

port from his foreign secretary, Gottlieb von Jagow, who, in November 1916, was replaced by Arthur Zimmermann, a diplomat who manifested more energy but far less judgment. Zimmermann, a hawkish policymaker, supported submarine warfare upon the Atlantic. He suffered from poor health and lacked parliamentary skills.

At first glance, Johann Heinrich Count von Bernstorff, ambassador to the United States, seemed most suitable for the position; his father had been foreign minister of Prussia and he himself had served in such far-flung posts as Constantinople, Belgrade, St. Petersburg, London, and Cairo. Intelligent, elegant, and charming and married to an American, the suave Bernstorff appeared the quintessential diplomat and, until war erupted in Europe, was quite popular in the United States. Believing in a compromise settlement between the Allies and the Central Powers, at times he exceeded his instructions in the hopes of maintaining peace with America. Yet the count's stiff bearing disturbed Wilson, making personal contact difficult.

Germany possessed a parliament, but its powers were extremely limited. The lower house, the Reichstag, by no means possessed the prerogatives held by the American Congress, the British House of Commons, or the French Chamber of Deputies. It did exercise one crucial function, for it had the sole authority to vote military allocations.

In Germany the military played a far more crucial role than in the United States. The Kaiser bore the title of supreme war lord and legally commanded the armed forces, but once war began, the general staff increasingly wielded decisive power. In mid-1916 Wilhelm complained that he had become a mere shadow, relegated to the sidelines. When Germany entered the war, its first chief of staff was General Helmuth von Moltke ("the younger"), but after his defeat in September 1914 at the battle of the Marne, Wilhelm replaced him with Erich von Falkenhayn. Falkenhayn suffered major failure in Verdun and eastern Europe, thereby giving way late in August 1916 to Paul von Hindenburg. By then the real authority lay in the hands of quartermaster general Erich Ludendorff. Army leaders at first exercised caution, but by the fall of 1916 they endorsed massive use of U-boats, a policy that ultimately drew the United States into the conflict.

Certain admirals exercised strong influence. Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, state secretary of the navy office, began the conflict as his nation's foremost naval leader. By February 1915 he ardently supported U-boat warfare. His faulty analysis of British strategy alienated Wilhelm, who forced his resignation in March 1916. Tirpitz's replacement, Eduard von Capelle,

long remained opposed to unrestricted submarine use but finally bowed to the wishes of his fellow officers. Georg Alexander von Müller, chief of the imperial naval cabinet, possessed great influence; he often voiced caution in confronting the United States. Henning von Holtzendorff, chosen to head the Admiralty staff in the spring of 1915, initially wavered on U-boat use but in December 1916 presented convincing arguments in support of this policy.

If Germany had one bitter foe among the Americans, it was Theodore Roosevelt. Among critics of Wilson's diplomacy, none was as prominent. The former president endorsed an "intimate association" with the British Empire and adhered to the notion that the English-speaking peoples were superior to all others. Recently defeated for the presidency on the Progressive or Bull Moose ticket, TR had almost abandoned domestic reform by the end of 1914 in order to concentrate on foreign policy. In late August, though apprehensive concerning Japan and Russia, he privately voiced the fear that a victorious Germany would soon engage the United States. Within a year Roosevelt condemned Germany's invasion of Belgium, endorsed universal military training, and called for a league of nations that would "put force back of righteousness." Given such views, as well as his desire to recover his party's fortunes, he sharply criticized the Wilson administration. No major American leader expressed himself with such venom. In August 1915 he wrote to his son Kermit that the president was an "abject coward."²⁵ In public he was almost equally abusive. In the 1914 congressional elections, the Roosevelt Progressives were decimated, retaining only one Senate seat, but the volatile ex-president still enjoyed considerable popularity among Americans.

TR's views on Europe lacked coherence. Though he frequently indicted Germany, praised the Allies, and advocated policies that would invariably lead to war, he never publicly endorsed outright intervention. Indeed, he asserted that a show of force would keep America at peace. "The worst policy for the United States," he wrote soon after war began, "is to combine the unbridled tongue with the unsteady hand." A woefully weak America could have perceived wisdom in this view, but, as the *Nation* magazine observed: "he pleads his cause with such heat and so little moderation that his words fail to be impressive." The *New York Times* added: "He warns, he denounces, he glares, he shrieks."²⁶ Nevertheless, he drew such popular support that had he lived in 1920, he might well have been the Republican presidential candidate.

Roosevelt gained strong support from senators Elihu Root (R-N.Y.) and Henry Cabot Lodge (R-Mass.) as well as from Congressman August

tus P. Gardner (R-Mass.). Root had been secretary of war under presidents McKinley and Roosevelt, then became TR's secretary of state. Far more of a standpatter on domestic policy than TR, in 1912 Root supported the reelection of President William Howard Taft, thereby "betraying" his close friend Roosevelt. Nevertheless, when a German U-boat sank the British liner *Lusitania* in May 1915, Root privately maintained that the United States should enter the conflict. In February 1916 he publicly accused Wilson of "threatening words without deeds."²⁷

Lodge, the ranking Republican on the Foreign Relations Committee, was even more strident. Just slightly less conservative than Root on domestic matters, he supported Wilson on certain specific measures, such as permitting arms traffic with the belligerents and defending the right of Americans to travel on their passenger ships. Like Roosevelt, Lodge considered Wilson far too timid, even unpatriotic, and also like TR, he harbored a personal animosity, finding the president downright dishonest. Lodge wrote TR in 1915: "I never expected to hate anyone in politics with the hatred I feel towards Wilson."²⁸ His son-in-law, the highly powerful and visible "Gussie" Gardner, was a Spanish-American War veteran who spearheaded the preparedness movement in the House of Representatives.

Wilson's foreign policy triggered strong opposition from congressional leaders of his own party and from Bryan's followers in particular. Senator William J. Stone of Missouri, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, fought the president on such matters as arming American merchant ships in 1917; he voted against war with Germany. The committee's second-ranking Democratic member, Gilbert M. Hitchcock of Nebraska, shared many of Stone's sentiments, though, in times of crisis, he upheld the president out of loyalty. In the House, Claude Kitchin of North Carolina, majority leader and chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, took the lead in fighting military appropriations. Like Stone, in April 1917 he opposed the president's war message.

Wilson also received sharp criticism from certain midwestern Republicans, who believed him far too pro-British. Senator Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin, the most prominent in their ranks. Using the monthly *La Follette's Magazine* as his forum, the Wisconsin Republican espied Wall Street greed behind most U.S. actions overseas, whether the matter was intervention in Latin America or loans to the Allies. Whereas Bryan stressed "cooling-off" treaties to preserve American neutrality, La Follette emphasized an advisory war refer-

endum by which the American public could directly express its views on entering the conflict.

Debate in the Congress spilled over to the world of journalism. Certain weeklies offered particularly articulate perspectives. Oswald Garrison Villard's *Nation*, an affiliate of the *New York Evening Post*, manifested a Wilsonian perspective. Publisher Villard usually limited his own comments to matters concerning preparedness and the activities of German Americans; Rollo Ogden, a former Presbyterian minister, wrote most of the editorials. *The Outlook*, edited by Congregationalist clergyman Lyman Abbott, espoused Theodore Roosevelt's brand of interventionism, although TR had resigned as its contributing editor in July 1914. The *New Republic* began as a voice for Bull Moose progressivism and a mild version of Rooseveltian foreign policy. Its editors, Herbert Croly, Walter Weyl, and Walter Lippmann, supported the Allies, Lippmann being the most intense advocate. By March 1916, finding TR lacking in positive alternatives to Wilsonian diplomacy, it veered toward the president. Early in 1917 Croly and Lippmann became close to Colonel House, a circumstance that confirmed the journal's increasing reputation as the semiofficial Wilsonian organ.

The newspaper chain of William Randolph Hearst, which reached 4 million readers daily, stood in a class by itself. Hearst was unsuccessful in frequent bids to secure public office, including the presidency, but nonetheless exercised greater influence over the public than many members of Congress. His holdings included a movie studio, a newsreel firm, and a company supplying syndicated features. His wire agency, International News Service, served several hundred newspapers. By 1914 the flamboyant publisher owned newspapers in San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Boston, though he took particular pride in his *New York American*, which boasted the highest circulation in the nation and which drew upon eighty correspondents in covering the war. Though denounced as a mouthpiece for Imperial Germany, the *American* gave far more space to pro-Entente articles than to those inclined to the Central Powers; it featured such prominent British contributors as H.G. Wells, Rudyard Kipling, and George Bernard Shaw. Hearst was a progressive in domestic politics but trumpeted a strident foreign policy, pressing for major rearmament, warning against a "predatory" Japan, and seeking the annexation of Mexico. Mutual animosity marked the relationship between Hearst and Wilson, reflecting in part the publisher's desire for a far more rigid neutrality in the European war than the president envisioned.