When Germany went to the polls on Feb. 23, the timing of the election was unusual. According to the electoral calendar, the election should have taken place in September. But the coalition government of outgoing Chancellor Olaf Scholz had broken apart over a variety of issues, most immediately a disagreement over how to finance future government spending. As a result, the vote was held a mere month after U.S. President Donald Trump’s return to the White House and just a week after Vice President JD Vance’s bombshell speech at the Munich Security Conference, which attacked some of the most fundamental foreign policy beliefs that Germans hold.
Despite the prominence of these and other foreign and defense policy developments these days, as well as the obvious challenges they pose to Germany, those issues didn’t played a particularly important role in the campaign, which focused primarily on migration and the economy. The election resulted in a win for Friedrich Merz’s conservative Christian Democratic Union, or CDU, which—combined with its Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union, or CSU—took 28.6 percent of the votes, followed by the far-right Alternative for Germany, or AfD, party with 20.8 percent. Scholz’s Social Democratic Party, or SPD, dropped substantially from its previous showing, winning only 16.4 percent. In total, five parties, including the far-left Die Linke party, made it over the 5 percent threshold to enter parliament.
Nevertheless, despite the relative disinterest in defense topics in the runup to the election, when Merz—now the likely next German chancellor—announced his three priorities for any potential coalition government the day after the election, Germany’s defense policy was first on his list. Since then, Trump ambushed Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in one of the most shocking Oval Office meetings in living memory; stopped U.S. arms deliveries to and intelligence-sharing with Ukraine; and demonstrated in various ways that Washington’s European allies, most of which rely extensively on U.S. security guarantees, are less than an afterthought for his administration.
Whether German politicians or the public wanted it to be or not, security policy has therefore become an urgent challenge to deal with. As the first meetings to negotiate a possible coalition government comprising the CDU/CSU and SPD take place in Berlin, what debates are taking place on the directions of security and defense policy for Europe’s largest and economically strongest country? And what changes are to be expected?
More Money for the Bundeswehr
The Bundeswehr, or the German armed forces, is Europe’s second-largest military, with 185,000 soldiers in uniform. Nevertheless, for decades, it has suffered from poor funding, leading the inspector of the army to note on the morning of Russia’s all-out invasion of Ukraine three years ago that the Bundeswehr was “more or less bare.” Three days after the Russian invasion, Scholz announced in his now famous Zeitenwende speech the establishment of a special fund amounting to 100 billion euros to fill some of the Bundeswehr’s gaps, with a substantial part of it going to U.S.-made big-ticket items, like F-35 aircraft and Chinook helicopters since then. But more equipment is needed, even as experts agree that substantial amounts must also be spent to equip, train and recruit for the Bundeswehr going forward.
With the help of the special fund, Germany just about reached NATO’s target of spending 2 percent of GDP on defense last year. But the special fund has now been emptied, meaning Germany has to find more money for the Bundeswehr, even as there is growing consensus among NATO allies that the peacetime spending target of 2 percent of GDP is obsolete under the current circumstances and will need to rise.
The problem is how to do so under the constraints of Germany’s “debt brake,” a law introduced into Germany’s constitution in 2009 by the government at the time—ironically also a coalition comprising the CDU/CSU and SPD—prohibiting annual structural deficits from exceeding 0.35 percent of GDP. Since then, the rule has severely limited German governments’ ability to borrow money to finance anything, meaning that any increase to defense spending must be funded through tax hikes or budget cuts elsewhere. That explains Berlin’s underfunding of defense and infrastructure, but also why Germany’s debt is lower than that of its European partners.
It looks like the new prospective CDU/CSU-SPD coalition government has just found a way to clear the debt brake hurdle, however, and in record time. Despite the fact that the coalition has not been formally constituted yet—the parties are still in “exploratory talks,” not even coalition negotiations—their representatives announced truly momentous proposed changes on Tuesday.
It appears that Germany’s leaders have a clear vision of the task at hand and its urgency, and that they are ready to respond quickly. The first decisions are encouraging, but many open questions remain.
First, if the changes take effect, all German defense spending over 1 percent of GDP will be exempt from the debt brake. This would give the next government room to raise spending to the level it feels is needed without restrictions. The prospective coalition partners also announced that they would implement a law so that defense funding can be spent effectively and as fast as possible, and will put together a list of priorities for equipment to be procured quickly.
Second, Germany will spend 500 billion euros over 10 years financed through a special fund to rebuild German infrastructure, which has been shown increasing signs of wear in recent years. This spending is not directly related to defense, but because of its geographical position and its role within NATO as a logistical hub, Germany’s infrastructure plays an outsize role for the transport and concentration of allied troops and equipment. Hence, it needs bridges and roads that can carry tanks, trains that can transport material and hospitals that can take care of potential casualties. A big push to improve Germany’s infrastructure is thus highly welcomed from a defense standpoint.
German politics tends to move slowly, so yesterday’s announcement came at warp speed for Berlin. Two reasons explain this. First, the shock of the recent announcements and actions by the Trump administration cannot be overstated. As Merz, a staunch trans-Atlanticist from Germany’s most trans-Atlanticist party, put it on election night, “I never thought I would have to say something like this on a television program. But after Donald Trump’s statements last week at the latest, it is clear that the Americans, at least … this administration, are largely indifferent to the fate of Europe.” He went on to compare Elon Musk’s open support for the AfD ahead of the voting, including a video appearance at an AfD campaign rally, to election interference by Russia. And Merz’s statements came before the U.S. cut its support for Ukraine and before Vance called Europe’s biggest military powers “random countries which have not fought a war in 20 or 30 years.” It seems that the shock in Berlin at having lost its most crucial military ally is bigger than even the shock of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.
The second reason things are moving fast is that the window of opportunity for the new prospective government to act is running out quickly. The old German parliament—in which the CDU/CSU and SPD, together with the Greens, have the two-thirds majority needed for these constitutional changes to be passed—is only in place until March 24. Once the new parliament convenes, however, the political extremes on the far left and far right will have a blocking minority in the Bundestag, making these changes impossible. Berlin, it seems, has understood the urgency of the situation and is acting accordingly.
German Troops for Ukraine Remain Unlikely
At the same time, debates are taking place in Europe on whether Europeans will secure any future peace deal in Ukraine with troops on the ground. The U.K. and France have shown themselves open to the idea, but so far Berlin had been very clear that this is not an option for Germany. Scholz pushed back very forcefully against French President Emmanuel Macron in February 2024 when Macron refused to exclude the possibility of deploying European troops to Ukraine in a defensive capacity while the hostilities were ongoing. More recently, Scholz noted repeatedly that he considered all discussion of deploying European troops to secure a peace deal as “premature,” since no peace deal or ceasefire agreement has been agreed to yet.
At this point, there are no indications that the new prospective government in Berlin will be more sympathetic to the idea, though one can hope that Merz is able to communicate the German position better. Despite the Zeitenwende and the more recent shock of being abandoned by the U.S., the German mindset remains deeply skeptical of military power. The idea of putting German troops in a situation where they might face a real danger of engaging with Russian forces seems beyond the scope of what’s imaginable.
But there are also questions as to Germany’s ability to send troops even if it wanted to. Berlin has been an important supporter of NATO’s new plans to boost the defense of the alliance’s eastern flank. Specifically, the Bundeswehr is creating a permanent combat brigade numbering 5,000 troops to be stationed in Lithuania. This is a crucial contribution to build up NATO’s deterrence, but it has also proven to be a challenge for Germany’s hollowed-out armed forces. So even if the government decides it wants to contribute substantial troop numbers to a future peacekeeping force in Ukraine, there is no guarantee the Bundeswehr would be able to do so.
Will Germany Change Its Stance on Funding European Defense?
The shock in Germany regarding the perceived end of the trans-Atlantic relationship runs deep. Merz’s aforementioned statements would have been unimaginable only weeks ago. Now Germany, as well as the rest of Europe, will need to reevaluate and reconfigure its relations with the United States. It might be good news for Germany that the next government will be led by a Christian Democrat, as it creates an “Only Nixon could go to China” situation: No one can accuse Merz or the CDU/CSU of being anti-American. Hence, no one is in a better position to make the argument for less dependence on the trans-Atlantic partnership and more European cooperation.
Common European defense efforts are the obvious way to replace some of what the trans-Atlantic alliance provides. Indeed, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has just proposed a new plan to “Rearm Europe,” and efforts to build up the EU’s defense capabilities predate the most recent shakeup of trans-Atlantic relations. Merz has identified European defense cooperation as an “immediate priority.” Rhetorically, Germany has always been very committed to common European defense. Berlin, however, has always been skeptical when it comes to funding European defense through collectivized debt, so-called eurobonds. So far, there are no clear indications that the next German government plans to shift its stance on this issue. EU leaders are meeting today to discuss European defense in Brussels, where Germany will be represented by Scholz, who is still chancellor; Merz is also in town, though not part of the meeting itself. It will be interesting to see whether Germany, as well as the EU’s other “frugal states” opposing eurobonds, will face any pressure to change their stance.
What does appear likely is more openness from Berlin to discuss joint European options for nuclear deterrence. To be clear, engaging in discussions and debates is a far way off from any kind of real European nuclear-sharing arrangement. But at a time when Macron just announced in a major address last night that France would consider ways of adding a European dimension to its nuclear deterrent, even engaging in such debates seriously would be a sign that the thinking is changing in Germany as well.
The new German government has not been formed yet, and it is already facing Berlin’s—and Europe’s—most momentous foreign and defense policy challenges in a generation. It appears that the leaders in Berlin have a clear vision of the task at hand and its urgency, and that they are ready to respond quickly. The first decisions are encouraging, but many open questions remain, not least whether the CDU/CSU and SPD will finalize a coalition agreement.
When it comes to defense, the biggest question mark is how much this government will actually spend. It’s one thing—admittedly an important one—to give oneself the option to spend more. It is quite another to actually do so. In their election programs, both the CDU/CSU and SPD only pledged to meet the 2 percent of GDP target stipulated by NATO, while making no firm commitments to anything higher than that.
Whether the prospective government will be able to manage the dramatic changes in trans-Atlantic relations skillfully, whether it will find compromises on common European defense funding and whether troops in Ukraine are an option remain unclear. What the past few days have shown, however, is that Germany’s new government and its likely leader are still good for some surprises, bold moves and clear statements, which is already an encouraging development.
Ulrike Franke is a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, based in Paris. She focuses on German and European security and defense, the future of warfare and the impact of new technologies such as drones and artificial intelligence. Her bi-weekly WPR column appears every other Wednesday.