Crisis and Institutional Collapse in Haiti
The Haitian polycrisis intensifies
The assassination of President Jovenel Moise in July 2021 plunged Haiti into accelerated institutional decay. Armed groups took control of 80 percent of the capital city and gained autonomy from the powerful political and private actors that had initially funded and controlled them. The state’s failure to stop the gangsterization of Haitian society reflects the predatory nature of its ruling class. Moreover, neoliberal policies imposed by Western powers have widened the chasm between the privileged elite and the majority trapped in poverty, contributing to a series of cumulative and worsening social and political crises. The fall of Haiti’s Duvalier dictatorship in 1986 unleashed popular euphoria and the promise of democratic reforms; since then, however, the country has endured unrelenting and deepening crises. The state has withered away and is incapable of providing basic security; gangs have taken over 80 percent of the capital city, Port-au-Prince, and are threatening to impose their control on other areas of the country, especially L’Artibonite, the country’s breadbasket. Although the story of “big men” building their own militias to defend their interests is not new, the gangsterization of Haitian society has reached new heights.
Armed groups have now gained autonomy from the powerful political and private actors who had initially funded and controlled them. The resort to private force by the ruling class reflected its historical incapacity to establish a social contract on which to erect a legitimate state. The fragility of the state is in turn rooted in a history of cumulative and worsening political and economic crises that have continuously enlarged the social chasm dividing the privileged elite and the majority trapped in poverty. The increasing impoverishment of the urban population has transformed it into a reserve army of gangs for public officials and oligarchs. Haiti’s systemic decay, caused by an unproductive economy, is at the root of the country’s gangsterization. This material foundation has nurtured an increasingly destructive politique du ventre—belly politics—in which access to public office becomes a means to acquire illicit wealth. In a country where poverty is rampant, controlling the state is a zero-sum game, leading to recurring political instability. While the ruling class has historically relied on a combination of private and state coercion, it is also dependent on external powers to sustain its rule. The country’s sovereignty, which was always vulnerable, has become purely symbolic since the first overthrow of democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in 1991. The incessant crises that have occurred since then have all had ephemeral resolutions orchestrated by the Core Group composed of foreign powers under the hegemony of the United States. … Moise’s assassination (July 2021) left a void of authority, an inoperative constitution, and a broken-down judiciary. At the urging of the Core Group, Ariel Henry became prime minister … On August 31, 2021, a coalition of over 180 political parties and civil society organizations signed the so-called Montana Agreement, calling for a “Haitian solution to Haitian problems,” and portrayed Henry as an illegitimate imposition on the country by the international community. … Chartbook 167 Although Henry rejected the Montana Agreement, in December 2022 he negotiated the National Consensus for an Inclusive Transition and Transparent Elections with the support of the business sector and a few political parties and civil associations, as well as the international community. But most Haitians rejected the deal, and it eventually collapsed without leaving a trace. … Realizing that the situation was untenable and that his rule rested on the support of the international community, Henry called for a foreign military intervention to tame the gangs’ violence. In October 2023, Henry finally got his wish: the UN Security Council authorized the deployment of a Multinational Security Support (MSS) mission, led by Kenya and largely funded by the United States. Facing multiple financial, legal, and constitutional obstacles, the mission began to deploy in June 2024. Paradoxically, it was when Henry traveled to Nairobi in late February 2024 to sign the final documents leading to the arrival in Haiti of a 1,000-strong Kenyan police force that a virtual total collapse of Haiti’s institutions occurred. A concerted onslaught by the gangs provoked an American soft coup. Prevented by the United States and the Dominican Republic from flying back to Port-au-Prince, the prime minister was humiliated and left stranded in Puerto Rico. The Biden administration abruptly withdrew its support for Henry and compelled him to resign and accept a de facto exile. Washington then embarked on an ad hoc strategy, with the help of the Caribbean Community, France, and Canada, to orchestrate the formation of a Transitional Presidential Council. After weeks of complicated negotiations and bickering, an all-encompassing group of Haitian political parties and civic associations agreed to form a council comprising seven voting members and two nonvoting observers. They also consented to the deployment of the MSS mission to Haiti. The council was officially installed as the new interim government on April 25 2024. … Under strong American lobbying, six of the seven members of the council selected Garry Conille as prime minister on June 3. Haitians dubbed Conille the “man of the Americans” because Clinton had appointed him as a key adviser on post-2010 earthquake reconstruction. …The task became even more complicated on November 11, when the Presidential Council, headed by Voltaire, dismissed Conille and replaced him with Alix Didier Fils-Aimé. Voltaire and the council accused Conille of failing to address the country's pressing problems, but his dismissal was partly the result of a power struggle over who was ultimately in charge of foreign and domestic policies. … The Biden administration, Kenyan President William Ruto, and Conille all expressed certainty that the MSS mission would succeed and the gangs would be defeated. Such confidence could not hide the reality that when fully deployed, a mission comprising only 1,000 Kenyan police officers and a contingent of 1,500 troops from other Caribbean and African countries may be too small to defeat 200 armed gangs. Moreover, the mission lacks the financial support it was promised and has neither clear rules of engagement nor metrics of success. Not surprisingly, it has failed to stem the gangs’ territorial advances, and security conditions have only worsened.
Although the country seems trapped in decay, new grassroots forces are surfacing. Not yet fully visible, they may ultimately transform Haiti. The recent emergence of Bwa Kale—popular self-defense movements fighting back against the gangs encroaching on their neighborhoods—may indicate that people are no longer prepared to put up with being the victims of injustice. Undoubtedly, the risks of vigilantism descending into a spiral of uncontrollable violence exist, but in the absence of public authority, Haitians seem to be left with no other alternative.
Source: UCpress by Robert Fatton, Jr.