North Korea’s Lethal Aid to Russia: Current State and Outlook
- By: Tianran Xu
- February 14, 2025
Like all foreign military aid to a warring party, North Korea’s (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea or DPRK) lethal aid to Russia largely falls into two broad categories. First, old and/or surplus equipment and ammunition sent to replenish Moscow’s depleted stocks. Second, new weapons and main battlefield equipment that can be field-tested in Ukraine. If the war drags on, North Korean weapon provision to Russia is most likely to escalate further. The combat performance of these hardware in Ukraine will give Pyongyang a valuable opportunity to evaluate and refine its domestic weapon systems. In return for Pyongyang’s lethal aid, Moscow will likely reciprocate with weapons and/or military technologies, further strengthening North Korea’s offensive and defensive capabilities on the Korean Peninsula and beyond.
Old Weaponry and Ammunition
North Korea’s ammunition deliveries to Russia were first revealed by the US government in October 2023, when Pyongyang allegedly provided Moscow with over 1,000 containers of military equipment and ammunition. By October 2024, South Korea estimated that North Korea had shipped around 20,000 containers to Russia, which could carry approximately 9.4 million 152 mm shells when fully stocked. Some Western intelligence sources estimated in late 2024 that North Korea supplied “half of the shells used by Russia in Ukraine,” while the Ukrainian intelligence estimated that 60 percent of shells fired by Russian army were provided by North Korea. Given the sheer quantity of shells provided, this ammunition is critical to Russia’s war efforts.
To date, the old equipment and ammunition have included:
- 122 mm artillery shells, 130 mm artillery shells, 152 mm artillery shells, mortar shells, North Korean militia version 122 mm multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) and MRL rockets: These weapons and ammunition originated from the Soviet Union and have been mass-produced in North Korea for decades. Frontline reports suggest North Korean ammunition is of poor quality and unreliable—consistent with its performance during the 2010 Yeonpyeong Island shelling, where about 25 percent of North Korean artillery shells and rockets that landed on the island failed to detonate.
- 170 mm self-propelled guns (SPGs) and shells: The “Koksan gun” developed by North Korea to target the greater Seoul area is considered outdated, with a low rate of fire and alleged poor accuracy. According to Ukraine’s military intelligence chief Budanov, North Korea supplied Russia with 120 such SPGs between November 2024 and January 2025. These SPGs have already reached the frontline. In early February, South Korean defense ministry stated that the North had sent 200 pieces of long-range artillery to Russia but did not specify the types.
New Weaponry
New and/or more powerful weapons have also been sent to Russia. The provision of these weapons not only helps reinforce the Russian army’s capabilities, but also allows North Korea to assess the real-world combat performance of its domestic weapon systems. So far, there has been evidence or allegations of the following systems:
- Hwasong-11 series ballistic missiles. These represent North Korea’s new generation of short-range (aero-) ballistic missiles (SRBMs). Citing South Korean intelligence, Bloomberg reported in October 2024 that about 100 Hwasong-11 missiles had been detected on the battlefield in Ukraine. In January 2025, Ukraine’s military intelligence chief claimed that Pyongyang is expected to deliver 150 Hwasong-11 missiles to Russia in 2025, in addition to the 148 missiles already supplied in 2024. Debris of a Hwasong-11 series SRBM recovered in Ukraine in early January 2024 included more than 290 non-domestic electronic components, most of which were found in the missile’s guidance system. Despite the use of non-domestic electronics, the accuracy of conventional DPRK missile strikes appears to be low, as Ukraine’s top prosecutor claimed that only two among the 24 DPRK ballistic missiles fired at Ukraine in early 2024 were “relatively accurate.” This may be due to a large quantity of counterfeit parts identified in the wreckage of the Hwasong-11 missiles.[1] However, in early January 2025, Reuters reported that the North Hwasong-11 missiles fired at Ukraine since late December 2024 had a “marked increase” in accuracy in comparison to missiles fired over the past year, which, according to senior Ukrainian officials, suggests that North Korea is successfully using the battlefield to refine its missile technology.[2]
- New type of short-range surface-to-air missiles. In early January, a North Korean short-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) system was allegedly struck by Russian friendly fire in the Kursk region. The system, modeled after the Russian Tor SAM, was first showcased during a military parade in Pyongyang in October 2020. In November 2024, it was displayed at a defense equipment exhibition in Pyongyang, with information boards showing the system conducting test fires (Figure 1).
If the provision of this new-type SAM system is confirmed, its
performance on the battlefield will provide North Korea the opportunity
to further evaluate and improve this system.
Figure 1. Left: The SAM system hit by Russian-friendly fire in early January 2025 shares a close resemblance to North Korea’s newly-developed short-range SAM system. Right: Information displayed at a weapon exhibition in November 2024 in Pyongyang suggested that the North Korean SAM had already undergone test fires. (Images: Left: Militarnyi, Right: Korean Central News Agency)
- Alleged provision of guided and/or unguided 240 mm MRLs. Ukraine’s military intelligence chief stated that North Korea supplied Russia with 120 such MRLs between November 2024 and January 2025. Although the unguided 240 mm MRL is as old as the 170 mm SPG, it remains a key asset for the Korean People’s Army due to its high rate of fire and ability to cover a large area quickly. Meanwhile, the guided version is expected to have significantly improved accuracy, making it far more effective against smaller, fixed targets—though it is highly unlikely to match the precision of US M270/HIMARS guided rockets. According to the Financial Times, guided 240 mm MRLs have already been sent to Russia. However, no publicly available evidence currently confirms North Korea’s provision of 240 mm MRLs (Figure 2).
Figure
2. A partially-censored video frame showing the transportation of at
least two 170 mm SPGs and what appears to be a 240 mm MRL in Russia. A
more positive identification of the 240 mm MRL is not possible with
available information.
What Might Come Next
For North Korea, providing lethal aid to Russia offers multiple benefits, such as: 1) disposing of outdated ammunition with questionable quality and replacing it with newly-produced stock under presumably better quality control, 2) field-testing new and main battle weaponry under realistic combat conditions, 3) receiving foreign currency, energy, goods, services, and technology transfers from Russia in return, and 4) reducing Pyongyang’s isolation and breaking international sanctions. If the war in Ukraine drags on, Pyongyang may supply more modern weapons to the battlefield. Depending on Russia’s needs, these could potentially include:
- Anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) and man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS). These modern North Korean weapons have already been proliferated to the Middle East, but their combat performance remains unclear. The provision of a North Korean ATGM system might have already taken place. On July 30, 2024, a Telegram channel reporting on the war on Ukraine published a video frame showing a purported new-type North Korean anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) system spotted inside Russian territory near Ukraine’s Kharkiv region. The quality of the video frame was too poor for a more positive identification. However, according to documents obtained by Bloomberg in October 2024, South Korean intelligence service seemed to assess that North Korean ATGMs had been used by the Russian army.[3]
- Possible provision of Pukguksong-2 mid-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs). A video clip that surfaced online in December 2024 suggests that North Korea may have sent at least five tracked vehicles armed with Pukguksong-2 MRBMs to Russia, along with 170 mm SPGs. If verified, this would mark Pyongyang’s first MRBM transfer to Russia. The Pukguksong-2 was flight-tested only twice in 2017 before Kim Jong Un declared it operational. Field-testing this MRBM in Ukraine would allow North Korea to better assess its performance and reliability.[4]
- Kim Jong Un has emphasized the importance of drones in modern warfare, and has personally inspected flight demonstrations of various North Korean drones. In early February 2025, NHK reported that North Korea will start the co-production of several types of drones with technical help from Russia.
- Mid- to long-range SAMs. North Korea has been
developing new mid- to long-range surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems.
At the November 2024 weapons exhibition, a previously unknown mid- to
long-range SAM was unveiled alongside two other domestically developed
SAMs (Figure 3). As Russia seems to struggle to
intercept Ukrainian drones striking deep into its territory, Pyongyang
may consider deploying its new SAM systems inside Russia. A rear
deployment would make them less vulnerable to electronic intelligence
gathering by Ukraine and NATO compared to forward deployment.
Figure 3. A previously unseen type of SAM (in yellow box) was displayed during the November 2024 Pyongyang weapon exhibition, along with two types of 별찌-1-2 (Pyoljji-1-2/Meteor-1-2) SAMs (in red box) developed by North Korea. This new type SAM appears to be wider in diameter, and has a simpler layout than the Pyoljji-1-2/Meteor-1-2. (Image: Korea Central News Agency)
- 155 mm SPGs. North Korea developed this modern SPG using the NATO-standard 155 mm caliber, making it incompatible with Soviet/Russian 152 mm shells. However, the deployment of 170 mm SPGs—a caliber not used by the Russian army—already demonstrates that Russia does not mind interoperability issues when it comes to North Korean aid.
- 300 mm guided MRLs. North Korea’s 300 mm guided multiple rocket launchers (MRLs) have been overshadowed by the more advanced 600 mm MRLs, likely due to their inability to carry North Korea’s tactical nuclear warheads (estimated at ~460 mm in diameter) and alleged low cost-effectiveness.[5] However, Russia may still welcome this system as its own 300 mm MRL rocket stocks appear to have been largely depleted.[6]
- 600 mm guided MRLs. The 600 mm guided rockets are de-facto SRBMs. The rockets can be fitted with both nuclear and conventional payloads and could complicate missile defense with its high firepower density.[7] The 600 mm caliber offers enough space to accommodate large conventional warheads. This system has become a prized weapon in North Korea.[8] Pyongyang may be willing to have it field-tested on the battlefield.
In addition to the possible provision of new weapons, Pyongyang is highly likely to continue supplying Russia with ammunition from stockpiles, along with other older weapon systems, depending on their availability and Russia’s needs. These may primarily include older tanks, towed artillery and armored vehicles (including older SPGs). The provision of liquid-propellant SCUD SRBMs (Hwasong-5/6）and MRBMs (Mainly the Hwasong-7) remains a low possibility, as Russia no longer has the personnel or infrastructure to support the operation of liquid-fuel SRBMs and MRBMs. However, Pyongyang could choose to send Strategic Rocket Force personnel to operate these missiles.
Conclusion
As demonstrated by: 1) receiving North Korean arms and troops, 2) providing Pyongyang with more oil than the annual cap set by UNSC resolutions, and 3) disbanding the UN Panel of Experts (PoE), Russia has effectively abandoned arms control and non-proliferation norms regarding North Korea. Consequently, Moscow is highly likely to reciprocate with weapons and/or military technologies.[9] Although the war in Ukraine has depleted much of Russia’s weapon stockpiles, and both Russian and North Korean weaponry rely heavily on foreign electronics, Moscow still possesses a considerable amount of hardware, expertise, and technology that it could offer in return.
- [1]
The author also confirmed this with an investigator who studied the debris.
- [2]
The missiles fired since late December 2024 have landed within 50-100m of the intended target, according to the Reuters report.
- [3]
In the Bloomberg report, the ATGM was referred to as the Bulsae-4 (Phoenix-4). However, according to information in the open-source domain, the Bulsae-4 is most likely the name for a type of North Korean ATGM built on the basis of the Russian AT-4 Spigot ATGM, not the purported non-line-of-sight type ATGM seen in the video frame.
- [4]
The very limited number of flight tests of the Pukguksong-2 might suggest that the North Korean leadership has lost interest in this MRBM in favor of the hypersonic glide vehicles that the North has been testing since 2021. However, available data points are too limited to test this hypothesis.
- [5]
The number of launches has decreased since the test fire of 600 mm MRL took place.
- [6]
The 300 mm MRLs have been used extensively at the beginning of the conflict.
- [7]
A MAZ-543 based truck can only accommodate one SCUD missile, while the same chassis could carry up to six 600 mm caliber guided rockets.
- [8]
Judging by the high number of launches by the 600 mm MRL conducted by North Korea.
- [9]
In addition to the report on the co-production of drones mentioned in this article, it has also been reported that Moscow had agreed to supply MiG-29 and Su-27 fighter jets to North Korea. Pyongyang is also likely seeking Russian technologies to advance its space launch and satellite capabilities, ballistic missiles, air defence systems, naval and land warfare systems.