdom’s modernisation efforts will likely face challenges in Afghanistan. The ideological divergence between the two is a concerning factor in the reformist agenda of MBS. Afghan Taliban continue to adhere to their conservative interpretation of religion. The Afghan Ministry of Vice and Virtue adopted numerous ultra-conservative laws, ranging from preventing males from shaving their beards to barring women from education. Similarly, Afghanistan remains the hotbed of terrorism with the presence of terrorist groups like Islamic State-Khorasan Province, Al-Qaeda and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan.
To find relevance in Saudi Arabia’s reformation strategy, the Afghan Taliban would need to adapt to the changing geopolitical landscape. To strengthen the bilateral relations, the Afghan Taliban must demonstrate a commitment to uphold certain human rights obligations. This includes moderating their stance on governance, women’s rights and preventing extremist groups from using Afghan territory. This shift is necessary for Kabul to be aligned with Riyadh’s modernisation efforts to project a more tolerant version of Islam and a progressive image of the Muslim world.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.