When analysts seek to explain Donald Trump’s approach to government they inevitably focus on his personality: an unstable and capricious transactional negotiator with no fixed ideology who seems to be a narcissist and a pathological liar.
The risk in this approach is that it privileges the agency of one individual over the systems and structures within which they make their decisions. Outrageous and untruthful remarks for the media make good headlines and shock his opponents, but they often bear little on what policies ultimately transpire.
Focusing on Trump’s personality tells us surprisingly little about what US foreign policy will look like over the next four years.
For a deeper understanding, both of American foreign policy itself and the implications for friends and allies of the US, we need to ask two specific questions which delve beneath both the surface of media headlines about Trump’s idiosyncrasies, and the reflexive outrage of his opponents.
Is there a consistent theme in Trump’s foreign policy?
To the extent that there are coherent and consistent themes underwriting Trump’s approach to foreign policy — with a focus on those around him rather than the mercurial president himself — it is clear the new administration is not isolationist. Having covetous eyes on Greenland, Canada, the Panama canal and Gaza is not the behaviour of a government seeking to retreat behind its borders.
Jennifer Mittelstadt is correct to highlight the anti-internationalism of the Trump Administration, which has a long history in conservative American thought. She defines Trump’s approach as sovereigntist, where no interference in the prerogatives of US power — neither people, money nor territory — is permitted.
It is important to note that the term sovereigntist does not signify support for the inviolability of sovereign borders around the world. Just ask Denmark, Canada, Panama and the Palestinians of Gaza. Or talk to Ukrainians, whom Trump expects to surrender territory to Russia as part of a peace settlement for that conflict. Now imagine how the rulers of Taiwan feel today.
For Trump, sovereigntism has only US characteristics. It can be seen in his punitive (if self-defeating) tariffs imposed on Canada and Mexico (and soon China and the EU), anti-immigration policies directed at Mexico, Washington’s hostility to “world government” at the United Nations, and in sanctions recently imposed on prosecutors at the International Criminal Court.
Internationalism and international co-operation in global bodies such as the UN, World Bank, IMF and the WTO are, therefore, not political objectives but merely tools used to further US interests. As soon as these institutions impose constraints or costs on Washington’s unilateral ambitions and the exercise of its power, Trump believes they should either be withdrawn from or dismantled entirely (eg the Paris Agreement on climate change; the WHO).
Allies in NATO and AUKUS should take note. In fact they should realise that the term “ally” has significantly less resonance for Trump, who evinces little if any nostalgia for the contours of modern history and the vital friendships and alliances forged over recent times.
If a country, territory or an organisation inhibits the unilateral projection of power by Washington, it can expect little co-operation: or outright hostility. The rules, conventions and institutions of international society are on the wane in Washington. Unbridled power and deals struck between Great Powers are waxing again.
This should be a salutary lesson for medium-sized states such as Australia, which have a disproportionate dependence on maintaining order in the international system. Ethical benchmarks, stabilising agreements, the sanctity of contracts, and international organisations help to compensate medium-sized states for their relative lack of hard power. They give middle powers forums and protections that would be otherwise denied to them. For Trump they compromise America’s strategic and economic authority.
Adam Tooze is right when he says US hegemony is over, especially if you compare 1955 with 2025. No-one is inspired by the US political system: it has become a soap opera where election victories are effectively bought and sold like bananas. Even the cultural dominance of Hollywood has collapsed. US corporate power remains unequalled, but in finance, trade, manufacturing, energy production, telecommunications, public transport, robotics and IT development, America is one of a small number of important states, not the dominant player it once was.
Economic globalisation is despised by the sovereigntists around Trump, but it is a global transformation from which they cannot escape. For all his breast beating and petty mercantilism, Trump knows that the United States cannot revert to economic nationalism and remain the world’s most important economy: China will ensure this. On its current trajectory, soon the US will no longer be the indispensable power it once was.
Where will Trump confront resistance?
The battle to watch is between Trump and the Deep State (military-intelligence complex). Who wins this struggle will ultimately decide what happens.
Trump’s electoral victory and current popularity will buy him time – perhaps 18 months or more – to “flood the zone” with multiple revisions to the current world order based on his sovereigntist priorities, including the possible destruction of NATO and the break-up of the Atlantic alliance. This will be fiercely resisted by the Pentagon, the intelligence community and the State Department: men in dark suits with blue ties who were in a much stronger position to resist him eight years ago.
This is another way of saying that neither Europe nor Zelenskyy will be decisive in what will happen to Ukraine. The focus of analysts should be on the internal struggle within Washington’s beltway – between an unpredictable maverick with sovereigntist instincts and those who want the post-war trans-Atlantic security architecture to continue as normal. Where they divide is on Russia. Trump sees Putin as man he can cut deals with. The Deep State considers Russia to be a permanent enemy of the US.
Trump’s conservative cheerleaders outside the United States are already splitting. Interestingly, it wasn’t the imposition of tariffs which broke them apart, it was his abandonment of Ukraine. And yet the former was an explicit violation of neoliberal economic principles (free trade) which has direct consequences for countries such as Australia, while the latter does not: proof that on the right, ideology trumps national interests.
As an existing entity, Ukraine will no longer be as it was three years ago and is likely to become a modern day Sudetenland with quasi, compromised sovereignty. Sanctions against Russia will persist but they are already starting to break down: Germany’s energy needs and a new government in Berlin will further undermine a common European position.
Predictably, Moscow is turning up the black arts on Zelenskyy, sensing its opportunity. He can get all the pledges he wants from President Macron, but it’s nothing more than hot air from the Élysée Palace and the French President has more important domestic challenges to confront. Prime Minister Starmer has barely enough troops to defend Notting Hill market, and Chancellor Scholz will remain a caretaker lame duck until the conservative CDU/CSU can patch together a coalition which is unlikely to be as sympathetic towards Ukraine. In other words, Europe can’t do anything about Ukraine without Washington’s leadership.
Imagine a peace negotiation which excludes one of the two protagonists! It is not clear why anyone is surprised by this, given Trump’s history with Zelenskyy. Whether Washington and Moscow can reach a deal remains to be seen. It seems improbable in the short term but we can be certain that Kyiv is unlikely to be consulted by either about its fate.
Trump’s plan to ethnically cleanse Gaza and turn it into a Riviera in the Middle East for US and Israeli real estate developers is dead on arrival. It required the co-operation of Egypt, Jordan and, to some extent, Saudi Arabia. Despite their autocratic status and aid dependence on the US (Egypt and Jordan), none were prepared to risk popular revulsion amongst their populations by being party to the expulsion of Palestinians from their homeland.
In fact, only Trump, his court and Israel support the process, which to Tel Aviv’s great disappointment has morphed into an Arab-led reconstruction with Palestinians remaining in situ. Trump appears to have lost interest in the absurd and criminal enterprise so we should expect the idea to die an early and natural death. The danger is that Israel will be given a free hand to continue the genocide and add the annexation of the West Bank as its booby prize.
What these two examples reveal is instructive. Trump is more likely to have success in ending the Ukraine-Russia war despite serious divisions and concerns held by his traditional support base and opposition from the Deep State. On Palestine, where Trump can rely on a complicit Congress and the fulsome support of his Israeli ally, he is unlikely to make any meaningful progress towards his goal of being awarded a Nobel Peace Prize.
Dr Scott Burchill is Honorary Fellow in International Relations at Deakin University. He is the author of The National Interest in International Relations Theory (Palgrave Macmillan 2005), Misunderstanding International Relations (Palgrave Macmillan 2020) and co-author and editor of Theories of International Relations (5th ed Palgrave Macmillan 2013). He has also taught at Monash University, the University of Melbourne and the University of Tasmania.