A “Freedom for Öcalan” demonstration was held in the Şeyh Maksud
neighbourhood in Aleppo, Syria, February 12, 2025 [photo credit:
@HalidAbdo]
Should that happen Ankara believes it can remove international
support for secular Kurdish forces by replacing them as the main
anti-ISIS force in Syria. In anticipation of such an outcome and in
partnership with Jordan and Iraq, Erdoğan will shortly host
a counterterrorism summit. This would provide an isolationist Trump
with an offramp from any criticism from his supporters who may fear an
ISIS resurgence on American targets. In such a scenario European
countries will be left with no choice but to follow suit and back the
Erdoğan initiative.
The peace talks with Öcalan would put further pressure on the SDF in
Syria. Kurdish forces are already being squeezed in ongoing talks with
Syria’s interim government, led by Ahmed al-Sharaa, who seeks to fold
the SDF into the national army and establish complete control in today’s
post-Assad Syria. Kurds in Syria believe that Erdoğan is leaning on
al-Sharaa, out of fear that any autonomy afforded to Kurds in Syria
could fuel unrest among Kurds in Türkiye.
PKK fighters also continue to operate out of Iraq, particularly in
the Qandil mountains, to evade Turkish efforts at dismantling them.
However Erdoğan has been making inroads with Iraq’s main political
leaders, especially as Iran, Iraq’s primary foreign patron, has been
weakened in its ongoing conflict with Israel and the United States.
The expected peace talks would address the sanctuary given to PKK
fighters in Iraq. This would serve as a boon to the Kurdistan Democratic
Party (KDP), led by the Barzani clan, a close
ally of Erdoğan and the dominant party in Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional
Government. Under a deal that reins in the PKK, the KDP would be
strengthened, especially vis-à-vis the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the
KDP’s major rival, whom Türkiye accuses of supporting the PKK.
Successful dialogue between Türkiye and the PKK would also reduce
regional instability in Iraq, which could benefit regional economic
development. When Erdoğan visited Baghdad in June 2024, his first in 13
years, a major focus was on the Development Road Project. The megaproject
seeks to establish a trade corridor through building a series of rail
and highway lines from Basra in southern Iraq to Türkiye and onward to
Europe.
For the ambitious project ever to be successful, the removal of the
PKK from northern Iraq would be necessary. Iraq’s central government
declared the PKK an illegal
organisation for the first time in 2024, highlighting hopes that the
Development Road Project will provide significant economic gains for
leaders in Baghdad and Erbil.
As foreign capitals are left to assess Türkiye’s role in Assad’s
sudden collapse at the end of 2024, they will need to consider the
implications of a deal with Ankara’s longtime foe, the PKK, and how it
would advance Erdoğan’s future plans in remaking both his country and
securing greater influence in the wider region for the Turkish
president.
For more on the shifting power structures that have followed in the wake of the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad here is our recent podcast with the Turkish writer and analyst Aslı Aydıntaşbaş.
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