The Trump administration paused military aid to Ukraine on Monday evening following several days of rumors of a break stemming from Friday's argument in the Oval Office.
The confrontation between President Donald Trump, Vice President JD
Vance, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky drew widespread
attention for its sheer hostility and drama. But as DEFP Policy Director
Benjamin H. Friedman notes, this "loud departure from diplomatic
normalcy" should not distract from the substantive difference in play.
Here's the gist of that difference and what it means for U.S.-Ukraine relations.
U.S. and Ukrainian interests are not the same
- The Oval Office fight is "fundamentally a result of the fact that the United States and Ukraine have different interests," Friedman says:
- "The United States has an interest in ending a war that threatens
escalation with a nuclear rival and which has been costly to American
taxpayers—albeit less costly than the $350 billion figure President
Trump erroneously repeats."
- "Ukrainian leaders, having suffered so much to protect their
sovereignty, understandably want a just peace where they get most of
their land back and some sort of ironclad U.S. guarantee that they will
be safe from future attack."
- "Rather than yell at Zelensky, Trump should simply have noted that
the United States has limited interests in Ukraine and can safely walk
away from peace talks or arming Ukraine." [DEFP]
- DEFP scholars have explored this difference in greater depth throughout the course of the conflict:
The truth Zelensky should have been told
- The previous administration was not sufficiently forthright
with Ukraine about the reality that the United States can simply
withdraw from all involvement in this conflict. This administration seems more inclined to be frank—but should do it without the bombast and probably in private. [X / Friedman]
- Setting aside his style, argues
Carnegie scholar Stephen Wertheim, Trump's message amounts to: "The
U.S. will either broker an end to the war in Ukraine in short order or
remove itself from the conflict, unless perhaps it deems Russia to have
obstructed a ceasefire."
- "The U.S. has the sovereign right to adopt this stance, for the
sake of its own interests, which include limiting the costs and risks
the U.S. is bearing for European defense."
- European leaders are likely mistaken, Wertheim contends, if they
think Trump's goal is to align Washington with Moscow or if they expect
him to agree to guarantee Ukrainian security. [The Guardian / Wertheim]
Europe can step up—in some ways
- If U.S.-Ukraine relations continue to deteriorate, one plausible
positive outcome would be greater European responsibility for the
continent's defense. [Reason / Joe Lancaster]
- That's not to say, however, that Europe should put boots on the ground in Ukraine:
- "Remove the U.S. from the equation and a European reassurance
force in Ukraine risks becoming almost dangerously problematic. The
Europeans are still digging themselves out of a three decade-long
military slumber." [The Telegraph / Daniel DePetris]
- That includes a peacekeeping scheme, which would come with all the
risks of any other plan to put NATO troops on Russia's border and might
be "used as an appealing shorthand that lures policymakers into
believing that security can be provided on the cheap or without loss of
life." [Stars and Stripes / Peter Harris]
- Ultimately, the U.S. should "begin drawing down the forces it has
in Europe, starting with the 20,000 added since the war in Ukraine
began," and Europe should respond as it sees fit—albeit with a realistic
sense of its own military capacity as well as Russia's overestimated
and diminished strength. [DEFP / Friedman]
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"Ukraine
doesn't have enough men, no matter how much equipment it gets, how much
ammunition, any of those things. All the things that Kier Starmer,
Emmanuel Macron keep asking for are inconsequential if you don't have
the manpower to use those items."
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