-------- Forwarded Message --------
| Subject:
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First Reflections on the Shape of Peace for Ukraine |
| Date:
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Thu, 13 Feb 2025 16:41:56 +0100 |
| From:
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John V. Whitbeck <jvwhitbeck@gmail.com> |
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TO: Distinguished Recipients
FM: John Whitbeck
After yesterday's statements by President Trump and
Secretary of Defense Hegseth, there is genuine hope
for peace in Ukraine for the first time since April
2022, when Boris Johnson descended upon Kyiv to
prevent a peace agreement (https://www.president.gov.ua/en/news/na-peregovorah-iz-rosiyeyu-ukrayinska-delegaciya-oficijno-pr-73933)
which had been almost fully negotiated between Russia
and Ukraine but was deemed by Western leaders to be
contrary to their own interests.
While I have no claim to be an expert on Russian or
Ukrainian matters, I have read a great deal written by
people who do have such a claim and am therefore
taking the liberty of sharing some preliminary
thoughts on how, now that the United States has opted
for radical "common sense" and a preference for
imminent peace over perpetual war, a durable peace
might take shape.
It is widely recognized that territorial acquisitions
have never been the primary Russian objective in this
conflict. Indeed, Russia's formal annexation in
September 2022 of the four Russophone-majority oblasts
(two of which it had recognized as independent states
three days before launching its "special military
operation") may well have clarified, defined and
constructively limited its territorial
ambitions.
As a practical matter, it would make no sense for
Russia to seek or attempt to rule over Ukrainians who
hate everything Russian (its history, language,
literature, music, religion ...), as the great
majority of Ukrainians outside those four oblasts and
Crimea appear to do, and one may legitimately wonder
why western Ukrainians have ever been eager to fight
to the last Ukrainian in order to rule over people
whom they clearly detest.
More important for Russia has been ruling out NATO
membership for Ukraine, something that was never more
than purely rhetorically on the table -- never a
genuinely realistic possibility -- but that Trump has
now taken definitively off the table.
Having achieved that objective and particularly if he
achieves progress on the overarching Russian goal
cited below, it is possible that President Putin, in
order to achieve a definitive and durable peace
agreement and not just a fragile ceasefire or
armistice, might show flexibility on the borders of
the four contested oblasts, three of which are still
not under full Russian control, accepting the
battlefield lines of control, potentially subject to
some geographically rational adjustments, such as the
Dnipro River as a border, with a view to producing
"sensible" borders less likely to give rise to any
future dispute.
Of course, the overarching Russian goal has always
been to negotiate a new European mutual
security architecture under which all countries in
Europe would feel secure and none would feel
threatened.
It was in this context that, in late 2021, Russia
presented to NATO a draft agreement which was intended
to serve and could have served as the starting point
for potentially constructive negotiations.
Unfortunately, the Biden administration, clearly
preferring war to being perceived to make any
meaningful "concession" to Russia, dismissed this
Russian initiative with contempt, refusing even to
discuss it and thereby leading President Putin, who
could not ignore the build-up of Ukrainian troops
along the lines of control in the two oblasts
partially controlled by secessionist forces since
2014, to conclude that he had no alternative but to
recognize those two oblasts as independent states and
to launch his "SMO".
President Trump, notwithstanding his many
irrationalities in other areas, appears genuinely to
prefer peace to war and not to view security for
everyone as constituting a threat to American
"national security".
It would therefore not be surprising if President
Putin were now to resubmit Russia's 2021 draft
agreement, subject only to any essential updates, to
the new American president and if the new American
president were to agree to discuss it.
Two further thoughts:
(1) On March 30, 2022, just before Boris Johnson's
peace-prevention mission to Ukraine, I wrote the
following in one of my messages:
"Achieving a near-term ceasefire and an eventual
negotiated peace agreement will require both the
Russian and the Ukrainian governments to be able to
save face by claiming 'victory' or at least some
measure of success. While this is not easy, I believe
that it may now be possible.
"An essential aspect of mutual 'victories' is
maintaining the two countries' distinct narratives
regarding Russia's objectives in invading Ukraine.
"To its own people, Russia has always presented its
primary objective, in addition to achieving neutral,
non-NATO status for Ukraine, as being the full
'liberation' of the Donbass. It has presented any
military action elsewhere in Ukraine as being intended
to degrade the Ukrainian military's capacity to resist
the 'liberation' of the Donbass, which would, indeed,
have been a rational military strategy. It has now
announced the 'successful' completion of Phase 1 of
its 'special military operation' and its intention to
focus henceforth on its 'primary objective'. If it
achieves both Ukrainian neutrality and some measure of
territorial success in the Donbass, the Russian
government can present this result to its own people
as a victory.
"Ukraine and the West have asserted that Russia has
sought -- and expected -- to conquer the entirety of
Ukraine and effect a regime change in a matter of
days. Whether or not this was ever the Russian
intention, it is clearly not a possibility now. The
Ukrainians, including those in portions of the Donbass
not previously controlled by Russian separatists, have
impressively resisted the Russian invasion. If the
fighting ends with only relatively minor potential
territorial losses in the Donbass, the Ukrainian
government can present this result to its own people
and the world as a heroic victory.
"Both sides should and must be permitted to maintain
their own 'victory' narratives."
Thanks to Western intervention and insistence, the
fighting did not end, and Russia has achieved some
considerable additional measures of territorial
success in the two oblasts connecting the Donbass to
Crimea, but I still believe that the cause of peace
requires permitting both sides to maintain their own
'victory' narratives.
(2) Since President Trump has wisely chosen not to
assume "ownership" of this war, moving immediately to
seek to end it, he has no need to worry about saving
face in the face of a disappointing outcome. However,
President Zelensky and the European "leaders" who have
gone all-in behind President Biden, particularly if
they and their countries are to be of limited
relevance to the terms of any peace agreement, must
feel such a face-saving need.
In this context and in light of the position of the
new U.S. administration, they might now see at least
personal benefits in proposing a "democratic solution"
to the conflicting sovereignty claims along the lines
outlined in my article published in March 2023 (https://www.counterpunch.org/2023/03/17/a-democratic-end-to-ukraines-war).
Since Russia's position has improved significantly
over the past two years, it is unlikely that it would
now agree to permit such democratic choices (except,
perhaps, in the portions of the four contested oblasts
over which it does not yet exercise full control), but
there should at least be face-saving advantages in
proposing such democratic choices for those proposing
them, and saving face for anyone involved in this
unnecessary and misbegotten war can only help to
facilitate the decisions necessary to bring it to a
prompt end.