At a recent military ceremony in Israel, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made a provocative statement about the new Syrian government, outlining his nation’s strategy since the fall of the Assad regime.
His speech emphasised three key points. Firstly, Netanyahu said Israel would not permit the new Syrian government to deploy forces south of Damascus, calling for the “full demilitarisation” of that area - specifically Quneitra, Daraa and Sweida provinces.
Secondly, Netanyahu positioned Israel as a protector of the minority Druze community, aligning with Defence Minister Israel Katz’s recent statements about strengthening ties with “friendly populations” in southern Syria.
Thirdly, Netanyahu reiterated Israel’s commitment to occupying Syrian lands, asserting that Israeli forces would remain “indefinitely” in the buffer zone and Mount Hermon area.
This stance reinforces Israel’s ongoing agenda of territorial expansion and occupation, particularly in the Golan Heights.
Netanyahu’s overarching goal appears to be the systematic weakening and fragmentation of Syria, ensuring it remains under Israeli occupation, devoid of a central government, and mired in sectarian conflict.
This environment of “controlled chaos” would prevent Syria’s recovery after more than a decade of war, turn it into a failed state, and empower Israel under the pretext of minimising any potential threats from the new Syria.
This approach is not new. It has been a consistent element of Israeli policy since the state’s establishment, applied in various contexts and regions, including Lebanon.
Demilitarising the area south of Damascus would hinder the Syrian government’s authority, potentially leading to a weakened state presence. This could enable the formation of Israeli-backed local militias pushing for a “state within a state”.
Israel’s strategy also aims to encourage other minority groups in northern Syria to challenge the Syrian government, thus fragmenting the country, even if only in a de-facto manner.
The explicit mention of the Druze community reflects Israel’s “alliance of minorities” doctrine, which seeks to forge alliances with minority groups in the region against the Sunni majority. This divide-and-rule policy fosters animosity, suspicion and sectarianism, using minorities as leverage to provoke violent responses from the majority.
Israel has previously employed this strategy in Lebanon, collaborating with the Christian and Shia communities. It is now attempting to do the same with Syria’s Druze, Kurds and Alawites. But this approach is destructive and counterproductive, ultimately harming both the minorities involved and those who seek to manipulate them.
Netanyahu’s demand for the demilitarisation of southern Syria, coupled with Israel’s surge of air strikes on Syrian military positions, has not elicited a response from western countries or the broader international community. This lack of reaction is interpreted by Netanyahu as a green light to continue such policies.
From the new Syrian government, Israel’s provocative and aggressive actions have spurred a multifaceted response. Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa has balanced restraint with defiance, an approach shaped by several critical factors, including Syria’s weakened military, economic and political position; his need to maintain legitimacy as a leader, while extending state control to all Syrian territories; and the process of rebuilding the nation.
The Syrian National Dialogue conference’s statement late last month rejected any territorial concessions, signalling to both Israel and Sharaa’s domestic audience that he would not bow to Netanyahu’s demand for demilitarisation. The statement demanded Israel’s “immediate and unconditional withdrawal” from Syria - a symbolic act of resistance that reinforced Sharaa’s authority without risking an immediate confrontation.
On 26 February, Sharaa visited Jordan and met King Abdullah II, who reiterated Amman’s support for Syria’s sovereignty and condemned Israel’s incursions. Sharaa’s third foreign trip since taking power, the visit points to an effort to build a regional coalition to counter Israel’s moves diplomatically, rather than militarily, especially as Jordan shares Syria’s concerns about border stability.
Sharaa’s restrained response also navigates domestic pressures. Protests in Quneitra, Daraa and Sweida against Netanyahu’s recent statement reflect public anger, but Sharaa has not mobilised these sentiments into action against Israel, as previous attempts by regional regimes have not ended well.
Sharaa has instead responded to Israel’s provocations with a mix of verbal condemnation, appeals for peace, and diplomatic manoeuvring, avoiding escalation while asserting Syria’s right to its territory. His previous vow to abide by the 1974 ceasefire deal encapsulates this approach.
But while this may grant Sharaa regional and international support, it could erode his internal legitimacy in the medium and long terms - and it is highly unlikely that it will be enough to deter Israel.
Historically, Israel has interpreted calls for peace as a sign of weakness; an opportunity to aggressively pursue its expansive territorial ambitions.
Given the complex situation in Syria, the response to Israel’s actions should be collective. The international community must uphold its responsibilities, and Arab nations should act together, as they stand to lose significantly if Israel succeeds in turning Syria into a failed state.
The Arab League, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, among others, have strongly condemned Israel. Most importantly, Turkey, a regional power with substantial stakes in Syria, has much to gain from a stable Damascus, and much to lose from Israeli aggression against Syria.
Since December, Turkey has responded to Netanyahu’s statements and Israel’s aggression with sharp condemnation. Emphasising Syrian sovereignty, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan has accused Israel of expansionism and undermining peace and stability “under the guise of security”.
Still, Ankara’s actions remain diplomatic and restrained, focusing on the Kurdish issue in northern Syria rather than confronting Israel directly.
Turkey’s policy in this regard appears to be constrained by two key factors. One is the fate of the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG), an offshoot of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which Ankara considers a terrorist group. The second is Turkey’s anticipated deal with US President Donald Trump to end American cooperation with the YPG.
Ankara is unlikely to engage significantly against Israel until these two issues are resolved, as an early confrontation could backfire with Trump and the hawkish pro-Israel officials in Washington.
At the same time, avoiding confrontation with Israel could not only embolden Netanyahu, but also undermine Ankara’s credibility and transform Syria from an opportunity into a serious challenge for Turkey.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.